Supply Chain at War: Critical Materials and the Fight for Microelectronic Sovereignty
by Benjamin Cook
NOTE: Ukraine’s emergence as a defense innovation hub brings with it both opportunity and urgency. The country has the potential to supply critical raw materials and eventually serve as a friendshore partner for allied microelectronics supply chains. But it must also confront the same hard reality facing Western nations: building advanced systems without Chinese inputs is nearly impossible. Printed circuit boards, motors, and even basic components often rely on Chinese-sourced materials or refinement. As Ukraine builds out its defense industrial base, it must adopt an onshore, nearshore, and friendshore strategy—not only to serve partners but to safeguard its own supply. Strategic stockpiling of vulnerable materials like barium, tin, niobium, and tantalum will be essential. This paper is about the US. Not Ukraine. But it was Ukraine’s vulnerability that got me thinking about it. Also, it’s important to note while you read this how current US policy is completely counter to its own long term interests regarding mineral inputs.
The manufacture of microelectronic components underpins everything from national defense systems to consumer electronics. Modern warfare, AI acceleration, aerospace, telecommunications, and data infrastructure all depend on a stable and secure supply of key microelectronics. At the heart of this system lies a complex and globally distributed supply chain—one increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical disruption, especially due to overreliance on China for critical materials and value-added processing.
To reduce strategic dependence and build resilience, it is essential to identify which materials are required, where they originate, and how supply chains can be realigned toward onshore, nearshore, and friendshore partners. This is not simply a matter of mining; it also includes refining capacity, processing purity, and the infrastructure to convert raw inputs into usable form.
Microelectronic components fall into five primary categories: active components such as transistors and integrated circuits; passive components like capacitors and resistors; electromechanical or MEMS devices including gyroscopes and pressure sensors; timing and power management components such as oscillators and voltage regulators; and packaging elements like solder and wire bonds. Each of these components relies on a unique mix of raw materials—many of which are not widely available in the United States and must be sourced internationally.
Hate Subscriptions? Me too! You can support me with a one time contribution to my research at Buy Me a Coffee. https://buymeacoffee.com/researchukraine
Semiconductors require elements such as silicon, germanium, gallium, arsenic, and indium. Conductive layers rely on copper, aluminum, tungsten, cobalt, nickel, gold, and silver. Insulating and dielectric materials are drawn from silicon dioxide, hafnium oxide, and barium titanate. Critical doping and specialized performance characteristics also depend on boron, phosphorus, and antimony. Less visible but equally important are niche metals like tantalum, niobium, manganese, and tin. Any disruption in the availability or processing of these materials creates cascading risks to entire industrial sectors.
The United States has partial mining access to many critical inputs. Silicon, copper, gold, silver, zinc, iron, lead, lithium, manganese, germanium, gallium, and indium are all mined domestically to some degree. Tungsten, boron, antimony, and chromium are also accessible, albeit with limitations in scale. But four critical materials remain essentially out of reach without imports: barium, tin, niobium, and tantalum. These elements are either not mined at scale in the U.S. or lack refining capacity entirely.
To close this vulnerability gap, the focus must turn to nearshore and friendshore sources. Canada is a linchpin in this strategy. It provides niobium, tantalum, cobalt, lithium, and refined metals including nickel and gold. Mexico adds key inputs like antimony, silver, zinc, and iron, and has nascent lithium projects underway. Australia is a global leader in lithium, manganese, and rare earths, while Brazil dominates niobium and tantalum production. Peru and South Africa offer zinc, tin, silver, and manganese. Germany and Estonia contribute refining expertise for rare earths, tantalum, and copper. Japan and South Korea bring high-purity metal processing and precision refining to the alliance network.
Despite these options, barium remains a singular vulnerability. China controls the vast majority of barite production, the primary source of barium. No large-scale, non-Chinese alternative exists. Tin is also a concern, with only minor production from Peru and Indonesia and limited commercial attractiveness to Western refiners. Niobium and tantalum refining remains concentrated in Brazil and Canada, with no U.S. capacity.
Refining capacity—not just mining—is the fulcrum. Even when ally nations extract the raw materials, value-added processing frequently returns to China due to its industrial scale and permissive environmental policies. This is particularly true for gallium, indium, germanium, and rare earth elements. U.S. policy must focus on rebuilding refining infrastructure domestically and across aligned countries, including Canada, Australia, and Japan. Critical facilities such as the Hermosa Project in Arizona and MP Materials in California must be accelerated through permitting and investment.
Without this, the U.S. remains exposed. Defense platforms, space systems, advanced sensors, and AI hardware cannot function without reliable access to purified, processed strategic materials. In a wartime scenario or global supply shock, current dependencies could become fatal bottlenecks.
