Sudan, 15-18 April 2023, Part 2
Hello everybody!
To continue my coverage of affairs in Sudan of the last few days…
For better understanding of what is going on since 15 April, it’s necessary to know a little bit about the structure of the Sudanese Defence Forces. The SDF counts around 100,000 officers and other ranks, organised into six regional commands, which simultaneously act as divisional commands. The biggest concentration of forces can be found in the Khartoum area, where the 7th Armoured and the 9th Airborne Divisions are garrisoned, as are the 144th Special Forces Battalion, the Republican Guard, and the sole Engineering Brigade.
Chief-of-Staff and thus the overall commander is Lieutenant-General Burhan, the strongman in Khartoum. On average, each of divisions counts only around 6,000 troops, and the 9th Airborne is actually a brigade. Thanks to the oil boom of the 2000s, the SDF was significantly mechanised and is equipped with about 500 armoured vehicles and 700 artillery pieces. It has its own military educational facilities training enough new officers at home, while additional are trained abroad. However, since the times of the Darfur War, it’s foremost the air power of the Sudanese Air Force that’s serving as the ‘spearhead’ of the SDF.
The last I’ve checked – arguably: some 5-6 years ago – the air force was organised into a total of five squadrons operating combat aircraft, all home-based at Wadi Sayyidna AB (20km north of Omdurman). Through 2015-2016, it worked-up a unit operating Su-24Ms (No. 4 Squadron; which was repeatedly deployed in combat in Yemen), and a UAV Squadron, equipped with Iranian-made Ababil III UCAVs. However, the decrease in oil income, followed by years of political unrest resulted in economic crisis and thus the build-up of the SuAF slowed down, the last few years. This in turn made it heavily dependent on the work of the Safat Aviation Complex (SAC), constructed with Chinese support at Wadi Sayyidna AB. Over the recent years, this took care to overhaul and return to service a number of older jets of Soviet and Chinese origin, like (ex-Libyan) MiG-23MS and MiG-23UB, Shenyang F-6 and FT-6. The SAC is meanwhile running periodic overhauls of the MiG-29-fleet (No. 2 Squadron), but it seems the SuAF lacks the money for similar works on it’s A-5Cs and Su-25s (No. 24 Squadron): many of which have been grounded the last few years.
Something similar happened with the large fleet of Mi-24/35 attack helicopters. Since acquiring first examples from Libya, in the late 1980, Khartoum purchased more than 50 of these. All were operated by No. 3 Squadron, together with a sizeable fleet of Mi-8/17 assault helicopters. However, and while many of Mi-24/35s were overhauled by the SAC over the last 4-5 years, nearly all were sold to Khalifa Haftar in Libya, leaving less than a dozen in active service – all home-based at the newly-constructed Jebal Aulia AB, south of Khartoum.
The 1st Transport Squadron – which flew a miscellany of An-12s, An-26/30/32s, C-130Hs, and Il-76s – was based at Khartoum International, while the Flight School (including two squadrons) was (and still is) based at Port Sudan AB, and completely re-equipped with Chinese-made CJ-6 basic trainers, K-8 jet trainers, and FTC-2000 supersonic jet trainers.
This small size of the ‘army’ is one of reasons for heavy reliance of successive regimes upon the Rapid Support Forces. As mentioned in the Part 1, nominally, the RSF is under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), not the Ministry of Defence. Actually, its commander is First General Mohammed Hamdan Dagallo. He is supported by his brother and Deputy commander RSF, Major-General Abdulrahim Hamdan Dagallo. Notably: both are wearing military ranks but, and just like most of other four ‘major-generals’, about a dozen of ‘brigadier generals’, ‘colonels’ and ‘lieutenant-colonels’ of the RSF: none has formal military education. Indeed, very few members have such a background – which, to a certain degree, is ‘no surprise’, considering the RSF is dominated by two families: no less than 2,900 of RSF’s officers are from the Dagallo family or at least married into it (that is including a number of Chadians); another 5,000 from the Mahriya clan (Rizeigat tribe). Obviously, there is simply no way for all of these to be sent to any kind of military academies. The few RSF-officers that do have some sort of formal military training, have all served with the SDF and Border Guards at earlier times, until sentenced by military courts for violating different laws, and then released to serve with the RSF.
Indeed, most of the RSF-officers are as ‘military officers’ as ‘businessmen’: involved in different forms of organised crimes, ranging from human trafficking (especially to Libya), illegal export of gold extracted from the Jebel Amir area in Darfur, smuggling of drugs, cars, and narcotics. Nevertheless, the organisation has its own Intelligence Service, own Military Police, and an Armoured Corps of unknown size and composition. Operationally, it is organised into small ‘brigades’ of between 500 and 1,000 troops each, mostly ‘light infantry’ mounted on dozens of Toyota pick-ups equipped with heavy machine guns (so-called ‘technicals’).
