Tracking Vladimir Putin: Pattern-of-Life Intelligence Analysis
by Benjamin Cook
NOTE: I am rushing to publish this research because it seems these exact tactics were used on Maduro in Venezuela. So this isn’t as polished as I would like. But since this research can inform how Maduro was tracked I think it is important to put it out to my readers now.
LLMs were used to do some of the research and to fix my grammar. The ideas, conclusions, and initial research are all mine.
Pattern-of-life analysis is a surveillance method that compiles the habitual behaviors and routine movements of a target to predict and track their location over time[1][2]. In the realm of intelligence, a nation’s leader like Russian President Vladimir Putin inevitably generates a significant footprint through communications, travel, security arrangements, and digital exhaust. Both the United States and likely Ukraine devote substantial resources to finding and tracking Putin’s whereabouts at any given time, leveraging everything from cutting-edge signals intelligence (SIGINT) and geospatial surveillance to on-the-ground human intelligence (HUMINT) networks. This report examines how U.S. and Ukrainian intelligence services build a pattern-of-life picture of Putin’s movements, highlighting the methods used, the role of commercial data, and how modern AI/machine learning techniques enhance tracking and prediction. We also contrast the extensive technical capabilities of U.S. agencies with Ukraine’s likely heavier reliance on human sources, and discuss how Putin’s own countermeasures complicate tracking efforts.
Pattern-of-Life Analysis: An Intelligence Framework
Pattern-of-life analysis involves collecting and analyzing diverse data about a person’s daily activities to discern routines and anomalies[1]. By monitoring where someone goes, when they go there, whom they meet or travel with, and how they communicate, analysts can establish a baseline of “normal” behavior. Any deviations from this baseline might signal unusual activity or location changes – crucial for anticipating a leader’s movements or detecting potential threats. Intelligence agencies have long used this approach for counterterrorism (e.g. tracking insurgent leaders) and now apply it to state actors. Modern digital technology has made such analysis far more powerful: the smartphones, computers, vehicles, and security details surrounding a person constantly emit data that, when aggregated, tell a detailed story of that person’s life[3].
Key elements that feed pattern-of-life analysis include:
● Location data from devices: Smartphones and other devices regularly ping location coordinates. This data (often gathered via apps and digital ads) can reveal where an individual goes throughout the day and night, forming a map of their routine[4][2].
● Communication metadata: Call logs, messaging timestamps, and network connections (even if content is encrypted) show when and where communications occur, hinting at a target’s schedule and contacts.
● Travel records and sightings: The use of planes, trains, motorcades, or even private convoys leaves records (flight plans, ticketing data) or generates public observation (road closures, escort vehicles). Repeated patterns – e.g. a flight from Moscow to Sochi every Friday – build a profile of habits.
● Human observations and reports: People in the vicinity (security staff, insider informants, local sources) can provide descriptions of a target’s movements. Many intelligence agencies integrate HUMINT reports to corroborate or fill gaps in technical data.
● Open-source intelligence (OSINT): News reports, social media posts, and public camera footage can inadvertently reveal a leader’s location or plans (for instance, an announcement of a regional visit, or locals posting about an unusual security presence). These feed into the larger pattern-of-life matrix.
By compiling these inputs, analysts can chart where Putin is likely to be at certain times (e.g. at the Kremlin on weekday mornings, or at a private residence on weekends) and identify changes that might indicate something out of the ordinary. Crucially, AI and machine learning now help sift through the massive data streams to find meaningful patterns. Machine learning algorithms can correlate disparate data points, such as matching a spike in secure phone calls with satellite images of motorcade activity to flag when Putin is on the move. Over time, AI models can even predict future movements by learning from past behavior, improving the ability to anticipate where a leader will be and when.
