The Saga of Ukraine and F-16s: Quick Reaction Alert (a.k.a. 'Part 4')

It’s already the Part 4 of this feature… or a series of features - but I’m still not discussing how are Ukrainians going to use their F-16s, you say? At least for the start…?

OK… so, how are they going to do that?

Don’t worry: this is NO actual photo. Just a ‘CGI’ (computer generated image) of something like F-16C in PSU’s colours and markings… ‘for illustration purposes’…

Actually… and that’s one of ironies of this entire affair: under the current conditions in Ukraine, one simply can’t expect the PSU to deploy its F-16s in a very different fashion than it’s already deploying its MiG-29s and Su-27s.

The principal reason will be that about GenStab-U, its generals, the resulting procedures, which I’ve already discussed so much in Parts 1, 2, and 3., plus the – de-facto unavoidable - ‘conflict within the PSU’,

Mind the following: yes, sure (indeed: 1000% certain), Ukrainian F-16-pilots are going to return to Ukraine with their ‘new’ (ages-old) jets, their minds full of knowledge and crispy-fresh from their training, and thus having their heads full of corresponding procedures. They’re going to know, or at least have very specific ideas, how to deploy their aircraft in combat.

But, who’s said the generals commanding the force, their wing commanders, and their ground controllers are going to know how to do that – with F-16s?

They surely know about MiG-29s, and Su-25s, and Su-27s… and then Soviet-style… I’ve got no doubts about that. But: F-16s…?

….which would be crucial, actually, because in the PSU the standard procedure is for commanders and ground controllers to tell pilots how to do their job. And, well, unless there are written procedures… which would be the task of the GenStab-U…

…sigh… after reading the Overture, and the Procedures part of this analysis, perhaps also the ‘update’ from 25 July (just to make sure)…I guess you’ve got the picture by now.

Oh, and: if you belong to those still wondering about that with ‘generals’ and ‘procedures’, and ‘commanders’… you think the PSU is the only one with such problems?

How cute!

Here’s a memorable example. Early 1986. The 48^th Tactical Fighter Wing of the US Air Force – a unit based at Lakenheath Air Force Base in Great Britain, and equipped with General Dynamics F-111F light bombers, was preparing for a ‘super’-mission: fly over 3,000km to Tripoli, in Libya, and target the headquarters of Muammar el-Qaddaffi, Libyan ‘leader’… Now, in the US Air Force of the time, it was on wing-commander’s staff to select weaponry, routes etc. Not on crews actually flying the mission. And, in this case, not even on them: instead, first the commander of the USAF Europe, and then the White House became insistent on ‘delivering really big bang’. Correspondingly, F-111F-crews received the orders to use 1,000kg-heavy GBU-10 laser-guided bombs. Actually, the crews would’ve preferred the much lighter, and much more precise, 250kg-heavy GBU-12s. Because, between others, their own exercises have shown that GBU-10s were constantly undershooting: hitting the ground some 50 metres short of the target. But nah: who were crews actually flying the mission to say? No way: ultimately, it was the White House who said it wants ‘big bang, period’.

And so it was April 1986, and the F-111Fs flew the mission all the way from Lakenheath, around the Iberian Peninsula and via Gibraltar, all the way to Tripoli – armed with GBU-10s, of course. By side that several jets aborted before reaching Tripoli due to technical issues, but: the formation lost a jet and a crew of two shot down and killed by Libyan air defences, and the mass of their GBU-10s missed the target. Fell 40-100 metres short of it. (It wasn’t like there was a direct order, ‘kill Q’, but fact is: he survived.)

For comparison: the US Navy’s part of the mission (air strike on Benghazi; marked with a small red arrow to the right, on the map above) was planned the ‘US Navy style’. Read: by a Lieutenant Junior Grade (lowest officer rank in the US Navy), and then one fresh out of initial training on Grumman A-6E Intruder light bombers – but, also: one of people actually flying the mission. Not ‘somebody up the chain of command’. To keep long story a short one: the jets went in, few suffered technical malfunctions, yes, but: all have reached their targets, all dropped their bombs on target, and all returned safely back to their aircraft carriers.

Ah, you prefer an example not related to the USA?

Even better…

See Iraqi Air Force (IrAF). As of 1986-1988, this was commanded by two highly experienced and competent generals that understood the technology they’ve had on hand and have developed corresponding procedures. Indeed, one of them spent something like 14 years of his life building-up the IrAF as it was of that period. As a result, the IrAF was ranging down the entire Persian Gulf, or deep into the well-protected Iranian airspace. Sure, time and again it would suffer losses to the Iranian air defences, but ultimately, it destroyed the Iranian capability to keep the country – and thus its armed forces – supplied with fuels. So much so, eventually, Tehran was forced to accept an UN-mediated cease-fire.