Next to unknown is that – at least until 15 April – the RSF was operating its own air wing, equipped with one Antonov An-12, one An-74, one Ilyushin Il-76TD transport, and two Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm Bo.105 helicopters (acquired by Sudan in the 1980s, and completely rebuilt by the SAC, about 5-6 years ago). In total, the RSF had about 30,000 ‘active/regular’ officers and other ranks, but – reportedly – was capable of putting up to 100,000 under arms.
Overall, it can be concluded that the SDF and RSF are closely matching. The SDF has superior firepower, but the RSF is more mobile. Probably better motivated, even ‘better commanded’ to a certain degree. Sure, its troops are poorly disciplined, and the mass of its commanders has little clue about combat tactics, but it has a very centralised chain of command, certain to function better than that of the SDF, where there are still lots of Bashir-fans, not entirely loyal to Burhan…perhaps even having a grudge against him (if for no reason then, ‘because he attempted to merge us, professional soldiers, with these gangs of RSF-bandits’).
The ‘action’ in the course of the latest coup attempt in Sudan can be said to have been initiated in late March this year. On 27 March 2023, the Burhan’s military junta and civilian parties had started talks in Khartoum, to find solutions towards civilian translation. The aim was to conclude these on 6 April, with an agreement for re-establishment of the civilian government, full subjecting of the SDF to the civilian control, and a full integration of the RSF into he SDF.
Considering the top brass of both the SDF and the RSF is neck-deep involved into all sorts of extra- or outright illegal ‘economic’ activities, enriching themselves through looting the country, and thus would have a lot to lose in the case of RSF’s integration into the SDF, and then the subjection of the SDF to the civilian authorities…. Well, the talks stalemated and in early April the RSF began mobilising and re-deploying its units to Khartoum and elsewhere. Most of mobilisation was completed by 11 April, and two days later the army protested when one of RSF columns approached the town of Merowe, while another entered Khartoum: the RSF replied that this was a part of its ‘normal duties in coordination with the regular armed forces’. With hindsight, it’s obvious that Dagalo was bringing his troops into position, and Burhan – and not only Burhan, but the entire NISS, plus intelligence services of several ‘interested parties from abroad’ – was dumb enough to buy his excuses…
At dawn of 15 April 2023, the RSF went into action. I’ll try to reconstruct the flow of its operations ‘clock-wise’ – ‘around’ the map of Sudan.
Northern State
In northern Sudan, early on the morning of 15 April one of RSF ‘brigades’ brought the Merowe AB (also Merowe International) under control, together with the compound housing a contingent of the Egyptian Air Force. Curiously, despite days of tensions and reports about the concentration of RSF troops nearby, not only the Sudanese guards, but the Egyptian contingent, too, was taken by surprise, and quickly disarmed: commander of Syakas (Egyptian Commando troops) responsible for protection of the contingent was caught still wearing civilian clothes. Three of Egyptian MiG-29M2s and a single C.295 transport were left parked on the apron, with other three MiGs inside a maintenance hangar, and not touched.
That changed on the morning of 16 April, when the SDF counterattacked: while withdrawing, the RSF took away at least 27 Egyptian servicemen, and shot up all Egyptian MiGs. At least one burned out, others were heavily damaged by machine-gun fire, causing them to leak lots of fuel… Whether it is true that one of Egyptian servicemen was shot at this occasion, remains unclear.
The RSF regrouped and counterattacked early on 17 April, and secured the Merowe AB for good, this time destroying at least one, perhaps two of SuAF FTC-2000s parked there (that said, I’m not convinced the photo shown FTC-2000s was really taken at Merowe AB). As of yesterday, 18 April, the RSF reported multiple air strikes by the SuAF, while locals reported that after another attack by the SDF, the Merowe is in the hands of the regime, and the RSF withdrew towards on al-Multaqa, 100km to the south.
Red Sea State
The only area from this part of Sudan from which any kind of fighting was reported is the port of Suakin. The SDF claimed to have ‘defeated the rebels’ there. Supposedly, ever since, it should be rushing reinforcements in form of mechanised units in direction of Khartoum. If so…. Well, along the road that’s a trip of some 800km. That’s going to take some time… Elsewhere, tanks of the SDF were sighted while moving down the streets of Port Sudan, too: probably underway to secure the crucial facilities there.
Khartoum
In Khartoum, RSF troops led by Major-General Osman Mohammed Hamid have reached the compound of the Presidential Palace – and that, apparently, without fighting - early on 15 April. No idea if they’re in control of the facility, though: heavy fighting was reported from this area early on 17 April again.
Hamid’s second most-important task was a multi-prong attack on the huge complex including the Khartoum IAP (the northern side of which is including a military base), the General Command SDF, SuAF HQ, Navy HQ, and he NISS HQ, all in the very centre of the city. One of involved columns shot up a number of civilian aircraft while advancing along the tarmac from the south, including an Airbus A330 of Saudia, a Boeing 737 of SkyUp, and a turboprop of the UN Humanitarian Air Service – before reaching the tarmac of the No. 1 Squadron SuAF, and shooting up two Il-76s, one An-12, two An-26/32s, and one An-72/74, all of which burned out as result.
