Three Wars in Ukraine (Part 1)
by Donald Hill
There are three main battlefields in this war: the war on the ground, the air war over Ukraine, and the air war over Russia. Although they are directly related, and some of the means are similar, each of them is fought in different fashion and with different aims.
Ground Campaign
On the ground, the Russians want to overwhelm Ukrainian forces on the ground with mass. Initially, the mass took the form of massive mechanised assaults and artillery bombardments. That evolved into dismounted infantry and tactical drones. Their tactics change with the technology but remain simple at its core: Forward, ever forward.
Ukraine responded to the initial conventional Russia assaults with conventional defenses and combat, but they did not have enough firepower to sustain an attritional war on even terms. They needed to multiply their combat power, so they developed tools to improve their command and control. They also developed drones at the grassroots level, and then on a governmental scale. These measures were effective and forced Russia to change how it was fighting.
Ukrainian defense works evolved from trenches and bunkers that protect their soldiers to trenches, dragon’s teeth and wire that slow Russian vehicular and foot movement and expose the infantry to attacks in the open. It is very difficult to infiltrate past these obstacles. Most Russians die while they cross them. The rest are detected while crossing them and are killed soon after.
There is a functional stalemate on the ground right now, with small to no advances being made, and both sides are fighting for drone superiority. Objectives are not always met on the stated timelines, but Ukraine plans to produce 7 million drones in 2026 while Russia is hoping to produce 7-9 million drones. Russia wants to kill Ukrainians, but primarily advance at all costs.
Ukraine is using sustained operations up to 150 km from the front line to slow the flow of Russian troops to the front line and make it difficult to sustain them. The slower flow of Russians provides Ukraine with more time to engage them once they reach the front lines. The defensive obstacles not only slow Russians trying to penetrate Ukrainian lines, they also create kill zones in Russia’s rear areas when they move past them.
Ukraine is using defensive obstacles and command and control innovations to multiply the combat power of their drones. Their objective is to slow the Russian advance and kill more Russians than can be recruited. If Russian losses and recruitment remain at the same levels as they have been for the last four months then Russia will have 65,000 fewer men in Ukraine by the end of the year, which would be a 9% reduction of the nearly 700,000 troops Russia has in Ukraine now.
Air War in Ukraine
The war will be decided on the ground, but the long-ranged battles in the skies will set the conditions for the battle on the ground.
Russian long-ranged attacks in Ukraine are focused on the civilian population, the energy grid, and Ukrainian military production. Historically, attacks on civilians for the purposes of breaking their morale do not work, despite all the misery they inflict. The attacks on the energy grid was primarily focused on causing a humanitarian crisis during the coldest winter in 20 years.
Transmission lines were destroyed to prevent redistribution of power between regions. Then the electrical and heating infrastructure within the isolated regions was repeatedly attacked to reverse repairs. In the past, Ukraine asked their allies for parts to repair the powerplants and substations. With the repeated attacks rendering repairs useless, Ukraine switched tactics and focused on decentralized backup power and asked for diesel generators and boiler units. Ukraine lost 5-6 gigawatts of power from the centralized facilities, a third of its needs during peak consumption. By late January, the portable stations were providing more than 3 gigawatts. Ukraine will continue to establish decentralized power generators.
Russia also attacked Ukrainian industry. The Flamingo production site was attacked at least twice, but it’s still producing. A drone manufacturer was also attacked and now has production spread out at 20 different locations. Some companies are forming air defense units using government weapons pulled from storage, and factories that are damaged are reportedly operating again in weeks.
The number of Russian drones is increasing. They are flying at very low altitudes to decrease radar detection and force Ukraine to rely on short-ranged defenses and visual detection systems. In fact, Ukraine is increasing the deployment of short-ranged air defenses, the interceptor drone teams in particular, and the remote piloting is multiplying their combat power. They also utilize an audio detection system that can detect Russian drones that radars might have missed, and electronic warfare disrupts the navigation systems of some Russian drones. Russia is now conducting day and night drone operations to stress Ukrainian defenses, much in the same way the US and UK conducted day and night bombing operations during WW2.