To break this dependency, several actions are recommended. First, the United States must aggressively diversify refining through bilateral and multilateral agreements targeting tantalum, niobium, tin, and especially barium. Second, domestic investment in the processing of gallium, indium, germanium, and lithium must be expanded and fast-tracked. Third, key refining sites in the U.S. and Canada must be prioritized for environmental and construction permitting. Fourth, barium and tin should be added to the National Defense Stockpile, treated as strategic materials on par with oil or ammunition. Lastly, the U.S. should lead in forming a tech-metal processing alliance with Canada and Australia, backed by incentives and secured purchase agreements.
With a unified strategy that spans domestic mining, allied sourcing, and non-Chinese refining, the United States can shift from dependence to resilience. China’s dominance is not unbreakable. Only one material—barium—has no scalable substitute outside China. Every other critical material can be mined, refined, or processed through partnerships, infrastructure investment, and decisive policy. The cost of inaction is measured not just in dollars but in vulnerability. The path forward is complex but within reach.
1. The manufacture of microelectronic components is foundational to national security, modern economies, and technological leadership. This report identifies the critical elements involved, the types of components they support, and evaluates the geographic feasibility of sourcing both raw materials and value-added refinement processes from inshore, nearshore, and friendshore partners.
2. Essential Microelectronic Components
2.1 Active Components
● Transistors (BJT, MOSFET, FinFET, GAAFET)
● Diodes (Zener, Schottky, LED, Photodiode)
● Integrated Circuits (MCUs, CPUs, ASICs, DSPs, Op-Amps)
2.2 Passive Components
● Resistors (carbon, NiCr, tantalum nitride)
● Capacitors (ceramic, tantalum, aluminum electrolytic, barium titanate)
● Inductors (ferrite, iron core, wire wound)
2.3 Electromechanical / MEMS
● Accelerometers
● Gyroscopes
● Microphones
● Pressure sensors
2.4 Timing and Power Management
● Crystal oscillators
● MEMS clocks
● Voltage regulators (LDO, DC-DC converters)
● Phase-locked loops (PLLs)
2.5 Packaging and Interconnects
● Solder (Sn, Ag, Pb)
● Wire bonds (Au, Al)
● Ball Grid Arrays (BGAs)
3. Elemental Requirements
Semiconductors
● Silicon (Si)
● Germanium (Ge)
● Gallium (Ga)
● Arsenic (As)
● Indium (In)
● Phosphorus (P)
● Boron (B)
● Antimony (Sb)
Conductors
● Copper (Cu)
● Aluminum (Al)
● Tungsten (W)
● Cobalt (Co)
● Nickel (Ni)
● Gold (Au)
● Silver (Ag)
Insulators / Dielectrics
● Silicon Dioxide (SiO2)
● Silicon Nitride (Si3N4)
● Hafnium Oxide (HfO2)
● Barium Titanate (BaTiO3)
Other Critical Elements
● Tantalum (Ta)
● Niobium (Nb)
● Iron (Fe)
● Zinc (Zn)
● Chromium (Cr)
● Manganese (Mn)
● Tin (Sn)
● Lead (Pb)
● Lithium (Li)
4. U.S. Access to Raw Material Mining (Onshore)
● Yes: Si, Cu, Au, Ag, Zn, Fe, Pb, Li, Mn, Ge, Ga, In (limited), W, B, Sb, Cr
● No: Ba, Sn, Nb, Ta (limited domestic potential)
5. Nearshore and Friendshore Mining Sources
● Canada: Ni, Co, Nb, Ta, Li, Ag, Au, Zn, Fe
● Mexico: Sb, Ag, Zn, Pb, Au, Fe
● Australia: Li, REEs, Ta, Ti, Mn
● Brazil (friend?): Nb, Ta
● Peru: Ag, Zn, Sn
● South Africa (friend?): Cr, Mn
● Germany/Estonia: minor REE and metal processing
6. Refining and Value-Add Processing Capability (Ex-China)
6.1 Best Non-China Refining Options
● Canada – Leading nearshore processor (Ni, Co, Li, Nb, Ga)
● Australia – Scaling REE & lithium refining (Lynas, Iluka)
● Japan/South Korea – High-purity processing (Ga, In, REEs, battery metals)
● Germany/Estonia – Copper, REEs, PGM, tantalum refining
● United States – Rebuilding capacity under DPA/CHIPS Act (REEs, Li, Cu)
6.2 Strategic Gaps
● Barium: reliant on Chinese-sourced barite
● Tin: limited sources; minor ally production (Peru, Indonesia)
● Niobium and Tantalum: no current U.S. refining; dependent on Brazil and Canada
7. Recommendations
● Diversify Refining: Prioritize allied refining agreements for Ta, Nb, Sn, and Ba
● Domestic Investment: Expand U.S. refining for In, Ga, Ge, Li
● Fast-Track Permitting: Expedite domestic and Canadian processing sites (e.g., Hermosa, MP Materials)
● Strategic Stockpiling: Barium and Tin should be added to defense reserves
● Public-Private Alliances: Incentivize U.S.–Canada–Australia tech-metal processing networks
Onshore (United States)
● Chromium (Cr): The U.S. has limited chromium mining; however, efforts are underway to identify domestic sources.
