Ukraine War, 1 March 2023 Update, Part 2

OPERATIONAL (Level)

OPERATIONAL (Level)

The last few days, and in the light of the publication of a captured tactical manual of the VSRF, there is lots of talk about new infantry-centred tactics of the VSRF. Essentially, the Russians have re-organised the mass of their formations into assault groups, and (multiple assault groups organised into) assault battalions. Each of the latter contains up to six assault groups, and further has its own command element, mortar and AGS-element, a platoon of MBTs and IFVs, each has electronic warfare support, and an UAV-detachment. This is not only explaining videos shown Russians assaulting Ukrainian positions with 1, perhaps 2 MBTs, and 2–4 IFVs, but — and especially — their recent advances in the Bakhmut area. There, they’re grinding forward almost exclusively by heavily armed infantry (or ‘heavy infantry’): infantry equipped with plentiful of RPO rocket launchers, with AGS-17 grenade launchers, with RPG-7s, KORD heavy machine guns, and sniper rifles. Certainly enough, they’re still lacking UAVs — to a degree where commanders are discouraged from using these to continuously control their troops. However, they can always replace UAVs by pushing mobiks forward, to find Ukrainian positions, and then assaulting these either with Wagner PMCs, or with their VDV troops.

Two points in this regards. Firstly, it’s ironic. Ever since 2014–2015, ZSU was indoctrinated and built-up to face the ‘mechanised juggernaut’: VSRF’s battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in which de-facto everything — including vehicles of airborne assault units and artillery — was armoured. Over the first six months since Pudding’s re-invasion of February last year, it proved capable of destroying the Russia’s ‘peace-time army’: I do not know a single Russian BTG that wasn’t mauled at least once in Ukraine by September-October last year. On the contrary, there are plenty of units that meanwhile had to be re-built some three or even four times.

Indeed, it’s still so that whenever and wherever the Russians are assaulting over open and vegetation-free areas — like in the Avdiivka, Marinka, and Vuhledar areas — the ZSU is doing fine.

However, at least in the ‘bocage’-like terrain of northern Donetsk, Ukrainians are experiencing all sorts of troubles, no matter how many and what units (and commanders) are involved there. The ZSU simply has no solution for the Russian ‘Stoßtruppen/heavy infantry’ tactics on hand (after German initiators of the same, back in 1918): if nothing else, it’s got not enough heavy infantry weapons, not enough spare barrels for its machine guns, and is far from having at least enough ammunition for its artillery.

….yes, I know, meanwhile, I sound like a broken record. But, that’s a matter of fact and I do not see any kind of improvement in this regards over the last 8–10 weeks. On the contrary, not only is it a matter of fact that NATO is delivering less artillery ammunition than as of July-August the last year, but also less ammunition and spares than in November-December…

Secondly: we’ve heard a lot about horrendous Russian casualties of the last few weeks. However, one should keep the resulting euphoria in check. Mind that, no matter in what war, there is always a tendency to disparage the opponent. The number of examples is going into dozens: see the USA and allies in the Korean War complaining about ‘masses of Chinese infantry overwhelming them by sheer numbers’. See the Indians doing exactly the same after being defeated by the Chinese in the Himalayas of 1962. See Iraqis complaining about ‘human wave attacks of Iranian cockroaches’ and having to (literal translation) ‘harvest’ them…. and lets not go into discussing the POVs of different other Western armies vis-à-vis any kind of armed forces ‘from the Third World’ until this very day. Nowadays, it’s Ukrainians (and much of the West) who’s behaving in similar fashion vis-à-vis this ‘new infantry tactics’ of the VSRF.

Me thinks, it would be better to accept few simple facts. USA and allies were exaggerating about ‘Chinese human-wave attacks’ because these were regularly taking them by surprise by assaults from unexpected directions and by night. Because they were too racist and too proud to admit the Chinese outsmarting them. The Indians got overrun by the People’s Liberation Army in 1962 because their generals are more ‘British’ than the British generals are (and that until this very day), and they’ve left their troops sitting and waiting in their trenches until they were overrun by manoeuvring Chinese. And, privately, the Iraqis are going to — grudgingly — admit that they’ve feared the Iranian infantry more than any other ‘weapon’ in Tehran’s hands, precisely because this infantry proved an expert in infiltrating their positions by night, swarming around these and collapsing entire sectors of the frontline by penetrating deep into their rear — and that in terrain that was offering no cover whatsoever, and by night.

