Yeah, Putin's in a tight spot and seems to have concluded some time back that his only way out is forward. Hence the mountains of corpses. When he finally sees that all that meat won't suffice in Ukraine, he'll probably double down with a strike on Europe rather than retreat. He doubled down after Kharkiv's retreat. A nihilist streak in dictators, perhaps from the loneliness and fear, standing at the top of the mountain of corpses. He will surely go nuclear before retreating. Perhaps kill billions before going to hell alone.
The strike on Europe will become necessary once the narrative that they're winning in Ukraine becomes untenable. That may be soon. Those poor devils still signing up to become drone absorbers in the Donbass, and their misplaced bravery to run in suicide assaults - that may be the only thing still standing between reality and Putin's delusion. The last glass that once shattered, will leave only the EU strike to nuclear tunnel.
As unfair as it may sound after all the suffering he has caused, the best outcome for those still alive is probably a safe haven for him, in North Korea or some african dictator he propped up.
Without Donbass there is no solid Ukrainian defence West of Dnyepr - thus it is the CoG of the Russian army - you should read 2nd world war books - there are lot of parallelities
That's correct. That's why the unconquered part of Donetsk oblast' is so important to both sides and such a sticking point in any peace deal.
There's a lot of blood in that soil, which changed hands several times, in the most brutal way, during WWII, starting 20 October 1941 when the Germans first took Kramatorsk. The most dramatic chapter of this story was the German Donetsk Campaign, starting Feb 1943, which culminated in the Third Battle of Kharkov, the greatest feat of arms of the war, in my view, and the Germans' last significant offensive success. Pitting the war's two greatest commanders against each other, Erich von Manstein vs. Rokossovsky.
There are indeed a lot of parallels. Except that, sadly, Ukraine does not have any von Mainstein, nor any Rokossovsky.
"Except that, sadly, Ukraine does not have any von Mainstein, nor any Rokossovsky." I can't believe what I'm reading. Have you never heard of a certain Oleksandr Stanislavovych Syrski?
Actually it is good that you brought up von Manstein and Rokossovsky - indeed they were outstanding Military leaders (even compared with some over-hyped theatre generals of the WW2).
Comments on Syrski are fair - he is not an asset but a liability however we should call out a few underlying conditions:
- apparently Ukrainian political leadership can define short term politican priorities constantly over-writing military logic
- Syrski took over exactly at that point when Ukraine lost opportunity to regain strategic initiative
- the West-NATO did precious little to help but watching the Russian adaptation at levels from tactical to operational and strategic (yes there is now a global strategy in the eastern Block - which is more than alarming
- Sirski's micro management is a disaster but just calling this out is one sided: West Point articles are there calling out the immediate need to adjust the US Military Doctrine which is now obsolete - Russian operational level adopted to the operational art of constant shifts of pressures within the theatre without loosing the overall focus around CoG...that is something the NATO planners cannot practise as there are eg in the UK army like 3-4 brigades which could be leveraged ín a NATO exercise - so how do we want to practise coordination among half a dozen army corps - that requires practice and experience... Syrski in a way is just hiding the systematic problems lying deeper - the symptomes are there and we need to read them
Wow, what an insightful comment. I actually rather agree with this. Tom's passionate criticism of Syrsky I find pretty persuasive, but I keep in mind always that you can't really finally judge a military leader until decades after the war is over. It's not possible to understand what any given military leader had to work with until the archives have been declassified and opened, passions have cooled, and real historians have sifted through the mass of data.
It's easy to criticize a military leader who is losing, and easy to praise one who is winning (Tom doesn't do that in this case). We don't have nearly all the data to know all the reasons for the loss, or to know which were the main ones, out of all of them. Syrsky has a very poor hand of cards -- catastrophically few people (and the recruiting fiasco is not his fault), not enough materiel, and political leadership which constantly interferes.
It will be interesting to see how history treats him - if we live long enough. Probably poorly, probably much as Tom describes it, but we can't be completely sure, since there is a vast amount we simply can't know at this point.
Unlike the utter disregard he seems to have for other people's lives, he does seem to value his own life quite a bit, never getting near the front, running away from Moscow as soon as Prigojin approached.
Imagine you find yourself in an alley with 32 people trying to stab you. You have a bomb and a knife. If you use a knife, you are dead. If you use a bomb there is some chance you might survive. Which one do you use ?
Depends on the bomb. A tactical bomb means you are alive but only for a few more months as your security services and military finally join force and shoot you behind a building and bury you in a ditch.
A Strategic nuke means you are dead within the hour. You are the first thing targeted. Even if you are on your doomsday plane, you don't make it an hour.
Google "pattern of life." You can't be a national leader and not have a HUGE digital footprint that leaves a trail to be followed. Putin knows he is the first Russian to die in any Strategic exchange.
You are personalizing the problem to include only Putin. This is not a Putin problem. If you have a nuclear armed state that is in a situation of existential crises, about to be overwhelmed and crushed by foreign militaries, do you think the chance of nukes being used is 0 ? It is not.
What military is going into Russia other than Ukraine?
NATO is a defensive organization. It can barely tie it's shoes in the morning. It can't plan and execute an offensive. The only thing it can do is call a meeting, hold off an invading Russia for 30 days, and wait for the US to show up.
"NATO" as the enemy of Russia is made up propaganda.
You are talking about an enemy that doesn't exist. An existential crisis that doesn't exist. The USSR faced an existential crisis when it collapsed. It didn't destroy the world when it did.
When Putin's Russia collapses, it will go much the same way. And once again, "loose nukes" will be the real concern. Not a preemptive launch.
NATO is a "defensive organization"?! Really? List the defensive wars NATO has fought. Now list the offensive ones. And get back to us when you've figured it out.
You and I are speculating here -- it's never happened, so who knows?
But I can tell you that our military planners, our nuclear doctrine, assumes exactly what you say. It has been our strategic policy for the better part of a century, not to push a nuclear power into an existential crisis.
We most certainly do NOT assume, as a matter of strategic doctrine, that the risk is zero, or anything close to zero.
What existential crisis? NATO is not bombing russia, is not invading russia, is not doing anything about the shadow fleet, still allows russian 'fishing' vessels to dock in NATO ports, does not shoot down russian drones flying for hours over NATO territory, does not react when russia firebombs cargo jets on NATO territory.
Does not react when russia initiates cyber attacks, or when russia commits chemical warfare on NATO territory.
Get a grip, NATO is not inherently aggressive, russia is.
And there is another reason why peace will create a serious problem: Russian soldiers returning from the war in Ukraine have killed or injured more than 1,000 people inside Russia since the invasion began nearly four years ago, according to a review of court rulings by the exiled news outlet Vyorstka
And the supply of weapons brought back from the front isn't controlled at all, I suspect.
