Some ‘Food for Thoughts’…

Hello everybody!

Yes, my maps and reporting about what’s going on in southern Zaporizhzhya and south-western Donetsk are, ‘once again’, entirely different than what the mass of other ‘war monitors’ in the social media are reporting. Thus, I ‘must’ be an ‘Ukrainian cheerleader’, publishing fabrications and fantasies, and, generally, everybody knows I have no idea what am I talking about…

Arguably, there are lots of ‘good reasons’ for such conclusions about the content of my reporting. If nothing else, there are, as of right now, no photos or videos precisely supporting what I wrote.

However, for me, ‘monitoring’ and ‘commenting’ wars solely on basis of photos and videos is nothing else than ridiculous. The reason is that they are always only showing an extremely limited field of view, and only a very limited period of time. They never show what happened before, nor (and even more importantly): after. And they never explain what is what of involved parties trying to achieve; nothing about the tactics, nothing about the tactical situation, not even less so anything about capabilities and intentions of involved units.

….which is why in my reporting, I’m foremost depending on what they call the ‘HUMINT’: reports from contacts with at least some sort of decent insight into what’s going on. And I rarely care about photos and videos: principally because it regularly takes ‘days’, if not ‘weeks’ before they are released. Because most of the times they are ‘obsolete’ and thus misinforming.

Today, while thinking about all of this, an excellent example why am I working the way I do came to my mind. It’s related to both ‘gauging by videos’, and to ‘gauging casualties by reports’ (and then from both sides of the frontline). Even if most of what’s to follow is written ‘from memory’, this is still quite fresh because only recently I’ve co-authored a related book based on cross-examination of documentation and accounts from ‘both sides of the tribune’.

***

Slightly over 35 years ago, back in February-March 1988, a major, months-long military campaign took place in the south-eastern ‘corner’ of Angola. Specifically: between Cuito Cuanavale and Mavinga, though mostly closer to the former place.

South-eastern ‘corner’ of Angola. Borders to Zambia (East) and South West Africa/Namibia (South) are clearly visible, too.

The fighting in question was pitting following parties and forces:

-          Angolans: which is, Angolan Army (FAPLA), which fought for the Angolan government (MPLA)

Vs

-          Angolan insurgency of the UNITA, and its military wing, FALA, supported by

-          South Africans: which is, South African Defence Force (SADF).

Now, if one asks the South Africans, it wasn’t just Angolans they were facing, but ‘thousands’ of ‘crack’ Cuban troops, too. Indeed, no matter what one tells them, many of SADF-veterans remain convinced they’ve ‘killed hundreds of Cubans’. Actually, only a small – though influential – part of the (about 40,000-strong, as of early 1988) Cuban contingent in Angola took part. It was so that in November 1987, Cubans imposed themselves in command of FAPLA forces in the area in question. Castro and aides got fed up of corrupt MPLA and incompetent Soviet advisors assigned to the FAPLA, and actually wanted to finish 12 years of their military intervention in Angola with something like ‘decent success’. To enable one, they sent a team of officers to command FAPLA units in the Cuito area, and deployed two of their brigades to secure the supply link from Menongue. The mass of Cuban troops in the country were actually deployed about 400km further west: along the ‘Castro Line’, protecting southern Angola from a possible invasion by South Africa. Thus, while some Cuban troops were indeed present in the ‘general Cuito area’, most of them remained west of it and very few of them ever got a chance to fire a single shot at South Africans (or the FALA, which was what actually mattered).

In turn, the South Africans weren’t actually after capturing Cuito Cuanavale. Rather in rendering it useless for another FAPLA offensive on Mavinga. And they were extremely cautious about avoiding losses. Moreover, they were experiencing huge problems in maintaining any kind of sizeable force that far into Angola: their supply links to South West Africa (Namibia) were too long. And so, their offensive came forward very slowly: it took them from October 1987 until February 1988 to push the FAPLA into the area east of Cuito Cuanavale. At that point in time, Castro grew fed up and ordered the withdrawal of all the Cuban-controlled FAPLA-units to positions west of the Rivers Cuito and Cuanavale, i.e. west of their joint into Cuanavale (south of Cuito Cuanavale). Only the Angolan 25^th Infantry Brigade was left in a position east of the town, well-entrenched behind numerous minefields. This area became known as the ‘Tumpo Triangle’. And so, on 25 February 1988, and then again on 23 March 1988, two South African task forces moved out to destroy the 25^th Brigade…

Now, imagine the resulting actions being monitored by the modern-day social media…. (:rolleyes:)

For 25 February 1988, those supporting the South Africans or UNITA would report either a ‘rapid advance’ of the 61^st Mechanised Battalion and the accompanying FALA infantry, or ‘some problems with extensive minefields’. But, conclusion would’ve been ‘clear’, because all involved units came away with quite a collection of captured weapons, and also lots of photos of Angolan casualties. ‘Angolans and Cubans were defeated, period’.

