Epic Fury: Ukraine's Lessons Omitted
by Benjamin Cook
Summary
Public reporting indicates that, months before Operation Epic Fury began on Feb. 28, 2026, Donald Trump[1] and senior aides received a detailed offer from Volodymyr Zelenskyy[2] to share Ukraine’s combat-tested methods for defeating Iranian-designed one-way attack drones, including low-cost interceptor drones plus supporting sensors, software, and operational concepts tailored to U.S. basing locations in the Middle East. The offer included a “prophetic” warning that Iran was improving Shahed designs and proposed “drone combat hubs” in locations including Turkey, Jordan, and Gulf states. Axios reports that, although Trump asked his team to work on it, “they have done nothing,” and U.S. officials later characterized the snub as a major tactical error once the war began. [3]
In parallel, U.S. and partner defenses in the Gulf confronted exactly the kind of mass drone and missile problem that Ukraine has faced for years: large salvos designed to drain interceptors and exploit coverage gaps. AP reported that Gulf partners complained they were not given advance notice of the Feb. 28 strikes, that U.S. warnings were ignored, and that interceptor stocks were “rapidly depleting.” [4] Reuters and AP further document that, after losses and depletion became visible, Washington and Gulf partners turned to Ukraine for help or for access to Ukrainian interceptor drones and electronic warfare capabilities. [5]
Measured outcomes, as currently available in the permitted public record, include a substantial human, reputational, and financial toll for U.S. forces and Gulf partners. Reuters reports seven U.S. service members killed and about 140 wounded over 10 days. [6] Reuters also reports deaths in multiple Gulf partner countries hosting or supporting U.S. posture, including fatalities in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. [7] Financially, The Washington Post reports the Pentagon expended $5.6 billion in munitions in just the first two days of the assault on Iran, with follow-on concerns about stockpile strain. [8]
This paper argues that the administration’s dismissive posture toward Ukraine plausibly cascaded into, at the very least, omission-based choices that delayed fielding of low-cost interceptors and operational know-how to Gulf partners and U.S. forces, contributing to avoidable casualties and higher costs. The causal claim is supported by the sequence of a documented Ukraine offer, documented inaction, documented surprise at the scale and difficulty of mass drone defense in closed-door briefings, and a documented later reversal to seek Ukrainian help once exposed. [9]
Thesis and Standard of Proof
Thesis: The administration and U.S. Department of Defense[10] absorbed key Ukraine-war lessons in the abstract but failed to translate them into Gulf force-protection preparations prior to Epic Fury because senior-level skepticism and ridicule toward Ukraine shaped what was treated as urgent, credible, and worth acting on. In practice, this produced omission-based policy behavior: leaving scalable, low-cost interceptors and associated electronic warfare and training concepts outside the posture deployed to Gulf partners and many U.S. sites until after the opening strikes. [11]
Standard of proof: This position is advanced as a plausible causal pathway anchored to the permitted public record, not as a definitive assignment of intent. Proving intent would require internal communications and decision memos not available in these sources. The argument therefore relies on: (a) documented offers and timing, (b) documented public and closed-door acknowledgments of difficulty, and (c) documented reversal toward Ukraine only after costs were incurred. [12]
Operational Context in the Gulf
Epic Fury unfolded in an operating environment defined by massed, relatively inexpensive drones and missiles fired against a geographically dispersed set of targets across Gulf partner states and U.S. facilities. AP’s tally, based on official statements, reported that since the war began Iran fired at least 380 missiles and over 1,480 drones toward five Arab Gulf countries. [13] Reuters, citing U.S. Central Command, reported a broader theater figure of over 500 ballistic missiles and over 2,000 drones launched in retaliatory attacks across the Middle East. [14]
The defining tactical-economic feature was the cost-exchange problem. Reuters reported that PAC-3 missiles for the Patriot system can cost about $4 million each, while the Shahed-136 is estimated at $50,000 to $100,000. [15] AP reported a Shahed cost estimate of roughly $30,000 and emphasized that Patriot interceptor missiles cost “millions.” [16] Both Reuters and AP report that Gulf states and U.S. forces expended hundreds of air-defense missiles costing millions of dollars each. [17]
