Origins of the Shahed, Part 3

This is the 3rd and final part of an article originally published back in September the last year, on my former Medium.com account.

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In the West, the mass of PRC’s products is considered for poorly-manufactured and unable to compete with Western competition. While some of this is truth, no doubt — and supported by reports about poor quality of such Chinese-made UAV/UCAVs like CH-4 Wing Loong in Saudi Arabia and few other places, or failed PR-stunts from Iran, for example — the mass of such assessments is based on the stand from ‘years ago’. Others are based on little else than jealousy, and some on little else but lack of knowledge about just how much the Chinese improved their manufacturing standards. Indeed, things changed dramatically over the last few years and, unsurprisingly, the Iranians stress that notions like ‘everything Chinese is bad’, is entirely wrong. They say that many of Chinese products are based on reverse-engineered technology of US, Israeli, British, French, Austrian, and other designs, and that while much cheaper, these are of exactly the same quality.

Considering that — thanks to super-smart CEOs of such Western companies like Boeing, Lockheed-Martin etc. — Chinese-made parts, even chips, have meanwhile found the way into some of most advanced US-made combat aircraft…. and notwithstanding occasional failures (a ‘norm’ when it comes to such high-tech weapons systems), in grand total: I see no reason to have any serious doubts about this.

FROM IRAN, VIA SYRIA TO YEMEN

This about the quality of Chinese- and thus, nowadays, the Iranian UAVs, is even more valid considering how many and how much are operated by the IRGC, meanwhile, and how much combat experience have Iranians accumulated with them. Essentially, since 2016, not one of IRGC-QF-controlled combat operations in Syria took place without extensive reconnaissance by UAVs like Mohajer-4 and Shahed-129. The IRGC was deploying (and still deploys) its UAVs to monitor US military operations — in Syria, and in the Persian Gulf, too. The threat only increased once the first of armed sub-variants of the Shahed-129 entered service, in early 2017. Unsurprisingly, they soon found themselves on the receiving end of US intercepts. For example, on 8 June 2017, one was shot down by a Boeing F-15E Strike Eagle of the US Air Force over eastern Syria

Stills from different videos shown Shahed-129s UAVs operated by the IRGC-QF over Syria in period 2016–2018.

Stills from videos shown IRGC-QF’s Mohajer-4s underway over Syria and — lower right corner — one of Russian-made Orlan-10s. During operations in that country, Iranian-made UAVs and UCAVs proved vastly superior to anything made in the Russian federation — in endurance, in quality of collected intelligence and because, contrary to the Russian UAVs, the Iranian-made systems could be armed with suitable mini-PGM, too.

Meanwhile, in 2012, the Iranians got their hands on a US-made, ‘super-secret’ Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel ‘stealth’ UAV (also known as the ‘Beast of Qandahar’): the cyber warfare branch of the IRGC managed to jam its command link and caused it to land inside Iran.

For reasons explained to the length in Parts 1 and 2 of this feature, as of 2012–2015, the Iranians couldn’t do much with it but stage a few PR-shows: but, the situation was entirely different once they’ve entered their strategic alliance with the PRC. The result were the Shahed Saeqeh and Shahed-171 Simorgh, which are piston-powered, and the turbojet-powered Shahed-191. Shahed-171 and -191 can be armed with two Sadid mini-PGMs. At least the -171 has been deployed in combat in Syria since 2018. However, AFAIK, they have been manufactured in small numbers only.

Iranian-made Saegeh UAV/UCAVs.

For PR- and testing purposes, one of these was then sent via Jordanian- into the Israeli airspace, but shot down by a Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopter from №113 Squadron, Israeli Air-Space Force, on 10 February 2018. In retaliation, the Israelis launched a massive counter-strike, first knocking out Syrian air defences, and then demolishing the ‘IRGC corner’ of the T-4/Tiyas Air Base, in central Syria.

At least according to the information released by the IDF, the focus of Israeli air strikes of 10 February 2018 were these two hangars on the northwestern side of T-4 air base, which housed IRGC-operated UAVs.

Over the following years the IRGC collected even more combat experience with UAVs over Syria. Moreover, it became neck-deep involved in Yemen. In that country, the IRGC is supporting the Houthi movement, which is fighting against the Saudi-led coalition that, in turn, is supporting the former government, meanwhile based in Aden. Iranian UAVs began appearing there in 2018: meanwhile, Iranian-designed loitering PGMs are the primary long-range weapon of the Houthis.

SHAHED-136

The story of coming into being of Iranian loitering PGMs is quite ironic, actually. It was the Iraqis who, back in the late 1980s, came to the idea to make remotely piloted UAVs that would carry a warhead and a video camera and, if finding a suitable target, be flown into the same. At the time, they were cooperating with South Africa in regards of both artillery and UAVs, and in around 1989–1990 the two designed the first loitering PGM ever — and then one with a bomb-like body, ‘carried’ by a delta-wing planform. This cooperation was interrupted by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in August 1990, and the resulting UN-imposed arms embargo. However, the South Africans had an even more intensive cooperation with Israel and, unsurprisingly, few years later a de-facto copy of the original Iraqi-South African design emerged in Israel in form of the Harpy anti-radar UAV. In turn, the latter was then used as a specimen for the Iranian design, refined by the Chinese. That’s how the HESA Shahed-136 came into being.