Similarly, for 23 March 1988, the same people would report the same. One way or the other, some 2-5 days, at least few weeks later, they could provide plentiful videos in support of such reporting, showing Centurion MBTs and Ratel IFVs advancing in western direction, just some 4-5km east of Cuito (indeed, at one point the 82^nd Mechanised Brigade was less than 2km east of Cuito), destroyed T-55s, BTR-60s, artillery pieces, and bodies of FAPLA troops…

In turn, those supporting Angolans and/or Cubans would report massive air- and artillery strikes on advancing SADF and FALA, these becoming bogged down in the minefields and then suffering catastrophic losses…and support this with videos shown dozens of explosions in the middle of South African columns, ‘fire and smoke’…

And both sides would stress they’ve suffered minimal losses only…

***

You know what’s the best?

Both ‘sides’ would be right!

Yes, it’s ironic - but then: nearly all the wars are full of ironies. It’s just so that ironies are rarely captured on the video. Or even on photos.

They would be right because all of this did happen in these two operations. And much more. For example: on 25 February 1988, once they were finally through the minefields, the SADF and FALA units aimed to converge towards the same spot in the defence perimeter of the 25^th Brigade. Said, done. However, as their two columns – constantly shelled by the Angolan artillery, and under repeated air strikes – approached each other, the FALA infantry misidentified the infantry of the 32^nd Battalion SADF, and opened fire, sparking a ‘blue-on-blue’ or ‘fratricide’ engagement. And, if that was not enough: this firefight warned Angolans and Cubans about the exact position of the enemy (largely covered by thick bush until that point in time), so they promptly plastered the area with fire from BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, D-30 howitzers calibre 122mm and M-46 guns calibre 130mm…

Similar can be said about the next – and then final – SADF attempt to attack Cuito: the one on 23 March 1988. The only difference was that this time the 82^nd Mechanised Brigade abandoned its effort to destroy the 25^th Infantry Brigade ‘already’ after passing two minefields, and the southern prong of the SADF advance - the one by the 32nd Battalion and two battalions of FALA - didn’t even take place: somebody figured out it would’ve been pointless, alone considering extensive minefields… 

To make sure: it’s not like if South Africans didn’t perform well. They did. And it’s not like if Angolans didn’t suffer loses. They did. However… while Angolans retained Cuito, Castro wouldn’t order sufficient reinforcements to the area to enable a counterattack. He wasn’t interested in doing more than defending the place and then declaring a ‘victorious defence’. Which is what the Cuban-controlled Angolans did, and what Castro’s PR-machinery then did, respectively. And, the South Africans weren’t really after capturing Cuito – except this would prove simple and possible to do at minimal casualties. Foremost, they were just after preventing FAPLA from launching another advance on Mavinga. Which is what they did.

That much about ‘what would have videos shown’ - and reality.

***

As next, please pay attention: where was UNITA/FALA in all of this? After all, this battle was fought because FAPLA attacked the FALA-held Mavinga, intending to break through all the way to the UNITA’s ‘capital’ in Jamba. And the South Africans launched their intervention and drove Angolans back to Cuito Cuanavale in order to ‘save’ UNITA and FALA. But, when the results of the battle are discussed, nobody cares about the insurgency? And UNITA and its military wing FALA don’t matter any more…indeed: not at all…?

Problem: this is not recorded on any videos. Not even by any photos. Which is bringing me to the discussion of casualties, too.

Until this very day, the mass of English-language reports are based on South African accounts. And, these are leaving no trace of doubt: in both attacks, SADF troops ‘closed hatches’ of their Centurions MBTs and Ratel IFVs, and – regardless how much bombed and shelled by Angolans – simply advanced. Except for mines, all the enemy artillery fire, and all the air strikes simply didn’t matter and next to nothing happened as South Africans were advancing through thick bush, minefields and enemy artillery fire. ‘Ah yes’: on 25 February 1988, one truck carrying ammunition was hit and blown up, but otherwise: just five Ratels damaged, one tank-crewman and one MANPAD-operator killed. And it wasn’t that different on 23 March: few Centurions disabled, two left behind, about a dozen of lightly-wounded troops…

However, what none of South African sources is detailing are the losses of the accompanying FALA infantry. Namely, it was so that both on 25 February and on 23 March 1988, every of SADF units was ‘reinforced’ by at least a battalion of insurgents. These acted as ‘infantry screen’: traveled atop of SADF vehicles until encountering enemy fire, then would dismount and spread in front of them, to combat the enemy infantry hidden in the bush.