● Manganese (Mn): The Hermosa project in Arizona, operated by South32, is a significant zinc-manganese mining initiative fast-tracked under the FAST-41 federal permitting initiative. Reuters+1Reuters+1
● Iron (Fe): Iron ore is mined in several states, including Minnesota and Michigan, contributing to domestic steel production.
● Zinc (Zn): The Red Dog Mine in Alaska is one of the world's largest producers of zinc.National Mining Association
● Gold (Au): Nevada hosts some of the most productive gold mines in the U.S., such as the Carlin Trend.
● Lithium (Li): Albemarle's Silver Peak mine in Nevada is the only active lithium production site in the U.S., with expansion plans underway. Reuters
● Tin (Sn): The U.S. currently lacks significant tin mining operations.
● Silver (Ag): Silver is produced as a byproduct in several U.S. mines, including those in Nevada and Alaska.
● Lead (Pb): Lead is primarily produced in Missouri, with the Viburnum Trend being a notable mining district.
🇨🇦 Nearshore (Canada)
● Chromium (Cr): The Ring of Fire region in Ontario is known for its chromite deposits, though development has faced delays.
● Manganese (Mn): Canada has manganese resources, but there is limited current production.KPMG Assets
● Barium (Ba): Barite, a source of barium, is produced in Canada, supporting various industrial applications.
● Niobium (Nb): The Niobec Mine in Quebec is one of the world's leading producers of niobium.Wikipedia
● Iron (Fe): Canada is a major iron ore producer, with significant operations in Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador.
● Zinc (Zn): Canada ranks among the top global producers of zinc, with active mines in several provinces.
● Gold (Au): Canada is a leading gold producer, with major mining operations in Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia.
● Lithium (Li): Canada hosts several lithium projects, particularly in Quebec and Ontario, aiming to support battery supply chains.
● Tin (Sn): Tin production in Canada is minimal, with limited active mining operations.
● Silver (Ag): Silver is produced across Canada, often as a byproduct of other mining activities.
● Lead (Pb): Lead production occurs in Canada, commonly associated with zinc mining operations.
🇲🇽 Nearshore (Mexico)
● Chromium (Cr): Chromium mining in Mexico is limited, with no significant production reported.
● Manganese (Mn): Mexico has manganese deposits, but current production levels are modest.
● Barium (Ba): Mexico produces barite, supporting both domestic use and exports.
● Niobium (Nb): There is no notable niobium production in Mexico.
● Iron (Fe): Mexico is a significant iron ore producer, with major mining operations in states like Michoacán and Colima.
● Zinc (Zn): Mexico ranks among the world's top zinc producers, with extensive mining activities.
● Gold (Au): Mexico is a leading gold producer, with numerous active mines across the country.
● Lithium (Li): Mexico has identified lithium resources, particularly in Sonora, with development projects in progress.
● Tin (Sn): Tin production in Mexico is minimal, with limited mining activity.
● Silver (Ag): Mexico is the world's largest silver producer, with a rich history of silver mining.
● Lead (Pb): Lead is produced in Mexico, often in conjunction with zinc and silver mining.
Friendshore (Allied Nations)
● Chromium (Cr): South Africa and Kazakhstan are major producers of chromium, supplying global markets.
● Manganese (Mn): Australia and South Africa are leading manganese producers, essential for steel and battery industries.
● Barium (Ba): China is the largest producer of barite, though efforts are underway in other countries to diversify supply.
● Niobium (Nb): Brazil dominates niobium production, with the Araxá and Catalão mines being significant sources.
● Iron (Fe): Australia is a top iron ore exporter, with extensive mining operations in the Pilbara region.
● Zinc (Zn): Peru and Australia are major zinc producers, contributing significantly to global supply.
● Gold (Au): Australia, Canada, and South Africa are among the world's leading gold producers.
● Lithium (Li): Australia and Chile are key lithium producers, supplying the growing battery market.
● Tin (Sn): Indonesia and Peru are significant tin producers, with active mining industries.
● Silver (Ag): Peru and Australia are major silver producers, supporting various industrial and investment demands.
● Lead (Pb): Australia and China are leading lead producers, with substantial mining operations.
Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) related to the war in Ukraine. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.
Hate Subscriptions? Me too! You can support me with a one time contribution to my research at Buy Me a Coffee. https://buymeacoffee.com/researchukraine
Mr. Cook’s Substack:
Well, Trump has found the solution: Annex these territories -> problem solved!
/sarcasm
Good piece, Benjamin. Thanks.To your point that current American foreign policy runs counter to what is required, I agree. I doubt many of the 'friendshore nations' are now likely to do raw materials deals with America on any terms other than the most beneficial for them, if at all. Their electorates won't stand for it. I suspect Trump's bullying has ensured "a tech-metal processing alliance with Canada and Australia" won't happen either whilst he is in power other than once again on terms that favor them inordinately. And China's dominance of the rare earth element refining sector means they can manipulate the market to make it impossible for refiners outside China to compete without huge government subsidies. That is, of course, an option.