Ukraine War, 14 March 2025

Hello everybody!

Have been delayed again… this time by the ‘top’ and ‘most authoritative military magazine’ in a certain country of southern central Europe. The same was caught plagiarising my ‘update’ on the collapse of the Ukrainian-controlled Kursk bulge/salient. Lost half a day with ‘listening’ the director there declaring me a troll and spammer for writing them an e-mail requesting the removal of the offending content and an apology, declaring ChatGPT for ‘tool of scrupulous semantic analysis’, lying that the ChatGPT says the plagiate is none, and expressing threats for my personal security…

Of course, he neither offered an apology nor anything else of this kind: after all, the director in question is the royal majesty alone becaue he’s a director of that magazine, while ChatGPT told him that mere 26% of the plagiate’s content is the same like my article. What did the ChatGPT ‘tell’ to me in response to related question, and - even more so - what do dozens of his own readers tell him (including several that made me aware of the plagiate, because I’m not following that magazine) - is ‘irrelevant’…

The ‘best’ in all of this, though, is what are such interpretators of other people’s interpretations - like the creator of the plagiate in question - doing. You see: he believes that the collapse of the salient was caused by the ‘cessation of American intelligence/ISTAR sharing’. For his director, this is clear evidence he didn’t plagiarise. Who cares if the USA stopped providing intel to Ukraine on 7 March 2025, ‘only’, while the ZSU inside Russia was in deep trouble already since January? Who cares about that belief being an entirely wrong conclusion based on ‘author’ simply being clueless about what was going on, but ‘having to add text’ in order to masquerade his plagiate?

Matter of fact is that survivors of the ZSU units that used to be deployed north and east of Sudzha, and were lucky enough to get out of there, report that they were de-facto cut off for at least two-three weeks before, if not for longer than a month. The Russian electronic warfare and severe and sustained bombardment from the air and by artillery, but especially the massive deployment of fibre-optic UAVs made not only the troop- but especially the movement of supplies and reinforcements impossible. Many of units couldn’t even contact superior command nodes (if for no other reasons then because their communication systems were knocked out and no replacements could be brought forward). Eventually, their commanders were clever enough to take the decision to withdraw: in most of cases, entirely at their own discretion.

…which, BTW, is also demolishing all the conspiracy theories about Kyiv (i.e. Zelensky/Yermak) withdrawing Ukrainian troops from Russia as some sort of ‘goodwill gesture’ for Dumpf’s cease-fire negotiations. Even provided they would have brought such a decision (frankly: no clue if they did), the corresponding order was unlikely to reach the majority of ZSU units while these were still holding positions north and east of Sudzha. Because their communications were severely disturbed by the Russians.

(Anybody having ‘doubts’ about this is free to explain me how should have, for example, the battalion that used to hold the Ruskaya Konopelka area, ‘wait to receive the orders for withdrawal’, if the Russians were already deep in its left and right flanks, and infiltrating its rear at the time its commander ordered that withdrawal - which, BTW, was still a day earlier before the USA cut off their intel supply and the Glavcom assumed the command of this sector?)

…sigh…

Another reason ‘this was no plagiate’, so the director of the magazine in question, is that his ‘author’ has written that the Ukrainian use of the H07 highway (of course, it’s a pure accident his ‘author’ is using exactly the same style of writing that, like I do), was hampered by ‘UMPK(s) and drones’, and I didn’t. Well, I didn’t, because the Ukrainian use of the H07 was (as reported for months without end already) hampered by UMPKs ‘only’: the mass of Russian RPVs and fibre-optic drones can’t reach that far. However, just like the Russian RPVs and fibre-optic drones were mauling the ZSU supply efforts along the H07/R200 road already since January (as obvious from reporting by people who are following this war far more carefully than I do; note, R200 is the Russian side of the H07), they were within range to maul the ZSU units withdrawing along that road in direction of Ukraine.

Moreover: as reported earlier, the crucial point was the fall of Sverdlikovo. Combined with the Russian systematic hunt for Ukrainian UAV-teams, this forced the latter to withdraw back over the border. The next crucial point was the Russian onslaught from Nikolaevo-Darino and Sverdlikovo towards south - on Zhuravka and Novenke. Arguably, this was meanwhile (two days ago) largely stopped, but then precisely because the advancing Russian units ‘outrun’ their electronic warfare- and drone coverage, and then found themselves exposed to (in their own words) ‘masses of Ukrainian FPVs’. Which the ‘author’ in question can’t know, because he’s plagiarising my work, and then interpreting things he has no idea about.

He also can’t know that the mass of the ZSU units had to walk out of the bulge: literally withdraw for 20-30 kilometres on foot, under constant attacks by the Russian fibre-optic drones. Just like he can’t know that while the losses in vehicles were (really) ‘heavy’, with few exceptions, the troops inside survived because modern Western and Ukrainian are constructed with ‘built-in survivability’ in mind. See: the vehicle is wrecked, but most of troops inside coming away unscathed. Or that most of vehicles were found and hit by the Russians precisely because they’ve had to stop: whether because a bridge was demolished, or the road badly damaged…

Finally, something for characters still insistent on reports about summary executions of captured and disarmed Ukrainian troops by the uniformed and armed mob known as the ‘Armed Forces of the Russian Federation’ (VSRF), being ‘propaganda’ and ‘lies’. You are free to check https://osintukraine.com/. Arguably, that’s something ‘from Ukraine’, and thus might not be available to the Russians. Point is: it’s a website created to collect information, document, and store details on all the Russian war crimes in Ukraine. Essentially, it’s scanning the social media (especially Telegram) and capturing all the photos and videos - so also those about dozens of Russian summary executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war.

