Illusions and Realities of ‘Cross-Border Incidents’, Part 1

Hello everybody!

To round up the latest, four-days-long…erm.. war between India and Pakistan (which, actually, was neither declared, nor officially announced as ‘really over’), here an overview of most important events, plus some analysis – also in regards of lessons that can be drawn in regards of the war in Ukraine.

1.) On 22 April 2025, five terrorists of ‘The Resistance Front’ (TRF) – an offshoot of the UN-designated terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayba (LeT) from Pakistan - attacked tourists near Pahalgam, in India-Administered Jammu & Kashmir. They bunched together a sizeable group of tourists, forced them to recite the Islamic kalima (a Muslim declaration of faith) to identify non-Muslims, then executed 26 (24 were Hindu tourists, one Muslim and one Christian).

2.) In the light of this attack, New Delhi decided to launch a punitive reaction to a Pakistan-instigated terror attack.

Considering general circumstances, it seems Islamabad originally did not expect an Indian counter-strike. Correspondingly, the TRF publicly assumed responsibility for this attack. When it became obvious that New Delhi is going to hit back, this came as surprise for Islamabad, and the TRF promptly retracted its claim of responsibility. By then, it was already too late, because the government in New Delhi has changed its doctrine: from one where it was ‘merely’ issuing diplomatic protest notes in reaction to Pakistan-instigated terror attacks, to one where it is reacting with punitive military strikes.

However, because India then took more than two weeks to launch its punitive strikes, the Pakistani armed forces were given ample time to prepare its defences.

On the other side, as much as the government in New Delhi officially ‘gave free hand’ to its armed forces to act, whether on order from above, or because of their own traditional insistence on procedures and etiquette, the Indian Armed Forces limited their reaction to striking terror-related targets. This is an estranging decision considering terror organisations like TRF/LeT are closely linked to the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): this is a military intelligence agency of Pakistan. It is responsible to both to the government and the Director General of the Pakistan Armed Forces, and controlling all the other of country’s intelligence agencies, but: it is exclusively staffed by military officers drawn from all service branches of the Pakistani Armed Forces.

So, what’s the point of ‘targeting terrorists only’, if it’s clear these are directly linked to the ‘armed forces’ to the level where striking ISI’s proxies is near-certain to result in striking the Pakistani Armed Forces, too?

That is one thing about which New Delhi might want to think really hard in the future. Indeed, considering Pakistan has launched over 120 different terrorist attacks into India since 2008 alone, and if New Delhi wants to establish and maintain something like ‘deterrent’ against similar attacks in the future, India might want to consider the option of establishing something like ‘quick intervention capability’: a group of forces capable of, in the case of future terrorist attacks, striking on much shorter notice (preferably within 24-48 hours). Why? In order to prevent Pakistani armed forces from preparing themselves.

This is even more important considering that not only the Pakistan’s terror attack into India-administered Jammu and Kashmir, but also what was to follow – made it obvious that we’re living in the times where there are no ‘superpowers’ left that would be curious and powerful enough to prevent the outbreak of one or another war, and where the United Nations (the very body established with the aim of preventing wars) are useless. I.e. the principles of conflict avoidance and the mechanism of maintaining peace – defined already in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 – are null and void, and nobody needs to expect any kind of international mediation, nor any kind of serious repercussions if instigating (yet another) armed conflict.

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7 May 2025, Part I

3.) Designated the Operation Sindoor, India’s punitive retaliation strike was aiming to hit nine ‘terror camps’: essentially, nine out of 30+ Madrassas used by proxies of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) to indoctrinate, organise, and train jihadists for terror attacks into India.

Primary targets were facilities used by the LeT and another major ISI-run terror group, the Jaysh-e-Mohammed (JeM).