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U.S. Intelligence Methods for Tracking Putin
The United States intelligence community, with its global technical reach and analytic resources, employs a multifaceted approach to track Putin’s movements virtually in real time. This approach combines traditional spying techniques with modern digital data exploitation and analytic modeling:
SIGINT and Electronic Surveillance
U.S. agencies like the NSA utilize signals intelligence to monitor electronic emissions associated with Putin and his entourage. While Putin himself is known to avoid using ordinary cell phones or unsecure lines, those around him – security personnel, aides, military units – do rely on communications that can be intercepted or tracked. For example, encrypted radio and phone traffic spikes might occur in whatever area Putin is visiting, providing a tip-off. The U.S. can eavesdrop on communications networks and gather metadata to map out networks of phones traveling together. In one notable case, U.S. analysts realized that by geofencing the locations of Russian government buildings and examining advertising data, they could identify phones regularly present in President Putin’s entourage – and then follow those phones’ movements across Russia[5]. Even if Putin isn’t carrying a personal smartphone, the digital trail of his motorcade and entourage can be picked up. As a result, American intelligence could often deduce where Putin was going and when, simply because the cluster of devices belonging to his drivers, bodyguards, and aides moved with him everywhere[5].
Beyond phone data, the U.S. employs geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) from satellites and high-altitude aircraft. Spy satellites can image key locations such as the Kremlin, Putin’s residences, or known vacation retreats on a frequent basis, looking for telltale signs of his presence. For instance, distinctive motorcades, increased security forces, or the arrival of presidential aircraft are observable indicators. Over time, analysts know Putin’s usual locations – like the Novo-Ogaryovo estate outside Moscow, his Sochi residence (Bocharov Ruchei), or the Valdai compound – and monitor these for activity. If imagery shows the presidential Il-96 jet or an armored convoy at one of these sites, it’s a strong clue Putin is there or en route. Signals intercepts also extend to radar and air defense networks; if Putin takes to the air, U.S. SIGINT might detect the activation of special squawk codes, radar tracking of a “special flight,” or heightened communications on secure frequencies that accompany VIP movement. Each electronic signature adds a piece to the puzzle of Putin’s location.
Purchasing and Exploiting Commercial Data (“ADINT”)
One of the most potent modern tools is the purchase of commercial location data, turning the private-sector’s mass surveillance into an intelligence treasure trove. As surprising as it may sound, U.S. agencies (and their contractors) can legally buy granular smartphone location data harvested by data brokers from apps – a practice some jokingly call “ADINT” (advertising intelligence)[6][7]. This data, even if “anonymized,” can often be de-anonymized or used to follow a specific device’s path. The New York Times demonstrated how one massive dataset of smartphone pings allowed them to track individuals from places like the Pentagon and White House to their homes, clearly identifying their daily routines[8]. In an intelligence context, similar data can reveal the pattern of life of Putin’s circle. A U.S. contractor in 2016-2017, for example, acquired a large Russian mobile data set and identified devices that always traveled alongside Putin’s known locations, likely belonging to his retinue[5]. Those phones moved everywhere Putin did – to meetings, residences, and trips – effectively acting as beacons for his whereabouts[5]. Importantly, analysts concluded Putin himself was savvy enough not to carry a trackable personal device; instead, it was the drivers, bodyguards, and aides’ phones that unknowingly gave away the leader’s movements[9]. This underscores how a modern leader’s digital exhaust (even via others) can undermine secrecy.
Beyond location trails, commercial data can include financial transactions, airline bookings, and closed-circuit TV feeds from commercial vendors. U.S. intelligence might quietly purchase or subpoena records from airlines for VIP travelers, or tap into credit card transaction alerts (though Putin likely isn’t swiping a Visa card, his entourage’s logistics – fuel purchases, hotel bookings for advance teams, etc. – could leave a financial trace). The unregulated data broker industry has made a huge volume of information available for a price, and U.S. agencies leverage that rather than solely depending on clandestine hacks[10][11]. As one U.S. tech consultant explained, the modern advertising technology ecosystem is “the largest information-gathering enterprise ever conceived,” far larger than traditional spy networks[12]. Intelligence agencies have taken note: instead of expending effort on difficult intercepts, they can often buy data that users inadvertently provide via apps and devices[10].