Feel free to try denying that, of course…

Bottom line: while there are people accusing me of posting ‘click-baits’ and searching for public attention, there are also people who wonder why am I avoiding (with few exceptions in Ukraine) the snakepit known as the mainstream media, turning down requests for interviews by famed Western TV-stations and banning… erm.. top dailies and magazines (especially from the USA) from even quoting from my blog?

Boys and girls: we’re not all the same. Not all of us are after that ‘fame & fortune’ and ‘mutual advantages’ so many are promising me for the last three years. Perhaps it’s so that I’ve achieved almost everything I ever wanted to achieve in my life. No idea. Fact is: I can’t care less about ‘fame & fortune’. And if this blog ends up being read by 2,5 - 17,7 readers (like this was the case for years before 24 February 2022): that would not only be fine, but great - with one exception: Rickshaws for the ZSU, our collection providing at least some help to so many of Ukrainian Army troops.

Back to what matters.

***

So… the essence of the ‘Kursk situation’ is explained above, and I think to have thus managed to address a few of your questions, too. What else comes to my mind as being ‘important enough to add at this point’, is the issue of whether the Russians are now going to follow-up with a ‘sweeping drive into the Sumy Oblast’?

The answer is: nope. The VSRF is incapable of running ‘sweeping manoevures by mechanised formations’. It couldn’t breach the frontline and drive into the Ukrainian rear already at its ‘best times’ - back in April-June 2022 - and now, three years later, it’s entirely unable of conducting such operations. Not only for the lack of armour and artillery, but foremost because at least since 2023, it’s not even trying to train its officers and other ranks to run such operations.

Sure, the Russians have attempted to initiate a ‘pursuit’ of withdrawing ZSU units, but were slowed down already on approaches to the first two Ukrainian villages. Arguably, in the last two days, and after securing Zhuravka and Novenke, the Russians then pushed forward in between of the two, and came about 500 metres forward. But, that’s ‘infantry grinding forward’, no ‘sweeping mechanised manoeuvre’. It’s still not enough to put the H07 road under their fire-control - even if definitely enough to continue pounding whatever is the ZSU moving there. By fibre-optic UAVs. Foremost, the ZSU did not ‘broke and flee’, but withdrew. The mass of it: ‘on time’, too. Correspondingly, while losses were ‘heavy’ (for Ukrainian circumstances) the units came away largely intact, took new positions - partially along the border, partially south of it - and continue fighting the Russians.

The other thing that needs an ‘explanation’ is the resumption of the US military aid and intelligence to Ukraine. Because Pudding has, de-facto, turned down Dumpf’s ‘offer’. What a surprise and ho-hum.. Well, firstly, I foremost hope both the US military logistics services and the ZSU are going to exploit the opportunity and haul whatever they only can to Ukraine, as quickly as physically possible. Because, with Dumpf and Pudding, one can never know when the next stop might follow.

Related to that issue: by now it should really be well-known that this famed ‘US intelligence aid for Ukraine’ was (and now again: is) primarily (though not exclusively) consisting of providing targeting intelligence for long-range multiple rocket systems like M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS, and of providing similar targeting intelligence, and of granting permissions for the supply of British-made Storm Shadow long-range missiles (because these are still containing US made avionics). There are no similar issues in the case of the French-supplied SCALP-EGs, though.

***

Talking about SCALP-EG is, in turn, bringing me to the point of French-made Dassault Mirage 2000s for the Ukrainian Air Force and Air Defence Force (‘PSU’…): here I have one correction/update. It turned out, the Mirage 2000-5F serial number 47 is still in France, still wearing the French Air Force’s registration 102-EP, and still used for training of PSU’s personnel. I’ve also got to correct my artwork reconstructing the look of PSU’s Mirages: it turned out, these are wearing ‘high-visibility’ national markings - at least on the fin. The application of these on the fuselage… remains unconfirmed.

Another ‘new detail’ is that in-flight-refuelling probes (‘black rods in front of the cockpit’) have been removed prior to delivery, too:

***

That much about it for right now. I’ve still got so many of your - highly interesting - questions to address, and then continue few other things (for example: about Ukrainian air defences). Hope, I’ll manage to return to that, later during the day.

Meanwhile, I also ‘hope’, the publication of this feature is taking place early enough in the day to be considered for plagiarisation by editorials of different noble magazines around the World.

I would not recommend anybody to continue such practices, though, because I’ve grown fed up of such behaviour to the point where the next time I’m certainly going to commission one of legal companies specialised in online copyright violations. And that without any kind of announcements to the violator.