Ukraine War, 1 March 2023 Update, Part 1

Hello everybody!

Hello everybody!

It’s the first day in the new month and thus the time for an update.

Once again, I’ll focus on Bakhmut — but this time for a ‘few different reasons’: what is going on there in the last few days is explaining a lot about how-, or in what direction have both the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) developed over the last 12 months.

This will be the Part 1, discussing the strategic situation as of these days.

Before I go on, a reminder (indeed a ‘disclaimer’) that while much of the following is based on what I’ve got to hear from 1st-hand contacts ‘in the Bakhmut area’, many of conclusions are based on little else but deduction — and all mistakes are my own.

Thus, and as usually, don’t take anything of the following as ‘written in stone’: it’s going to be a few years before something like ‘semi-definite truth’ crystallises…(if at all, because that would require a sufficient number of participants to survive the battle, first and foremost, and I’m already experiencing major problems just when trying to reconstruct the first two weeks of the war — because so many participants have fallen….)

STRATEGIC (possibly, though not necessarily related to ‘Bakhmut’)

1.) On 27 February 2023, official Kyiv announced Zelensky’s dismissal of Major-General Eduard Mykhailovych Moskalov (or Moskalev, not sure about correct transliteration), ZSU Commander of the United Forces in Donbass. There are lots of explanations for why, but I actually know nobody who can say exactly why was Moskalov dismissed. Therefore, I’m not going to guess (at least not in the public): from more than enough of 1st-hand experiences, I know that — no matter what his failures might be, or what kind of disagreements between him and whoever else in all of Ukraine there might have been — it would be unfair. Just like it’s unfair to dismiss him, but not to explain why.

I’m only going to observe that I do find Zelensky’s move ‘strange’, even ‘unprofessional’. I would expect such a decision to be taken — or at least signed — either by General Zaluzhny (as C-in-C ZSU), or Colonel-General Syrsky (C-in-C ZSU Ground Forces, i.e. ‘army’).

After all, Kyiv is supposed to be different to Moscow… and, I would want it to be different to the Washington DC/Pentagon, Brussels… and few other non-transparent snake-pits… The way this affair is handled, it turns out — it’s not, and that’s simply not good for Ukraine, first and foremost.

2.) Over the last 8–10 weeks, an ironic situation crystallised in this war. The ZSU, built-up, indoctrinated, and equipped since 2014 to counter the ‘mechanised juggernaut’ of the VSRF — a job it did valiantly and with an extremely high level of proficiency the previous 10 months — is finding itself in deep trouble when confronted with ‘masses’ of Russian heavy infantry. Largely consisting of light infantry, the ZSU is ill-equipped for this task; some of units even seem to lack related training — and many of commanders definitely need detailed instructions.

Arguably, the ZSU is ‘OK the way it is’ — at least when the terrain and vegetation are in its favour: flat and open. Like in the Avdiivka, Mariinka, or Vuhledar areas. But, in the ‘Bocage’-type of terrain like that in the Bakhmut area, where the VSRF can exploit unevenness of the terrain and those long, thick hedgerows…Ukrainians are experiencing one crisis after the other.

3.) As next, ‘what’s the importance of Bakhmut’?

This issue is widely discussed already since the fall of Soledar, back in January. Because several of you have asked: my point of view is that there is no single and no simple answer.

For those who used to live there: Bakhmut is everything. Home, family, friends, neighbours, pets, every-day life. Matter of fact is — and sorry to say this — that the Bakhmut they used to know is no more, already now. It’s completely destroyed…

For people of Ukraine: it’s almost like Mariupol, a symbol of resistance to Pudding’s war of extermination: a town, literally, murdered by the Russian aggression, but still holding out. Correspondingly, it’s loss would be a blow to the morale of millions.

For Zelensky and his government: the loss of the town might symbolise a major strategic mistake — but for reason nearly nobody is discussing. Namely, they’ve squandered months to get the West to deliver ‘tanks’, while the ZSU actually needs other weapons, and — especially — ammunition, and is still not getting these (to be discussed below). As so often, ‘great ideas’ and ‘symbolic achievements’ are simply standing in no relation to reality…

For ‘collective West’: the sheer fact this battle is going on this long is making Bakhmut the symbol of failure in assessments of the strategic situation and thus advice to the decision-makers. Clear evidence that all the armies of expensive experts and divisions of even more expensive think-tanks, plus half of intelligence services (whether ‘civilian’ or ‘miltiary’) are entirely useless. Not one of them seems to have come to the idea to help support Ukraine the way it really mattered while there was still the time to finish this war in a ‘quick’ fashion: back in the last summer. The idea of ‘Russians have endless supplies of men and material’ — prevailed, regardless how obsolete…

For Pudding: discussing any details and finesse in his case is making no sense. The name, place, number of killed, disappeared, maimed, extension of destruction…. all do not matter. Important is that the war goes on and his regime to prevail, no matter what way. And he’s always going to find a way, because he can explain away everything. Notably, even Medvedev recently observed, in the public, that a failure and/or withdrawal from Ukraine would result in something like a downfall of the Russian Federation: thus, the war must go on, and the only way Russians can think of war is ‘advance’. If Bakhmut falls, that advance is successful — especially because it was stalled for more than seven months…

For Russians — and especially for Pudding-fans outside Russia — it’s a symbol of VSRF’s ability to continue grinding into Ukraine while ignoring all the wrongdoings of this aggression, even rejoicing at all the mass-murder of civilians and soldiers alike. Because, you know, ‘Americans did that to….(enter place of your choice) before’…

…and it’s ‘only then’ that such ‘unimportant lessons of war’ might surface: those related to military factors. For example:

For ZSU: it’s a battle that distilled some of its best, and much of its worst — and one that found it facing something like ‘an entirely new problem, for which no solution seems to be in sight’ (see Point 2, above).

For VSRF: does it matter? Well, if at all, then as another major railway knot; a place that — provided it can take it, first and foremost — would improve its ability to haul reinforcements and supplies to this part of Ukraine, and thus ‘continue grinding and advancing’…

….and that’s just a shortened list of what’s coming to my mind in this regards…