An awful lot of really bad, or really disturbed (or both) people in Russia have access to a LOT of exceptionally lethal devices. Not just guns, of course, but long range, armed, FPV drones, missiles, mines, etc.. Anything that can be smuggled home will be in someone's house in Russia at this point. Piss any of those people off enough (and in may cases that includes simply existing) and those weapons will be brought to bear.
Different set of values. RU does not care. There is Russian folklore: "Ivan died, and to hell with him".
Safety could be a the serious issue if and when the government decide it is. Then all these "veterans" will have a choise, take a carrot and shut up or go to jail and disappear. For this exact purpose there are like 5,000,000 "siloviks" in Russia, bunch of cops and agents from a dozen "law enforcement agencies", people with guns & a law behind them.
This is - another - great summary. My problem is that we always forget the framework setting of the xxi century - this is a much more heated cold war 2.0 which means we cannot see Russia alone as a sole actor.
China had a lot of challenges around 15 years ago. They recognized that the USA weaken and isolate strategy will hit them sooner or later. They also realized that the rules based world order can be used as a hybid weapon. They had a lot of strategic exposures: - no force projection
- deoendency on fossil fuels and sea lanes
- no battle hardened Military strength
- problems with aging and family model (you cannot afford to have high casualties if the families have one child...typically)
So having Russia as a proxy force and abundant energy source - As well as hartland secure routes with other proxy forces - helped China to act as a real near peer force not globally but in the Pacific region.
So as Russia is weaker it is more and more built into the Chinese ecosphere - loosing its strategic independence
The problem for the West that Trump is also cash cowing Europe thus it is resulting again an instable duel - power struggle. European leaders are crying out that as early as 2028-29 Russia will be ready to attack European NATO - well the date is correct but the date is not related to Russian abilities or actions but the Chinese area denial - which would neutralize US Navy the first time in 80 years
Absolutely spot on assessment. The execution of the Ceaucescus underlies Putin's paranoid decisions now. Karza-Murza, his jailed opponent said that change in Russia is slow but when it eventually arrives it happens very swiftly, giving for example the 1917 revolution, not the October Coup by Lenin but the popular uprising led by the women of Petersburg and joined by the troops sent to suppress them. It was all over in less than a week, the police hunted down and eliminated by the troops.
Interesting article, now some additional 5 cents from my side:
1) The problem of criminals returning: This is nothing new. That already happened after WWII when MILLIONS of them returned. People like Kopelew and Solzhenitsyn warned of that problem and were kicked out of the communist party. Still it happened and the USSR survived.
2) The longer the war continues the more poverty will rise inside the RF. This is a much bigger problem than in 1945 as most of the population at that time did know only poverty and hardship. Now they did get a taste for a 'normal' life. The elites know that "Gollum" will squeeze them as much as he thinks he has to. So it has to be their goal that the war ends.
3) "Gollum" living in a self created bubble (the usual problem dictators have, as they only accept 'yes sayers') brought himself into an untenable position. Yes he will continue with his obsession to bring back the USSR under a different name, no matter how much it costs OTHERS. No hope that the arse lickers around him will stop him.
4) The RF has to lose otherwise the problem for the world will only get bigger, because that 'cancer' is still growing. The nuclear arms race has started and the longer some idiots are willing to benfit an aggressor the more this planet will become an insecure place.
- Separation tendencies in regions amplified by unevenly distributed burden of the war you have mentioned. (And connected problems with nukes and mass murder chemicals etc.)
- China lust for Russia far east. They may directly annex it on pretext "restoring order" or simply corrupt local officials and lease local lend and buy the local business changing it to de-facto Chinese province.
BTW. I've read rumors that some Chinese press is already "debating" that it would be necessary to "restore the order" in case of "some problems" in the "poorly defended" Russia far east.
You referring to that insidious colonial practice of defining the question, gathering data, and determining conclusions based on consistency with the data?
Great summary of the socio-economic state of things in Russia.
I'm also wondering how Russian society will cope with this "lost generation" - so many killed or maimed or walking-wounded, lost in their prime, from a population that was barely managing population replacement before the war.
Even for ever-stoic Russia, that has to be near impossible to ignore.
I mean immigration is the only answer to all of the industrialised world's demographics problems, but Russia, after what it has done to immigrants in this war (much less in general), would have to be pretty low on the list of places to go for all but the most desperate. And the most desperate are not going to bring into Russia the skills Russia needs to survive as a state, even assuming Putin has gone.
Russia's demographics problem is, in the long run, the real killer of the Russian state. It simply can't survive when there are fewer and fewer people in Russia each year. And while immigration is the answer (at least in the short term) there's no way there will be enough immigration to turn the tide.
Check Russian immigration statistics. For many years, Russia ranked as one of the two top immigration destinations in the world, after the U.S., measured as number of immigrants as a percentage of population.
Russian demographics are below replacement rate, but the birth rate is above the European average. I'm not sure why anyone thinks this is a special problem. Lowest birth rate in the world is actually Ukraine, less than Japan. But I don't think Ukraine will disappear, either.
AI will solve this, probably. If there's not an AI apocalypse in the labor markets as some predict.
A tiny fraction of this carnage in Afghanistan catalysed the downfall of the USSR. These are different times and this war plays to different political tropes and psychological traits. That was the Russo-Japanese War Part II, this is the Great Patriotic War repeating as farce.
The problem with restless demobilised troops can be addressed in several ways other than starting another major war (and this is relevant even if Putin was somehow out of the picture):
- start a small war - e.g. there's several former Soviet republics that are getting too uppity and haven't helped despite treaties or whatever, if this big war fails, it'll be their fault!
- if the current war ends, one of the likely outcomes will be some sort of a border zone that will need to be fortified and guarded, that will keep quite a few men occupied
- not all those men need to return at all - just march them into the thickest Ukrainian defenses and let them do the job for you. This is especially likely for former convicts and similar untrusted personnel...
All of these solutions have their issues but it's likely some of these will used to try and at least reduce the size of the problem.
One of the issues with the "Start a small internal war" notion is that a LOT of the Russian troops are from these small republics and are as likely to join such a rebellion as put it down. It would be a very dangerous game to start down that road.
The peace brings no benefits to Rusia: the sanctions are not lifted, the investments are forbidden and the Russian elite is still not accepte in the West.
So the Russians can choose between hardship with military defeat and hardship with victory. They will stick with Putin.
The agreements discussed so far don’t mention a clean time table for lifting the sanctions. It might be 1 year or 10 years even if Russia fulfills all requirements.
