Operational Concept Paper: Embedded Tactical Battle Labs for Iterative Warfighting Innovation
by Benjamin Cook
1. Purpose
To define an operational concept for implementing embedded Tactical Battle Labs at the brigade and company level across the U.S. military (NATO), enabling real-time iteration of warfighting capabilities through collaboration between troops, engineers, and defense industry representatives.
2. Operational Problem
Contemporary conflicts—most notably Ukraine's ongoing defense against Russia—demonstrate that battlefield dominance is not driven by specific technologies (e.g., drones) but by the speed and adaptability of innovation. The current U.S. defense acquisition process is too slow, centralized, and protective of intellectual property to respond in operational timeframes.
A new model is required to:
● Rapidly adapt fielded equipment based on real-time combat feedback.
● Merge soldier experience, technical expertise, and industry knowledge into an active feedback loop.
● Institutionalize innovation below the program-of-record level.
3. Concept Overview
This concept proposes the deployment of embedded Battle Labs at the brigade and company levels. Each lab is staffed with:
● Active-duty warfighters
● DoD civilian or contracted engineers
● Embedded industry technical teams
These teams will fabricate, modify, patch, and iterate on warfighting systems in the field. A DoD-wide innovation sharing platform and scaling pipeline will support these labs.
4. Capability Requirements
a. Battle Lab Infrastructure
● Brigade-level: Full fabrication suite (3D printing, CNC, electronics, software dev)
● Company-level: Lightweight fabrication/mod cell (firmware, code, parts swaps)
● Secure digital comms for version control, design sync, and documentation
b. Personnel
● Military operators (user/feedback role)
● Embedded engineers (DoD and contractor)
● Subscription-based contractor tech teams (Skydio, RTX, Anduril, etc.)
c. Policy and Legal Frameworks
● Mandated participation in Battle Lab programs via DoD acquisition clauses
● Temporary IP-sharing agreements valid for duration of conflict
● Cross-branch transparency on in-development solutions
d. Digital Innovation Exchange
● DoD-wide secure portal
● Tracks: What works, what’s in development, failure logs
● Open across all services and innovation cells
e. Scaling Pipeline
● Direct link to DIU, DARPA, service rapid acquisition units
● Fast lane for industrial scaling of validated designs
● Enables transition from tactical prototype to full-scale production
5. DOTMLPF-I Implications
● Doctrine: Requires new doctrine on in-theater iteration and decentralized acquisition authority.
● Organization: Battle Labs must be structurally embedded in brigade/company TO&E.
● Training: Military engineers and operators must be trained to co-develop with contractors.
● Materiel: Equipment designed for modularity and rapid adaptation.
● Leadership: Commanders empowered to prioritize innovation and adaptation.
● Personnel: Specialized roles for tech-enabled warfighters and lab managers.
● Facilities: Mobile labs or fixed installations depending on deployment phase.
● Policy: Acquisition reform to enforce contractor participation and IP sharing.
● Infrastructure: Cloud-based code/data sharing, secure innovation network, logistics support.
6. Operational Priorities: Mission Areas Needing Battle Labs Most
● Air and Missile Defense: Rapid updates to intercept algorithms and sensors
● UxS Operators (Air, Ground, Sea): Hardware tweaks, firmware patches, payload customization
● ISR Units: Sensor tuning, edge AI updates, real-time data pipeline fixes
● FLOT Troops: Triggering devices, counter-drone kits, tactical tools
● EW Teams: Rapid countermeasure adaptation to changing enemy signatures
● Logistics: Smart inventory systems, low-signature resupply tech
7. Implementation Roadmap
Create Joint DoD–Industry Working Group
Draft and publish Battle Lab participation clause for all new contracts
Pilot program with selected brigades in each service
Establish Innovation Exchange and Scaling Pipeline
Evaluate outcomes and codify into acquisition doctrine
8. Conclusion
Ukraine doesn't succeed because it has better tools—it succeeds because it builds a better feedback loop between soldiers, engineers, and manufacturers. The U.S. must institutionalize this advantage through embedded Battle Labs that accelerate iteration, bypass slow procurement, and weaponize innovation itself.
Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) related to the war in Ukraine. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.
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Mr. Cook’s Substack:
Nice idea. Likelly to need seven committees, three think tanks, numerous white papers and about 15 years to implement.
Cannot have anything accepted for production until it has been obsolete for at least 5 years.
The US military...along with most western European militaries...are institutional "elephants", very large and difficult to move. Also, resistent to change. Ukraine took several years of desperate fighting to get to where they are today...out of dire necessity. Your proposal makes good sense but until the "necessity" arises it will remain on some junior planning officer's desk.