Russian Artillery & Ammo Production

by Donald Hill

(Note: the following was originally meant to be the ‘Part 5’ of Today’s Don’s Weekly. However, considering the importance of the topic in question, and lots of related questions from our readers, have decided to ‘position’ it as a separate feature.)

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During WW2, indirect fire caused 69% and 64% of the deaths in the Mediterranean and European theaters and 47% of the deaths in the Pacific. Despite the increased usage of drones, more than 70% of Ukraine’s casualties are caused by Russia’s artillery, rockets and mortars. Rusi examined how sanctions could suppress Russia’s production of artillery and ammo.

Russia has four facilities that produce artillery barrels. One is a research and development facility and only has the capacity to produce enough barrels for testing. Another is the main assembly path at Uraltransmash, but this facility is primarily for systems integration. And then there are two more factories that are “not currently a significant source of barrel production.” In 2019, a Russian report said it produced 328 armored vehicles of all times (tanks, artillery, etc.) and was operating at 64% capacity, giving it a theoretical maximum of 512 barrels of all calibers. An April 2024 claim by Russia says they increased production of self-propelled artillery by ten times and towed artillery by 14 times. Refurbished barrels were likely a part of these figures and the stocks of those are limited. Rusi estimates that Russia may be able to produce hundreds of new artillery barrels per year. Production will decrease when the stocks of barrels to refurbish are depleted.

(About 80% of all Russian vehicles in Ukraine are refurbished from storage).

Not counting worn out barrels, Russia lost 19,000 artillery pieces in 20 months, averaging over 900 guns per month. The rate of loss doubled in July and August.

These are Russian monthly losses of artillery according to Ukraine. The September figure is 518 pieces as of September 18th.

More than 50% of the chromium Russia needs for artillery is imported. In 2021, 87% of Russia’s chromium imports came from Kazakhstan, and in 2023, 99% of Kazakhstan’s chromium exports went to Russia. Most of South Africa’s shipments of chromium to Russia pass through Europe. Sanctions on chromium imports from Kazakhstan may be difficult to monitor but those from South Africa would be easier to track. Even if South Africa continued to send chromium, it would cost more and take longer if Europe did not facilitate the transportation.

Russia produces a limited amount of Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines to automate the precision shaping of shells and barrels, but it mostly relies on imports of the CNC machines. In January 2022, it imported $29.46 million of machine tools. It then accelerated the import of CNC machines, purchasing $120.86 million in July 2023, with 70% of that coming from China, until sanctions came into effect and the imports were dramatically decreased.

Russia has a greater need for the machines now because they can automate the production process and Izvestia estimated that Russia was short 4.8 million workers in 2023. In addition, as of 2023, 63-65% of the capital equipment in defense and related industries was worn out or approaching the end of its service life. This impacts not just barrel and ammo production, but drone and other pieces of war equipment.

In 2022, Russia produced 7,221 CNC machines. In 2023, that increased to 9,269. In that same time period, imports of machine tools exceeded 60,000 units. Most of that was coming from China, which (until the July 2023 sanctions) exported 90% of the goods on the G7 control list.

Russia planned for a need of 4 million 152 mm artillery rounds and 1.6 million 122 mm rounds in 2025. It produces 1.3 million 152 rounds and 800,000 122 mm rounds. It plans to make up the difference with imports and refurbished shells from the limited stocks of stored shells.

The raw materials that are needed for artillery ammo are ammonia, formaldehyde, aluminum, nitric acid, sodium hydroxide, iron ore, alloy components, copper, zinc and cotton pulp. The cotton pulp is treated to become nitrocellulose. Attempts to grow cotton domestically or develop alternatives have failed and the import of cotton is vulnerable to western sanctions. Russia increased its imports of cellulose by 70%.

In quantities of dollars, the import of cotton dramatically increased after Russia’s open invasion created a need for more ammo.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are the main source of Russian cotton imports (and cotton is the reason for the disappearance of the Aral Sea when the Soviet Union decided in 1960 to expand the growth of cotton in an arid environment). Uzbekistan remains a close ally with Russia and continues to send an increasing amount of cotton.

But Kazakhstan has distanced itself from Russia somewhat. A Kazakh company that used to be one of the largest supplies to Russia dramatically decreased its shipment of cotton cellulose between July and October 2023 due to diplomatic pressure, and then stopped all shipments. Instead, it is shipping all its cotton to a US customer.

So not only did Kazakhstan stop supplying Russia, it started supplying a Ukrainian ally, possibly for a higher profit. Since the west is ramping up their ammo production, they also need new sources of raw material. A significant portion of western ammo production relies on Chinese cotton cellulose, a vulnerability that they are trying to mitigate with alternate sources of cotton and by developing new types of explosives.

Russia also relies on chemical and precursor imports, as well. While the imports have decreased, companies in China and NATO countries sell directly to Russian companies. They then sell to Russian companies that produce explosives. Shipments that originate in NATO countries or pass through them can be intercepted.

Chemicals are shipped to Russia to create explosives.

The transportation of materials and goods is also a Russian vulnerability. The trains are short of parts and 40,000 wagons are out of service because locomotives aren’t available because they need repairs. Russia can only move 93% of the cargo it has, leading to longer waits and a slowdown in productivity. Any further degradation of the rail system would impact not just the production of war materials but the economy itself.

Russia is self-sufficient for many of its needed resources but there are areas that sanctions would have an effect on Russia’s ability to produce weapons and ammo for this war, and also make it more difficult to re-arm itself after the war.