Russian soldiers do not have any authority in the society. People see them as risk takers who are joining the war to make a profit. It can be clearly seen from the social monitoring — for example, majority of the population does not support giving veterans any benefits (tax, mortgage, etc). Russian socity is starkly divided by the wealth level — naive to expect that regular folk will be holding in high regard those who went from rags to riches in the blink of an eye. It just doesn't happen that way.
You are correct to point out that Russians feed on one another. But a charismatic leader who is a war vet can cut through all of that. Russians are not anything if not easily lead by the nose.
It doesn't matter if this theoretical leader can "cut through" social animosity. In modern Russia you just don't get a seat at the power table unless you are a part of the system. Your ceiling is a YT or TG channel with a lot of likes. That's it. And if the amount of likes is getting too large you can't even stay in the country — well, you can but…
Look at Navalny for an illustration. Popular man, probably the most popular opposition leader in our lifetimes. Arrested — nobody bat an eye. Killed — a lot of sad posts and crying at the kitchen tables. Same with Prigojin. Extremely popular — just with very different crowd, military and patriots. People cheered on the streets when he marched to the capital. Killed. And no reaction except stealthily laying flowers to improvised memorials.
And things are much more difficult nowadays compared with Navalny times.
What a load of bullshit. This whole post is prime example of West's projections and wishful thinking. This whole "people will revolt", "Russian elites are not interested in the war" and "economy will collapse soon" just keeps going all since the beginning of the war.
> A negotiated end—especially one short of clear victory—would raise unavoidable questions: Why the casualties? Why the economic hardship? Why the defacto-mobilization? Why the lies? These questions are manageable during war. They are much less so in peace.
There is no one worth considering who will ask these questions. In fact, these questions are being asked every day with exactly zero effect (apart from more people fined or imprisoned). Putin and siloviki who are the actual "elites" know this very well and give exactly zero fucks about such questions.
> Elites are looking for the door.
Would be nice to have a proof of that. "Elites" in Russia can be understood differently depending on the context. There are "economic" elites, sometimes they are also being called "oligarchs" in Western media and then there is "government" ruling the country. The latter are siloviki (effectively former KGB). The economics elites were completely subjugated by them in early-mid 2010s and have near-zero influence on policy and politics.
The economic elites _might_ be looking for the door, but if they are doing so, they are doing it in silence. We do not observe any attempts of exit apart from those that were done in the very beginning of the war and were few. We know that some high-profile managers in several corporations committed exit through the window, so this might be the reason.
The KGB elites, on the other hand, are definitely not looking for any exit. In fact, they are looking the enter even deeper and we observe preparations for prolonged period of eternal war: implementation of total control over internet, banking system, surveillance state, censorship, limitation of economic mobility, propaganda in education and making the education system less accessible overall, economy mobilization, etc.
> Putin and the elites are scared to bring home a war-torn, abused, and lied-to army.
No they are not. A bunch of traumatized alcoholics only are problem for the regular people in their immediate surroundings. At worst, they are _maybe_ capable of organizing into gangs to extort local business for money. In reality, this will likely happen, but the gangs will be controlled by the KGB. Again, not an issue for neither Putin nor Russian "elites".
In Russia the army is not represented in politics and the government for exactly the reason described in the post - that would be a threat to those in power. This approach was started by Stalin after the end of WW2 and has been successfully carried over to the present. That time Zhukov and the army were a legitimate political threat, modern army returning from Urkaine is not. And the army of then was successfully neutralized there is zero doubts that this one will be as well.
> The Russian military—despite catastrophic losses—is lionized by Russian society. Soldiers are portrayed as heroes defending the nation against the West.
No they are not outside of the most blatant state propaganda. Russian society is split approximately 20% - 60% - 20% on the spectrum of strongly support the war - don't care - strongly oppose. Only the first 20% "lionize" the soldiers. The rest is either afraid of them or hates them. There is zero moral authority in people killing other people for money, which how they are perceived by the majority.
And so on and so forth. The KGB is totally fine with current state of affairs. There is no danger to them in the near and mid term. Worsening economy is no problem for them. Maybe in the long run (in 10+ years) if things will continue as they are, it will lead to a system collapse, but there is always a space for manoeuvre and controlled exit (simplifying things: we will stop the war/harassing you - you will left the sanctions and the money will start flowing in again). Since the West doesn't have resolve to actually push the system to the brink, and the KGB knows that, they are free to continue as long as they please because they know they can exit any time if it will become to dangerous, and there will be no recourse of consequences for them.
EDIT: the above doesn't mean that Russia will continue to fight untill the last soldier on either side is capable of holding a rifle. Putin and the KGB might decide that it's enough and wrap it up. But this will not be because they are afraid of consequences, face domestic revolt or want to leave the economy in at least a decent shape. This will be because for some reason they concluded that it's better to stop but these reasons have very little to do with described (non-)factors.
Why exactly do you think I'm a paid troll? You probably mean that I'm paid by Russia? Then try to read my post again and realize which conclusions follow from it.
In case this is not obvious: since KGB doesn't give a shit about economy, rules, opposition or whatever, the only way to stop them is military defeat combined with the toughest sanctions possible as a supplemental measure. I don't think this fits Kremlin narrative.
I don't think there is a need to engage with the comment either, since properly discussing these points involves hours and hours of work and research - the time neither of us has. This is because the topics like people's attitude towards the war are complex and subjective, and both the post and my comment only make generalized statements that are hard to prove/disprove in a short post format. They are a product of a prior experience in ingestion of the content though, and might very well be that we just consumed content from different information bubbles.
However, I do want to apologize for the tone of my comment, especially given that this is "friendly fire" in the space that is infested by real Russian trolls. I'm not sure why I got so triggered with this post, I usually try to maintain polite attitude. Whilst I believe that the essence of my comment is correct, but the form is poor and therefore doesn't contribute to the topic or to the greater good. Especially given the valuable work Ben (usually) does.
Just out of curiosity where do you come up with a 20% - 60% - 20% split from? My impression is that the first percentage figure actually rose over the years whereas the last percentage figure is just not there (especially after "the Kursk detour")
Indeed, regardless of the outcome of the SMO, Russia stands to face many challenges next few years. Putin INSISTS on social lifts for veterans. Bringing the operation to a meaningful conclusion will be his legacy for many years, as he will soon be transferring power to his successor.
But I concur with your reaction to the analysis above. Many mistakes (e.g., real incomes increased in 2024 and 2025, and so on) For obvious reasons, there is next to none Russia expertise in the west these days.
> Just out of curiosity where do you come up with a 20% - 60% - 20% split from?
