Navigating with StarLink-Signals in GPS-Denied Environments: Part 2
by Benjamin Cook
(…continued from Part 1…)
Feasibility for State and Non-State Actors
Using Starlink signals for navigation does require technical know-how and equipment, but the barriers are falling. Here we assess how feasible it would be for different actors to adopt this method, including a look at real-world adoption by Russia and potential use by others.
● Ukraine: Ukraine has demonstrated ingenuity in rapidly adopting new technology on the battlefield. With significant Western support and an active tech sector, Ukraine likely possesses the expertise to implement SoOPNav using Starlink. In fact, Ukrainian engineers have been working on homegrown solutions to counter Russian jamming since early in the war. Given that Ukrainian forces have had extensive access to Starlink services (for communication) since 2022, it’s a small leap to also exploit those signals for navigation. The cost and size of necessary hardware is relatively modest – a drone could carry a lightweight SDR and antenna, or even repurpose parts of a Starlink user terminal. Reports suggest that Ukraine’s deep strikes (such as drone attacks on airbases far inside Russia) are using SoOPNav techniques to overcome heavy jamming[24][23]. This might involve using Russian civilian signals (like radio towers) as well as Starlink or other satellite signals. The feasibility for Ukraine is high: they have urgent operational need and likely access to the algorithms (some of which are published openly). We can surmise that if not already in widespread use, these methods are being tested or fast-tracked. The advantage for Ukraine is clear – it allows their drones and long-range munitions to maintain navigation even when Russian forces blanket the area with GPS interference[22].
● Russia: It might be surprising, but Russia itself has started using Starlink technology – despite Starlink being a Western (U.S.) system. Intelligence reports in late 2025 showed Russian “Molniya” UAVs recovered in Ukraine with Starlink satellite terminals onboard[29][27]. These are not ad-hoc hacks; they appear to be professionally integrated at a production level[27]. What does this mean? Primarily, it indicates Russia is using Starlink for communications (controlling drones via satellite link to avoid line-of-sight radio jamming). However, the presence of Starlink on their drones also inherently provides a navigation backup: a drone connected through Starlink is being guided in real-time by an operator or AI, which sidesteps the need for onboard GPS. Even if GPS is jammed, the operator can steer the drone via the satellite link and/or the drone can potentially use the Starlink signal for localization. Russian operators have found that drones under Starlink control are “largely immune to ground-based electronic warfare” – they cannot be taken down by conventional jamming[30]. They’ve achieved strike accuracies on the order of tens of meters using this method[28], sufficient to hit large targets. The fact that Russia has sourced Starlink units (even through indirect means, like intermediaries buying units abroad[31]) and deployed them at scale is telling. It validates the feasibility: even a military that initially did not have access to Starlink recognized its value and found ways to integrate it. This is a serious development for NATO to note, as it erodes a technological edge that Ukraine had early in the war[32]. It also underscores that Starlink’s signals – being global and commercial – are essentially up for grabs by anyone, including adversaries, unless measures are taken.
● China: China has closely watched the use of Starlink in warfare and has conducted research on both exploiting and countering it. Chinese scientists acknowledge that Starlink could serve as a PNT backbone in wartime (for example, for U.S. forces or Taiwan’s defenses if GPS were denied)[26]. Consequently, China has studied ways to jam or destroy Starlink in a conflict scenario. A recent Chinese study (covered in The Independent) outlined how an invasion of Taiwan might involve launching swarms of jamming drones to knock out Starlink signals over an area[26][33]. The concern from China’s perspective is that Starlink dramatically increases the resilience of their adversaries’ navigation and communication – an enemy could lose GPS but still have thousands of LEO satellites to fall back on. On the flip side, the Chinese military could also use Starlink signals themselves if available, or replicate the concept with their own satellites. China is deploying its own LEO constellations (such as a planned megaconstellation similar to Starlink) and has advanced electronic warfare and SDR capabilities. It is technically very feasible for Chinese forces to develop SoOPNav receivers for Starlink or any other available signals. If tensions rise, China might covertly acquire Starlink hardware (as Russia did) or use open-source signal data to build domestic receivers. Moreover, China’s growing BeiDou satellite navigation system and planned communication satellites could serve a dual role for them – providing their forces another layer of navigation signals (some Chinese analysts have indeed called for multi-layer PNT, mixing GNSS, LEO comm satellites, and terrestrial signals). In short, China has the means and motivation to pursue this; the only question is access to the signals. Since Starlink is a U.S.-operated system, political control could be used to deny service in certain regions – but remember, no service doesn’t mean no signals. Even if SpaceX geofences user access, the satellites still beam down some signals that could be intercepted. Thus, Chinese units could potentially use those as navigational aids regardless of being an “authorized” user.
● Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs): Non-state actors like drug cartels or other organized crime groups have increasingly adopted advanced technology – drones for smuggling, encrypted communications, etc. Could they use Starlink signals to navigate in scenarios where GPS might be unreliable? It’s plausible, though currently GPS jamming is not a typical threat to criminal operations (it’s mostly a military concern). However, TCOs have used Starlink for communication – for example, criminal enterprises in Southeast Asia set up Starlink dishes to run cyber-scam compounds beyond government surveillance[34][35]. This shows they can obtain the equipment and have tech-savvy personnel. If in the future law enforcement or others tried to jam GPS to counter smuggling drones or vehicles, TCOs could indeed pivot to SoOPNav methods. The knowledge to do so is publicly accessible through academic literature, and the hardware (SDRs, antennas) is commercially available. The cost is relatively low (a few hundred or thousand dollars), which is negligible for cartel operations. The biggest hurdle is expertise – but as with any technology, with time it diffuses. We might imagine a scenario where high-value smuggling drones come with multi-sensor navigation packages (much like military drones do). It’s notable that the SoOPNav approach is passive, which suits covert operations well: a drug-running semi-submersible or UAV could navigate by listening to satellite TV signals or Starlink, and there’d be no radio transmissions to give it away. Thus, while we do not have confirmed reports of TCOs using Starlink for navigation yet, the feasibility is there. It’s a development to watch, especially as more off-the-shelf navigation solutions using signals of opportunity appear.
● Other Non-State or Terror Groups: Similarly, terrorist organizations or insurgents could utilize this method if they obtain the hardware. For example, Iranian-backed groups or others have used GPS jammers against U.S. assets in the Middle East[1]; those same groups could benefit from navigation that doesn’t rely on GPS. We have already seen relatively sophisticated drone development by non-state actors (e.g. custom autopilots by ISIS, or hobbyist drones modified by insurgents). The step up to incorporate SoOPNav is challenging but not out of reach if they prioritize it – particularly if states begin to supply such technology to proxies.
In summary, feasibility is high for state actors with technical resources (they can develop this in-house, as evidence by Ukraine and Russia’s adoption), and increasing for non-state actors as technology disseminates. The open nature of signals like Starlink’s means that it’s very hard to keep this capability out of someone’s hands. If they have the will and minimal resources, they can tap into these signals. NATO commanders should assume that in a future conflict, a wide range of adversaries may be using SoOPNav to negate our jamming or to navigate without our GPS.
From a cost perspective, using existing signals is extremely efficient. One doesn’t need to launch expensive new navigation satellites or build a dedicated infrastructure – the “infrastructure” (Starlink satellites, cell towers, TV stations, etc.) is already up and running. It’s essentially free-riding on commercial signals. As one analyst put it, “SoOPNav is cheap, passive, and incredibly difficult to counter.”[11] Those three qualities make it attractive to all actors, big or small, lawful or illicit.
Enabling Operations in Jammed Environments and War Implications
The primary motivation for exploiting Starlink signals for navigation is to maintain operational capability in environments where GPS is denied or degraded. In modern conflicts, space-based navigation like GPS is often the first target of electronic attack. Russia, for instance, employs powerful jammers that can blanket whole regions with interference, and spoofers that can mislead unprotected GPS receivers[22]. Traditionally, once GPS is down, many precision weapons, drones, or units would struggle to navigate accurately. SoOPNav changes that equation, giving forces a way to “see” through the GPS blackout by using other sources of signals.
