This is kind of hard to explain — at least ‘in few words’.

Namely, on one side, we are usually taught something like ‘Zaidi Shi’a are a minority of Yemeni population’ and similar; and Houthis are…

This is kind of hard to explain — at least ‘in few words’.

Namely, on one side, we are usually taught something like ‘Zaidi Shi’a are a minority of Yemeni population’ and similar; and Houthis are ‘just one sect of the Zaidi Shi’a’. Thus, it’s ‘logical’ to question their popularity in the Yemeni public.

It’s also logical to question popular support for a repressive regime.

That aside, and hand at heart: it took Houthis 10 years to develop from a ‘local insurgent gang’ to a military force capable of ‘overrunning’ places like Sa’ada or Sana’a etc.

However, one should keep in mind that Saleh is a Zaidi Shi’a too, yet he was elected two times for president (and this in relatively free and fair elections; in comparison, Hadi: never). One should also keep in mind that Houthis (meanwhile reinforced by Saleh and his loyalists) are in control of Sana’a and most of NW Yemen ‘only’ since about two years — which, simply expressed, means that they haven’t had enough time and opportunities to ‘screw up’ with the local population.

But still. It is so that Houthis found plenty of support when they overrun Sana’a in September 2014 (‘2013’ was my typo). Much of this support was from ‘public’, i.e. civilian sector — as visible by some of demonstrations against Hadi and the Saudi-led coalion that are often mobilizing up to 1 million of people. I find it was logical considering their demands (which are really easy to understand, accept and even support). Over the time (I’m talking here about period September 2014 — March 2015), they also either convinced (whether through negotiations or outright ultimatums) or at least bribed plenty of local commanders and personnel of various units to join them. For example: two YAF pilots that flew air strikes on Presidential Palace in Aden, in late March 2015, were bribed to do so (by some 100 pistols each).

At that time, much of the public sided with them: people are genuinely fed up of foreign powers that are bribing different ruling cliques in Yemen for these to act in their interest; people are fed up of powerty, of lack of prospects etc. After all, that was what brought them to the streets already back in 2001.

Of course, it’s hard to quantify exactly how many people are actively supportive for Houthis, but all I recall in terms of ‘opposition’ from this period were few dozens of journalists (most of them arrested ever since) and majority of businessmen and merchants (Houthis were rather ‘bad for business’).

Then the Saudi-led coalition launched its intervention, and ‘plenty’ (again: I can’t say exactly how many) of additional Yemenis became supportive for Houthis — simply because they oppose a foreign aggression on their country. Again: I can’t specifically quantify, and I doubt anybody could do so. But, ‘if even’ English-speaking businessmen active on Twitter and similar platforms turned ‘anti-Saudi’ and ‘anti-Hadi’, then the situation is actually quite clear.

Then the former president Saleh publicly sided with Houthis, and pulled lots of additional Yemeni military units with him.

Overall, yes, I would say that big part of population of Sana’a for example, is meanwhile pro-Hothi . ‘Repression’ is playing no role here: one should keep in mind that this repression is primarily aimed at leading figures of the Islah Party (Yemeni ‘branch’ of Moslem Brotherhood), various tribal leaders, or independent observers etc.. I.e. at ‘political opponents’ for Houthis, many of which is despised by plenty of Yemenis, ‘anyway’. But, that’t not the ‘majority’: ‘average’ people in Houthi/Saleh-controlled areas experience no repression. So, why would they be against?

At the same time, the majority of Hadi-supporters can be found in Aden, not in Sana’a, and all the Yemenis I asked about this agree stress, there are actually very few people who support him ‘even there’. Southern Secessionists (Hirak Movement), Marxists, various Salafists, and transnational Wahhabists (aka Jihadists) of the AQAP are at least as numerous in the south of Yemen as ‘Hadi-supporters’. This really shouldn’t be a big secret (and is one of reasons why Houthis/Saleh eventually lost the battle for Aden and adjacent areas, in addition to military might of the Saudi-led coalition and its cooperation with Hirak, Salafists etc.).

Anyway, further conclusions for popularity of the Houthi/Saleh coalition can be found when examining to which side Yemeni military units sided: out of about 90 brigade-sized units existent as of February-March 2015, over 60 went to Houthi/Saleh side, while only some 4, maximum of 6, sided with Hadi (few others sided with the Islah Party, few with the Hirak Movement, few remained neutral, and few were overrun by the AQAP).

Overall: no I do not say it’s the ‘same’ like with Daesh-supporters in Mosul. I would say there are far less Daesh-supporters in Mosul than there are Houthi/Saleh supporters in Sana’a and similar places (even n Ta’iz).