The efficacy of commercial data for pattern-of-life tracking was starkly shown when a Wired investigation obtained 3 billion location coordinates from a data broker and was able to map the daily routines of U.S. military and intelligence personnel at bases in Germany[2]. Investigators traced individuals from high-security installations to their off-base homes, favorite restaurants, and even sensitive facilities, solely from phone signals[13][2]. In intelligence hands, such data can just as easily be turned towards foreign targets. What once required risky physical surveillance can now often be done remotely by analyzing digital footprints.
HUMINT and Insider Reporting
Despite America’s sophisticated tech, human intelligence remains valuable for tracking Putin – though cultivating sources close to Putin is notoriously difficult. U.S. agencies likely rely more on allied intelligence and third-country sources for insights into Kremlin inner workings, given how closed Putin’s circle is. Still, there have been indications that Western services have their ways: occasional leaks suggest that Western governments know more about Putin’s movements than publicly revealed. For example, during sensitive events (such as surprise visits or health rumors), U.S. officials have hinted at awareness of Putin’s status – implying they receive tip-offs. HUMINT could come from diplomatic contacts, foreign VIPs or oligarchs who report on Putin’s meetings, or even disgruntled insiders passing information. In a historical parallel, the CIA ran agents in the Soviet Kremlin; today they might recruit officials in Russia’s security apparatus or government who have knowledge of Putin’s schedule. Furthermore, U.S. and allied intelligence share information – for instance, European services might have better local access and share with the U.S. Through joint intelligence centers and fusion cells, details on Putin’s whereabouts are exchanged, especially during crises.
Open sources are also monitored: U.S. analysts keep a close eye on Russian state media and social media. Even tightly controlled news can inadvertently reveal Putin’s location (such as images or videos of meetings where the surroundings can be analyzed). There have been cases where investigators identified that a supposedly live video of Putin was actually pre-recorded based on details in the video, revealing he was elsewhere at that time – a type of open-source analysis that helps unmask deception in his public appearances. All these human and open inputs complement the technical data, providing context (the “why” behind movements) and validation (ensuring that the person spotted is indeed Putin).
Big Data Analytics and AI Prediction
Given the flood of data – from satellite images to phone pings to intercepted comms – the U.S. increasingly relies on advanced analytics and AI to process information and discern patterns. Machine learning algorithms can rapidly crunch years of movement data to find patterns that a human might miss: for instance, an AI system could learn that whenever Putin plans a regional visit, certain indicators spike (maybe specific Moscow police units deploy or particular aircraft reposition in advance). By training models on historical data of Putin’s travel and appearances, analysts can get predictive warnings (”high likelihood Putin will travel to location X in next 48 hours”). Activity-Based Intelligence (ABI) systems integrate multi-source data to flag correlations in time and space[14]. If an unusual combination of factors occurs – say a known Putin security officer’s phone appears in an uncommon city and Russian air defense radar there goes active – automated systems alert analysts to a potential Putin movement outside his normal pattern.
U.S. intelligence agencies have also developed specialized platforms to model patterns of life. Software initially designed to track terrorists is equally applicable to a head of state. These tools map out nodes (places frequently visited) and edges (routes traveled, contacts made). Over time, a very detailed profile emerges: e.g., hypothetically, “Putin typically spends Monday-Thursday in the Kremlin or Novo-Ogaryovo, Friday-Sunday often at his Valdai residence; he favors flying on short notice late at night; his entourage phones go dark (offline) an hour before movement,” and so on. This kind of modeling allows U.S. analysts not only to know where Putin is, but where he is likely to be next. Importantly, the use of AI means this analysis can run continuously and adapt as Putin changes habits. The result is a dynamic “Putin tracker” that informs policymakers of the Russian leader’s location in near-real-time — an invaluable asset during fast-moving events like crises or wartime decisions.