4.) Involving at least 30-40 combat aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) – including one or two of it’s A-50I and/or Netra AWACS aircraft – but also a number of UCAVs, the punitive strike was run between 01.28 and 01.15hrs local time, on 7 May 2025. As far as can be assessed from official Indian releases, the aircraft in question deployed SCALP-EG and AGM-250 HAMMER guided weapons. Other terror camps were targeted by attack UAVs, including some of Warmates acquired from Poland, and indigenous types armed with UL-PGMs.

A strike by one of Indian guided missiles on one of Pakistani terror camps, as captured by the dash-camera of a Pakistani civilian.

While India claims to have hit all nine terror camps, and at least some of India’s social media presences have provided some of related satellite imagery, independent reports from the Pakistani social media have confirmed multiple hits on six such facilities. At least five top terrorists have been killed, together with – according to official New Delhi – over 140 other militants. Official Islamabad is zip-lip about this topic: stressing only civilian casualties. Like in that country it’s only young women and children that are sleeping inside Madrassas by night (where, actually: they’re usually not left anywhere nearby). Unofficial Pakistan – i.e. its social media – is anywhere between flat denial of existence of terror-training camps, and cheering killed jihadists as ‘martyrs’. The latter went so far, numerous of killed terrorists were buried with military honours sponsored by the Pakistan Army (PA), and in attendance of dozens of PA’s officers.

Considering there is at least circumstantial evidence that the JeM suffered serious casualties in this strike, it is surprising there were still so many of Pakistani terrorists around their main bases at the time of the Indian counter-strike. ‘Normal procedure’ would have been for the ISI to order them all out and keep them out until the crisis is over. Was it complacency, ignorance, or accident? No idea.

Another thing to keep in mind at this point is: Pakistan’s deterrent – the strategy of, ‘if you hit our terrorists, we’re going to hit back at you, your armed forces, civilians, religious sites, even try to instigate sectarian-motivated unrest’, ‘and we have nukes’, ‘and are ready to escalate, too’ – failed. It did not deter India from striking back. Indeed, Pakistan’s deterrence also failed also in regards of preventing New Delhi from continuing to escalate in reaction to Islamabad’s subsequent ‘escalatory retaliations’.

This is going so far that until this very day, and despite the ‘quasi cease-fire’, the government in Islamabad failed to act even against the government in New Delhi’s decision to (in reaction to the terror attack on Pahalgam) suspend the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). Signed in 1960, the IWT is granting India the control over the Indus River and its tributaries: Pakistan’s primary source of water. Means: India has turned off the water tap for Pakistan, and Pakistan found no means to force it to revert that decision – although its top brass has lately declared this issue for a ‘red line’.

A map of the Indus River and its tributaries – nicely illustrating just how dependent on the IWT is Pakistan. Arguably, with the early onset of this year’s monsoon season, this might not be ‘particularly urgent’: but, unless somebody manages to convince New Delhi to change its stance, it’s going to be felt in Pakistan ‘only’ in some 6-9 months from now.

5.) Because they were given ample time to ready for India’s punitive counter-strike, the Pakistani armed forces – and especially the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) – were ready. At least one Saab 2000 AWACS was on station (apparently, somewhere in the Peshawar area), and about 20 fighters airborne at the time the IAF air strike (sorry: not paying attention about any kind of official releases, nor what was published in the media: my experience is that all of that is a mix of lies or nonsense, no matter who is fighting what war). Indeed, the PAF also proved capable of setting up an ‘ambush’ for several of incoming IAF formations. As a result, it definitely shot down

• 1 Rafale EH fighter-bomber, and (gauging by different photographs and videos of resulting wreckage), most likely also shot down

• 1 MiG-29UPG,

• 1 Mirage 2000H, and

• 1 Su-30MKI.

The Indian military etiquette might demand different procedures, but a matter of fact is: giving an opponent enough time to prepare for defence is never a good idea. Also, the fact the Indians were sticking to the unwritten (or written) rule of ‘don’t shoot (air-to-air missiles) over the international border’, does not ‘automatically’ mean that the Pakistanis ‘must’ do the same.

