The Strategic Return on US Investment in Ukraine

by Benjamin Cook

A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Support to Ukraine in the Russo-Ukrainian War

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Executive Summary

As of early 2025, the United States has committed approximately $185 billion in total assistance to Ukraine, encompassing military aid, economic stabilization, humanitarian support, and security cooperation. This white paper evaluates the strategic return on that investment, estimating that the United States has received between $778.7 billion and $1.66 trillion in direct and indirect benefits.

By degrading a near-peer adversary’s military capability, gaining unprecedented battlefield intelligence, and accelerating the testing and development of advanced weapons systems, the U.S. is realizing a Return on Strategic Investment (ROSI) of 321% to 797%. This figure rivals or exceeds the strategic value generated by Cold War containment, and it has been achieved without deploying American troops into combat.

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1. Introduction

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, U.S. support has been framed largely in moral, political, or ideological terms — a defense of sovereignty, democracy, and the rules-based international order.

This paper reframes the issue through a strategic lens: Ukraine is not simply a recipient of American aid — it is a combat-proven accelerator of U.S. strategic interests.

By supporting Ukraine, the United States has helped:

● Severely degrade Russia’s conventional military strength;

● Expose critical Russian doctrine, systems, and weaknesses;

● Train and refine autonomous and AI-enabled battlefield systems;

● Accelerate weapons R&D and real-world iteration; and

● Enhance deterrence against future aggression by near-peer competitors.

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2. Methodology

Valuation is based on a comparative analysis of:

● Historical U.S. expenditures in high-intensity conflicts;

● DoD and GAO estimates for R&D cost per weapons system;

● Defense industry pricing and foreign military sales (FMS) reports;

● NATO intelligence reports, OSINT data, and AI training benchmarks;

● RAND, CSIS, and SIPRI estimates of strategic deterrence and adversary degradation.

Figures are triangulated using open-source and government data, adjusted for inflation and normalized to 2025 USD.

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3. Strategic Return Estimates

The following table summarizes the strategic value of Ukraine’s partnership, based on documented battlefield outcomes and defense impact.

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4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Battlefield AI Dataset ($25B–$100B)

Ukraine provides the world’s most robust collection of real-world, labeled data on enemy armor, infantry positions, EW signatures, camouflage, and damaged states. This dataset is a cornerstone for:

● Training vision-based AI on drones and loitering munitions;

● Improving automated BDA (Battle Damage Assessment);

● Enabling on-device, edge AI processing for ISR platforms.

Commercial equivalents cost tens of millions and remain synthetic. Ukraine’s dataset is combat-proven and growing daily.

4.2 Real-World Weapons Testing ($1.7B–$6.5B/year)

Testing new weapons and countermeasures in combat normally requires years of simulation and bureaucratic hurdles. Ukraine enables:

● Real-time feedback from frontline operators;

● Rapid battlefield iteration and adjustment;

● Data on performance in EW-contested, urban, and mixed-terrain environments.

This accelerates not only development but also doctrinal validation.

4.3 Russian Military Degradation ($500B–$1T)

Russia has suffered extraordinary losses:

● Over 3,000 tanks;

● Thousands of IFVs, artillery systems, and air defense units;

● Dozens of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters;

● Strategic naval assets in the Black Sea;

● Irreplaceable personnel losses among elite units (VDV, Spetsnaz).

To replicate these outcomes via direct U.S. force would have required a war on the scale of Iraq or Korea.

4.4 Exposure of Russian Systems ($50B–$150B)

NATO has acquired deep visibility into:

● Russian EW platforms (e.g., Krasukha-4, Leer-3);

● Air defense systems (S-300, S-400 performance and vulnerabilities);

● Drone doctrine and ISR limitations;

● Tactical communications and logistics under fire.

These insights feed directly into U.S. and allied military modeling and allow for targeted modernization and deception planning.

4.5 Strategic Deterrence ($100B+)

Lessons from Ukraine shape the next decade of deterrence planning:

● Taiwan contingency logistics;

● Baltic corridor reinforcement;

● Maritime security in the Black Sea and Arctic.

Avoiding surprise or underestimation in a future war could save hundreds of billions in corrective defense measures.

4.6 Foreign Military Sales ($1B–$5B)

Combat validation boosts the global demand for:

● HIMARS (Poland, Taiwan, Romania, Latvia);

● Javelin and NLAW;

● Drones and C-UAS systems;

● Defensive radars and AI targeting software.

U.S. defense exports benefit directly — as do industrial base expansion and allied interoperability.

4.7 Geopolitical Impact ($100B–$300B)

Russia’s international influence is at its lowest in decades:

● Arms sales to India, Egypt, and Southeast Asia are collapsing;

● BRICS coordination is weakened;

● Western sanctions and corporate exits have reduced long-term Russian GDP and global engagement potential.

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5. Conclusion

Support for Ukraine is not just the right thing to do — it is the smartest strategic investment the U.S. has made in decades. For a one-time outlay of $185 billion over three years, the U.S. has:

● Avoided direct war with a near-peer adversary;

● Accelerated battlefield AI and military innovation;

● Degraded Russian military capacity by decades;

● Shaped global deterrence against China, Iran, and North Korea;

● Strengthened alliances and defense exports.

This is not foreign aid. It is a return-focused investment in American power, security, and long-term dominance.

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Appendix: Selected References

● RAND Corporation. War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable (2015)

● CSIS. Loitering Munitions and the Future of Warfare (2023)

● SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

● Oryx. Russia Equipment Losses Tracker (2022–2025)

● U.S. Department of Defense. AI Strategy (2022)

● IMF. Russian Economic Outlook Reports (2022–2024)

● Atlantic Council. Sanctions Tracker

● DSCA. Foreign Military Sales Reports

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Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and related topics. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.

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