Ukrainian Intelligence Methods for Tracking Putin
Ukraine’s intelligence community faces a different set of resource constraints and advantages. Lacking the global surveillance infrastructure of the U.S., Ukraine compensates with ingenuity, superior human networks inside Russia, and assistance from partners. Tracking Putin is likely a high priority for Ukraine’s defense and security services (such as the GUR – Military Intelligence, and the SBU – Security Service of Ukraine), not only for strategic awareness but also as a psychological weapon in their war against Russian aggression.
Human Networks and Insider Sources
Ukraine likely leans heavily on HUMINT to monitor Putin. Culturally and geographically close to Russia, the Ukrainians have had decades to develop spies, informants, and sympathizers within Russia. Ukrainian intelligence officials have openly hinted at having sources in Putin’s inner circle. In July 2023, Major General Kyrylo Budanov (Ukraine’s head of military intelligence) stated that “we have our own sources in the closest offices to Putin… we usually know what’s going on”[15]. This striking claim suggests Ukraine has penetrated Putin’s entourage or administration at some level, providing insight into his activities. These might be officials, military officers, or staff who, motivated by money or dissent, pass information to Kyiv. Ukraine’s HUMINT advantage is bolstered by the fact that many Ukrainians and Russians share language and personal ties, making it easier to blend in or recruit agents. Additionally, in wartime, discontented insiders who oppose Putin’s motivations might be more willing to tip off Ukraine about his movements, viewing him as ultimately responsible for the conflict.
Beyond high-level moles, Ukraine likely gathers a torrent of grassroots human intelligence. Consider that whenever Putin travels within Russia, especially outside Moscow, it creates local disruptions – security sweeps, road closures, unusual military deployments – which locals observe. Ukrainian intelligence can tap networks of observers or partisans (for example, in occupied Crimea or Belarus, or even ordinary citizens in Russia using Telegram channels) to get wind of such signs. Reports of “sightings” or unusual activity can be funneled back to Ukrainian handlers. For instance, if a special train or motorcade is spotted heading to a known presidential residence, Ukrainian spies might alert their analysts. Ukraine has proven adept at crowdsourcing intelligence through call centers and apps where civilians report enemy movements; a similar approach could gather clues about Putin. These human reports might lack the precision of technical intel, but they provide context and confirmation that technical means might miss.
Open-Source Intelligence and Creative Techniques
With limited access to high-end satellites or global eavesdropping, Ukraine maximizes open-source intelligence. Their analysts monitor Russian state media obsessively, parsing every Kremlin press release or TV broadcast for hidden clues. Sometimes, timing of announcements or the content of Putin’s video conferences can hint at his location (e.g., a meeting with local officials might imply he’s nearby, or a delay in airing an event might suggest he was traveling). Ukraine also follows Russian social media and blogs closely – even though open discussion of Putin’s movements is suppressed for security, occasionally something leaks out. For example, a local VKontakte (Russian social network) post might mention an “important visitor” in town or an uptick in Federal Protective Service (FSO) agents, tipping off a Putin visit. Ukrainian intelligence units dedicated to OSINT would scrape such data.
There are also reports that Ukraine has benefited from hacking Russian communications at tactical and strategic levels. While Russia’s secure comms are robust, Ukraine’s cybersecurity teams (often in concert with Western partners) have intercepted less-secure channels. It’s been alleged, for instance, that Ukraine at times listened in on conversations among Russian officials or even breached email/phone networks. Any mention of “the President” moving or scheduling could be golden information. Additionally, Ukraine receives selective intelligence from Western agencies – while sensitive sources might be guarded, the U.S. and NATO likely share some satellite imagery or SIGINT intercepts relevant to Putin if it helps Ukraine’s war aims. Ukrainian officials have hinted that they get intelligence from partners about threats; it’s plausible this extends to learning about Putin’s location in critical moments (for example, before major speeches or if he were to visit occupied territories).
