How to De-Musk Ukraine's Battlefield Communications
by Benjamin Cook
Hello everybody!
The Problem
Since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine has relied heavily on Starlink for frontline communications. While highly effective, Starlink has several vulnerabilities:
● Susceptibility to Russian electronic warfare and jamming
● Dependency on a single foreign-owned commercial vendor
● Terminal visibility and RF emissions that can be geolocated
Ukraine needs a sovereign, survivable, and mobile communications system that replicates the key tactical benefits of Starlink while eliminating these vulnerabilities. This system must maintain Line of Sight (LOS) with front line troops, or the next node in the system. (Radio waves generally require LOS.)
System Overview and the Importance of Line-of-Sight (LOS)
Effective radio and data communications rely on clear line-of-sight (LOS) between transmitting and receiving nodes. In a battlefield environment, terrain, curvature of the Earth, and atmospheric conditions limit LOS at ground level, particularly beyond 30–50 km.
To create a resilient national battlefield communications network, this architecture places the highest broadcast node (C) at approximately 30,000–40,000 feet—well above terrain and environmental obstructions. This altitude allows it to maintain LOS over a 200–300 km radius.
However, such platforms are vulnerable if placed too close to the front. Russian long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) such as the S-400, as well as air-to-air interceptors, present a significant threat to any aerial asset operating within approximately 150–200 km of the front.
Therefore, the high-altitude communications platform (C) must remain deep in friendly territory, typically 300–400 km from frontline troops.
This creates a critical gap in connectivity: frontline equipment cannot reach C directly.
To bridge this gap, mobile relay nodes (B) positioned roughly 60 km behind the front extend ground-based communications upward to C using directional microwave links.
Hate Subscriptions? Me too! You can support me with a one time contribution to my research at Buy Me a Coffee. https://buymeacoffee.com/researchukraine
In parallel, the Ground Station HQ (D) remains even farther back—ideally in central Ukraine—and must be either hardened against ballistic and cruise missile strikes, or mobile and redundant to ensure continued command connectivity.
The Proposed Architecture
The system is structured into four components:
A. Frontline Troops ("A")
Users: Infantry units, drone operators, ISR teams, forward observers, and mobile command elements.
Equipment:
● Rugged LTE-enabled smartphones and tablets
● UHF/VHF tactical radios
● Secure mesh radios (e.g., Silvus, Doodle Labs)
● Drone control stations and Blue Force Tracking apps
Power: Portable battery packs, solar panels, small generators
Comms Link: Devices connect to a mobile relay (B) via LTE, UHF, or mesh networking. Range is typically 5–20 km depending on terrain and power.
B. Mobile Relay Node ("B")
Platform:
● Tactical vehicle or trailer-mounted system (e.g., Toyota Hilux, Kamaz)
● Telescoping mast (10–30 meters)
● High-gain microwave antenna for uplink to C
● LTE eNodeB or UHF repeater for connection to A
Mobility:
● Designed to relocate every 30–45 minutes to stay ahead of Russian ISR and kill chains
● Operates from pre-surveyed positions: tree lines, hills, defilade terrain
Comms Role:
● Extends tactical communications by rebroadcasting LTE or UHF
● Acts as a microwave uplink to high-altitude node C
Power: Diesel generator with battery backup; optionally hybrid with solar
Deployment/Recovery Time:
● Mast systems: 5–15 min deploy, 5–10 min recovery
● Aerostats (if used): 30–90 min deploy, 30–60 min recovery
Rationale:
● Troop equipment cannot reliably reach 300+ km to C node
Enables secure, high-bandwidth LOS link to high-altitude platforms without exposing C to front-line threats.
***
C. High-Altitude Communications Platform ("C")
Altitude: 9,000–12,000 meters (approximately 30,000–40,000 feet)
Coverage Radius: 200–300 km line-of-sight footprint
Platform Options:
● Modified Bayraktar Akıncı UAVs (interim solution)
● Long-endurance solar-powered UAVs (e.g., Airbus Zephyr, PHASA-35)
● Aerostats for semi-static use (FOBs only)
Payload:
● Microwave receiver for B uplink
● LTE base station or tactical radio rebroadcast
● Secure edge computing node (optional)
Fleet Planning:
● 4 platforms per zone for 24/7 coverage
○ 1 on-station
○ 1 inbound
○ 1 outbound
○ 1 in maintenance
Role:
● Receives data from mobile relay (B)
● Rebroadcasts communications to ground forces via LTE or tactical waveform
● Maintains distance from the front to avoid Russian air defenses
D. Ground Station HQ ("D")
Location: Central Ukraine (e.g., Vinnytsia, Poltava, Kropyvnytskyi)
Role:
● Provides backhaul to command and control networks
● Houses encryption, routing, and coordination infrastructure
● Uplinks to high-altitude node C via secure microwave link
Connectivity:
● Fiber internet or military backbone
● Microwave dish aimed at C
● Redundant power supply (grid + generator + UPS)
Security:
● Hardened building or protected field facility
● Redundant routing with automatic failover
Why Relay Node B is Essential
Even if frontline troops are within 60 km of B and 360 km from C, the relay node is indispensable:
● Handheld or tactical radios cannot reach 300–360 km line-of-sight
● Microwave links require elevation and precise alignment
● B allows C to remain deep in friendly airspace, avoiding detection and destruction
● B acts as a power amplifier, directional antenna, and tactical repeater
Removing B forces C to operate dangerously close to the front, dramatically increasing the risk of shootdown by SAMs, loitering munitions, or fighter intercepts.
