Ukraine War, 11 January 2025

by Tom Cooper

Hello everybody!

Back to ‘routine’ updates…

There are three ironic things about this war. One is monitoring Western commentators self-confident that they are excelling at predicting Pudding’s next moves. Their latest fashion is explaining how the people surrounding him – the ‘Russian elites’ – are hoping for an earliest, negotiated way end of the ‘special military operation’. At least something of that kind by 9 May 2025, so Pudding can go down in history with his own giant, brilliant victory. The expertise in question is particularly fascinating to read, considering the very same people are constantly proving completely unable of explaining what even ‘our/their own’ politicians, ‘statesmen’, and ‘leaders’ are doing, and what and why not. Not to talk about the fact that they’re also missing the point with Pudding already describing the Russian military intervention in Syria for a major victory, and for the war there over – and that three times, by 2018 alone…

Another are the same ‘Experten’ explaining how the Keystone Cops in Moscow – the Ministry of Defence and especially the GenStab of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) – are ‘concerned’ about massive losses of the last four months: like if there is anybody there who gives a damn…

…while, actually, the Keystone Cops are all the way kicked and pushed by Pudding and Belusov into finding the way to intensify not only the war against Ukraine, but also the ‘shadow war’ against all of NATO. And that, in addition to retaining their positions and pocketing their cut from all the payments for recruitment, deaths and mutilations of ‘their’ troops..

The third is that even three weeks since my last update, it’s relatively easy to get back to monitoring developments on the battlefield because, despite immense efforts by the armed mob called the VSRF, and massive losses, the frontlines largely remain where they used to be back in mid-December. Of course, it’s not like if the Russians made absolutely no advances: they did. But, these are so diminutive that all are easy to follow.

Is that unimportant?

Well, that’s the way the public opinion is shaped – all over ‘the West’ – and that systematically, every single day. Indeed: several dozens of times a day…

In similar way, another newest ‘fashion’ in the reporting is to blame the Scholz administration in Berlin for holding back this and that much of military aid for Ukraine. While, actually, something like ‘most dramatic’ changes in this kind of behaviour over the last month have been recorded precisely in Germany. In December, the country not only delivered 50,000+ artillery shells to Ukraine (thus becoming the second NATO-member, after the USA, to manage such a feat), but also additional IRIS-T systems. Lets hope that’s going to remain that way, month for month, too…

BTW, while the USA ‘can’t find’ additional PAC-2/3 Patriot surface-to-air missiles, nor M2/M3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles to ship to Ukraine, as far as is known by now, Germany alone delivered six IRIS-T SLM firing units to Ukraine, plus 10 additional SLS launchers (which were meanwhile integrated into the six firing units). Another three firing units and six SLS launchers are to follow through this year (2025). According to Ukrainian sources, the system has intercepted more than 240 targets as of June 2024, with effectiveness of more than 95%.

For orientation purposes: a single firing unit is including:

- 1 TRML-4D surveillance radar

- 1 TOC (command post) module

- 3 launchers, plus trucks with reloads, workshop, spare parts, and logistics.

Average size of a single IRIS-T firing unit.

All of German-delivered command posts (also ‘TOCs’) are nowadays protected by add-on armour.

Germany has also delivered 52 Gepard and 15 Cheetah self-propelled anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine by now, and is financing production of ammunition for them: the latter is meanwhile in full swing and deliveries to Ukraine ongoing.

In regards of ground equipment, Germany has delivered a total of 140 Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles (partially co-financed by Denmark). These are now in operation with the 25^th Airborne Assault Brigade, 33^rd Assault Battalion, 36^th Marine Brigade, 38^th Marine Brigade, 82^nd Airborne Assault Brigade, 100^th Mechanised Brigade, 199^th Training Centre, and the 229^th Assault Battalion. Some 20 have been lost in combat meanwhile, but 20-25 additional ones are to follow in this year. In long term, they are likely to be replaced (and/or supplemented) by Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, the first 10 of which were delivered recently – for testing purposes: production of the Lynx is about to – finally – commence in two factories constructed for this purpose in Ukraine. Croat M-84 main battle tanks and M-80 infantry fighting vehicles acquired by Germany, should be in the process of reaching Ukraine, too.

Finally, a few days ago, the government in Berlin has authorised the Bundeswehr and Luftwaffe to shot down unidentified UAVs underway over Germany…which is not much, no doubt, but: yet another decision hardly any other NATO-members have taken…

***

AIR/MISSILE WAR

Something like ‘biggest news’ of the last few days was that a single F-16AM of the Ukrainian Air Force and Air Defence Force (PSU) has shot down six Russian attack UAVs during the same combat sortie. Four by air-to-air missiles, and two by guns. There’s some disagreement about when should this have happened: some say on 13 December, others mention 6 January… One way or the other, this is an achievement, and then one pointing out the advantages of this type over, say, MiG-29s and Su-27s: the situational awareness its avionics is offering. To kill so many attack UAVs during the same mission, and then survive downing two by gun without hitting any wreckage in return, the pilot must know where are his targets, he must remain capable of knowing this all through the progress of the mission, and especially during repeated acquisition-kill-acquisition-kill chain of events. Might sound simple, but is anything else than easy. That’s where the superior sensors and communication systems (in comparison to those of MiG-29s and Su-27s) provided by the F-16AM are excelling.