One creative area Ukraine might exploit is psychological operations and disinformation to flush out Putin’s pattern. By spreading rumors or using decoys, they could observe how Russian security reacts, indirectly revealing Putin’s position. For example, in May 2023, drones attacked the Kremlin in Moscow; while Ukraine did not officially take credit, such incidents can force Putin to respond or relocate, and Ukraine can observe those reactions. Similarly, Ukraine’s public statements sometimes pointedly address Putin’s actions or location (Budanov has even alluded to knowing Putin’s personal conditions), possibly to rattle the Kremlin into betraying information through their counter-measures or denials.
Constraints and External Support
Ukraine’s technological capabilities, though improving, are more limited. They lack their own constellation of spy satellites or a global SIGINT network. However, commercial satellite imagery is increasingly available – Ukraine can purchase high-resolution imagery from private companies to surveil known Putin locales (for instance, checking if his presidential jet is at a certain airport or if new construction is happening at a residence). They may also utilize drones near the border to pick up radio signals or observe VIP movements in adjacent regions. In one instance, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly pinpointed a secret Russian command bunker and struck it, shocking Russian leadership[16]. While details are scant, such a feat likely combined human tip-offs with careful analysis of available imagery and signals – illustrating that Ukraine can mount sophisticated intelligence operations even without the full suite of U.S. tools[16].
Moreover, Ukraine receives considerable intelligence support from allies. Real-time satellite data, reconnaissance aircraft feeds, and signal intercepts around Eastern Europe are often shared with Ukraine to aid its defense. Though direct info on Putin might be politically sensitive, it is broadly known that Western intelligence has helped safeguard President Zelensky by informing him of threats, and presumably, any information on Putin that could be actionable (such as a sudden trip to frontlines) might be relayed to Ukraine. This partnership effectively gives Ukraine some of the “eyes and ears” it would otherwise lack.
In summary, Ukraine’s approach to tracking Putin is highly proactive and human-focused: they likely cultivate insiders, gather on-ground observations, leverage any open-source hint, and lean on partners for high-tech intelligence. Despite their fewer resources, Ukraine’s motivation is enormous, as knowing Putin’s moves can inform defensive planning and propaganda efforts. And indeed, Ukrainian officials often exude confidence about Putin’s status – a reflection of the intelligence they quietly gather.
Putin’s Countermeasures and Evasion Tactics
President Putin is acutely aware that foreign intelligence agencies are trying to track him, and he has taken elaborate steps to obscure his pattern-of-life. His security detail (the FSO) and military planners enforce strict operational security to make Putin’s movements as opaque as possible. Some of the key countermeasures include:
● Secure Communication Practices: Putin reportedly does not use cell phones or computers for sensitive matters; he often relies on secure landline networks or in-person couriers. By minimizing electronic emissions from himself personally, he denies adversaries an easy SIGINT target. The entourage’s devices that are necessary (for less-sensitive coordination) are likely rotated or strictly controlled, and sensitive movements might be coordinated verbally to avoid telegraphing via radio or phone. This practice was evident in the data analysis by U.S. contractors: none of the trackable devices belonged to Putin himself, indicating Russian security’s awareness of digital tracking risks[9].
● Unpredictability and Last-Minute Travel: Putin’s schedule is a state secret. Often his trips (especially within Russia) are not announced until after the fact. He may cancel or alter plans last-minute to foil intelligence predications. His motorcades sometimes use decoy vehicles and routes. In Moscow, multiple identical motorcades have been deployed to confuse onlookers as to which one carries Putin. This complicates any real-time pattern-of-life analysis, because it introduces false trails. Foreign intel might see activity but not be certain which is the real Putin. Timing variability – such as traveling at unusual hours – further adds randomness to his pattern.