Meanwhile, the RSF pushed into the General Command Building, which it appears to have quickly secured – before a counterattack by the SDF from western direction, that resulted in the building being completely demolished. As far as can be said, the battle for this area went on for most of the next 48 hours, with unclear results. Despite Burhan’s claims of the contrary, RSF might still be in control.
Early on 16 April, the SDF claimed to have recovered the Khartoum IAP. I’m sure it tried, causing multiple clashes with the RSF, and lots of damage to the RSF vehicles nearby, and aircraft on the tarmac of No. 1 Squadron, but not if it was really successful: it’s unclear who is in control of downtown Khartoum ever since. Certain is only that the fighting resulted in damage or destruction of two C-130Hs, two An-72/74s etc., plus an Il-62 operated by the Sudanese Government.
Elsewhere around the city, early on 15 April the RSF managed to secure the base of the 1st Infantry Brigade, the HQ of the Signal Corps, Medical Corps, and retain its bases in Tiba and Supa/Soba (both of which were claimed as ‘destroyed’ by Burhan’s junta in one or two air strikes by SuAF MiG-29s), before refocusing its efforts in direction of Omdurman: this is where a major battle against the SDF raged for the rest of the day, apparently as the RSF brought the main base of the Engineering Brigade under control, while Burhan ordered a counterattack by units home-based in the Karari area (southern Omdurman), to recover Khartoum IAP and nearby facilities (all of which are on the eastern bank). By the morning of 16 October, the RSF claimed to be in firm control over all of Omdurman, and to have shot down (or forced down) a SuAF Mi-25 in the Kobar Bridge area (northern Khartoum).
South of Khartoum, early on 15 April the RSF did manage to overrun the Jebel Aulia AB, where it captured some six non-operational Mi-24/35s of No. 3 Squadron (not sure if this video is from the same facility), but a few of helicopter-crews managed to evacuate to Wadi Sayyidna and were seen in action in the Omdurman area, already later during the morning. The damage on Jebel Aulia is clearly visible on latest sat-photos, indicating destruction of some 3-4 Mi-24/35s outside the hangars.
As of this morning, fighting went on near the downtown and the airport, and around the presidential palace. The SuAF flew additional air strikes, and the SDF is regularly deploying heavy weaponry, foremost in form of tanks. Multiple hospitals reported the lack of electricity and water, and to have been entered by military personnel. Looting was reported from several residential areas, too.
North Kordofan
The RSF seem to have at least raided the al-Ubayyid Airport (‘el-Obeid’), destroying three Su-25s, and few additional aircraft. Not sure if it secured the facility, but certain that it is heavily investing there: al-Ubayyid is crucial as a road-connection between Darfur and Khartoum and it seems the RSF forces commanded by Brigadier Ahmed Abdelrahim are attacking the local SDF garrison from the west and east, but haven’t secured the city yet.
North Darfur
In North Darfur, the RSF claimed to have overrun both the town and the airport of el-Fashir (and a forward operating base of the SuAF, together with few non-operational Mi-24/25s). Heavy fighting was reported from this area on 16 April, though.
West Darfur
In West Darfur, the RSF units quickly brought the town of al-Junaynah (also ‘Geneina’) and the nearby airport under control (near the border to Chad), on 15 April. Several SuAF Mi-8/17s and a MI-17 of the UN were captured intact there.
South Darfur
Finally, in South Darfur, RSF units commanded by Brigadier Ahmed Baraktalla should have secured the town of Nyala, together with the local airport.
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Overall, as of early 18 April, when a 24-hour ceasefire was announced (which was almost immediately violated by both sides and thus didn’t held), the RSF controlled entire Darfur (three states) in the west, and a wide swath of territory from there all the way to Khartoum and up to Merowa. If regime’s claims about the recovery of Merowa are correct, then the northern ‘tip’ of the ‘frontlines’ is now in the Multaqa area, though.
Of course, both sides are claiming for themselves to be nothing short of angels, never attacking civilians: it’s always the other side that is villains. Burhan, that fluffy pink bunny, even publicly announced he’s sorry for all the suffering the fighting is causing to the civilians, by ‘dirty rebels’ of course. But no, it was the RSF that came under attack of the SDF, and Burhan is a criminal, and Dagalo was always pro civilian government in Sudan….As next, Burhan can be expected to do his utmost to collect as much support from Bashirists as possible.
….and all the saints in Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia etc, can’t stop calling for an end of the fighting: this civil war is ruining all the years of their successful PR-management (including helping Putin sponsor his war in Ukraine by the smuggled Sudanese gold). So much so, RUMINT has it Egyptians are already in the process of deploying their special forces and elements of their air force in support of ‘Saint Burhan’…
Please, make no mistake: this is all little else but a fight between ‘gangs of Khartoum’.
So, this is another civil war to satisfy the lust of corrupt generals.
So basically one may ignore most of the details and conclude that the country remains a total mess with no chance for an improvement in sight. Unfortunately.