Don's Weekly, 9 June 2025: Part 4 (Syrsky's Continued Command Dysfunction)

by Donald Hill, with Tom Cooper

(…continued from Part 3…)

***

Syrsky’s Continued Command Dysfunction

Within the Ukrainian army, there is a lot of faith in General Drapaty (Commander, Ground Forces). For comparison, there appears to be only widespread contempt for Syrsky (Commander ZSU; therefore, Drapaty’s superior). To many, Drapaty represents initiative, teamwork, competence, accountability, even ‘hope for victory’. Syrsky is despised for ignoring problems until it’s too late, for incompetence, for micromanagement, mistreatment of subordinates, and blaming everybody - but himself. Drapaty, and the people that support him, were - and remain - a ‘threat’ to Syrsky’s influence. Correspondingly, when Drapaty resigned, ‘Zelensky’s’ (read: Yermak’s and Syrsky’s) solution was to limit what Drapaty’s authorities, while exploiting his skills in commanding troops on the front.

For Syrsky, the success of Drapaty’s methods is no good news - and that for two reasons: because the mass of Drapaty’s methods are diammetrically opposite to his own, and (at least as much, if not even more so) because Drapaty’s methods are not Syrsky’s. This is why Syrsky & Buddies are doing everything in their powers to frustrate, even sabotage Drapaty’s reforms, which is why concept of a corps formation, standardized training and other reforms have yet to be realized - full six months after being announced. Fundamental reasons for the slow implementation of all these reforms is always the same: lack of, or questioning of Drapaty’s authority. What a surprise them, when his orders were repeatedly ignored, Drapaty submitted his resignation.

Drapaty is a commander understanding no two people are the same: some are learning quicker, others not. He understands that subordinates have to be trained to do the job, and then trusted to do the job. Therefore, he’s taking care to explain his orders to his subordinates. Moreover: he listens what comes in return, and adapts his orders correspondingly. This is a logical approach, because he knows that nobody knows everything. For comparison: Syrsky first ignores problems for months, then is surprised to find out there are problems, then knows everything better, issues orders and expects everybody to blindly follow. If not, he overrules the officers in question and commands in their stead: starts micromanaging.

How bad is this often getting was nicely explained by a soldier of the ZSU, in following words:

‘Instead of planning strategic (-level and/or), operational (-level) operations, Syrsky is busy writing combat orders to restore the detachment's positions. The General Staff, in violation of logic, common sense, and regulatory documents, sends coordinates where to place the detachment's position. Determining the detachment's position is the task of the platoon commander at most! Moreover, these orders come with a clarification: if you do not place the position there, you will face criminal liability.’

Result of such actions by Syrsky are always the same: the local tactical commander is finding his hands ‘handcuffed’: he - i.e. his command staff - is (are) unable to plan their own operations based on knowledge they have, and also unable to react quickly when the situation changes. The latter because Syrsky’s orders are always ‘backed’ by threats of criminal charges.

Problem: an ongoing battle is a highly fluid situation; one, where facts are constantly changing. Indeed: all too many facts are constantly changing. Correspondingly, the top commander has very limited ability to micromanage the brigade-level of activities, even less so to micromanage battalion-level activities, and no chance at all to micromanage company- and squadron-level activity. This is why warfare needs subordinates trained and trusted to do their job. However, if they are neither - and that’s the regular situation under Syrsky’s command - then they are neither trained-, nor can be trusted.

Another major difference between the two top Ukrainian commanders is that Drapaty understands the realities of the battlefield in eastern Ukraine; on the contrary, Syrsky remains stubbornly insistent on the idea of ‘holding terrain’. In his own words,

‘After all, how can we leave something behind? How can we – I emphasize – be forced to leave a settlement? And the fact that the front may be smaller due to the peculiarities of the terrain, in particular a water obstacle in the form of a reservoir, is of no interest to anyone…’

The Seym river is a defensible terrain feature.

Certainly enough, Syrsky is ‘right’ to argue that the general experience in warfare is that holding a piece of terrain (instead of operating flexibly) causes more casualties to the enemy than it does to friendly forces. However, his stubborn insistence on holding terrain is neutralising his own (and therefore that of the entire ZSU) operational flexibility. This is contrary to another general experience Syrsky would do better to keep in his mind: if ‘holding terrain’ is increasing own losses, then it’s better to retreat.