But nah: they’re not even mentioned. Something like ‘unimportant’: at least not a problem of the SADF’ (nor that of the MPLA and the FAPLA, of course). Thus, when one reads South African accounts, it was above-mentioned-, minimal losses (if at all) the SADF has suffered, against ‘hundreds’ of killed Angolan (and Cuban) troops. And, when one reads Cuban accounts (Angolan are next-to-non-available), there were ‘hundreds’ of killed ‘enemies’ - meaning South Africans… which simply didn’t happen. Is a matter of fact.

Thus, easy to conclude’: ‘Cubans (and Angolans) always lie’….

What doesn’t matter to either side is that hundreds of FALA insurgents were killed, too, while trying to support the advance of South African main battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles through dense minefields, under severe artillery barrages and air strikes. Just for example: the fact that – according to UNITA’s own accounts - the 5^th Battalion FALA lost over 400 killed (out of perhaps 550-600 troops) on 23 March 1988 alone.

To make sure: it’s not surprising if MPLA/FAPLA and Cubans never mention this. They didn’t know back then, and most of them don’t know until today. But, why are South Africans ignoring these losses of their allies?

***

If all of this is not enough, now pay attention at the following:

-          Until today, both sides are stylising this campaign (I’ve described only its ‘final two acts’) into the ‘Battle of Cuito Cuanavale’,

-          into the ‘biggest conventional battle in Africa since 1945’, and,

-          ‘last battle of the Cold War’.

….all of which is, actually, nonsense.

Sure, it might be pointless to discuss the naming of the campaign the ‘Battle of Cuito Cuanavale’. If nothing else, it’s easier to ‘summarise’ it that way.

However, it’s definitely pointless to declare it the ‘biggest conventional battle in Africa since 1945’. It wasn’t even the biggest conventional battle in Africa of the Year 1988. It might have been the biggest conventional battle in Africa of February 1988, but certainly not of March 1988.

Just for example, and as one can read in another of books co-authored by your very own, in March 1988, about 20,000 Eritrean insurgents attacked the 20,000-strong Nadew Command of the Ethiopian Army protecting the road between Afabet and Keren. While, as of February and March 1988, the ‘Battle of Cuito Cuanavale’ rarely involved more than perhaps 10,000 Angolan and Cuban, around 4,000 FALA and perhaps 2,000 SADF troops, alone the Nadew Command suffered a loss of over 3,000 killed, over 6,000 wounded, and 3,000 missing in action (and that according to official Ethiopian documentation).

….and mind: the destruction of the Nadew Command wasn’t even something like the ‘10^th biggest battle of the Ethiopia-Eritrea War’: in that conflict there were major show-downs involving far more combatants before and after it.

However, not even ‘Africans’ are coming to the idea to consider it, and instead claim the ‘Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was the biggest’…?

BTW, Ethiopia was supported by the USSR. And, just like the leadership in Luanda at least officially declared itself for ‘Marxists’, so also that in Addis Ababa did the same. Sure, Eritrea wasn’t supported by the West: at most, by different Arab countries of the Middle East – most of which were at least ‘clients for Soviet arms’, if no ‘Soviet allies’. But, why then declaring the battle of Cuito Cuanavale the ‘last battle of the Cold War’, while ignoring not only the destruction of the Nadew Command, but a number of even bigger battles in Ethiopia through 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991…? ….and why not considering this a part of the Cold War…?

…and this is not to talk about the fact that a number of big battles ‘of the Cold War’ was fought in northern Chad and southern Libya through the second half of 1987, and the first half of 1988, too – and that by US- and France-supported Chad, against the Soviet-supported Libya…

I beg your pardon: except for ‘ignorance’ and ‘somebody there is clueless about contemporary military history’ – no other explanations are coming to my mind.

Bottom line: sorry, I’ve got my own experiences in regards of what ‘works’ and what doesn’t. I consider these for ‘well proven in action’, and I’ll continue working that way, no matter who likes them and who not.