Supplement: Operator’s Guide

This is in reaction to different ‘comments’ I’ve received in response to my summaries over the last few days. I’ve posted something similar…

This is in reaction to different ‘comments’ I’ve received in response to my summaries over the last few days. I’ve posted something similar on my Facebook account already three months ago, but, it seems it’s about the time to ‘repeat the exercise’ here. The reason is that the mass of you ‘following’ me nowadays have no trace of clue about me, about my points of view, about why do I focus on following ‘only’ specific things, avoid paying attention at others, write specific things, and even less so about my work.

I grew up in the 1970s and 1980s. Back then there was no internet: people like me could follow ongoing wars only via newspapers, magazines, TV and radio. Exchange of information was one way only, and — in comparison to modern times — extremely slow.

Back then, armed conflicts followed by people like me were such like the war in Angola (1975–1992), Nicaragua (1979–1989), Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979–1989), the fall of the Shah of Iran and then the Iran-Iraq War (1979, i.e. 1980–1988), Falklands/Malvinas War (1982), the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 etc. Obtaining comprehensive and dependable information was so slow that — with few minor exceptions — mass of things I know about these conflicts nowadays actually became known to me only since I’m online, in 1996.

That said, one of ‘positive’ experiences from ‘those times’ was to ‘learn to read between the lines’. This is a ‘skill’ next to unknown to many Westerners until more recently: AFAIK, people old enough to have lived in Eastern Europe of the 1970s and 1980s are going to know it very well.

Another ‘skill’ I learned back then was that of empathy: of learning to find out reasons why other people think what they think and do what they do the way they do. I.e. to understand people whose mentality is entirely different than my own — and then well-enough to become able of ‘putting myself into their shoes’.

Gradually, the latter ‘converted’ me into a ‘maverick’: when others were, the way I saw it, ‘quickly jumping to conclusions’, I tried to understand why somebody did something, and explain that; and I began refusing to take all the news for bare money.

For example: one of stories related to armed conflicts widely published in the 1980s was that there was no air war between Iran and Iraq. That, essentially, both air forces were doing nothing, were kept back by their governments, or (mis)used for show purposes. The more I was researching about Iranian and Iraqi air forces, the less I could ‘believe’ such reports: with hindsight, I cannot but conclude that I was a clueless kid, but I did learn enough to say that there were two professional air forces, trained for years, equipped with some of the best gear there was to buy. Regular/official communication channels were all closed (see: local embassies were of no help), media-reports were useless, and even the specialised press was always repeating the same old story. Thus, this was — except for my ‘enthusiasm for military aircraft’ — one of reasons why I began to research on my own. Gradually, 10–15 years later, I’ve had enough info for my first few books about the air war between Iran and Iraq, published in 2002–2004.

From what I know about this topic today, that was still ‘nothing’. Like ‘stone age’. But, it was a good start, and — despite all the possible jerks throwing stones in my way (and at me) — I pressed on, continued researching and collecting info. Nowadays, I can comfortably say: people explaining there was no air war between Iran and Iraq were all wrong (should there be any doubts in this regards, check one of my recent books to this topic).

While researching that war, I worked myself through a few dozens of other, ‘obscure’, ‘no story’ air forces and air wars. Indeed, because my nature is such that the less is known about specific topic, the more interesting it is for me, I became something like specialised in researching and publishing about little-known, sometimes ‘entirely unknown’ air forces and air wars. Nowadays, I do feel I’ve got a very good idea about the history of (in alphabetic order) Algerian, Angolan, Egyptian, Ethiopian, Iranian, Iraqi, Libyan, Moroccan, Sudan, Syrian, Yemeni, Zimbabwean air forces — and air wars they fought (which, I guess, can be seen from my related books, too).

Over all these decades, I’ve heard, researched, and debunked a mass of legends and myths: Iranians were ‘not flying’ over Iraq, Iraqis were ‘not flying’ over Iran, ‘Arabs always lie’, Egyptians and Syrians ‘never flew’ over Israel, Israelis are ‘shooting down Arabs on sight’ and ‘never lost a single aircraft in air combats with Arabs’, and Algerians ‘can’t fly’, and Yemenis ‘even less so’, and Sudan or Zimbabwe ‘have no air force’…. I’ve heard, fact-checked, and de-bunked all such nonsense, long ago.