Sure, holding Bakhmut was a Zelensky’s political requirement. However, Syrsky is more than happy to follow any such orders without a trace of objection. Unsurprisingly, there were plenty of other situations when the sensible military solution would have been to withdraw to better ground: instead, the Russians have it easy to encircle one Ukrainian stronghold after another…

Syrsky’s ‘Need for a Win’

Syrsky’s another problem is his ‘need for a win’. He needs at least apparent victories, to remain in good standing with Zelensky/Yermak-combination. He needs ‘fantastic news’. Therefore, he is convinced that Ukraine ‘must’ attack, no matter where, but, please, at the place of his preference. Such ideas resulted in him, in late spring/summer 2023, sending two highly-experienced ZSU brigades into a counteroffensive in the Bakhmut area, at the time many other, less experienced units were running the major counteroffensive in the south. Syrsky ‘needed a win’, was in a disagreement with the offensive in the south, and didn’t want Zaluzhny to earn any merits if successful tehre. Therefore, he attacked at a place of his own choice, and in complete disregard for Ukraine’s strategic position, or this resulting in a waste of time and resources necessary somewhere else.

Similar ideas were what prompted him into few other, though minor operations - for example in the Tjotkino area, at Novy Put, west of Kucherov, or at Demidovka - and then what prompted the Kursk operation, the last summer. Like Bakhmut of 2023, all of these resulted in very little gain, no achievement of operational advantage and - except in the case of Bakhmut (where it was the excellence of the 3rd Assault Brigade that resulted in mauling of six brigades of the Russian army at minimal loss) - all resulted in entirely unnecessary, high losses for Ukraine. In this regards, the Kursk Operation is a ‘classic’ example: Syrsky first sent his troops to attack in wrong directions. When thus failing to secure the local road network, this resulted in logistics-related problems, in turn slowing down the advance, which caused the involved units to fail to secure defensible positions on time. Nevertheless, Syrsky then continued bolstering the failure: as first, he’s ordered an attack in direction of the Seym River much too late, he then continued ordering attacks in north-eastern direction even when it was clear these would end nowhere, and then endlessly insisted on ‘holding ground’, resulting in the ZSU losing a great deal of men and equipment.

If the Kursk operation was intended to provoke Russian counterattacks then seizing defensible terrain should have been the primary objective. The Seym river is an excellent defensive terrain feature and should have been the primary objective. Additional defensible terrain could also be seized as a secondary objective. This would force Russia to attack on a narrower front against Ukraine’s more capable brigades while brigades with less combat power could defend the Seym river. Instead, five weeks after the incursion, the Russians launched an attack south from Korenevo through a sector held by a weaker Ukrainian brigade and began attacking the bulge from three sides, gradually pushing it back until its collapse six months later. With a better position, Ukraine could have still ‘hold the ground’ in Kursk.

Such failures cannot be justified with any kind of explanations. Nevertheless, Syrsky then did his utmost to explain that he (essentially), ‘values soldiers over terrain’. In mid-March he said,

‘My priority remains to protect the lives of our soldiers. If needed, our units will reposition to more strategic locations. Despite the increased pressure from the Russian-North Korean alliance, we will defend the Kursk region as long as it is necessary.’

Quite an awkward statement considered the fact that by that time, the ZSU’s positions in the Kursk Oblast were no longer viable, and the troops still deployed inside Russia had to run through a narrow gauntlet that was saturated with drones from Russia’s best UAV unit. Even more so considering Ukrainian experiences at least since Severodonetsk of June 2022, if not since Debaltseve of 2014 are always the same: the cost of belated withdrawals out of cauldrons are always the same like the costs of attacking in wrong place because some general there ‘needs a win’.

Indeed, throughout this war, there were plenty of examples of Ukraine - on Syrsky’s orders - holding onto terrain long after it made sense to withdraw. Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Kurakhove, Velyka Novosilka are just some of the larger, or better-known examples. These decisions not to withdraw when the terrain was no longer viable cost the ZSU lives that would otherwise be saved. Conclusion is unavoidable: regardless what is Syrsky explaining about his ‘priority’, he did not care to protect soldiers for whom he is responsible.

While Syrsky was in personal command over this sector, the fighting around Kurakhove resulted in an entire series of cauldron-battles, fought over four months as Ukrainian forces were compelled to hold ground at all costs. The narrow openings of the cauldrons allowed Russian drones to focus on any traffic passing through, and Ukraine lost a lot of vehicles, especially logistical vehicles that were trying to supply the forward forces and evacuate the wounded and killed.

