I have researched all of such claims extensivelly over the last year, so hope you are not going to…
First you say:
I have researched all of such claims extensivelly over the last year, so hope you are not going to mind if I offer you some help and additional explanations about them.
First you say:
> Which doesn’t explain how the rebels have been using Scud missiles…
I think I mentioned it two times in the article, and quite clearly too: it’s not some ‘rebels’ (in sense of ‘a hodgepodge of armed civilians’), but _units_ of the Yemen Army’s Missile Defence Command that are firing Scuds, Tochkas etc.
Yemeni Army is operating Scuds and Frogs since back in the 1970s and 1980s, Tochkas and North-Korean-made Scuds since back in 1990s. Originally, units operating such weapons belonged to the Republican Guards, which was primarily staffed by Saleh-loyalists. In 2012–2014 period, Hadi run a big reorganization of the military, trying to dismantle the system of loyalty to Saleh. Between others, he separated missiles-equipped units into the ‘Missile Defence Command/Missile Batteries Group’, consisting of three brigades (here a link to one of relevant reports by SABA — in Arabic — citing one of many ‘Presidential Decree/s on Military Command Positions’, the organization of that new force and some of its commanders: http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news305414.htm; feel free to let me know if you would like to see other related links, there’s a total of 4–5 I still have and should still be online).
As should be well-known for anybody who followed this conflict at least with help of sources available to everybody with internet connection (means: by reading dozens of media reports, every single day, since September 2014) — not to talk about people who have first-hand sources in Yemen — most of their commanders have sided with Ansar Allah. Then the Saudis claimed them — or at least their TELs (transporter/erector/launchers) and missiles destroyed, back in March-April 2015, but they survived and began firing back.
Anyway… this means that these troops have been trained to operate such complex armament for decades.
Could anybody explain me why would they need any kind of Iranian help?
Because of Western prejudice — or because of Iranian propaganda nonsense?
BTW, something similar can be said for Yemen Air Force’s air defence brigades, which began siding with Houthis already before these have taken over in Sana’a. Most of brigades in question have extensive stocks of SA-2s. Although hopelessly obsolete for their actual purpose (air defence), these missiles have a built-in surface-to-surface mode (see Zaloga’s ‘SA-2: the Red Sam’ if there is a need for reference to this topic). They are operated by the YAF since early 1970s.
Means: ‘Houthis’ — i.e. the pro-Houthi media in Yemen — are lying when they report ‘they have modified’ whatever kind of missiles in order to fire what are actually SA-2s in surface-to-surface mode. The same units that are operating these weapons for 40 years, are now using them in an ‘unusual’ mode. That’s all.
(BTW, Egyptians were using their SA-2s in surface-to-surface mode back in October 1973 against Israelis, and Serbs during the war in Bosnia, in 1995. So what’s ‘new’ about this issue?)
Next, you mention:
> C802 (Noor) Anti-ship missiles…
There is no trace of evidence for any kind of deliveries of C.802s, C.802K-2s, or Noors (Iranian-assembled C.802K-2) to Yemen, of their operations there, or anything of that sort. If you have any kind of evidence for their presence, please: let me know. But, I found absolutely nothing.
But, it should be well-known and it is confirmed (and I can’t stop wondering how comes nobody knows about that deal) that Yemenis purchased three Type-021 fast missile boats from China, in 1995, together with a batch of (solid-powered) C.801 (C.802s are turbojet-powered).
This means: Yemeni troops loyal to Saleh, and who sided with Houthis, are simply using armament they’ve got 20 years ago, which they have been trained to use. What they do in this case is the same like when Argentineans took MM.38 Exocet surface-to-surface/anti-ship missiles from three of their frigates and deployed them to defend Port Stanley during the Falklands War of 1982. Means: Yemenis took C.801s from their Type-021s, installed them on some sort of trucks, and began deploying them from the coast. I guess, their only significant problem for deploying C.801s in this fashion is power supply: like Exocets, and because it’s based on Exocets, the C.701/801/802 family requires an unusual power supply system (say: you’ll not find it ‘beyond any corner’). But, that problem can be solved — just like targeting data can be collected with help of any decent surface search radar (it’s not going to be perfect, of course, but this can be done).
> the large number of Iranian weapon shipments caught…
If ‘two intercepted shipments of Malyutkas, RPGs, and AK-47s’ (the two that are well-documented), and few claims (none of which is as well documented) is ‘large number of Iranian weapons caught’ for you, then OK.
Curiously, Yemen is well-known as stuffed full of all sorts of arms already since decades. Unsurprisingly, back during the 2009–2010 war, Saleh’s authorities had their hands full arresting dozens of his own Yemeni arms merchants that were selling arms and ammo to Houthis: none of them had any kind of connections to ‘Iranians’.
Sorry, but given there is no evidence for something like ‘large number of Iranian weapons caught’, while there is plenty of evidence for more than half the Yemeni Army siding with Houthis, I doubt Ansar Allah are lacking arms or in need of any kind of ‘large number of Iranian weapon shipments’.
Finally, you say:
> and how when the Houthis took power in the east of the country the first thing they did was open an air route to…iran
This is also incorrect. Ansar Allah overrun Sana’a in September 2014. It signed a contract stipulating up to 15 flights by commercial airliners from and to Iran only in February 2015. So, this was anything but ‘first they did after taking over’.
But, and foremost: Iranians proved hopelessly unable of running so many flights to Yemen. Primary reason was that they lacked suitable aircraft (i.e. aircraft in condition and with necessary clearance to be flown outside Iranian borders). MAHAN Air managed exactly one flight during the week before the Saudi-led military intervention was launched.