This resulted in a situation where the PAF was able to ready a nasty surprise for the IAF – in form of obtaining the capability to deploy Chinese-made PL-15 long-range air-to-air missiles from Chinese-made JF-17C fighter-bombers.

Mind: the radar of the JF-17C has only a maximum detection range of about 150km. With the PL-15 having a maximum engagement range of over 200km, the JF-17C was not supposed to be capable of deploying this weapon to its full capability. Moreover, both Beijing and Islamabad took care to claim the PL-15s delivered to Pakistan are ‘PL-15Es’, an export version with a maximum range of ‘only’ 150km – and New Delhi fell for it. That was a major blunder on the part of the Indian intelligence services.

This even more so because the Erieye radar of the Saab 2000 has a maximum detection range of about 450km, and it turned out to be capable of cooperative targeting: means, JF-17Cs were capable of launching PL-15s at incoming IAF fighter-bombers while still well inside Pakistan and while the Indians were still well inside their own airspace – or on the best way of withdrawing into its depth. And the Indian intelligence appears not to have been aware of this fact.

As a result, several of IAF’s formations either flew into numerous PL-15s fired at them, or were hit by these while withdrawing back into India’s airspace. Moreover, nearly all of the IAF aircraft known to have been shot down, crashed to the ground between 80 and 120km deep inside India.

That said:

a) Pakistan’s claim for ‘shooting down five IAF fighters’, including ‘3 Rafales’ is exaggerated. There is simply no evidence the IAF lost ‘3 Rafales’. At most, available evidence is ‘confirming’ four IAF losses (as listed above). Of course, it is possible that additional aircraft suffered different degrees of combat damage. Moreover,

b) Western claims about PAF deploying J-10Cs armed with PL-15s are de-facto denied by Pakistani media reports crediting JF-17C-pilots for ‘downing Rafale’.

Squadron Leader Afridi from No. 11 Squadron – the pilot credited with a ‘Rafale kill’ on 7 May 2025 – as interviewed by the Pakistani media. Whether he was the one who actually shot down the Rafale EH serial number SB001 remains unknown. However, as obvious from his ‘wing’ patch (his right shoulder), and his squadron patch (his right chest, showing the crest of No. 11 Squadron), he flies JF-17. No J-10C.

6.) Of particular interest in regards of the IAF air strike on terror camps in Pakistan was the first ‘confirmed deployment’ of Russo-Indian Brahmos land-attack missile. However, whether any of Brahmos was really deployed – in terms of any of Brahmos actually being fired at their targets – remains unclear.

Brahmos is a big and heavy weapon, deployed exclusively by Su-30MKIs of the Indian Air Force. It can reach speeds above Mach 3, and has a range of 450-500km. The deployment of Brahmos in the IAF air strike became obvious through photographs of their booster stages that were found about 100-120km inside India. Got no problem to shamelessly admit, the photos confused me mightily: original, Soviet/Russian-designed booster-stages for the air-launched Brahmos were relatively short (1-1,5m). Photographs surfacing on 7 May were showing pipe-like structures some 6 or more metres long. Thanks to help from a contact in India, have figured out why: because the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) of India has designed and pressed into production (and service with the IAF) a much longer version of the booster stage for the Brahmos: this is now some 6m long. As visible on photos like this one:

The DRDO-designed booster stage for the Brahmos. Gauging by its size, it is likely to stretch that weapon’s range well beyond the usually claimed ‘450-500km’.

Gauging by its grey colour, this booster was certainly not ‘fired’. I.e. this missile was jettisoned by one of Su-30MKIs involved in air strikes of early 7 May 2025.

…this even more so considering the protective cap for the intake was found nearby. Had the missile been released the way this is planned, this would’ve crashed to the ground ‘kilometres away’ from the (much heavier) booster stage.