On the other hand, this is also pointing at the fact that the majority of Russian attack UAVs are meanwhile intercepted by Ukrainian F-16s and different helicopters, rather than surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Which is good, too: at least the Ukrainian- and NATO stocks of air-to-air missiles and 20mm ammunition for guns like M61 Vulcan installed in F-16s, are not as severely depleted as those of SAMs.

In other operations, and for example, during the night from 7 to 8 January, the Ukrainian UAVs have hit the POL-dump outside Engels. This is still burning.

Conflagration at the POL-dump outside Engels.

During the night from 9 to 10 January, the Russians streamed 72 attack UAVs over Ukraine: 33 were claimed as shot down, 34 jammed by electronic warfare. The number of such attacks is in decline since around 20 December, though: apparently, the Russians are maintaining pressure, but also ‘saving’ their ballistic- and cruise missiles for yet another ‘all out’ strike on the Ukrainian power network – this time in the middle of the winter.

In turn, during the same night, Ukraine hit the Russian Plastifactor Works near Rostov, using attack UAVs, and the ammunition storage depot in Chaltyr, Rostov Oblast, using Neptune missiles and UAVs. What exactly caused the major conflagration in the industrial zone of St. Petersburg is presently unclear: about 1,600 square metres, including works manufacturing acetone are still burning.

Chaltyr ammunition dump, outside Rostov, on fire…

The last night, the Russians streamed 74 attack UAVs over Ukraine; Ukrainians claimed 47 as shot down and 27 as jammed – while the Ukrainian UAV-strikes were reported from the Rostov, Novosrossik and Anapa areas.

While this is ‘great’ it remains so that the Ukrainian effort against strategic targets in Russia are rather ‘random’ by nature: one week refineries, other week POL storage depots, then one week ammunition depots, and in between different factories…

***

Kursk

Once again, the much-announced Ukrainian ‘resumed offensive’ in Kursk – the one launched the last week – turned out to be little else but another politically-motivated operations undertaken on Zelensky’s order. This time because of the latest (the 25^th) meeting in Rammstein, on 8-9 January. Yes, it regained some ground in the Kruglik area, but lasted for only a day. In turn, since Monday, the Russians are counterattacking all along the northern and western side of the salient: severe fighting is reported all the way from Loknya in the west to Orlovka in the north, and then to Russkoe Porechnoe in the east.

***

Kupyansk

Sadly, it turned out that during their sudden attack back in November, the Russians have secured the area of the former salt works, north of Kupyansk. The one from which they are going to be very hard to kick out. The ZSU is meanwhile working on counterattacking into the flanks and north of this area (for example: near Kladbishe), which is a good idea.

***

Bakhmut

The ZSU didn’t manage to neutralise the Russian breach to the railway station, but the Russians didn’t manage to widen the same, nor to enter the centre of the town.

***

Toretsk

One way or the other, this town is meanwhile de-facto lost for Ukraine. The Russians control about 80%, and are on the best way to secure another 10% - which is the northern- (Nasha Ryuba) and western outskirts (Krymske).

Frankly, as always, I simply do not understand what went so badly wrong in Toretsk: just a month ago, the ZSU was actually on the best way of kicking the Russians out (and that in a high loop). Ever since the 12th NG Azov Brigade was withdrawn, though, nothing is working in this sector any more…

***

Pokrovsk

In this area over the last two-three weeks, the Russians were foremost consolidating their reached positions. Latest assaults on Yeyzavetivka and Baranivka are bringing them to less than 1,000 metres from the local section of the railway berm (connecting Pokrovsk with Dnipro). It’s going to take them time, and additional thousands of casualties, but it’s crystal clear that this is the next main Russian aim in this sector. The question is only how much are Syrsky & Buddies aware of this…

***

Andriivka (former Kurachove Sector)

The ZSU is actually back to the line Shevchenko-Ulakly. Of course, the forward battalions of the 46^th and the 33^rd Brigades are still holding out in Dachne (west of Kurachove) and further south, but a withdrawal of the two is only a matter of time… all provided Syrsky & Buddies have found out there is that discipline in military sciences, and might order one on time (which, as always, depends on Zelensky granting them a permission to do so)…

Velyka Novosilka

No good news from here either: the Russians are on the best way of encircling the town from the west (they have already done that from the north and east). The situation is described as ‘very tense’.

That’s about that for today. Of course, more is to follow on Monday, and then the next week: after all, it’s about the time to complete my assessment on the VSRF’s condition.