Syrian War, 2 December 2024: Why the Offensive in Idlib (and then Aleppo)

Good evening everybody!

The last few days, quite a few have asked me (here and on the Facebook), why have the Syrian insurgents launched their offensive, how much is this related to Ukraine, and similar questions.

As described earlier, the force launching the offensive into eastern Idlib, then liberating Aleppo, and eventually liberating all of Idlib-, and nearly all of the Aleppo Provinces, is the Fatah Mobin Operations Room. Meanwhile, this seem to have re-named itself the ‘Command of Military Operations’ (CMO; see below for an official release in this regards).

Fatah Mobin originally included four (4) major insurgent factions. Meanwhile, its representatives are talking about a total of 13 insurgent factions, with - according to their own claims - (at least) 60,000 combatants (if anybody wants to know it closer: their spokesperson is Colonel Hassan Abdulghani).

Point is: one way or the other, the CMO (and the HTS, and all the 13 other factions involved) are Qatar-supported (financially), but NOT Türkye-controlled.

Really Türkye-controlled are insurgent factions further north: deployed along the border from Bulbul and Afrin via Azaz to Jarablus. Nominally at least, their alliance is controlled by the Hawr Killis Operations Room, but: although relatively well-equipped, they were neither involved in this operation (at least not early on), nor as well-trained or disciplined as the troops of the Fatah Mobin OR.

Perhaps the best way to understand the original positions of the Fatah Mobin OR and the Hawr Killis OR, but also the actual reasons for this operation, is the following map created by the OCHA and published back in July 2020.

To completely understand the importance of this map, start with the following fact: you must not ‘like’ the UN and the UNHCR, but according to their data, there are 3.2-3.4 million of Syrian refugees registered in Türkye (official Ankara counts 3.6 million). Then add (check the map above):

• 1.9 million ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDP) in western Idlib (area controlled by the Fatah Mobin OR;

• 0.8 million IDPs in the Türkye/Hawr Killis OR-controlled zone.

One way or the other, this means that Türkye (and Qatar) have to sustain no less than 5.9 million, perhaps as many as 6.1-6.3 million of Syrian refugees (out of a pre-war population of - perhaps - 22 million; last census in Syria of 2004, actually stopped short of 18 million).

Now, back in 2011-2015, Syrian refugees were welcome in Türkye. However, in the last few years, the public opinion gradually turned against them. Indeed, in the last two years, the public opinion is full of hate speech towards foreigners, and Syrians in particular. Except for Erdogan’s incompetence and corruption, that was the primary reason for continuous decline in the performance of the (once flourishing) Türkish economy of the last few years.

With other words: ‘Erdogan had to do something’.

Early this year, and with the Iraqi government as intermediary, he’s attempted to negotiate with Bashar al-Assad, and to find a solution. However, Assad - an Alawite (regardless how much ‘officially converted to Sunni Islam’), and then an Alawite increasingly pushing ever additional Syrians into the IRGC’s ideology of Twelver Shi’a - flatly refused. On the contrary, despite cease-fire agreements from 2020, he’s ordered his gangs to reinforce their shelling of IDP-camps in Idlib. The IRGC was happy to follow in fashion. Sometimes together with Russians, they began bombing IDP-camps: were killing dozens of civilians every week. ‘The West’ didn’t say a word: ‘we’re all ah-so-busy with Ukraine’.

Assadist and IRGC-aims were obvious: complete the ethnic cleansing of Sunni Arabs from Idlib and Aleppo (actually: from Homs and Damascus, too, because IDP-camps in Idlib and Aleppo are full of people ethnically cleansed by Assadists and the IRGC from eastern and southern Damascus, Homs [city] and northern Homs Province, from Hama and elsewhere): expel the 1.9 million IDPs from western Idlib into Türkye.

With other words: a peaceful solution was no option.

Because Türkye had an agreement (‘Astana’) with Russia, and thus with Iran too, initiating a Türkish operation inside Syria was out of question. Or at least: Erdogan couldn’t act through the Hawr Kilis OR.

On the contrary: the fact the Fatah Mobin OR, now CMO, was (and still is) not controlled by Türkye came handy as a ‘plausible denial’. If something went wrong (and it still can go wrong), Erdogan can always say, ‘t wasn’t me’.

With other words: my assessment is that Erdogan was left without a choice but to let Qatar finance a major build-up of the Fatah Mobin OR for the coming offensive.

This is obvious from the following fact: even preparing ‘just a liberation of north-eastern Idlib’ - i.e. an offensive of the kind the Fatah Mobin OR has originally launched - is requiring lots of supplies. The proverbial ‘beans, bullets and gas’. See: from helmets and body armour, via ammunition of all sorts and explosives, to fuel, even water (there’s never enough water in Syria), communication systems, electronics for FPVs etc. All of these supplies had to be brought in via Türkye. I.e. this part - the preparation of that offensive - was impossible without Erdogan. Which in turn means: yes, he must have granted his permission for it - even if being unable to control it, because the Fatah Mobin OR does not listen to him (actually, in the past, some of members of that alliance have declared a war on Türkye).

Of course, the Fatah Mobin OR wasn’t as crazy as to say ‘no way’. After all, it’s interested in liberating as much of Syria as possible, so that as many IDPs as possible can return to their homes (even if all of these were looted to their bare walls, over the last six years). Indeed, dozens of thousands of IDPs are already in the process of returning to their homes.

