> Regarding the relative strength of Islamists and ‘moderates’, my point I think still stands.
And that’s the essence of (your) problem: Daesh is not ‘Syrian’, and therefore no part of the ‘Syrian armed opposition’ (not to talk about…
> Regarding the relative strength of Islamists and ‘moderates’, my point I think still stands. At their height, Daesh alone…
And that’s the essence of (your) problem: Daesh is not ‘Syrian’, and therefore no part of the ‘Syrian armed opposition’ (not to talk about majority of the Daesh is fighting in Iraq, not in Syria).
Daesh is a creation of the al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and left-overs of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, bolstered by Russian export of its (true or perceived) Islamists, influx of Western jihadists, and even some of Assadist and Iranian activities. Daesh did spread into NE Syria, but this exclusively through attacking Syrian insurgents there.
It’s only other relations to Syria are a) that it proved crucial for the establishment of the Jabhat an-Nusra (JAN; which then refused to join it), and b) was imported to Syria by Assadists in order to bolster their legend about the uprising in Syria being one of ‘international conspiracy’ and run by ‘Islamic extremists’.
This goes so far that the Daesh considers Syrians as messy and lazy; indeed, as inferior.
> And, if I’m reading it right, you’re not contradicting my assertion that large portions of FSyA have Islamist tendencies themselves…
No: I do not say that ‘large portions of FSyA have Islamist tendencies’.
Like majority of Syrians are Moslems, so also majority of FSyA’s combatants are Moslems. That’s all. Means anything else but that they have ‘Islamist tendencies’ in sense of ‘extremist Islam’ (like that of Salafist and/or Wahhabist ideology) — otherwise there would be no FSyA as a group separate from such like the JAN’/JFS, Ahrar, etc.
> and you’ve acknowledged that FSyA’s strength is largely in local defense groups i.e. not organizationally cohesive in the way the Islamists are.
Yes, but I also explained why (and you seem to have missed that): reason is that they are not receiving any kind of aid from abroad.
Syrian Salafists, Syrian Wahhabists, and all sorts of transnational jihadists active in Syria are all receiving immense amounts of support from abroad (Assadist regime — even more so). The FSyA — not. That’s why the FSyA is out of condition to create an organizationally cohesive structure.
> Though perhaps the rise and fall of Daesh has severely dampened popular enthusiasm for Islamism — I wouldn’t know, to be honest — so maybe there is some room for moderate anti-Assad forces to grow.
The answer is so simple that I must wonder how comes so many fail to see and understand it?
Any party (no matter what) that gets money and all other sorts of support, is 100% certain to grow stronger — and that at the cost of the other party (or parties). Means: if we (the West) let Qatar, Turkey etc. provide ever more financing and supplies to Salafsts and Wahhabists, and if we let Iran provide ever more financing and supplies for Assadists/Alawites and various other sectarian militias…
…while at the same time we are doing absolutely everything possible to prevent any kind of aid from reaching moderates (which, as always, are simply the vast majority of people, like this is the case everywhere around the World)…
…then where is actually the problem? What do you think is the only logical consequence of such situation?
> But, from what you’ve wrote, it seems you believe that he hasn’t succeeded (you don’t believe the FSyA will take it out on Alawite civilians if they win) but I’m personally remaining skeptical for now — in Iraq, the Shi’ites seemed to have no problem cleansing Baghdad of Sunnis when they ascended to power, and they seemed ‘moderate’ by Syrian standards too (well, not the Mahdi Army, but the al-Maliki forces like Badr Brigade).
Heh… 13 years since US invasion of Iraq, and the situation there seems to remain entirely unclear…
OK, let’s se: in Iraq, there are, say, 6 major Shi’a political groups/parties. At least 3 of these are at least ‘cooperating’ with the IRGC (i.e. depending on its sponsoring) even if not being directly subjected to it, while 2 are little else but ‘IRGC in Iraq’.
‘What a surprise’ then, if they began ethnically cleansing Baghdad of Sunnis already back in 2004, isn’t it….?
‘Of course it is’ — and that’s why ideologically moderate FSyA factions ‘must be expected’ (mind: ‘expected’!) to do the same with Christians and Alawites in Syria, should they ever manage to remove Assad…?
Are you aware of how absurd this hears?
> Your support of no-fly zones is more interesting and potentially more dangerous — do you advocate shooting down Russian aircraft if they challenge us?
Yes.
Experiences with Russian violations of NATO airspace in Europe have shown that there are limits of what Russians are (‘really’) ready to do, i.e. how far are they ready to go. Indeed, these experiences have shown that all one needs to stop such behaviour is a robust set of Rules of Engagement — and these being made known to the Russians.
> I guess Turkey did it
Yes, but because of a Russian mistake. An agreement between the Deputy C-in-C VKS and the C-in-C THK, signed on 12 or 15 October 2015 in Ankara (can’t recall the exact date right now, but you can google related reports), stipulated Russians to announce every VKS fligt along the Syrian-Turkish border 12 hours in advance. Russians forgot to do so, and when their Su-24s approached the Turkish border, and then violated that border two times, Turks concluded these would be Assadists. That’s why they opened fire.
> What is the legality of this (won’t go through UN b/c Russian veto),
That should be more than obvious: self-defence.
Namely — and ‘if nothing else’ — in short terms: Assadist, Iranian and Russian assault on civilian population of Syria is causing waves of millions of refugees, most of whom long to flee to countries that are NATO-members. Such a mass influx of refugees is destabilizing the countries in question, and also has harmful consequences for mutual relations between specific NATO members. The crisis is further increased through Russian financial support for extreme right-wing groups within the NATO, and through bribing of selected top politicians in a number of countries that are NATO-members (including Germany).
In long-term, Assadist, Iranian and Russian assault on civilian population of Syria is not only cooperative with a host of groups and organizations considered ‘terrorist’ by the NATO (see: IRGC, Hezbollah, PKK, PFLP-GC, and the PLA), but also certain to establish a regime of terror, which is going to turn the country into a hotbed of international terrorism for decades in advance.
For all practical purposes, their actions are therefore an aggressive act.
A ‘non-violent’ one towards the NATO, if you like, but still an aggressive act — and then one causing plenty of damage (see alone all the expenses for taking care and then integrating all the refugees).
Therefore, any kind of military intervention in Syria would be an act of self-defence from clear, well-substantiated threat for national security of the entire NATO.
> and if we do it unilaterally what is the effect on US prestige and credibility in the future? (I don’t know, to be honest, so I’m asking you).
Hand at heart: is there anything of US prestige and credibility left after all that happened in the last 16 years?
(This is a serious question.)
Should your answer be negative (and it should), then there’s actually no need to worry about that issue any more.