● Use of an Armored Train and Secret Rail Network: In recent years, Putin has heavily utilized a personal armored train instead of the presidential aircraft for travel, specifically to evade detection[17]. Planes are relatively easy to track with radar, satellite, and even amateur flight trackers, whereas trains blend into rail traffic and have no public flight plans. Investigative reports in 2023 revealed that Russia built a secret railway network linked to Putin’s residences (with private stations at Valdai, Novo-Ogaryovo, and Sochi) so that he can travel discreetly by rail[18][19]. According to these reports, Putin switched to train travel around late 2021 as war preparations intensified, explicitly because “it is much harder to monitor train movements” than flights[17]. This indicates a direct attempt to defeat Western pattern-of-life surveillance, forcing agencies to find new ways to follow an unmarked train moving through Russia’s vast territory (such as tasking satellites on rail lines or relying on insiders to tip off when the train departs).
● Bunkers and Residences: Putin has multiple residences and rumored bunkers, and he often stays outside Moscow, especially during the Ukraine war. By not consistently being in one location, he avoids establishing an obvious routine. He has a sprawling residence at Valdai (between Moscow and St. Petersburg), a palace at Gelendzhik on the Black Sea, among others – any of which can serve as a hideaway. Some reports suggest he spends much of his time in fortified bunkers or distant compounds since 2022[20]. These locations are often in secluded areas with restricted access, making ground observation difficult. For intelligence agencies, detecting his presence there may rely on indirect clues (e.g., satellite photos of increased guard activity or communications relays active only when he is in residence).
● Operational Deception: The Kremlin frequently releases pre-recorded footage of Putin attending meetings or events, sometimes days later or out of sequence, to create confusion about his real-time location. For instance, a meeting shown on TV as “live from the Kremlin” might have been taped earlier, while Putin is actually elsewhere. If foreign intelligence is not careful, this could throw off their tracking. However, sharp-eyed analysts often catch inconsistencies (daylight, participants’ schedules, etc.) that reveal the deception. Still, as a tactic, it forces agencies to corroborate with other sources rather than relying on official portrayal of Putin’s schedule.
Despite these precautions, maintaining complete secrecy is difficult in the digital age. Putin’s need to appear in public (even if rarely) and to command a large security detail inevitably creates some observable pattern. For example, if he’s traveling by train, the very act of clearing other rail traffic and securing stations can tip off an observant adversary. Each method of evasion has its counter: Western intelligence can adjust by monitoring rail infrastructure or looking for unique signatures (like the specific configuration of Putin’s train). Likewise, unpredictability can be countered by broad surveillance – knowing whenever a VIP convoy moves or an abrupt change in communications status occurs. In essence, Putin can make tracking him harder, but not impossible.
Conclusion
Tracking a high-profile and security-conscious leader like Vladimir Putin is a daunting intelligence challenge, but by leveraging pattern-of-life analysis, adversaries can often know where he is with a high degree of confidence. The United States employs a technology-heavy strategy: sweeping up signals and commercial data to follow the digital footprints that even a cautious leader leaves, and using powerful analytics to anticipate his moves. Ukraine, facing an existential threat from Putin, complements limited technical means with aggressive human spying and clever use of open information – often claiming it knows “what’s going on” at the Kremlin[15]. Each brings distinct strengths: U.S. global SIGINT can quietly listen and watch from above, while Ukraine’s agents on the ground can hear whispers within Putin’s circle.
What emerges from the pattern-of-life approach is a paradox of the modern era: even the most guarded individual is part of a vast, sensor-rich environment. The phones of bodyguards, the satellites overhead, the innocuous apps and data brokers, the observers on a train platform – together these form a web of surveillance that is difficult to entirely escape. In the case of Vladimir Putin, this web means that his efforts to vanish from the grid (such as armored trains and strict OPSEC) are met with ever more inventive tracking methods by those who seek to find him.
