Hi Lee,
permit me to address your reply and commentary, ‘in order of appearance’:
Hi Lee,
permit me to address your reply and commentary, ‘in order of appearance’:
) In the military, there is a difference between ‘targets’ and ‘aiming points’. One target can ‘contain’ multiple aiming points. For example: a SAM site usually includes an early warning radar, a fire-control radar, multiple launchers, energy supply system, etc. So, while the entire SAM-site is ‘one target’, it takes hitting ‘multiple aiming points’ to knock out one SAM-site. Since the IDF claimed the destruction of something like ‘half of Assad’s air defences’, and these include at least some 20 operational SAM-sites in the Damascus area alone (I’m talking about all the operational SA-3, SA-5, SA-6/11, SA-17 and SA-22 sites known to me), it’s clear that the early IDF-report citing attacks on 4 SAM-sites was a) only partially truth, and b) also meant that there must’ve been several dozens of aiming points, too. More likely (this is a guess based on something like a summary of all the known reports) some 40+ aiming points within at least 10 SAM-sites were targeted by a total of about 40+ weapons — and then just in that part of the operation (i.e. it’s SEAD/DEAD element). That’s why I say: there must’ve been many more targets than the usually cited 12.
Just for example (even though really confused one): here one report citing multiple (Israeli) weapons targeting — essentially — the ‘same target’.
2.) Re. Iran bankrolling Assad: I have a semi-finished ‘write-up’ online, which I think might be worth taking a closer look — even more so since I’m lacking the time to complete my research in that regards. The topic is extremely complex alone because one needs really hundreds of sources of reference: A Write-Up & Collection of Links on Assadist Regime and its Functions; Financing (i.e. IRGC’s Sponsoring); and Troop Strengths.
When one ‘connects a few dots’, and especially in relation to the documentation showing clearly that the Assad regime has granted the status of ‘Syrian citizens’ and ‘members of the Syrian Armed Forces’ to all the foreigners brought to Syria by the IRGC-QF, and to all the Syrians fighting on the side of the IRGC-QF in Syria … well, and while still ‘vaguely supported’ — IMHO, the situation is more than crystal clear: with the Assad regime unable to cover more than 40% of its annual budget, somebody else has to pay all the other expenses. After all, supplies are the essence of every war. Availability of supplies depends on availability of money. No money = war is lost.
Now, why is Iran keeping Assad in power? Iranian officials have stated this several times (even declared Assad’s survival their ‘Red Line’): they need a ‘bridgehead’ to their Hezbollah ally, in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the IRGC is controlling more than 80,000 different combatants in Syria. Such a deployment needs ‘legitimacy’: this legitimacy is provided through the Assad regime ‘inviting’ an Iranian military intervention on its behalf — just like the same regime ‘invited’ the Russian military to help.
Re. Alawites: I doubt more than 30–40% of these are really supporting Assad. Indeed, not only that numerous Alawites defected from the military and joined the insurgency already in April-May 2011, but back in summer 2012 there was even a sizeable Alawite uprising against in the Qardaha area. This was crushed in blood (and de-facto mass-murder of most of five major non-Assad Alawite clans in that part of Syria). Ever since, Syrian Alawites are under such tight control of the regime, that hardly any of them dares speaking out. This doesn’t mean that there is no dissent between them: it only means that this is next to unknown in the wider public.
3.) Why put a ‘mobile command post’ (CP) on the same base with the UAVs: the question is rather, ‘why not’? The mobility of the CP is simply making its deployment easier: easier to re-position it from point A to point B, and then — for example — place it next to available source of power (connected to the electricity network). Otherwise, one has to haul not only the CP around, but also its autonomous source of power: this is usually a diesel-powered generator, the use of which then requires hauling diesel fuel around too… So, placing the CP at T-4 is making the issue of keeping it operational and supplied much easier: positioning it at T-4 means that the source of power is on hand, and that replacements and/or spares can be flown in quite quickly.
And re. ‘it makes no sense to control a drone from a mobile command centre 300km away’: the USA and Israel are regularly controlling their UAV/UCAVs from CPs that are thousands of kilometres away. Only the bases from which UAVs are taking-off and where they return after the mission, are ‘close to the battlefield’. Iran, however, has no satellites to do so.
On the contrary, a ‘nearer location’ is exposing the vulnerable CP (and its personnel) to the enemy fire. As obvious from this experience, ‘even’ 300+ kilometres away, the CP was still ‘not safe’, not outside the reach of the IASF.