This a rough approximation of the opinion spectrum rather than exact number. This is short form of the following distribution: Russian society in general is inert and atomized with the main focus for most of people on their own life and immediate surroundings [1]. They are indifferent to any issues that do not affect them personally. Their opinion is shaped not by own values, but rather by whatever people with higher social status say (typically from TV or state media), but they don't really hold on to it, won't act on it and will accept whatever sway that may come. They comprise the majority and they are in the middle of the distribution. They are at least 2x or 3x more of them than people that have strong own opinion about politics.
On the opposite sides of the distribution are those who strongly support or oppose the war, these people are in minority relative to the "don't care" camp.
The above is why the middle is more "fat" than the edges.
If we'll try to compare sizes of "party of war" vs "party of piece", we'll have a hard time because the former enjoy safety when stating their opinion in the polls, so the data will inevitably skewed in their "favor". The attitude is also highly variable across different demographic groups (50+ are several times more likely to support the war than <25). Also some part of the opposition fled the country. Therefore I'm hesitant to assign different sizes to these two groups, too much speculations here.
Here is a summary of the trends from Levada [2]. It broadly agrees with several other researches that I met but already forgot. There they state that during the war time those who openly oppose it were 18-20% of the society. It's worth reading the article to better understand the distribution, keeping in mind that any sociology is limited in modern day Russia.
[1] This distribution is true for any country, but in Russia it's especially pronounced because of the Soviet past and propaganda policy of the last 10 years.
"... на всем протяжении конфликта о полной, безоговорочной поддержке российских военных говорят заметно меньше людей — в среднем порядка 45% респондентов (ответы «полностью поддерживаю»)... Еще порядка 30% россиян выбирают ответы «скорее поддерживаю» — это более слабая поддержка с различными оговорками..." And further down below - "«сильная», бескомпромиссная антивоенная позиция характерна для 8–9% россиян"
To be duly noted "...в среднем порядка 52% россиян регулярно высказывались за переход к мирным переговорам (максимальные 58% наблюдались летом 2024 года на протяжении двух месяцев перед наступлением украинской армии на Курскую область)."
"Говоря о поддержке российских военных, люди прежде всего имеют в виду поддержку «своих», нежели поддержку военных действий как таковых. Респонденты иногда даже удивлялись вопросу: «А кого же нам еще поддерживать?» Это «наши мальчики», «наши воины», «мы поддерживаем своих»; ..."
And then
"... На всем протяжении конфликта доля россиян, которые открыто не поддерживают действия российских военных, составляла в среднем порядка 18–20% ..."
"... Так, «сильная», бескомпромиссная антивоенная позиция характерна для 8–9% россиян — это люди с наиболее последовательными и хорошо оформленными антивоенными убеждениями.
...
Оставшиеся 9–10% россиян демонстрируют скорее слабое, менее последовательное несогласие с позицией российской власти по Украине, которое совсем необязательно сопровождается проукраинскими и прозападными симпатиями.
"
Like I said, it's complicated and there is a lot of nuance. Depending on what exact questions you ask you get slightly different numbers. Above the difference is between "supporting "our guys"" and support of the war itself.
Personally, I don't think that these distinctions are important, the general picture holds: one minority strongly opposing the war, another strongly supporting it, and amorphous majority (which naturally tends to lean towards support in the polls given the oppressive atmosphere) in between. This is why I lost any faith in Russian people and stopped caring about the fate of the country. This is just sad.
>> In Russia the army is not represented in politics and the government for exactly the reason described in the post - that would be a threat to those in power. This approach was started by Stalin after the end of WW2 and has been successfully carried over to the present. That time Zhukov and the army were a legitimate political threat, modern army returning from Urkaine is not. And the army of then was successfully neutralized there is zero doubts that this one will be as well.
AFAIK, it is - to the degree where the mass of Russian military officers I happen to know, cannot understand how can a MOD be a civilian, like this is meanwhile a custom in 'the West'.
...is also the reason why Putin then created himself the Rosgvardia, and is nowadays taking care this to be better (and heavier) equipped than the SV (Ground Forces of the VSRF): to keep his backside safe from any coup-attempts.
Agree with the great post by Nameless One (minus 1st sentence). Putin is in a win–win position now.
He can carry on a war of attrition for many more years without even the slightest hiccup from the population or the economy. He is losing about 10,000 troops a month (buggy- and bike-mounted useless, jobless alcoholics, really—another win), but Ukraine is losing troops at the same rate, and it is a country four times smaller.
The economy is doing fine. The Russian Federation is not the USSR; it is not going to run out of bread and butter—it has a market-based economy. And the population is very flexible. I was there in 1998 when the Ruble fell fourfold against the dollar within two weeks (and all salaries and prices were tied to the USD). People just carried on, starting that Monday four times poorer.
"-Daddy, are you going to drink 4 times less now? -No, But you all are going to eat 4 times less!".
Less income = more vatnik meat for the SVO. Russian economists in exile (Dmitri Nekrasov, for example) confirm exactly this.
War is going on in Ukraine. 90% of Russians do not see it and do not feel it. Check Novosibirsk news NGS.RU - nothing about war. Of course it is censored, but ppl don't care about war.
Thank you for a different albeit depressing analysis. It boils down to this. In the end it doesn’t matter what the Russian masses think, their suffering does not matter and the economy will always have enough for those at the top. I honestly see nothing in Russian politics or society that disputes this. Of course Russia as a state will be weakened, but that does not matter to Putin. And Putin is in charge.
Yeah, Putin's in a tight spot and seems to have concluded some time back that his only way out is forward. Hence the mountains of corpses. When he finally sees that all that meat won't suffice in Ukraine, he'll probably double down with a strike on Europe rather than retreat. He doubled down after Kharkiv's retreat. A nihilist streak in dictators, perhaps from the loneliness and fear, standing at the top of the mountain of corpses. He will surely go nuclear before retreating. Perhaps kill billions before going to hell alone.
The strike on Europe will become necessary once the narrative that they're winning in Ukraine becomes untenable. That may be soon. Those poor devils still signing up to become drone absorbers in the Donbass, and their misplaced bravery to run in suicide assaults - that may be the only thing still standing between reality and Putin's delusion. The last glass that once shattered, will leave only the EU strike to nuclear tunnel.
As unfair as it may sound after all the suffering he has caused, the best outcome for those still alive is probably a safe haven for him, in North Korea or some african dictator he propped up.
Without Donbass there is no solid Ukrainian defence West of Dnyepr - thus it is the CoG of the Russian army - you should read 2nd world war books - there are lot of parallelities
That's correct. That's why the unconquered part of Donetsk oblast' is so important to both sides and such a sticking point in any peace deal.
