It's the Range, Stupid... Part 3

Good evening… actually, almost: good morning, everybody!

It’s really ‘no fun‘ to monitor developments in Ukraine of the last few days. Sure, the government and different authorities are trying to keep the spirits high; the PSU’s Su-24-units are really pounding the Russians on the occupied Crimea hard, and the Russians have lost an Su-35 over the Sevastopol area today (reportedly, the pilot ejected safely, and it was ‘own goal’).

However, in grand total, the situation remains unpleasant and no immediate improvement is in sight for weeks longer. Sure, in the rear, the PSU’s air defences are working reasonably well, and have shot down most (not all, though) of Shaheds released into the Ukrainian airspace of the last two nights. But, along the frontlines, the VKS is glide-bombing and glide-bombing, enabling ever additional assault groups of the VSRF to not only continue attacking, but forcing Ukrainians to continue their gradual withdrawal. Because: if the ZSU is not withdrawing, it’s getting hit by UMPK glide bombs very hard, and suffering much too heavy losses.

And, still critically short on artillery shells, and meanwhile short even on Patriot missiles - Ukrainians obviously have no means to stop all of this.

I mean… OK: turned out ‘the Russians didn’t capture all of Ivanivske, yet’. Yes, they are bitterly complaining about their massive losses, and nah, instead – and constantly supported by UMPKs that are hitting Ukrainian positions inside the village and then all the way back to Chasiv Yar – they’ve punched through south of Ivanivske, and have almost reached the Siversky Donets Canal. Now tell me, that’s making things much, much better…

What’s even more worrying (though not the least surprising): west of Avdiivka, the Russians haven’t managed to secure all of Berdychi yet, but seem to have crossed the Durna River somewhere between Semenivka and Orlivka, and word is they’re attacking Semenivka from the south. I.e. that they are already ‘inside’ the newly-constructed Ukrainian defence line.

…atop of that, it’s ‘suspiciously silent’ from the Robotine area: last news from there (form around two-three days ago) were that the ‘situation is not very good’, and then there were videos showing Russian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles entering what’s left of the place…

***

But, we should expect that all of this is going to fundamentaly change as soon as the PSU gets its F-16s - in ‘June or so’…?

That’s the essence of what inspired this ‘Part 3’ of the feature published back in December, as ‘It’s the Range, Stupid… Part 1’ and ‘It’s the Range, Stupid… Part 2’.

Primary between these is that early on (say: June-August this year), Ukraine is only going to get some 6-12 F-16s. The number is limited by such factors like:

a)       how many pilots and ground personnel can the air force ‘spare’ to send for conversion training by NATO – while retaining enough pilots at home to continue ‘normal’ operations;

b)      how many of PSU’s pilots and ground personnel can NATO train at once;

c)       how many of Ukrainian pilots and ground personnel can ‘quickly’ learn enough English to, essentially, ‘fly and maintain in English’, too; and then,

d)      how many of F-16s they’ll be able to keep operational in Ukraine at the same time.

Even once all of this becomes some sort of ‘routine’ (there’s never really ‘routine’ at war), the cold fact is that Ukraine is not going to have enough F-16s to something like ‘clear the skies’ of Russian fighter-bombers. This is going to be that way even if Ukrainian F-16s really get modified through the installation of AESA-radars and AIM-120C-7 air-to-air missiles, as some say they will be (and then also get either the Link-16, or its Ukrainian equivalent, which is meanwhile in service with the ZSU).

Why that?

a)       Because they are going to be too few to ‘cover all of the frontline fron dawn till dusk’, and then

b)      because fighter jets simply can’t remain within the combat zone anywhere as long as ground units equipped with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) can: in the sky, there are no ‘gas stations every 15-20km’, so one can stop and refill: which means that their time within the combat zone is foremost dictated by the amount of fuel they can carry with them. Finally,

c)       Ukraine will not be able to base its F-16s ‘too close’ to the frontline, otherwise it will have to risk them being hit on the ground by the Russians, because – and contrary to the HUR and SBU – the Russians do regularly target almost all the Ukrainian air bases and forward operating bases by their cruise missiles and UAVs). Means: Ukrainian F-16s will based so far to the rear that they will be spending most of their fuel just to get to the combat zone.

But, OK: lets say that – time and again – there are going to be cases when one or another of these ‘early Ukrainian F-16s’ will be ‘in the right spot at the right point in time’. Airborne, having enough fuel, and in a position to try intercepting an incoming Russian UMPK-strike. Considering the Russians are meanwhile regularly releasing some 120 UMPKs a day, its not like there are not going to be opportunities to arrange such occasions….

Then lets take a look at what are they going to face. The usual ‘strike cell’ of the VKS nowadays consists of

-          1x Su-35: armed with 2x R-37M, 1x Kh-31, 2x R-77 and 2x R-73; this one is providing top cover and anti-radar capability (against Ukrainian SAMs);

-          2x Su-34: armed with 4x UMPK (if calibre 250- or 500kg), and 2x R-73 (for self-defence purposes).

Problem: provided it detects an F-16 on time (and, be sure: the VKS is going to do everything in its powers to track down every single flight of any Ukrainian F-16), the Su-35 can engage from a range of 150 to 200km.

Something like 3,5 times the range of the longest-known (and confirmed) air-to-air kill scored by an AIM-120, ever. In most of cases, Su-35 are going to be capable of engaging F-16s well before these can get closely enough to engage Su-34s. And, as we’ve seen earlier this month (when a Ukrainian MiG-29 was shot down by an R-37M), the R-37M is nothing to ignore. Once it’s airborne, the targeted aircraft better moves out of its engagement envelope, pronto – if its pilot wants to survive, of course…

With other words: the usual situation is going to be quite similar to that there is already now: Just replace F-16s with Ukrainian-operated MIM-104 PAC-2/3 SAMs: positioned some 50km (or more) behind the frontline, Patriots regularly can’t reach Su-34s releasing UMPKs some 40-70km short of the frontline – and that despite their maximum range of 160km.

This is why one must expect that although there are certainly going to be enough opportunities, the realistic chances of any Ukrainian F-16 actually getting closely enough to engage with its AIM-120 – without being intercepted and fired upon by the Russian R-37Ms in return – are going to be low.

Of course, one can be 1000% sure that PSU’ pilots are already studying possible solutions. Indeed, one can be sure they’re carefully cross-examining all the available reports about every single combat engagement in which the Russians have deployed their R-37Ms: they’re searching for solutions. Perhaps they’re going to find some.

For example: they might conclude that their best option is to try operating in similar fashion like PSU’s Su-24s are already doing: supported by such stuff like ADM-160 MALD decoys. The activities of these could attract the Russians into ‘spending’ their R-37Ms, in turn leaving F-16s ‘free’ to get close enough to engage with their AIM-120s, just for example.

But, and foremost: one must hope that it’s really so as some are reporting since the last year, and Ukrainians have found one or another R-37M in ‘almost intact’ condition, somewhere in north-western Kherson. If that was the case, then one can be sure that the ‘Men in Black’ of the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (USA) have got enough opportunities to study the weapon and, hopefully, develop effective countermeasures against it. Only in such case are PSU’s F-16s going to have a serious chance of a successfully and - at least as important - regularly intercepting at least some of Russian UMPK-bombers.

…’all provided that is truth’, and ‘sometimes in the future’…