Point is: in some cases the ‘victims’ of different versions of what’s known as the ‘Stroßtruppen’ tactics, have never learned to cope with it; in other cases, it took them years (and chemical weapons). One must hope the ZSU is not going to venture either way, but learn its lessons quickly — and NATO to take care to, FINALLY and PRONTO, re-supply it with necessary heavy infantry weapons, ammunition, and UAVs. That is meanwhile an urgent issue: the ZSU needs heavy infantry weapons.

From that point of view, any kind of further daydreaming — for example: about Leopards 2, and Challengers, and M1s, and A-10s and F-16s — is the worst option: a waste of time and resources.

….anyway… back to ‘news’: two days ago, General Syrsky ordered reinforcements to the Bakhmut area, including a full tank brigade. Means: ZSU is going to keep on fighting for the town.

TACTICAL

Generally, whoever is still daydreaming about the Russians being short on artillery ammo, or still paying too much attention about quarrels between Prigorzhin and the Keystone Cops in Moscow: fine with me, but sorry, no time for that. Sufficient to say that contacts inside Bakhmut are reporting no shortage of Russian artillery fire. On the contrary. Moreover, ZSU positions in the outskirts have been subjected to multiple TOS-1 strikes, and to about 50 air strikes of the VKS, both yesterday and today. What is particularly interesting is that some of VKS air strikes are now including delivery of bombs by night, i.e. are almost certainly flown by Su-34s, not just the usual ‘spray and pray’ by day. This in turn is indicative of the VKS managing to suppress ZSU’s air defences in the Bakhmut area by quite some degree.

For this update today, have prepared two maps.

1.) The first map is shown directions of major Russian attacks of the last week. The ‘arrows in question’ are likely to look ‘awkward’ at first, because of ‘all these 90 degree turns’: mind that the Russian assault groups in the Bakhmut area are almost exclusively operating as infantry advancing along hedgerows, and these are surrounding — mostly — ‘quadratic’ fields. Hedgerows are used to infiltrate ZSU positions, too.

Another interesting point: there’s de-facto no firm ‘frontline’ from Orikhovo-Vasylivka in the north and Yahidne: too many attacks and counterattacks ever since, all of them ‘in thick bushes of hedgerows in between’…

One point of particular interest (at least for me) is ‘that hill above Klishchivka’: have marked it with a blue nonagon. To the best of my knowledge, as of yesterday evening this was still under ZSU control. No idea why is everybody reporting it as ‘under Russian control’, but the point is: this is the reason why the VDV and Wagner can’t get into southern Bakhmut. The Russians must pass by that hill whether they want to attack Chasiv Yar or Ivanivske, in the West, or in direction of the WOG petrol station on the Road 0504, in south-eastern Bakhmut.

2.) The second map is shown Ukrainian counterattacks of the last three days (here’s an example for the ‘looks’ of one such counterattack, run by the 24th Mechanised Battalion). Essentially, there was no ‘cauldron’ because there are too many Russians further east, and no weak spots to exploit. Instead, ZSU run a series of counterattacks with the aim of hitting forward rallying points of the VSR and disrupting further assaults, so to buy time for a rotation of battered units in the rear, and their replacement with fresh units.

The latest of attacks in question stopped short of reaching their objectives — if for no other reason then because the weather in the Bakhmut area became warmer, it was raining, and vehicles became bogged down in the mud as soon as leaving roads.

Net result: the situation as of yesterday evening was where it was around 24–25 February.

Surely enough, yesterday the Russians claimed the capture of the Meat Combinate District, in northern Bakhmut, and today to have reached points only 600m short of the 0506, west of Bakhmut. However, while they might have secured the MCD, an ‘advance’ in direction of the 0506 is not the same like ‘actually getting and entrenching there’. That’s, literally an ‘uphill struggle’ that’s going to take them a few days longer.

Overall, the Battle of Bakhmut is going on. The town is not lost: Ukrainians are fighting for it. ‘It’s just so’ that the situation is critical: the Russians are assaulting in yet bigger numbers and ferociously, and Ukrainians defending, bitterly, and with all means on hand.