The operational implication is straightforward: defensive posture that relies primarily on high-end interceptors must be paired with cheaper intercept options plus electronic warfare and training capacity, or it will burn scarce missiles quickly and leave coverage gaps. Reuters describes Ukraine’s approach as an array including cheaper interceptor drones and jamming equipment, precisely the classes of capabilities that were not fielded at scale to Gulf partners until after the war began. [18]
Public Record Timeline of Ukraine’s Offers and U.S. Responses
On Aug. 18, 2025, Zelensky presented an offer at a closed-door meeting in Washington: Ukraine’s low-cost interceptor drones, supporting sensors and defenses, and a concept for “drone combat hubs” in Turkey, Jordan, and Gulf states hosting U.S. bases. Axios reports the briefing included the warning “Iran is improving its Shahed one-way-attack drone design.” Axios further reports Trump asked his team to work on it, yet “they have done nothing,” and that U.S. officials later viewed this as a significant tactical error once the Iran war began. [3]
On Feb. 28, 2026, the U.S. and Israel began airstrikes on Iran[19], triggering Iranian retaliatory strikes throughout the region and rapidly exposing the vulnerability of host nations and dispersed U.S. logistics facilities. [20]
On March 3, 2026, Reuters reported the Pentagon identified the first U.S. soldiers killed in the war: six U.S. service members killed in a drone strike in Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, with Reuters also reporting that the attacked facility lacked a fortified roof and that it was unclear what air defenses were in place. Reuters further reported that lawmakers were told U.S. forces would not be able to stop all drones, and that officials acknowledged difficulty intercepting them. [14]
On March 5, reporting shows a shift toward Ukrainian solutions. Reuters reported early-stage government discussions among the U.S., Qatar[21], and Ukraine about acquiring Ukrainian interceptor drones and systems to detect and disrupt enemy drone communications. Reuters also reported Ukrainian delegations traveling to Doha and Abu Dhabi to share Ukraine’s drone-defense experience. [22]
On March 7 and March 10, Reuters and AP reported expanding interest and deployment of Ukrainian expertise and interceptor technology, including Ukraine sending air defense teams to Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, alongside mention of Ukrainian specialists deployed to a U.S. base in Jordan. [23] These are post hoc adaptations.
Institutional Pathways for Turning Lessons Into Protection
The public record shows the Pentagon has formal infrastructure intended to capture and disseminate lessons. The Joint Staff J-7[24] describes its mission as training, educating, developing, designing, and adapting the partnered Joint Force amid accelerating change, and specifically lists “Joint Lessons Learned” as a core function that identifies and makes strategic and operational lessons and best practices available to the joint force and partners, then analyzes effectiveness over time. [25]
Separately, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense[26] announced in April 2024 an evaluation to determine the effectiveness of DoD collection and use of observations, insights, and lessons learned from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and DoD’s support to Ukraine, explicitly to inform doctrine and force development activities including planning, training, and equipping. [27] That an IG evaluation was initiated signals that DoD’s own oversight apparatus regarded the translation of Ukraine-war lessons into broader practice as important. [28]
A fundamental institutional vulnerability follows from these two facts. The J7 can make lessons “available,” but the execution of those lessons depends on who owns implementation. In the Epic Fury case, the public record indicates the lesson at issue was not obscure: U.S. officials and lawmakers were briefed that drones could not all be stopped, and Gulf partners reported being hammered by massed drone and missile waves while burning through interceptors. [29] If no single empowered authority was responsible for converting Ukraine’s specific cost effective counter-Shahed tools and training model into Gulf deployment requirements before Feb. 28, then the system’s default outcome could be read as delay until losses and depletion force DoD change.