4.) Why did the damaged F-16I ‘fly north’, i.e. ‘around’ Ramat David AB? It’s unclear in what direction was the F-16I flying before it crashed. But, usual procedure — even in emergency — is for the aircraft to approach to some 10–15km from the base before lining with the runway. On the basis of reports about where the F-16I crashed, and where is Ramat David AB, I would say the F-16I approached from the north, and crashed while trying to line-up with the W-E runway.
(Namely, gauging by reports about activity of IASF aircraft all the way up to northern Lebanon, that morning, I would say the F-16I in question was involved in what was something like the ‘western flank’ of the Israeli operation. The eastern flank of the same has targeted such places like T-4; while the eastern one was targeting places between Bayt Jinn in the south and all the way up to Dmeyr in the north.)
5.) Why would the F-16I try to land at Ramat David, not at one of closer airfields? Because the latter have no such emergency installations like a fully-developed military base has: they’ve got no barriers that can stop the aircraft without damaging it, at the end of the runway; no excellently equipped fire-brigades etc.
6.) What is Iran gaining by provoking Israel? Iran, as a country, and as ‘Iranian people’ — nothing. The regime in Tehran — a lot. Prestige, first and foremost. If you check various of their releases of the last few days, they can’t stop claiming they have ‘broken the Israeli aerial superiority’. Of course, that’s hogwash. However, at the time the IRGC-controlled regime in Tehran is facing widespread dissent (including mass protesting) all over the country, it’s an excellent distraction. The essence of the IRGC’s message is something like, ‘see, we’re fighting ah so good against Zionist enemies: forget your foolish protesting, support us in this battle to liberate Jerusalem’.
7.) Supplying anti-air weapons to the rebels: what ‘al-Masdar News’ (AMN) claims in this regards is entirely irrelevant. The AMN is an Assadist propaganda mouthpiece, selling the line of ‘Islamic Resistance’ — i.e. the Hezbollah. Accordingly, there was no popular anti-Assad uprising in Syria, but there is an literally, and no matter how ridiculous this might sound to us) ongoing CIA/al-Qaeda/Mossad/Zionist/Saudi/add-whatever-you-dislike ‘conspiracy’ to bring down the ‘pluralist, tolerant, inter-ethnic, democratic, and legitimate government’.
Thus, the AMN ‘can’t but’ claim ‘USA and Israel have provided MANPADs to Jihadists’.
BTW, the majority of arms the USA (that is: the CENTCOM and the SOCOM of the US military, less so various of US allies) are acquiring in the Eastern Europe since something like three years is provided to the PKK/PYD/YPG/SDF-conglomerate in northern Syria. Not to any of Syrian insurgents fighting the Assad/IRGC/Russia-conglomerate. For details, see my commentary here.
(Mind: I’m often critical of — between others — Israel and the USA. That said, I’m simply critical of nearly everything I research and write about. Means not I’m ‘anti-’ whatever.)
8.) AFAIK, Assad never claimed he’s got any S-300s. Various of his online fan-boys do so. After monitoring their activities since years, I can only conclude that 99% of the characters in question have no trace of clue about modern day armament, military technology etc. and not a few are mixing the 60+ years old S-200 (SA-5) with 30+ years old S-300 (SA-10/20). Either way: fact is that Assad regime never got any S-300s. It simply couldn’t afford them. That’s why it can’t use them. Indeed, that’s why it’s as often firing its S-200s: that system simply has the range all the way down to Beersheba. Means not that Assad’s SA-5s have a serious chance of hitting any of modern-day combat aircraft (like F-15Is or F-16Is of the IASF): however, they do represent a clear threat for international airliners underway over Israel, Jordan, or Lebanon.
9.) Would Russia ‘know’ what are Assadists and/or the IRGC planning in regards of Israel? No. Indeed: no way.
The IRGC has its own command chain in Syria. The same is controlling de-facto most of the Assadist ‘military’, too, and operating entirely independently from the Russian command system. Indeed, whenever the IRGC (and Hezbollah) want to cooperate with the Russians on the battlefield, they have to establish special ‘operations rooms’ (ORs) for coordinating their operations. One of such ORs eventually resulted in creation of that ‘V Corps’ of (supposedly) ‘SAA’: this is a mix of Russian regular troops, Russian private military contractors, Russian proxies in Syria, IRGC’s regulars, IRGC proxies, and whatever quasi-Assad-loyal militias staffed by Syrian nationals the IRGC wishes to add.
In the case of an operation as complex as this one (sending an UAV over Israel while deploying SAM-sites into positions suitable to trap the IASF), I’m 100% sure, the IRGC left the Russians in complete darkness.
Anyway, I find our exchange very interesting, and hope this was of some help for better understanding of various of my conclusions!
Cheers,
Tom