There's a lot of blood in that soil, which changed hands several times, in the most brutal way, during WWII, starting 20 October 1941 when the Germans first took Kramatorsk. The most dramatic chapter of this story was the German Donetsk Campaign, starting Feb 1943, which culminated in the Third Battle of Kharkov, the greatest feat of arms of the war, in my view, and the Germans' last significant offensive success. Pitting the war's two greatest commanders against each other, Erich von Manstein vs. Rokossovsky.
There are indeed a lot of parallels. Except that, sadly, Ukraine does not have any von Mainstein, nor any Rokossovsky.
"Except that, sadly, Ukraine does not have any von Mainstein, nor any Rokossovsky." I can't believe what I'm reading. Have you never heard of a certain Oleksandr Stanislavovych Syrski?
LMAOROTF :D
Good one :)
Oh yes! But he has a hard time talking all the important decisions.
Actually it is good that you brought up von Manstein and Rokossovsky - indeed they were outstanding Military leaders (even compared with some over-hyped theatre generals of the WW2).
Comments on Syrski are fair - he is not an asset but a liability however we should call out a few underlying conditions:
- apparently Ukrainian political leadership can define short term politican priorities constantly over-writing military logic
- Syrski took over exactly at that point when Ukraine lost opportunity to regain strategic initiative
- the West-NATO did precious little to help but watching the Russian adaptation at levels from tactical to operational and strategic (yes there is now a global strategy in the eastern Block - which is more than alarming
- Sirski's micro management is a disaster but just calling this out is one sided: West Point articles are there calling out the immediate need to adjust the US Military Doctrine which is now obsolete - Russian operational level adopted to the operational art of constant shifts of pressures within the theatre without loosing the overall focus around CoG...that is something the NATO planners cannot practise as there are eg in the UK army like 3-4 brigades which could be leveraged ín a NATO exercise - so how do we want to practise coordination among half a dozen army corps - that requires practice and experience... Syrski in a way is just hiding the systematic problems lying deeper - the symptomes are there and we need to read them
Wow, what an insightful comment. I actually rather agree with this. Tom's passionate criticism of Syrsky I find pretty persuasive, but I keep in mind always that you can't really finally judge a military leader until decades after the war is over. It's not possible to understand what any given military leader had to work with until the archives have been declassified and opened, passions have cooled, and real historians have sifted through the mass of data.
It's easy to criticize a military leader who is losing, and easy to praise one who is winning (Tom doesn't do that in this case). We don't have nearly all the data to know all the reasons for the loss, or to know which were the main ones, out of all of them. Syrsky has a very poor hand of cards -- catastrophically few people (and the recruiting fiasco is not his fault), not enough materiel, and political leadership which constantly interferes.
It will be interesting to see how history treats him - if we live long enough. Probably poorly, probably much as Tom describes it, but we can't be completely sure, since there is a vast amount we simply can't know at this point.
There is zero chance Putin goes nuclear. Assuming he is suicidal isn't supported by the data.
And assuming his military will let him be that suicidal doesn't pay any bets either.
Sure hope you guys are right. Anyways even he was suicidal, wouldn't be good strategy to give him everything he wants.
Unlike the utter disregard he seems to have for other people's lives, he does seem to value his own life quite a bit, never getting near the front, running away from Moscow as soon as Prigojin approached.
Imagine you find yourself in an alley with 32 people trying to stab you. You have a bomb and a knife. If you use a knife, you are dead. If you use a bomb there is some chance you might survive. Which one do you use ?
Depends on the bomb. A tactical bomb means you are alive but only for a few more months as your security services and military finally join force and shoot you behind a building and bury you in a ditch.
A Strategic nuke means you are dead within the hour. You are the first thing targeted. Even if you are on your doomsday plane, you don't make it an hour.
Google "pattern of life." You can't be a national leader and not have a HUGE digital footprint that leaves a trail to be followed. Putin knows he is the first Russian to die in any Strategic exchange.
You are personalizing the problem to include only Putin. This is not a Putin problem. If you have a nuclear armed state that is in a situation of existential crises, about to be overwhelmed and crushed by foreign militaries, do you think the chance of nukes being used is 0 ? It is not.
What military is going into Russia other than Ukraine?
NATO is a defensive organization. It can barely tie it's shoes in the morning. It can't plan and execute an offensive. The only thing it can do is call a meeting, hold off an invading Russia for 30 days, and wait for the US to show up.
"NATO" as the enemy of Russia is made up propaganda.
You are talking about an enemy that doesn't exist. An existential crisis that doesn't exist. The USSR faced an existential crisis when it collapsed. It didn't destroy the world when it did.
When Putin's Russia collapses, it will go much the same way. And once again, "loose nukes" will be the real concern. Not a preemptive launch.
NATO countries attack other countries all the time. From Serbia in 1999, Iraq, Libya.... to today.
And the type of crises I mention are not academic. Israel was in one such situation in 1973.
NATO is a "defensive organization"?! Really? List the defensive wars NATO has fought. Now list the offensive ones. And get back to us when you've figured it out.
You and I are speculating here -- it's never happened, so who knows?
But I can tell you that our military planners, our nuclear doctrine, assumes exactly what you say. It has been our strategic policy for the better part of a century, not to push a nuclear power into an existential crisis.
We most certainly do NOT assume, as a matter of strategic doctrine, that the risk is zero, or anything close to zero.
What existential crisis? NATO is not bombing russia, is not invading russia, is not doing anything about the shadow fleet, still allows russian 'fishing' vessels to dock in NATO ports, does not shoot down russian drones flying for hours over NATO territory, does not react when russia firebombs cargo jets on NATO territory.
Does not react when russia initiates cyber attacks, or when russia commits chemical warfare on NATO territory.
Get a grip, NATO is not inherently aggressive, russia is.
And there is another reason why peace will create a serious problem: Russian soldiers returning from the war in Ukraine have killed or injured more than 1,000 people inside Russia since the invasion began nearly four years ago, according to a review of court rulings by the exiled news outlet Vyorstka
I saw this today also. 1000 reported. I don't see why it isn't twice that out in the hinterlands.
It probably is.
And the supply of weapons brought back from the front isn't controlled at all, I suspect.
An awful lot of really bad, or really disturbed (or both) people in Russia have access to a LOT of exceptionally lethal devices. Not just guns, of course, but long range, armed, FPV drones, missiles, mines, etc.. Anything that can be smuggled home will be in someone's house in Russia at this point. Piss any of those people off enough (and in may cases that includes simply existing) and those weapons will be brought to bear.
OK, 1,000 or 100,000 killed/injured. Who cares?
40,000 is killed every year in a car accidents in USA alone, no one cares either.
People care because safety is a serious issue, whether from trafic or from dangerous veterans.