In Ukraine, this has likely been a game-changer. Russia’s formidable electronic warfare around key sites (like Moscow or military bases) means any GPS-guided munition or drone would lose its primary guide. Yet throughout 2023 and 2024, Ukrainian drones struck oil depots, airfields, and command centers deep inside Russian territory[36]. Some of these drones possibly relied on inertial navigation plus occasional fixes from terrain or imagery, but SoOPNav is the most scalable solution[23]. By mapping out every available signal – “Every FM tower in Belgorod, every cell tower near an oil refinery in Tatarstan, every civilian broadcast signal left untouched” – Ukraine can turn the Russian heartland’s own electromagnetic emissions into a navigation grid[10]. And where terrestrial signals are scarce or turned off by Russia, overhead satellites like Starlink fill in the gap. The result is that Ukrainian operations can continue despite Russian efforts to create a GPS blackout. This denies the Russians the ability to force drones ‘blind’. It has gotten to the point where, as noted, Russia apparently resorted to partially shutting down civilian communications around Moscow during drone attack alerts, effectively denying its own people services to also deny the drones navigation cues[25]. Even so, completely eliminating all signals (radio, cellular, satellite) over a wide area is extraordinarily difficult without causing massive side effects. A quote from an analysis encapsulates this: “You can jam GPS. You can spoof satellite links. But you cannot – short of turning off your entire country’s broadcast and communications infrastructure – easily erase your own electromagnetic footprint. That footprint becomes a roadmap… a silent guide for munitions that fly low, fast, and unannounced.”[11]. In essence, any modern society or army emits too many signals to hide them all; SoOPNav exploits that fact ruthlessly.
For NATO and global conflict zones, this means several things:
● No Sanctuary from Drones/Missiles: Being in a GPS-jammed “safe zone” is no longer a guarantee of safety from guided attacks. If an adversary can navigate by other means like Starlink, they can strike anywhere, even in the midst of heavy electronic warfare. For example, NATO forces or bases that rely solely on jamming to protect against UAVs may find those UAVs still finding their way in using alternative signals. This compels us to broaden countermeasures (e.g., consider jamming Starlink or other comm bands, which is a much more complex and escalatory endeavor).
● The Need for Multi-Layered PNT: Just as adversaries will use layered navigation, NATO must do the same. Embracing SoOPNav methods within our own forces can provide resilience. The U.S. and allies are indeed looking at “layered PNT” – combining GPS with LEO signals, terrestrial beacons, and inertial systems[37]. Starlink or similar constellations could be formally integrated into military navigation systems for redundancy. In fact, the U.S. Army has tested Starlink for assured PNT in exercises[9]. This is a critical area of development to ensure NATO can operate in contested EM spectrum environments.
● Countermeasures and Electronic Warfare Evolution: If the opponent is using Starlink signals, how do you stop them? Jamming Starlink’s frequencies (Ku-band) is possible but requires different equipment and high power, especially because Starlink user beams are narrow and powerfully coded to resist interference. A Chinese estimate was that 935 simultaneous jamming drones would be needed to effectively jam Starlink over a Taiwan-sized area[38]. That’s a daunting number, illustrating that jamming a mega-constellation is far harder than jamming GPS (GPS has at most ~32 satellites with a known signal frequency – a much easier target than thousands of agile LEO satellites using broadband signals).
● Implications for Global Security and Tech Controls: The fact that a commercial system like Starlink can double as a military navigation grid raises policy questions. Should access be controlled? SpaceX has so far cooperated with Western governments (for example, geo-fencing Starlink service in certain areas at certain times), but as we saw, hardware can be diverted and signals can be used irrespective of service agreements[31]. This may lead to discussions on regulating or monitoring sales of user terminals, or on diplomatic pressure to prevent adversaries from exploiting the network.
● Broader Conflict Zones: Anywhere in the world where navigation is contested – the Korean peninsula, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, etc. – we can expect SoOPNav to play a role. For instance, North Korea has frequently jammed GPS near its borders; the South Korean military is exploring alternative navigation aids (like eLoran and possibly LEO sats) to cope[21]. In the Middle East, Iranian spoofing of GPS around the Strait of Hormuz has led commercial ships to seek other means to fix their position (some vessels use signals from Iridium satellites or Inmarsat as backups). As this technology matures, even peacekeeping or humanitarian operations in disaster zones (where infrastructure is down) could use signals like Starlink to navigate when GPS is offline.