The percentage of Russian drone hits decreased from 19% in October to 8% in March, even though the number of drones increased in March. This is a reflection of increasingly effective Ukrainian defenses.
Ukraine has NASAMS, IRIS-T, and Patriot air defense systems that can shoot down cruise missiles, as can Gepards, Skynex and machine guns if the missiles fly close enough to their positions. Pilots flying Western aircraft can also fly to a threatened area and intercept missiles. There are not enough systems spread throughout the country and cruise missiles sometimes flood a sector to overwhelm the defenses there. There have been attacks in which a system expends all its missiles and doesn’t have time to reload before the next missiles fly by. There are other times when launchers have room for six missiles but only two missiles are loaded because of missile shortages. Electronic warfare has disrupted the navigation of some cruise missiles.
Ukraine has 9-11 Patriot systems that can intercept short- and medium-ranged ballistic missiles. Five more systems have been promised and Zelensky said that Ukraine needed 25 Patriot systems to protect the nation. Along with the shortage of systems, there is an acute shortage of missiles for the Patriot system.
Ukraine has only received about 600 missiles since 2022. In 2023, Lockheed-Martin, increased production by 60% and built 620 missiles in 2025 and in January, the US agreed to increase production to 2,000 missiles a year over seven years. But Middle Eastern countries fired over 800 Patriot interceptors in the first three days, so it is probable that Ukraine will be low on the list of priority of Patriot missile shipments.
Ukraine also has nine IRIS-Ts that can engage short-range ballistic missiles, which are all the missiles Russia uses in Ukraine except the Oreshnik.
Russian long-range attacks on Ukraine continue to be a threat. Ukraine’s air defenses may be able to contain the rate of damage Russian drones are doing to current levels despite the increase in the number of incoming drones.
Cruise missile interceptions will likely remain within 60-90% range depending on the type and volume of missiles used.
Ballistic missiles have always had a high chance to evade interception and that will continue given the shortage of air defense systems and missiles.
Even with the continuing threats, there is no indication that Russia will achieve its goal of completely destroying Ukraine’s energy grid or industrial capabilities, or to break the will of the Ukrainian people.
Air Campaign in Russia
As of early 2026, it can be concluded that Ukraine is now re-focusing on two objectives: to a) degrade Russia’s economy and b) destroy factories that build military components. To achieve these objectives, Ukraine is destroying Russian air defense systems faster than they can be replaced. This comes at a time when Ukraine sent more drones into Russia than Russia sent into Ukraine. Russia claims that they shot down 7,347 drones in March, an average of 237 drones a day. Ukraine said Russia used 6,462 drones, an average of 208 drones a day.
Over a third of Russia’s revenues come from energy exports, and attacks on refineries and oil infrastructure were a featured target in Ukraine’s campaign over the last four years. Relatively few drones made it to their targets but the flammable nature of the oil and gas industrial targets amplified the impact of the smaller 50-75 kg warheads. Later drones would have 60-120 kg warheads. Missiles with 500-1,150 kg warheads would cause more widespread and lasting damage to refineries but they have been directed at non-flammable targets where their larger warheads would have a greater impact.
Exposed explosives at munitions depots proved to be dramatically successful operations but attacks on segregated bunkers had little to no effect. Multiple attacks on non-flammable targets had a wide range of results that averaged as moderate successes that at least delayed production.
(…to be concluded in the Part 2…)
The other huge shift on the battlefield is the decline of Russian artillery. I'm sure everyone here recalls the shocking intensity of the barrages that flattened Severodonetsk back in 2022. And also the "sky is falling reportage" in late 2024 when the US Republicans blocked munitions shipments to Ukraine whilst Russian artillery fire remained irresistible accorded to clueless reporters. Yet, somehow Ukraine did resist. Big surprise.
The days of Soviet-era thousand gun barrages appear to be long gone. And now, with Ukraine claiming its been jamming Russia's latest supposedly unjammable glide bombs for months, this could be another big factor in why Russia is gaining so little ground.
Thanks from Asturias Spain