That said, presence of intake-covers (or ‘caps’) on the crash sites of several of Brahmos’ boosters, as well as original, light grey colour of booster’s bodies, are indicative of some of missiles not being released, but jettisoned. I.e. released without activation, probably by Su-30MKIs the crews of which were surprised by Pakistani PL-15s, and forced into evasive manoeuvring. (Sure, intake-covers/caps are released at the same time the booster stage is released; but, they are extremely unlikely to come down to the ground at exactly the same spot).

A simplified diagram of an air-launched Brahmos. At the top, the complete missile, with its intake cover/cap, and the booster still in its place. In teh centre, the missile without its intake cover/cap. Below it, the intake cover/cap and the new - DRDO-developed booster. At the bottom, Brahmos the way it looks once its intake-cover/cpa and bososter are away, and the ramjet activated.

While this might appear as ‘going off topic’, one should keep in mind that after the Indian experiences from clashes with Pakistan in February 2019, there were rumours that the DRDO is working on an ‘anti-AWACS-version’ of the Brahmos: a version that would enable the targeting of PAF’s Saab 2000.

This is prompting the question: could it be that the IAF actually planned to start the Operation Sindoor by deploying one or another of its modified Brahmos to shoot down the PAF Saab 2000 AWACS that was airborne and on station, but this part of the mission was spoiled by timely reaction of PAF interceptors and their deployment of PL-15s?

Arguably, chances of the IAF top brass planning something ‘as daring’ as this are (extremely) slim (for why: see ‘traditions & procedures’). But still: they might have thought in this direction. While we’re unlikely to know for sure, any time soon: this possibility should be kept in mind for the future – especially considering the fact that the government in India has adapted its strategy for this kind of crises with Pakistan.

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With the punitive counterstrike on terror camps in Pakistan resulting in the loss of up to four fighter-bombers of the IAF, New Delhi began losing the control over the public narrative. Instead of everybody talking about why India launched this operation - which was a terror attack by Pakistan-organised, -financed, and -trained jihadists on civilians in India-administered Jammu & Kashmir - everybody began talking about IAF’s losses. Not only that it became ‘irrelevant’ that India was acting in self-defence (and as granted the right to do, by the UN Charter), or that even Islamabad’s claims about ‘dozens of civilian victims’ were largely ignored, but the only thing that mattered was how many fighter-bombers has the IAF lost.

Offended by such reactions, official New Delhi reacted by prohibiting its officials from contacting the Western media.

What a mistake… The chauvinists in New Delhi should’ve swallowed their pride, admit losses, and emphasise the reasons and achievements of their operation. Nothing can beat the Pakistani, Chinese, and Western double standards and cynicism as the truth. Another mistake were ‘too long to watch’ press briefings: sure, it was ‘demonstrative’ these were run by two female officers, but if the two are reading boring statements for the press, ‘minutes long’, instead of providing ‘easy to memorise’, illustrative ‘facts’, easy to re-post in the social media… the entire effort was in wain.

Lesson: New Delhi should’ve staged compact, easy-to-memorise presentations of FACTS. In this regards, India degenerated since 2019.

What’s more, the IAF was then withdrawn from battle: ‘to lick wounds’ and think about what has happened to which of its jets, and how to make itself useful again. That took it most of the following two days.

Question: what’s the point of having a super-turbo-equipped branch of armed forces, the very nature of which is offensive, if – due to a mix of major intelligence failures and conservative, definitely ‘obsolete’ planning style of the top political- and military brass – this is easily knocked out of action (by, for all practical purposes: a ‘single blow’)?

Be sure: this is going to be a major ‘lesson learned’ for a number of other air forces. Definitely so for the PAF. One is left to hope both the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW; India’s top intel service) and the IAF might have learned its own lesson, too.

And the Pakistani side? Nobody there learned anything at all. The chauvinistic hysteria went so far they didn’t even figure out that their deterrence has failed. That India dared striking back, regardless of all the possible Pakistani threats.

Unsurprisingly, Pakistan then started setting up its ‘retaliation’ – designed rather to score additional PR-points in the social media, and impress own and Western public, rather than India.

(… to be continued…)