Two years later: all the generals understanding the IrAF’s technology and thus its capabilities were retired. Instead, Saddam Hussein appointed his cousin as commander of the air force. Because that gent was a MiG-21-pilot, and a colonel in rank. Of course, a colonel never flying anything else than MiG-21s in his life couldn’t even imagine what is a ‘KARI integrated air defence system’, nor what can a ‘Dassault Mirage F.1EQ-5’ do with, for example, ‘Cyrel ESM-pod’, ‘Remora ECM-pod’ and ‘AS.30L laser-guided missiles’, and that 600+ kilometres away from its base (even less so, ‘following multiple in-flight refuellings from other Mirages’…)

Think about it: how the heck was the poor guy supposed to know, where the ‘most advanced’ jet he ever flew was actually equipped with a quasi-radar, four short-range air-to-air missiles, next to no navigation aids, and only enough fuel to remain airborne for 40-45 minutes?

What a surprise, in January 1991, the IrAF was smashed within less than a week of war…

***

With other words: once again, procedures are dictating everything. Procedures are created by generals, and if there is a problem with the two…. and then also a problem with commanders not understanding the technology and people they are supposed to command…

…nah, you don’t want to be around when there are problems of that kind. In the worst-case scenario, you get the ‘Egyptian air force of June 1967’.

Therefore, the next actual step in the deployment of F-16s in Ukraine by the Ukrainian air force, will be for pilots operating the type to FIRST find a way to teach their generals, their wing-commanders, and ground controllers, what their F-16s can, and what they can’t do.

If you think that’s easy: haha!

Think about some super-turbo-clever GENERAL letting himself ‘get humiliated by some pilot there’ while taught about how to command…

Thus, the hope is slim… but…sigh… lets hope for the best and hope they (Ukrainian F-16-pilots) can do so – at least without any losses, ‘first’…

***

But, OK! After discussing such factors exercising strong influence upon the delivery of F-16 to Ukraine, and their service entry there, like the institutionalised (indeed: ‘highly professional’) Western political- and strategic incompetence, Ukrainian wishful thinking (plus wishful thinking of ‘armies’ of Western Experten), NATO and Ukrainian generals, and resulting procedures in the ZSU and the PSU (or the lack of updated ones), and brigade/wing commanders, and all the resulting delays in deliveries, and all the delays in training, and all the delays in establishing bases with at least a bare minimum of maintenance infrastructure in Ukraine….sigh…

….OK, now lets say F-16s are there, in Ukraine. Pilots and ground personnel are trained and ready. Bases, fuel, spares, ammo, ground crews are ready. And the Ukrainians are about to use them (probably with ‘significant doses’ of some sort of ‘contractor support’ from the West, at least for maintenance-related issues and for the first few years)…

***

Thesis No. 1: Quick Reaction Alert

From what one can read in the social media, it appears that the ‘most logical’, perhaps even the ‘simplest’ method of introducing F-16s to operational service with the PSU is going to be through deploying them for air defence purposes. Indeed, it seems that something like majority of Experten and monitors agree: Ukrainian F-16s are first going to bolster PSU’s ground-based air defences.

And, indeed: when one checks something like ‘historic precedents’ for similar cases, it turns out there was a number of air forces doing something similar under similar circumstances. This is where the IrAF is coming to my mind again. As of 1977, when Iraq ordered Mirage F.1s from France, its air force was almost entirely equipped with Soviet-made types. MiG-21s, MiG-23s, Su-20s, Su-22s, etc. Indeed, some of IrAF-veterans like to say the IrAF was ‘dominated by the Sukhoi mafia’… so much so, when Baghdad placed an order for Mirages in Paris, there were not only few IrAF officers wondering how’s ‘such a fragile’ aircraft (like they thought the Mirage F.1 was) going to survive in the local climate, and they were all sure: the type was about to get easily shot down because it’s got no similar built-in survivability like that ‘tank’ of a combat aircraft known like Su-20 or Su-22…

And then, once Mirages began arriving in Iraq, starting in 1981, their first task was to stand ‘quick reaction alert’ (QRA), and get scrambled whenever another formation of McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II fighter-bombers of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) was about to thunder into the Iraqi airspace at extremely low altitude, to bomb yet another facility of the Iraqi oil industry…. Now, by 1981, the tempo of such Iranian air strikes was down to something like ‘one a week’. Thus, the tempo of Iraqi Mirage ops was rather mundane, too. Which, in turn, offered plenty of time for their ground crews to learn to maintain their new Mirages, and – especially – to clean their air bases (see: hangars, taxiways, runways etc.) well enough to operate it safely – which, obviously, is going to be something the PSU’s ground crews will have to learn to do for F-16s, too. Similarly, Iraqi generals began learning how and where to deploy their Mirages in combat. And their ground controllers have followed in fashion. At least for air defence purposes…

And so, it’s logical – at least at the first look – to conclude that the situation of Ukraine is not that much different from Iraq in 1981: foremost, the country’s air defences really need being bolstered, otherwise its energy sector isn’t going to survive the coming winter… just like the Iraqi oil industry was so demolished by the IRIAF’s Phantoms that it didn’t fully recover even as of 1990, two years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War…

OK. The ‘Thesis No.1’ is something like, ‘Ukrainian F-16s are going to serve air defence purposes, first’. Which in turn means: they’re going to ‘stand quick reaction alert’. Be ready to get scrambled on short note (5-15 minutes within alarm being sounded) and then go intercepting whatever comes their way - with air-to-air missiles, for example.