That said, the fact that in the wake of its success the Fatah Mobin OR meanwhile ‘grew’ into the CMO (i.e. that additional insurgent factions, formerly supported and controlled by Türkye, have joined it), means that ever less of insurgent factions are controlled by the Hawr Killis OR, and thus Türkye. While ‘good’ for the CMO - because that’s bolstering the total troop strength, which it is going to need in the coming days and weeks, because both the Assadists and the IRGC are hauling reinforcements to the (new) frontlines - this has also got its negative sides: factions formerly under the control of the Hawr Killis OR are neither as well-led, nor trained or as disciplined. Just for example:

• Fatah Mobin OR/CMO commanders seem to be leading ‘from the front’, and two of them are known to have been killed in action over the last 3-4 days).

• Fatah Mobin took care to develop its own long-range-reconnaissance/special forces assets like ‘Red Bands’, capable of infiltrating enemy positions and operating dozens of kilometres behind them; and

• Fatah Mobin is operating its own UAV-unit (‘Shaheens’), deploying hundreds of 'home-made’ FPVs, which in turn have significantly contributed to the rout of the Assadists and the IRGC.

The Hawr Killis OR has nothing of that kind.

One of FPVs operated by the Shaheens Unit of the CMO. Between others, over the last five days, these FPVs have killed the Heads of Assadist ‘Military Intelligence’ of Aleppo and Hama, contributing significantly to the rout of IRGC and Assadists.

Thus, the command of the CMO will have to keep an eye on what are its new allies doing and how are they behaving, and that at the same time it has to collect the battlefield loot and re-distribute the same to different of its factions, so to improve their combat effectiveness.

Overall, I’ve got to modify my assessment from 30 November: while this ‘episode’ became possible principally thanks to Türkish interests, it’s getting more complicated because things are now starting to slip out of Erdogan’s control. On the other hand, and exactly as assessed: this operation had nothing to do with ‘Ukraine’ - although the fact Putin is busy there, does mean that he can’t send lots of reinforcements.

***

Talking about that battlefield loot…

This is going to become another factor why Erdogan might lose control. The reason is that the CMO troops are capturing so much of arms, ammunition, equipment and gear, that they are likely to become ‘independent’ from supplies flowing via Türkye - at least for a few months.

Except for immense amounts of ammunition, communications equipment, firearms and other gear, this is meanwhile including more than 40 T-55, T-62, T-72, and T-90 main battle tanks, about 60 other armoured vehicles…

This T-72 (foreground, left) and T-90 - captured during the IRGC’s and Assadist panic withdrawal from as-Safira on Khanasir, yesterdasy, are just two additional out of at least 40 main battle tanks captured by CMO in the last few days.

…plus at least two S-125 surface-to-air (SAM) systems (better known in ‘the West’ by their ASCC/NATO-reporting name: ‘SA-3 Goa’)…

Assadist S-125/SA-3 SAM-system outside Tel Hassel, captured by insurgents of the CMO, yesterday. A similar system was found in the Nayrab area, too.

…at least one Buk M2E SAM-system…

…and at least one Pantsyr S1 and one 9K35 Strela-10 (ASCC/NATO-reporting name ‘SA-13 Gopher’) mobile air defence systems (mentioned earlier).

Because it’s Syrian, and lots of its officers have served with the Syrian armed forces, the CMO is likely to have ‘at least a few’ troops capable of operating such systems. Moreover, the Pantsyr came together with a user manual.

***

…and since I’m a historian, with a ‘soft spot’ for such details, let me end with the following…

This photograph was taken yesterday at Nayrab AB (military side of Aleppo International). It’s showing the front of an Ilyushin Il-28R reconnaissance bomber. The aircraft in question has quite an interesting story: so much so, it’s pity it can’t talk.

A total of 12 Il-28Rs was originally acquired by Egypt, back in 1957. During the times of the United Arab Republic - the union of Egypt and Syria of 1958-1961 - and while assigned to the Air Group 61 of the United Arab Republic Air Force (UARAF), this Il-28R was one of four such jets deployed for nocturnal reconnaissance sorties over Israel. Essentially, the Il-28s in question took off from Egypt, overflew the full length of Israel, and landed in the 'Eastern Province' (Syria during the times of the UAR).

Considering one of top UARAF Il-28-pilots of the time was certain Hosni Mubarak, it's perfectly possible it was flown by him during the last such sortie, launched only a few days before a coup in Damascus ended the UAR. For the following few years, this Il-28R was one of only four aircraft of this type left with the re-established Syrian Arab Air Force. They were home-based at the Maze/Almazze AB and assigned to the No. 40 Flight, SyAAF.

In mid-May 1967, two of Syrian Il-28Rs are known to have flown a few reconnaissance sorties over the Golan Heights, trying to find the 'concentrations of Israeli troops poised to invade Syria' - as, falsely, claimed by the Soviets, and thus believed by Nasser... (which led to the 'crisis' of May 1967, in turn leading to what the Israelis call the 'Six Days War': the conflict that created the map of the Middle East we know until today).

On 6 June 1967 - the day on which the Israelis did launch their aggression on Egypt, Jordan and Syria - this jet was evacuated to the Nayrab AB. As far as I know, it's parked there ever since, and it survived everything passing by it...

The last photo of this Il-28 I recall to have seen, was from around 2011... and now, in 2024, it's still there.

As said: just imagine what stories could this aircraft ‘tell’ - if it would only be able to speak...