First shown in the public at an airshow in 2014, as a ‘prototype of a small, delta-winged UAV, reminiscent of the Israeli-made Harpy’, what became the Shahed-136 made little progress until 2016. Two years later, first pieces of wreckage of a design with the same planform were collected from the sites of several Houthi-launched attacks in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. That’s the way it became known that the Iranians not only launched the production of their own loitering PGM, but also began developing tactics to counter such advanced Saudi-operated SAM-systems like MIM-104 Patriot PAC-2/3.

Shahed-136 is relatively simple: so much so, the IRGC taught the Houthis to make them on their own, using a mix of parts smuggled in from Iran, and whatever is available in the country (like moped engines). Meanwhile, some of resulting ‘do-it-yourself’ Shahed-136-likes are known to have been deployed for strikes against targets in Yemen that were dozens of kilometres behind the frontlines, (like al-Alam in the Ma’rib Province, in September 2020, or in the al-Jawf province, January 2021), but also for attacks well inside Saudi Arabia, and, in July the last year, Israelis reported that one of Shahed-136s was deployed for an attack on one of their merchants underway off Oman, too.

NUMBERS

How many Iranian-made UAVs and loitering PGMs can Ukraine expect to encounter while fighting Russia?

I do not know any ‘absolutely reliable’ source for the number of UAVs, UCAVs and loitering PGMs manufactured by Iran and pressed into service. Think to have read somewhere that about 50 each of Mohajer-4, Mohajer-6, and Shahed-129s were manufactured, but their series production is going on at least since 2016, and — at least in part — dependable on availability of engines made by Rotax of Austria. Thus, I doubt anybody except Tehran knows exactly.

In September 2019, the Iranians deployed a combination of 26 UAVs, loitering-PGMs, and cruise missiles to strike one of key Saudi oil facilities. Around the same time, they deployed more than 50 Shahed-129, Shahed-133, Shahed-191 and other UAV/UCAVs during just one exercise and trained strikes by groups of drones against the same target.

Sadid mini-PGM as seen miliseconds after release from a Shahed-171 UCAV.

Important in regards of Iranian-made UAV/UCAVs sold to Russia is the following:

Mohajer-6: this is a medium-sized UAV/UCAV, with a wingspan of 10m, a straight wing and twin booms. It is powered by a piston engine, equipped with a gimbal for a laser range-finder/marker and a reconnaissance and IR-camera, and can be armed with either two or four Qaem mini-PGMs. Its claimed range is around 200km. At least a dozen is known to have been delivered to Russia, meanwhile, and one was found by Ukrainians floating on the sea surface, off the coast of Odesa, on 24 September 2022.

Shahed-129: this is a big UAV/UCAV, with a wingspan of 16m (straight wing) and V-shaped fin. It is powered by a piston engine, equipped with a gimbal for a laser range-finder/marker and a reconnaissance and IR-camera, and can be armed with four Sadid and/or Fath mini-PGMs. Its claimed range is 1,700km. At least two were claimed as shot down by Ukraine, the last 7–10 days.

Airframes and wings of both are made of composites, but they are no ‘stealth’ designs: they should be detectable by radar from at least 30km, perhaps as much as 50km. Average operating altitude of both the Mohajer-6 and Shahed-129 is around 1,500–2,000m. Their engines are noisy and easy to hear from more than 10km.

Both Mohajer-6 and Shahed-129 are relatively slow: cruise speed is about 80km/h, even if they can reach higher top speeds. Especially Shahed-129 can fly relatively high: up to 6,000m (20,000ft).

None of Iranian-made UAV/UCAVs has satellite-communication capabilities: essentially, they are limited to ‘line-of-sight’ operations. However, the Iranians are known to have stretched that range through pre-programming, and through using other UAVs as command-relays. For example, since September last year, the Russians are regularly deploying Mohajer-6s as relays during their Shahed-strikes. In this fashion, the effective range of the latter can be stretched to well over 100km.

In comparison, Shahed-136 loitering PGM is much smaller: it’s some 2m in length and has a delta-wing planform. It is slightly faster than Mohajer-6 and Shahed-129, and can reach 150km/h. On average, it’s underway at altitudes above 500 metres and flying straight, but when approaching the target it’s descending to less than 100 metres. It is carrying a 36-kilogram-heavy warhead and can be pre-programmed to strike pre-selected, fixed targets: as such, it’s de-facto a slow-moving cruise missile, with a punch comparable to that of a artillery shell calibre 155mm. Alternatively, if still within the communication range with the ground base, it can be steered by the controller during the terminal flight phase.

I do not know how many Shahed-136 have been manufactured and pressed into service in Iran: only that they are much cheaper and simpler to manufacture than any of above-mentioned UAVs (especially in comparison to Mohajer-6 and Shahed-129). About a year ago, the Royal Saudi Air Force claimed its 500th Iranian-designed loitering-PGM as shot down (mostly by F-15C/E Eagle and EF-2000 Typhon II interceptors, using guided air-to-air missiles). That said, the mass of these were of other, even simpler (and more conventional) designs than that of the Shahed-136.

They are no good news, no doubt, and should not be underestimated: at least likely to enable the VSRF to continue monitoring the movement of Ukrainian ground forces even in freezing temperatures of the coming winter. But, they can be countered, at least by air defence weapons — as witnessed by Ukrainians claiming to have shot down at least four, today alone, primarily by SAMs. Indeed, if I didn’t miss something, as of this evening, the ZSU claimed a total of some 12–15 Iranian-made UAVs and loitering PGMs as shot down — all since 13 September 2022.

But then, precisely that’s the point about UAVs and UCAVs: if one is lost, there are plenty of others — and at least on the operator’s side, nobody was hurt.