Finally, because most of these air forces were equipped with Soviet-made ‘MiGs’ (and Sukhois, and Antonovs, and Mils etc.), through researching these air forces — I came to research the Soviet and then the Russian air force, too. Nowhere near as intensively as few other people, but sufficiently enough to understand them (for example, for the purpose of writing this book).

No matter what’s the topic, I’m applying always the same methods. Foremost between these is research with help of unofficial sources. No matter what’s the topic, I’m always approaching it in similar fashion: as first, I try to understand socio-economic and geo-strategic backgrounds, in order to understand why the politics in the country in question is ‘functioning’ the way it does. This in turn is helping me understand why is the politics organising its armed forces the way it does. Once I understand that, I can understand the doctrine, strategy and tactics of the air force in question — indeed, everything, down to camouflage colours and markings it is using.

EDIT: when I’m talking about politicians and/or administrators, please mind that I’m extremely critical of all of them. So much so, I openly admit: for me, all the politicians are ‘corrupt and/or incompetent — until proven otherwise’. This is valid on case-to-case basis: i.e. if it happens that I find some politician did something right for once, I do not ‘automatically’ expect him/her to do it right the next time, too.

Bottom line,

1.) I do not know everything: on the contrary, most of the times I know nothing at all. At least in many cases of my interest, I do know how to find out, though.

2.) My experience is that the internet is an excellent tool for learning through a rapid exchange of huge volumes of information. I’m using it for exactly that, all the time. Nobody knows everything, but a lot of us know much more than every single one. Thus, I’m always welcoming commentary, corrections and additional info.

3.) As stated on the Facebook, I’m inspired, curious and enthusiastic about many things — and (mercilessly) critical about everybody and everything (including myself). So much so, many consider me ‘undiplomatic’.

4.) What I’m doing when ‘online monitoring’ a conflict like the one in Ukraine is not meant to offer optimistic or pessimistic perspectives, replace the mass media, counter this or that person, influence anybody — and even less so am I doing it for any kind of fame of fortune.

I’m simply trying to collect info, record, cross-check, and inform.

It so happens that plenty of people are finding that interesting, even informative. Thanks a lot for attention and trust, but please always mind: I’m not forcing anybody to read, nor is it my aim to have thousands of followers and fans (this is one of principal reasons why I’m turning down most of interview-requests from the media).

5.) I’m sorry if the results of my work are ‘not making you enthusiastic’, even ‘making you sad’, but, mind: wars are no pleasant affairs — which is why it’s always better not to fight any. Point is. that’s not my intention, but I can’t help it if something I write is not making you happy. If that’s helping you any: call me cold and calculated. I’m used to being called plenty of names. Some are funny, others disgusting. Point is: I don’t care about that any more.

6.) What you’re reading here is prepared by somebody used to research most obscure conflicts, and to ‘online monitor’ dozens of armed conflicts — starting with those in Afghanistan of the 1990s (yes, before the US/NATO intervention of 2001), the I Congo War (1996–1997) and the II Congo War (1998–2003), via many others fought ever since. You’re also dealing with somebody working as editor of dozens of books about contemporary warfare, and encouraging and supporting other authors to research conflicts that have a direct impact upon our everyday lives — as should be obvious from books like Fury from the North, Wings over the Hindu Kush, Erawan War, Brigate Rosse, COIN Operations in Paraguay, or the war in El Salvador).

Arguably, this might sound ‘authoritative’, even ‘impressive’ to many. However, please always keep in mind: the mass of what you get to read is ‘raw data’, far from ‘ultimate truth’. Moreover, while nowadays we can establish specific facts (like: aircraft XY was shot down at this and that place and time), actually, this is just the beginning of research that never ends, and requires constant updates. With other words: keep in mind that it’s going to take at least few years until we find out and know what exactly has happened on what day, where, when, how, and why.

7.) I’m strictly separating what I’m doing for living from my private life. Please, respect that.