Conclusion: The ability to use Starlink’s signals-of-opportunity for navigation represents a fundamental shift in positioning technology. It leverages ubiquity and strength of commercial signals to overcome traditional vulnerabilities in military navigation. For NATO commanders, understanding this is crucial – both to exploit it and to counter it. We must assume the adversary’s drones or missiles can find their way even when our GPS is jammed, thanks to these alternate beacons. At the same time, our own forces should aggressively incorporate SoOPNav into our navigation toolkit to ensure we retain an edge in contested environments. This technique exemplifies the broader trend of warfare adapting to the “post-GPS era”[39], where resilience and diversity of navigation sources will be as important as precision and accuracy. By staying ahead in this domain – through innovation and layered defenses – NATO can deny adversaries the chance to blind or misguide us, while ensuring our assets remain on course under any conditions.
Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) related to the war in Ukraine. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.
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Sources: Academic papers by Kassas et al. on exploiting Starlink for PNT[12][15]; Inside GNSS Magazine (Jul/Aug 2025)[40]; Defense analysis “What’s Guiding Ukraine’s Deep Strikes?”[2][11]; RNT Foundation briefs[26]; Ukraine conflict incident reports (Ukraine’s Arms Monitor)[27]; SpaceX FCC filing coverage[8][9]; and others as cited throughout.
[1] [5] [7] [15] [16] [39] [40] kassas_exploiting_starlink_leo_for_pnt_signal_structure_and_ephemeris_and-timing_error_correction.pdf
[2] [3] [4] [10] [11] [17] [22] [23] [24] [25] [36] What’s Guiding Ukraine’s Deep Strikes.pdf
[6] [12] [13] [14] Kassas_Exploiting_Starlink_signals_for_navigation_first_results.pdf
[8] [9] [18] [19] [20] [37] SpaceX Details Starlink’s Existing and Potential PNT Capabilities in Response to FCC Inquiry - Inside GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Systems Engineering, Policy, and Design
[21] Blog - RNTF
[26] [33] [38] Study shows how China could jam Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites if it invades Taiwan - The Independent - RNTF
[27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] Drone warfare in Ukraine: Starlink on Molniya UAVs and AI on the frontlines
[34] Senator Hassan Urges Elon Musk to Block Starlink Access for ...
[35] Starlink: An Internet Lifeline for Scam Compounds - Lawfare
https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/starlink--an-internet-lifeline-for-scam-compounds
The question is how serious the situation is regarding this war and which parties are involved.
Here's a severity scale from 0-10:
1 Private individual - 0
2 Terrorist uses it once - 2
3 Criminal cartels smuggle constantly - 3
4 Country A attacks Country B, neither with nuclear deterrence - 5
5 Country A attacks Country B, one is with nuclear deterrence - 8
6 Country A attacks Country B, both with nuclear deterrence - 10
In cases 5 and 6, the destruction of satellites would certainly be the highest priority. Satellites are unprotected, and the technology for this already exists. Coordination without visual confirmation is difficult.
That's why the whole thing is very fragile and operates at a very high level. As a peaceful invention, it's brilliant. In war, it's only a matter of time before everything goes downhill.
That's why it's so important to be a nuclear power. Nobody would think of annexing Greenland or abducting presidents. If something like that happens, immediately launch a few nuclear strikes.
Unfortunately, Ukraine's mistake was giving up its nuclear arsenal. Anyone with common sense shakes their head at how this could happen. I'm not talking about peace poets, because they'll never understand that we humans are the most aggressive beings on this planet and we need to protect ourselves from ourselves.
The solution would rather be to further research and fully understand the technology of Earth's magnetic fields. I'm saying "pigeon post." Nature has already created many solutions. It's time we master and optimize them.
In other posts, it was about tracking down a person. If we look to nature and use a dog as a tracker, wouldn't that tell us something about researching this area as well? Every living thing that sweats releases unique molecules into the air. Just like a fingerprint, these molecules could be tracked with technology. This way, people could be identified immediately when a sleeper drone is lurking and about to initiate a pre-programmed event.
Unfortunately, these are all destructive thoughts. I would much prefer to develop and produce these tools for peaceful solutions.
But we are humans. Eventually, we'll destroy this planet anyway.
Excellent article. Looks like a single use contagious exploit would be the surest way to take out a chunk of Starlink (once). But it’s never a good idea to only have one bullet in your magazine