A Dutch F-16AM standing QRA at one of bases in the Netherlands. Notably: despite peace in the EU/NATO, the jet is fully armed. You can be sure: it’s fully refuelled, too. I.e. ready to ‘fight a war’. Visible on the right side is the pilot, seen running towards the jet to embark and quickly scramble.

Now, I haven’t seen Adrien’s summary for June, yet, but… well, the Russians are meanwhile so short on cruise missiles, that back in May, they have run exactly three big air strikes including these. In this month, it was even less (so far… and the one on children hospitals of 8 July was ‘more than enough’, that’s sure). And so, lets say, there are 12 F-16s in Ukraine, and 14-16 trained pilots for them. Well, something is telling me that this is unlikely to really work. Mind this: if they try to ‘gain combat experience and confidence’ in F-16 at that tempo, they might get three flights a month, each. And then they will still have to be lucky to be vectored appropriately (by the ground control), so to actually catch any of cruise missiles, or Shaheds, and open fire…

But OK. At least the F-16AM does have a slightly better radar than either MiG-29 or Su-27 (even if shorter-ranged than that of the Su-27P, for example). Foremost, it’s got a (far) more ergonomic cockpit, which translates into: it’s easier to use, especially in engagement with medium-range air-to-air missiles (and then especially in comparison to the Su-27). Indeed, its radar might also been so much improved meanwhile, that it might become capable of pursuing and engaging the Russian cruise missiles and Shaheds from longer ranges than either MiG-29 or Su-27 can do. Which means, just for example: cases where a jet is lost because it collided with the wreckage of the downed Russian missile or attack UAV are less likely to occur.

That far, everything’s fine.

….just… wait: let’s check the map of the latest Russian big-style Shahed-strike: the one from the night of 20-21 July:

Now, for many, all of these curvy lines across the map of Ukraine might not mean much. For me… hm… can’t find my own articles in question right now, but: do you recall what I’ve reported about the Russian cruise-missile strikes sometimes the last year?

It was the story about the Russians sending their cruise missiles and Shaheds forward, into the Ukrainian-controlled airspace, and then following these with high-flying MiG-31s, which were then releasing R-37Ms from ranges of 150-200 kilometres away? Have shot down a few of Ukrainian MiG-29s that way, already back in autumn 2022…

Now, check the map above again, and check the ranges: For example, from the Russo-Ukrainian border in the Sumy area, to, say, Nizhyn…. Say, an area where the PSU would be likely to scramble and then ‘position’ its F-16s to intercept that Shahed-stream approaching from the Kursk area… that’s some 170km or so…?

Certainly within the range of R-37M - even if fired from within the Russian airspace, and especially if fired from inside the Russian airspace, by a MiG-31BM underway at some 15,000m and Mach 2….

A still from a video showing a high-flying MiG-31 in the process of launching its R-33 or R-37 long-range air-to-air missiles.

With other words: even if they couldn’t find F-16s on their home-bases, somewhere in western Ukraine, the Russians must be expected to come to the idea to organise something like ‘field days’ for their MiG-31-crews. At least to have plenty of opportunities to use their missile-strikes and attack-UAVs for the purpose of ‘luring’ PSU’s F-16s into ambushes by R-37-equipped MiG-31s. Has happened in the past with Ukrainian MiG-29s and Su-27s: there’s no reason to expect the Russians to abandon such opportunities in the future.

Especially not with such a Shahed-strike run ‘shallow’ into Ukraine: one primarily targeting objects east of Dnipro, for example.

Finally, word is the ZSU meanwhile has up to 30,000 troops assigned to its ‘mobile air defence teams’. I mean  those guys (and girls) driving 4WD-‘technicals’ around, mounting heavy machine guns, and shooting down Shaheds and cruise missiles. Now, I’m not sure if they are really ’30,000’, but:  gauging by the size of the country, and how much space and how many objects need defence, that’s at least within possible. Moreover, especially when combined with latest electronic warfare systems, all of them combined are meanwhile quite effective. Or, at least, that’s what the PSU wants us to believe. And, the best part of all: even if there are really so many of such troops: they all – combined – certainly cost less than the introduction to service of F-16s…

With other words: OK, yes, and again; that with ‘standing QRA’ and ‘flying air defence for Ukraine’ as first tasks for PSU’s F-16s does sound perfectly logical. But, if this is really a way to go – and that at the time the ZSU is still crucially short on artillery and mortar ammunition (which is unlikely to significantly change, any time soon)….?

Hm…