Different set of values. RU does not care. There is Russian folklore: "Ivan died, and to hell with him".
Safety could be a the serious issue if and when the government decide it is. Then all these "veterans" will have a choise, take a carrot and shut up or go to jail and disappear. For this exact purpose there are like 5,000,000 "siloviks" in Russia, bunch of cops and agents from a dozen "law enforcement agencies", people with guns & a law behind them.
This is - another - great summary. My problem is that we always forget the framework setting of the xxi century - this is a much more heated cold war 2.0 which means we cannot see Russia alone as a sole actor.
China had a lot of challenges around 15 years ago. They recognized that the USA weaken and isolate strategy will hit them sooner or later. They also realized that the rules based world order can be used as a hybid weapon. They had a lot of strategic exposures: - no force projection
- deoendency on fossil fuels and sea lanes
- no battle hardened Military strength
- problems with aging and family model (you cannot afford to have high casualties if the families have one child...typically)
So having Russia as a proxy force and abundant energy source - As well as hartland secure routes with other proxy forces - helped China to act as a real near peer force not globally but in the Pacific region.
So as Russia is weaker it is more and more built into the Chinese ecosphere - loosing its strategic independence
The problem for the West that Trump is also cash cowing Europe thus it is resulting again an instable duel - power struggle. European leaders are crying out that as early as 2028-29 Russia will be ready to attack European NATO - well the date is correct but the date is not related to Russian abilities or actions but the Chinese area denial - which would neutralize US Navy the first time in 80 years
Absolutely spot on assessment. The execution of the Ceaucescus underlies Putin's paranoid decisions now. Karza-Murza, his jailed opponent said that change in Russia is slow but when it eventually arrives it happens very swiftly, giving for example the 1917 revolution, not the October Coup by Lenin but the popular uprising led by the women of Petersburg and joined by the troops sent to suppress them. It was all over in less than a week, the police hunted down and eliminated by the troops.
Thanks
Interesting article, now some additional 5 cents from my side:
1) The problem of criminals returning: This is nothing new. That already happened after WWII when MILLIONS of them returned. People like Kopelew and Solzhenitsyn warned of that problem and were kicked out of the communist party. Still it happened and the USSR survived.
2) The longer the war continues the more poverty will rise inside the RF. This is a much bigger problem than in 1945 as most of the population at that time did know only poverty and hardship. Now they did get a taste for a 'normal' life. The elites know that "Gollum" will squeeze them as much as he thinks he has to. So it has to be their goal that the war ends.
3) "Gollum" living in a self created bubble (the usual problem dictators have, as they only accept 'yes sayers') brought himself into an untenable position. Yes he will continue with his obsession to bring back the USSR under a different name, no matter how much it costs OTHERS. No hope that the arse lickers around him will stop him.
4) The RF has to lose otherwise the problem for the world will only get bigger, because that 'cancer' is still growing. The nuclear arms race has started and the longer some idiots are willing to benfit an aggressor the more this planet will become an insecure place.
Benjamin, do you use LLMs in writing these posts?
Yes. For research and grammar.
If I didn't my SC Public School education would be on display.
There are another two problems when the war ends:
- Separation tendencies in regions amplified by unevenly distributed burden of the war you have mentioned. (And connected problems with nukes and mass murder chemicals etc.)
- China lust for Russia far east. They may directly annex it on pretext "restoring order" or simply corrupt local officials and lease local lend and buy the local business changing it to de-facto Chinese province.
BTW. I've read rumors that some Chinese press is already "debating" that it would be necessary to "restore the order" in case of "some problems" in the "poorly defended" Russia far east.
You are using western logic and POV to explain Russian behaviour.
Fails every time.
I'm using data.
You referring to that insidious colonial practice of defining the question, gathering data, and determining conclusions based on consistency with the data?
More like ignoring any info that does not fit your wishful thinking.
Great summary of the socio-economic state of things in Russia.
I'm also wondering how Russian society will cope with this "lost generation" - so many killed or maimed or walking-wounded, lost in their prime, from a population that was barely managing population replacement before the war.
Even for ever-stoic Russia, that has to be near impossible to ignore.
Immigration. Immigration to a country that loathes immigrants/non-Russians.
I mean immigration is the only answer to all of the industrialised world's demographics problems, but Russia, after what it has done to immigrants in this war (much less in general), would have to be pretty low on the list of places to go for all but the most desperate. And the most desperate are not going to bring into Russia the skills Russia needs to survive as a state, even assuming Putin has gone.
Russia's demographics problem is, in the long run, the real killer of the Russian state. It simply can't survive when there are fewer and fewer people in Russia each year. And while immigration is the answer (at least in the short term) there's no way there will be enough immigration to turn the tide.
Check Russian immigration statistics. For many years, Russia ranked as one of the two top immigration destinations in the world, after the U.S., measured as number of immigrants as a percentage of population.
Russian demographics are below replacement rate, but the birth rate is above the European average. I'm not sure why anyone thinks this is a special problem. Lowest birth rate in the world is actually Ukraine, less than Japan. But I don't think Ukraine will disappear, either.
AI will solve this, probably. If there's not an AI apocalypse in the labor markets as some predict.
A tiny fraction of this carnage in Afghanistan catalysed the downfall of the USSR. These are different times and this war plays to different political tropes and psychological traits. That was the Russo-Japanese War Part II, this is the Great Patriotic War repeating as farce.
The problem with restless demobilised troops can be addressed in several ways other than starting another major war (and this is relevant even if Putin was somehow out of the picture):
- start a small war - e.g. there's several former Soviet republics that are getting too uppity and haven't helped despite treaties or whatever, if this big war fails, it'll be their fault!
- if the current war ends, one of the likely outcomes will be some sort of a border zone that will need to be fortified and guarded, that will keep quite a few men occupied
- not all those men need to return at all - just march them into the thickest Ukrainian defenses and let them do the job for you. This is especially likely for former convicts and similar untrusted personnel...
All of these solutions have their issues but it's likely some of these will used to try and at least reduce the size of the problem.
One of the issues with the "Start a small internal war" notion is that a LOT of the Russian troops are from these small republics and are as likely to join such a rebellion as put it down. It would be a very dangerous game to start down that road.
Why start an 'internal war', i.e. a civil war, when there's plenty of ex-Soviet republics that are not part of Russia today?
The peace brings no benefits to Rusia: the sanctions are not lifted, the investments are forbidden and the Russian elite is still not accepte in the West.
So the Russians can choose between hardship with military defeat and hardship with victory. They will stick with Putin.
The West is building internal suport for Putin.
Trump is building support for Putin. I would not say the "west".
Trump is just screwing everybody except Israel: Ukraine, EU, Taiwan, Japan, Russia, Canada, etc.