Threat Context: Russian Loitering and ISR Drones
● Lancet-3M has a max range of ~70–80 km
● Orlan-10 ISR drones have ~120 km range but are not weaponized
● B, located 60+ km behind the front, is generally outside loitering munition launch zones
● Mobile B units relocating every 30–45 minutes move faster than Russia’s kill chain
Cost Estimate: Starlink Replacement Architecture
Note: Costs for A, B, and C are calculated per coverage zone. D is a one-time infrastructure investment and should not be included in per-zone totals.
A. Frontline Equipment
● Rugged LTE devices (100 units): $100,000
● Mesh radios (20 units): $300,000
● Tactical UHF/VHF radios (50 units): $200,000
● Portable power kits: $40,000
Subtotal (A): $640,000
B. Mobile Relay Node (x5 for rotation)
● Tactical vehicles: $375,000
● Telescoping masts: $125,000
● Microwave terminals: $250,000
● LTE repeaters: $175,000
● Power systems: $50,000
Subtotal (B): $975,000
C. High-Altitude Platforms (x4 per zone)
● Modified Bayraktar Akıncı UAVs: $20,000,000
● Communications payloads: $2,000,000
Subtotal (C): $22,000,000
D. Ground Station HQ (One-Time Infrastructure Cost)
● Microwave dish + shelter: $250,000
● Encryption and routing gear: $100,000
● Backup power systems: $150,000
Subtotal (D): $500,000
Note: This is a one-time cost per country-wide architecture, not per operational zone. Additional HQs may be built for redundancy, but this does not scale with zone count.
Operational Costs (1 year)
● Maintenance, fuel, and staff: $5,000,000
Total First-Year Cost per Coverage Zone (A + B + C only): $28,615,000
Plus one-time Ground Station HQ infrastructure (D): $500,000
Limitations and Constraints
While this architecture provides a sovereign and survivable alternative to Starlink, it is not without limitations:
● B Nodes Have Limited Reach: Each B node can typically support communications within a 20–60 km radius, depending on terrain, elevation, and power. Troops conducting deep raids or operating behind enemy lines may fall outside of its effective range.
● No Coverage for Long-Range Deep Strikes: This system is optimized for sustaining communications across the main line of contact and rear echelon. It does not provide coverage for deep-strike special operations or cross-border activity.
● Line-of-Sight Dependency: All microwave and rebroadcast links require LOS. Terrain masking, urban environments, and forested regions can degrade performance.
● Environmental Risks to C: While platforms at 30,000–40,000 feet are beyond the reach of most Russian SAMs, high winds, icing, or persistent cloud cover may affect platform endurance or line stability.
● HQ Node (D) Requires Hardening: While only one HQ is needed, it becomes a strategic target. Hardening against ballistic and cruise missile strikes is essential.
● Cost and Maintenance: C platforms are expensive to operate and maintain. B nodes must be constantly repositioned to avoid detection, adding logistical complexity.
The More You Know
This architecture allows Ukraine to:
● Replace Starlink for tactical-level comms without relying on foreign vendors
● Mitigate jamming, interception, and missile strike risk
● Scale a sovereign and secure network across the battlespace
It is a strategic communications layer designed for maneuver warfare in a contested electromagnetic environment.
Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 14 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and related topics. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina; and Tucson, Arizona.
Hate Subscriptions? Me too! You can support me with a one time contribution to my research at Buy Me a Coffee. https://buymeacoffee.com/researchukraine
Mr. Cook’s Substack:
This whole investment falls apart with as soon as RF figures out how to hit B reliably. Off the top of my head, it could be adding a booster or air launch to the lancet, or adding "FPV" style guidance to a shahed or introducing a new UAV that can travel 100-120km, or creating units consisting of EW+smerch+Orlan to hunt B, or etc etc. The fundamental problem with the concept is that B has to be survivable within the kill zone (bc physics and LOS). As has been amply shown in this war, "shoot and scoot" is not a viable survivability tactic even for artillery which only stays in one position for minutes not a half hour+ like B has to.
This architecture is plausible for a short period of time, after which B become prey and the investment will be wasted. If the comms have to be wireless, the B comm node has to be either at an altitude that's unreachable by SAMs/AA missiles (space), or it has to be on the ground and hardened/camouflaged.
My solution to the B problem is much cheaper and simpler - fiber optic guided drones are already in mass production. Increase length of fiber to 20/30 km, and use drones to pull fiber from B to the front line. They will be hard to spot and easily/cheaply replaced in minutes. Make B a series of hardened and camouflaged bunkers.
What about the visibility of point A to enemy signals intelligence? Do you need some kind of directional antennas at point A to mitigate that effect?