The Impact of Russian Losses on Combat Operations

by Donald Hill

Hello everybody!

The following feature was prepared by Don as a part of his Don’s Weekly for this Monday. I’m posting it as a separate feature because I find it’s worth ‘special attention’: even if ‘based on official releases by Kyiv’ and thus likely to be considered for ‘propaganda’ by a sizable segment of those who are going to read it, it is pointing at a very distinct pattern.

Oh, and, for those who have ‘their doubts about the figures in question’: if we descend to your level, actually, it’s simple. If Russia is not suffering as many losses as the government in Kyiv is claiming, then how comes it hasn’t captured Chasiv Yar nor reached Kharkiv…? Why, instead of reporting about ‘liberation’ of this or that in northern Kharkiv, are such PRBS-industrialists like Kots now de-facto announcing an Ukrainian counteroffensive in direction of Kursk…?

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As this war is progressing, the rate of Russian losses is increasing with each sustained offensive effort.

There was an increase when Russia focused on Bakhmut and another one when they started to attack Vuhledar. By April and May of 2023, the losses tapered off with Bakhmut almost completely in Russian control and the Vuhledar attacks diminishing. There was also uncertainty about when Ukraine’s expected offensive would start so they were likely assembling reserves to react to that.

When Ukraine’s summer offensive did start, Russian losses were roughly maintained at the same level while they conducted defensive operations, but then jumped sharply when they started the Avdiivka offensive on October 7th, 2023. Russian losses have been consistently high since then, but May, 2024, brought both the largest number of casualties Russia’s suffered in one month and the largest single increase of casualties in a month. They had 38,904 killed and wounded in that month despite not beginning their Kharkiv attacks until May 10th.

Russian conscription increased from 15-25,000 per month in 2022 to an average of 32,000 a month for 2023. If Russian losses of 35,000+ are sustained this would strain Russia’s ability to replace losses. The strain would also has an impact on the quality of the Russian troops.

If Russia has a higher monthly conscription rate than their monthly loss rate, those “extra” troops can be trained. The longer they are trained, the more likely they are to develop skills that keep them alive for another week or month before becoming killed or wounded. This would contribute in some small way to a lower loss rate, even when participating in meat attacks. If the rate of loss is equal to or exceeds the conscription rate, then the untrained soldiers would need to be sent to the front without training and the rate of loss will be a little bit higher, contributing to a downward spiral.

If this rate of loss continues, Russia will need to increase the rate of recruitment: the Russian Armed Forces will be forced to find a way to increase that rate to more than around 30,000 new troops a month.

At the first glance, this appears ‘simple’: the oligarchs that loot 25% of the nation’s wealth created poverty conditions that enticed many to join the army simply for the opportunity to make 2-3 times their annual salary. This poverty has sustained the Russian army despite its huge losses. Now, with the need for replacements being so critical, some regions of Russia are offering contracts paying double what the salaries used to be. That enticement may very well be enough to sustain Russian losses. Only time will tell if the average Russian man will ever decide that the money isn’t worth the risk.

If, at some point, Russia cannot replace their losses then they will have to draft enough people to fill the void or reduce the intensity of their operations. This is something Putin has tried to avoid so, in his mind, there must be some sort of risk associated with a draft, but he is more likely to conduct a draft than reduce the intensities of the attacks. There is nothing in the history of this war or the character of Putin that suggests reducing intensity is an option he would willingly choose. And there is good reason for him to push as hard as he can right now.

Two-thirds of the armored vehicles Russia sends to Ukraine come from their storage facilities and by the end of 2025 those facilities will be largely empty. Russia is losing more vehicles than they can replace right now. Without the refurbished vehicles, the number of vehicles in the Russian army will diminish at a much faster rate. At the same time, Ukraine’s pipeline of supplies is (very) slowly increasing. This will translate to even higher Russian losses of men and equipment.

An argument could be made for Russia to play the long game and extend the war until Ukraine has a manpower crisis, or until more allies elect candidates that support Putin, or until the allies just tire of the war and cut off or reduce aid to Ukraine. A long, drawn out war could provide Russia with advantages. But Russia isn’t being patient, they are escalating the intensity, either because they are making a bad decision or they believe that they can’t survive a long, drawn-out war. They have the manpower, but they don’t have the equipment.

So the Russians increase their attacks. Equipment is being destroyed at a faster rate. Men are becoming casualties at a faster rate. The quality of the replacements is reduced and men die at an even faster rate. More money is spent to replace them. And when they start running out of equipment in the coming years, men will die at an even faster rate.

Russia is running out of time, so they have to push hard. And the harder they are pushing, the faster is the time running out.