The West has closed al doors for Russian elites and people. There is no station from Puțin train.
EU behaves like it is fighting the war, winning and demands uncondițional surrender.
Sanctions would surely be lifted in the event a durable peace broke out.
The agreements discussed so far don’t mention a clean time table for lifting the sanctions. It might be 1 year or 10 years even if Russia fulfills all requirements.
Some of this might be negotiated away. If Russia could negotiate and not only demand Unconditional Surrender.
Russian soldiers do not have any authority in the society. People see them as risk takers who are joining the war to make a profit. It can be clearly seen from the social monitoring — for example, majority of the population does not support giving veterans any benefits (tax, mortgage, etc). Russian socity is starkly divided by the wealth level — naive to expect that regular folk will be holding in high regard those who went from rags to riches in the blink of an eye. It just doesn't happen that way.
You are correct to point out that Russians feed on one another. But a charismatic leader who is a war vet can cut through all of that. Russians are not anything if not easily lead by the nose.
It doesn't matter if this theoretical leader can "cut through" social animosity. In modern Russia you just don't get a seat at the power table unless you are a part of the system. Your ceiling is a YT or TG channel with a lot of likes. That's it. And if the amount of likes is getting too large you can't even stay in the country — well, you can but…
Look at Navalny for an illustration. Popular man, probably the most popular opposition leader in our lifetimes. Arrested — nobody bat an eye. Killed — a lot of sad posts and crying at the kitchen tables. Same with Prigojin. Extremely popular — just with very different crowd, military and patriots. People cheered on the streets when he marched to the capital. Killed. And no reaction except stealthily laying flowers to improvised memorials.
And things are much more difficult nowadays compared with Navalny times.
The Tsar is always right until he isn’t. So if Putin was gone another leader could arise. But not before.
What a load of bullshit. This whole post is prime example of West's projections and wishful thinking. This whole "people will revolt", "Russian elites are not interested in the war" and "economy will collapse soon" just keeps going all since the beginning of the war.
> A negotiated end—especially one short of clear victory—would raise unavoidable questions: Why the casualties? Why the economic hardship? Why the defacto-mobilization? Why the lies? These questions are manageable during war. They are much less so in peace.
There is no one worth considering who will ask these questions. In fact, these questions are being asked every day with exactly zero effect (apart from more people fined or imprisoned). Putin and siloviki who are the actual "elites" know this very well and give exactly zero fucks about such questions.
> Elites are looking for the door.
Would be nice to have a proof of that. "Elites" in Russia can be understood differently depending on the context. There are "economic" elites, sometimes they are also being called "oligarchs" in Western media and then there is "government" ruling the country. The latter are siloviki (effectively former KGB). The economics elites were completely subjugated by them in early-mid 2010s and have near-zero influence on policy and politics.
The economic elites _might_ be looking for the door, but if they are doing so, they are doing it in silence. We do not observe any attempts of exit apart from those that were done in the very beginning of the war and were few. We know that some high-profile managers in several corporations committed exit through the window, so this might be the reason.
The KGB elites, on the other hand, are definitely not looking for any exit. In fact, they are looking the enter even deeper and we observe preparations for prolonged period of eternal war: implementation of total control over internet, banking system, surveillance state, censorship, limitation of economic mobility, propaganda in education and making the education system less accessible overall, economy mobilization, etc.
> Putin and the elites are scared to bring home a war-torn, abused, and lied-to army.
No they are not. A bunch of traumatized alcoholics only are problem for the regular people in their immediate surroundings. At worst, they are _maybe_ capable of organizing into gangs to extort local business for money. In reality, this will likely happen, but the gangs will be controlled by the KGB. Again, not an issue for neither Putin nor Russian "elites".
In Russia the army is not represented in politics and the government for exactly the reason described in the post - that would be a threat to those in power. This approach was started by Stalin after the end of WW2 and has been successfully carried over to the present. That time Zhukov and the army were a legitimate political threat, modern army returning from Urkaine is not. And the army of then was successfully neutralized there is zero doubts that this one will be as well.
> The Russian military—despite catastrophic losses—is lionized by Russian society. Soldiers are portrayed as heroes defending the nation against the West.
No they are not outside of the most blatant state propaganda. Russian society is split approximately 20% - 60% - 20% on the spectrum of strongly support the war - don't care - strongly oppose. Only the first 20% "lionize" the soldiers. The rest is either afraid of them or hates them. There is zero moral authority in people killing other people for money, which how they are perceived by the majority.
And so on and so forth. The KGB is totally fine with current state of affairs. There is no danger to them in the near and mid term. Worsening economy is no problem for them. Maybe in the long run (in 10+ years) if things will continue as they are, it will lead to a system collapse, but there is always a space for manoeuvre and controlled exit (simplifying things: we will stop the war/harassing you - you will left the sanctions and the money will start flowing in again). Since the West doesn't have resolve to actually push the system to the brink, and the KGB knows that, they are free to continue as long as they please because they know they can exit any time if it will become to dangerous, and there will be no recourse of consequences for them.
EDIT: the above doesn't mean that Russia will continue to fight untill the last soldier on either side is capable of holding a rifle. Putin and the KGB might decide that it's enough and wrap it up. But this will not be because they are afraid of consequences, face domestic revolt or want to leave the economy in at least a decent shape. This will be because for some reason they concluded that it's better to stop but these reasons have very little to do with described (non-)factors.
Oh wow. Finally a paid troll. Good work. I get tired of the lazy ones who don't put any effort into their work.
Why exactly do you think I'm a paid troll? You probably mean that I'm paid by Russia? Then try to read my post again and realize which conclusions follow from it.
In case this is not obvious: since KGB doesn't give a shit about economy, rules, opposition or whatever, the only way to stop them is military defeat combined with the toughest sanctions possible as a supplemental measure. I don't think this fits Kremlin narrative.
Ben, maybe engage with the substance of that comment? Nameless One makes important points.
Probably not going to get me to spend a lot of time on something that starts with "what a load of bullshit".
I don't think there is a need to engage with the comment either, since properly discussing these points involves hours and hours of work and research - the time neither of us has. This is because the topics like people's attitude towards the war are complex and subjective, and both the post and my comment only make generalized statements that are hard to prove/disprove in a short post format. They are a product of a prior experience in ingestion of the content though, and might very well be that we just consumed content from different information bubbles.
However, I do want to apologize for the tone of my comment, especially given that this is "friendly fire" in the space that is infested by real Russian trolls. I'm not sure why I got so triggered with this post, I usually try to maintain polite attitude. Whilst I believe that the essence of my comment is correct, but the form is poor and therefore doesn't contribute to the topic or to the greater good. Especially given the valuable work Ben (usually) does.
lmao how could you POSSIBLY think that was a pro-Russian comment wow. Definitely some "friendly fire" happening here.