In the future, AI-driven intelligence will only tighten this net, fusing disparate data in real time to update Putin’s likely location continuously. The cat-and-mouse game between Putin’s security measures and foreign intelligence will continue, but the advantage may tilt toward the side that better harnesses massive data. As one U.S. senator noted regarding commercially collected data, “the unregulated data broker industry poses a clear threat to national security”[21] – a warning that cuts both ways, since such data is equally a threat to Putin’s secrecy as it is to others’.
Ultimately, the pursuit of Putin via pattern-of-life analysis exemplifies modern intelligence: multi-source, data-driven, and persistent. Even if an intelligence service cannot continuously surveil Putin with a physical spy or drone, they can reconstruct and predict his life pattern through the digital and human signals that surround him. The case of tracking Putin underscores that in today’s interconnected world, no leader can remain completely hidden – their patterns will speak for them.
Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) related to the war in Ukraine. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.
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Sources
● Thompson, S. A., & Warzel, C. “Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy.” The New York Times, 2019 – (investigation showing how smartphone location data can pinpoint individuals at places like the Pentagon and track their routines)[8][3].
● Mehrotra, D., & Cameron, D. “Anyone Can Buy Data Tracking US Soldiers and Spies…” Wired, Nov 2024 – (reveals how billions of mobile phone location records from data brokers provide extraordinary insight into daily routines of U.S. military/intel personnel, illustrating pattern-of-life risks)[2][1].
● Cox, J. “How the Pentagon Learned to Use Targeted Ads to Find Its Targets — and Vladimir Putin.” Wired, 2024 – (details how a defense contractor tracked phones in Putin’s entourage via ad data, knowing where Putin was going by following his support staff’s devices)[5].
● RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty). “Putin Using Special Train, Secret Railway Network, Investigative Reports Say.” Feb 14, 2023 – (reports by Proekt and Dossier Center that Putin travels in an armored train and built secret rail lines to his residences to avoid flight tracking, believing trains are harder to monitor)[19][17].
● Ukrainian News/Reuters. “Ukraine receives information from Putin’s entourage – Budanov.” July 14, 2023 – (Ukraine’s intelligence chief Budanov claims to have sources in Putin’s closest circle, suggesting strong HUMINT penetration of the Kremlin)[15].
● Additional analysis based on open-source intelligence reporting, expert commentary on pattern-of-life and activity-based intelligence[14], and public disclosures by officials on intelligence methods and threats[21].
[1] [2] [4] [10] [11] [13] [21] Anyone Can Buy Data Tracking US Soldiers and Spies to Nuclear Vaults and Brothels in Germany | WIRED
https://www.wired.com/story/phone-data-us-soldiers-spies-nuclear-germany/
[3] [5] [6] [7] [9] [12] How the Pentagon Learned to Use Targeted Ads to Find Its Targets—and Vladimir Putin | WIRED
https://www.wired.com/story/how-pentagon-learned-targeted-ads-to-find-targets-and-vladimir-putin/
[8] How The New York Times is Visualizing the Smartphone Tracking Industry – Global Investigative Journalism Network
https://gijn.org/stories/how-the-new-york-times-is-visualizing-the-smartphone-tracking-industry/
[14] Activity-Based Intelligence: Understanding Patterns-of-Life - Medium
[15] Ukraine receives information from Putin’s entourage - Budanov | Ukrainian news
https://ukranews.com/en/news/944565-ukraine-receives-information-from-putin-s-entourage-budanov
[16] Ukraine Tracks Down Putin’s Secret Underground Command Bunker
[17] [18] [19] Putin Using Special Train, Secret Railway Network, Investigative Reports Say
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-putin-special-train-travel-secret-ukraine-war/32270737.html
[20] How tiny details expose Putin’s location - The Telegraph
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/11/13/spot-difference-putin-replica-offices-exposed/
I haven't noticed anything about body doubles used by Putin as well in the list of countermeasures?
Here is a replacement link for the YouTube video link that isn't working for some: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hq3hsiY1UiA
There was also a question about http://ukranews.com/ . Try your favorite VPN.