Responsibility for Epic Fury Planning and Non-Engagement of Ukraine
Public reporting identifies the top-level actors linked to the operation’s planning and conduct. Reuters reports statements and briefings led by Pete Hegseth[30] and Dan Caine[31], and Reuters reporting during the war also places the Commander of U.S. Central Command[32], Adm. Brad Cooper[33], as the senior operational commander describing phases and battlefield effects. [34] The Washington Post reports that Caine warned Trump ahead of the operation that an extended conflict could deplete U.S. precision-weapon stocks, and that this assessment was downplayed by the administration. [8]
The narrower question of why Ukraine was not engaged pre-conflict is addressed directly in Axios reporting. Axios reports that a U.S. official who saw Zelensky’s PowerPoint believed Zelensky was viewed by “some in the Trump administration” as a self-promoter of a client state that did not command enough respect, and that officials discounted the offer, with one official stating “somebody decided not to buy it.” [3] Those statements align with public Trump administration mercurial treatment of Ukraine and Zelensky: the capability offer was accessible, tailored to U.S. needs, and linked to U.S. basing locations, but it was treated as politically unappealing or not worth follow-through. [3]
AP adds that Gulf officials said the U.S. did not give advance notice of the initial strikes and “ignored their warnings,” and also reports that Pentagon officials conceded in closed-door briefings that they were struggling to stop waves of Iranian drones and that the U.S. did not have widespread capabilities throughout the Gulf to counter one-way drones outside conventional base targets. [35] The combined record supports a critical inference: the White House and Pentagon were unable to show that they had operationalized the mass-drone lessons of Ukraine into a Gulf-wide force-protection plan prior to launch, despite access to the ally whose recent combat experience was directly relevant. [36]
Measured Costs in People, Money, and Standing
The human toll seems firm, but reports can change. Reuters reports seven U.S. service members killed. [37] Reuters also reports the Pentagon estimate of about 140 wounded U.S. service members over 10 days, with 108 returning to duty and eight seriously wounded. [38]
Gulf partner casualties are also documented across multiple sources. AP’s tally reports at least 13 killed in the five Arab Gulf countries targeted, based on official statements, and describes specific incidents including a drone strike that killed six U.S. soldiers in Kuwait. [13] Reuters, compiling government-reported tolls as of March 10 and noting it has not independently verified them, lists deaths from Iranian attacks in multiple Gulf partners, including fatalities in United Arab Emirates[39], Saudi Arabia[40], Bahrain[41], Kuwait[42], and Oman[43]. [7]
The financial toll is similarly documented. The Washington Post reports the Pentagon expended $5.6 billion in munitions in the first two days of the assault on Iran, shared with Congress, and frames this as accelerating concern about scarce advanced weapon inventories. [8] Reuters and AP document that U.S. forces and Gulf allies expended hundreds of air-defense missiles costing millions each to counter drones and missiles. [17] Reuters reports PAC-3 interceptor cost around $4 million each, creating a severe mismatch when used against far cheaper drones. [15] It’s important to note that on March 5th, White House spokespeople seemed to blame Ukraine for a lack of Patriots, rather than invite their expertise.
The reputational toll is documented most clearly in AP’s account of Gulf partner frustration: officials from two Gulf states reported disappointment, anger about inadequate defense, and a belief the operation prioritized defending Israel and U.S. troops while leaving Gulf countries to protect themselves, all while their interceptor stocks depleted. [4]
Mechanism Analysis and Alternatives
The mechanism proposed here demonstrates political planning over operational and tactical. Axios provides direct evidence of a dismissive frame: a U.S. official recounts that Zelensky’s offer was discounted as “Zelensky being Zelensky,” with some in the administration viewing him as a self-promoter of a client state that did not command enough respect, followed by inaction despite a presidential request to follow up. [3] In such contexts, “induced compliance” leading to Cognitive Dissonance is a plausible explanation: organizations adapt to signals about what senior leaders value, so offices that might otherwise have pursued Ukraine-enabled counter-UAS pathways could rationally deprioritize them to avoid friction or appearing disloyal to the prevailing line. The resulting omission is not a written prohibition; it is the cumulative effect of random deadlines, name calling, and documented untruths that permeated White House and DoD leadership. [46]
Alternative explanations are present in the same record and should be weighed. First, training and integration are nontrivial: Reuters and AP both stress that Ukrainian interceptor drones depend on trained operators, software, and integration with sensors and radars. [48] Second, export and policy constraints in Ukraine existed early in 2025, but have since been lifted. AP reports a wartime ban blocking sales since 2022, complicating fast commercial transfer but allied political will would have surely moved the needle. [16] Third, allied consultation failures may have compounded the defense problem regardless of Ukraine-specific solutions: AP reports Gulf officials said they were not given advance notice and that U.S. warnings were ignored. [4] The position advanced here is that these alternatives explanations do not negate the US administration’s posture-based omission; rather it defines the implementation work that should have begun in 2025 if not 2023, certainly not after Feb. 28, 2026. [49]
Recommendations
Give Ukraine its due. No nation is fighting and dying to preserve Western democracy, except Ukraine. It fights alone. As such it has amassed weapons, data, and knowledge that is unique and impossible to duplicate. Weapons, data, and knowledge that the US and all western allies requires for its own security and defense.