Just out of curiosity where do you come up with a 20% - 60% - 20% split from? My impression is that the first percentage figure actually rose over the years whereas the last percentage figure is just not there (especially after "the Kursk detour")
Indeed, regardless of the outcome of the SMO, Russia stands to face many challenges next few years. Putin INSISTS on social lifts for veterans. Bringing the operation to a meaningful conclusion will be his legacy for many years, as he will soon be transferring power to his successor.
But I concur with your reaction to the analysis above. Many mistakes (e.g., real incomes increased in 2024 and 2025, and so on) For obvious reasons, there is next to none Russia expertise in the west these days.
> Just out of curiosity where do you come up with a 20% - 60% - 20% split from?
This a rough approximation of the opinion spectrum rather than exact number. This is short form of the following distribution: Russian society in general is inert and atomized with the main focus for most of people on their own life and immediate surroundings [1]. They are indifferent to any issues that do not affect them personally. Their opinion is shaped not by own values, but rather by whatever people with higher social status say (typically from TV or state media), but they don't really hold on to it, won't act on it and will accept whatever sway that may come. They comprise the majority and they are in the middle of the distribution. They are at least 2x or 3x more of them than people that have strong own opinion about politics.
On the opposite sides of the distribution are those who strongly support or oppose the war, these people are in minority relative to the "don't care" camp.
The above is why the middle is more "fat" than the edges.
If we'll try to compare sizes of "party of war" vs "party of piece", we'll have a hard time because the former enjoy safety when stating their opinion in the polls, so the data will inevitably skewed in their "favor". The attitude is also highly variable across different demographic groups (50+ are several times more likely to support the war than <25). Also some part of the opposition fled the country. Therefore I'm hesitant to assign different sizes to these two groups, too much speculations here.
Here is a summary of the trends from Levada [2]. It broadly agrees with several other researches that I met but already forgot. There they state that during the war time those who openly oppose it were 18-20% of the society. It's worth reading the article to better understand the distribution, keeping in mind that any sociology is limited in modern day Russia.
[1] This distribution is true for any country, but in Russia it's especially pronounced because of the Soviet past and propaganda policy of the last 10 years.
[2] https://www.levada.ru/2025/03/21/tri-goda-voennyh-dejstvij/
From your second footnote (I quote in Russian):
"... на всем протяжении конфликта о полной, безоговорочной поддержке российских военных говорят заметно меньше людей — в среднем порядка 45% респондентов (ответы «полностью поддерживаю»)... Еще порядка 30% россиян выбирают ответы «скорее поддерживаю» — это более слабая поддержка с различными оговорками..." And further down below - "«сильная», бескомпромиссная антивоенная позиция характерна для 8–9% россиян"
To be duly noted "...в среднем порядка 52% россиян регулярно высказывались за переход к мирным переговорам (максимальные 58% наблюдались летом 2024 года на протяжении двух месяцев перед наступлением украинской армии на Курскую область)."
Yes, and couple of paragraphs below:
"Говоря о поддержке российских военных, люди прежде всего имеют в виду поддержку «своих», нежели поддержку военных действий как таковых. Респонденты иногда даже удивлялись вопросу: «А кого же нам еще поддерживать?» Это «наши мальчики», «наши воины», «мы поддерживаем своих»; ..."
And then
"... На всем протяжении конфликта доля россиян, которые открыто не поддерживают действия российских военных, составляла в среднем порядка 18–20% ..."
"... Так, «сильная», бескомпромиссная антивоенная позиция характерна для 8–9% россиян — это люди с наиболее последовательными и хорошо оформленными антивоенными убеждениями.
...
Оставшиеся 9–10% россиян демонстрируют скорее слабое, менее последовательное несогласие с позицией российской власти по Украине, которое совсем необязательно сопровождается проукраинскими и прозападными симпатиями.
"
Like I said, it's complicated and there is a lot of nuance. Depending on what exact questions you ask you get slightly different numbers. Above the difference is between "supporting "our guys"" and support of the war itself.
Personally, I don't think that these distinctions are important, the general picture holds: one minority strongly opposing the war, another strongly supporting it, and amorphous majority (which naturally tends to lean towards support in the polls given the oppressive atmosphere) in between. This is why I lost any faith in Russian people and stopped caring about the fate of the country. This is just sad.
I find Ben a sensible commentator but I must admit you argue this very very convincingly.
Actually, fair points here.
I do disagree with one:
>> In Russia the army is not represented in politics and the government for exactly the reason described in the post - that would be a threat to those in power. This approach was started by Stalin after the end of WW2 and has been successfully carried over to the present. That time Zhukov and the army were a legitimate political threat, modern army returning from Urkaine is not. And the army of then was successfully neutralized there is zero doubts that this one will be as well.
AFAIK, it is - to the degree where the mass of Russian military officers I happen to know, cannot understand how can a MOD be a civilian, like this is meanwhile a custom in 'the West'.
...is also the reason why Putin then created himself the Rosgvardia, and is nowadays taking care this to be better (and heavier) equipped than the SV (Ground Forces of the VSRF): to keep his backside safe from any coup-attempts.
and FSO
Agree with the great post by Nameless One (minus 1st sentence). Putin is in a win–win position now.
He can carry on a war of attrition for many more years without even the slightest hiccup from the population or the economy. He is losing about 10,000 troops a month (buggy- and bike-mounted useless, jobless alcoholics, really—another win), but Ukraine is losing troops at the same rate, and it is a country four times smaller.
The economy is doing fine. The Russian Federation is not the USSR; it is not going to run out of bread and butter—it has a market-based economy. And the population is very flexible. I was there in 1998 when the Ruble fell fourfold against the dollar within two weeks (and all salaries and prices were tied to the USD). People just carried on, starting that Monday four times poorer.
"-Daddy, are you going to drink 4 times less now? -No, But you all are going to eat 4 times less!".
Less income = more vatnik meat for the SVO. Russian economists in exile (Dmitri Nekrasov, for example) confirm exactly this.
War is going on in Ukraine. 90% of Russians do not see it and do not feel it. Check Novosibirsk news NGS.RU - nothing about war. Of course it is censored, but ppl don't care about war.
Thank you for a different albeit depressing analysis. It boils down to this. In the end it doesn’t matter what the Russian masses think, their suffering does not matter and the economy will always have enough for those at the top. I honestly see nothing in Russian politics or society that disputes this. Of course Russia as a state will be weakened, but that does not matter to Putin. And Putin is in charge.
Putin this, Putin that...
Just shut up