Establish a pre-action Gulf force-protection trigger that requires host-nation notification and a depletion plan. The AP record of Gulf frustration over lack of notice, ignored warnings, and rapidly depleting interceptor stocks supports making notification, shared threat modeling, and resupply planning a formal prerequisite for operations likely to trigger regional retaliation. We are far beyond the days of “Scud hunting” in the 90s and 2000s. [50]
Create a single accountable “Ukraine lessons to theater protection” owner with authority to drive implementation, not only capture insights. The Joint Staff J-7 function is to identify and make lessons available, and the DoD IG evaluation highlights sensitivity around translating Ukraine-war lessons into practice. A designated owner should be tasked to deliver deployed counter-UAS capability packages into combatant commands on a fixed timeline, reporting progress to senior leaders and Congress. [51]
Stand up an accelerated acquisition and training pathway for low-cost interceptors and electronic warfare, paired with an operator pipeline. Reuters and AP both emphasize that Ukrainian interceptors are cheap but not plug-and-play; they require training, software, and integration. A scalable solution therefore needs procurement plus training throughput, with authority to embed Ukrainian instructors or teams where feasible and legal. Additionally the available battlefield evidence indicates that successful interceptor engagements depend primarily on pilot skill, not only from platform, sensors, and supporting systems combined. [48]
Benjamin Cook continues to travel to, often lives in, and works in Ukraine, a connection spanning more than 15 years. He holds an MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from Dublin City University and has consulted with journalists and intelligence professionals on AI in drones, U.S. military technology, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) related to the war in Ukraine. He is co-founder of the nonprofit UAO, working in southern Ukraine. You can find Mr. Cook between Odesa, Ukraine; Charleston, South Carolina.
If you or your organization needs clarity on issues surrounding Ukraine feel free to DM Benjamin on LinkedIn. https://www.linkedin.com/in/benjamin-cook-a781997b/
[1] [14] [24] [29] [47] https://www.reuters.com/world/us/pentagon-identifies-first-us-soldiers-killed-iran-war-2026-03-03/
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/pentagon-identifies-first-us-soldiers-killed-iran-war-2026-03-03/
[2] [5] [17] [19] [21] [22] [30] [45] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-qatar-discuss-acquiring-ukrainian-drones-down-irans-shaheds-source-says-2026-03-05/
[3] [9] [10] [11] [12] [31] [36] [41] [46] [49] https://www.axios.com/2026/03/10/us-ukraine-anti-drone-offer
https://www.axios.com/2026/03/10/us-ukraine-anti-drone-offer
[4] [13] [35] [44] [50] https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-trump-gulf-states-drones-defense-69d5bc227e468f06e20e5ad069330c7d
https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-trump-gulf-states-drones-defense-69d5bc227e468f06e20e5ad069330c7d
[6] [7] [33] [37] [40] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-many-people-have-been-killed-us-israel-war-iran-2026-03-10/
[8] [32] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/09/iran-war-cost/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/03/09/iran-war-cost/
[15] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraines-interceptor-drone-makers-look-exports-gulf-iran-war-flares-2026-03-07/
[16] https://apnews.com/article/iran-ukraine-shahed-russia-drone-defenses-war-76c91cad24bb98dd201f8f37a93c3464
[18] [20] [23] [43] [48] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-sends-drone-experts-three-countries-middle-east-zelenskiy-says-2026-03-10/
[25] [39] [51] https://www.jcs.mil/directorates/j7-joint-force-development/
https://www.jcs.mil/directorates/j7-joint-force-development/
[26] [38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/many-150-us-troops-wounded-so-far-iran-war-sources-say-2026-03-10/
[27] [28] [42] https://media.defense.gov/2024/Apr/18/2003442996/-1/-1/1/D2024-DEV0PD-0109.000_REDACTED.PDF
https://media.defense.gov/2024/Apr/18/2003442996/-1/-1/1/D2024-DEV0PD-0109.000_REDACTED.PDF
[34] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-not-expanding-military-objectives-iran-hegseth-says-2026-03-05/
The remarks by Rheinmetall's CEO and the Ukrainian response is also quite instructive. The Western Defense Industry and particularly the USAF are slow to learn. Eventually they will, but it always seems to require blood and treasure lost to break down the barriers to adapt and learn.
Well Ukraine warned them. Trump even listened to said warnings and then guess what? Stupid happened.
Really you have to love the Pentagon and CENTCOM, the solution was offered on a silver platter and they ignored it because of course they did. Damned fools.