It is impossible - both physically and mentally - for any single person to control all aspects of the entire war down to the squad position. ‘But’, Syrsky still knows better. As a result, his efforts to do so continually created ever more problems: from mid-2022 until summer 2024, the 72nd Brigade held the strong defensive position of Vuledar, eliminating far more Russian soldiers than it has lost. Still, it has suffered losses, but Syrsky never cared to replace these. Mind: it was, and it remains Syrsky, who ‘decides where 10, 20, 100 people go after the training center’ - and it was him who refused to send any kind of replacements to the 72nd, and any kind of reinforcements until it was too late. Eventually, the 72nd started running out of men to defend its strong positions, trenches with overhead cover, camouflage and fields of fire, and it began losing these strong positions. The loss of some terrain threatened others with encirclement. However, Syrsky’s insistence on ‘holding ground’ then resulted in the unit neither having the freedom to manoeuvre, nor to withdraw on time. Ultimately, it was forced to withdraw when the ruins of Vuhledar were de-facto encircled by the Russians. What a surprise it suffered heavy losses in the process.

Syrsky then continued micromanaging: he detached at least six different battalions from six different brigades and then rushed them to the left and right of Vuhledar. While micromanaging even positions of their squadrons, he did not take care to establish communication links between commanders of the battalions in question. There was no unified command structure to coordinate their defences. Unsurprisingly, the Russians easily found the ways to outflank one battalion after the other, destroy at least two, and in turn create yet another cauldron where their drones were able to focus on narrow openings to systematically decimate the Ukrainian communications, the flow of supplies, medical evacuation, and any reinforcements.

Instead of holding onto terrain that would enable Ukraine to kill a lot of Russians with little cost to themselves, Ukrainian units were forced to hold terrain that killed and wounded them at a much higher rate.

One might think that it’s ‘contradictive’ that Drapaty doesn’t believe that Ukraine has the capacity for offensive operations, but then stopped the Russian offensives on Khakriv and Pokrovs with help of counterattacks. Here it should be kept in midn that local or tactical counterattacks are an important part of defensive operations. Moreover, and contrary to Syrsky, Drapaty is not known of ordering any of counterattacks for such purposes like ‘restoring lost positions’: every of his counterattacks was a well-planned, methodic operation, aiming to push the Russians out of selected areas - not ‘just positions’. Indeed, under Syrsky’s command, ZSU brigades are rarely running any kind of local counterattacks at all - principally because Syrsky‘s orders are tying them in place and time, but also leaving them without enough reserves necessary to run counterattacks. Indeed, throughout 2024, Syrsky’s direct orders left the ZSU without operational reserves (such as independent battalions) in nearly all of sectors many sectors. For comparison, right since assuming control over the Pokrovsk sector, Drapaty first picked the excellent 425th Skala Assault Battalion (that became a regiment) in reserve and it was re-deploying it for most of counterattacks he commanded.

The criticism of Syrsky by officers and other ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has is existent for long time. That’s no ‘secret’ (or if, then a ‘public secret’). The last year, protests grew to a point where they resulted in his promises of organizational reforms (like formation of corps commands), standardized training, and the drone line. The drone line is progressing - reportedly: because its commander, Magyar, is good in smearing honey around Syrsky’s mouth - but the other stated objectives, those for which Drapaty is responsible, are not.

Every single of these failures costs Ukrainian lives that would otherwise be preserved, and this is adding to the frustration among many Ukrainian soldiers - even creating hatred reaching such proportions that the word is something like, ‘Syrsky better keeps his ballistic helmet and west (with plate carrier) when visiting the frontline’…

The situation is so bad, that the majority of brigade-commanders proven in combat chose to stay at the brigade-level rather than be promoted, because they do not want to be swallowed by the political nightmare that is ‘Syrsky & Buddies’: the General Staff of the ZSU.

In comparison to Syrsky, Drapaty is convinced that the ZSU has not enough forces to conduct offensive operations. What’s more - and contrary to Syrsky, who is losing one battle after the other - Drapaty has been successful at every assignment he was given.

Syrsky’s reaction is ‘rather typical’: instead of spreading that success, he is as stubborn in refusing to give Drapaty free reign, and he is in giving ground. As another source commented:

‘Syrsky as the commander of "Khortytsia" had much greater opportunities than Drapaty now. He was delegated the authority to appoint any official in the Land Forces, he single-handedly determined where the reinforcements ands upplies went, where the reserves went. And Drapaty works with minimal resources. Syrsky still decides where 10, 20, 100 people go after the training center, who will go to which corps, although the Land Forces should take care of this! He purposely and deliberately cuts off Drapaty's hands. For what? To show that Drapaty has failed?’

…and, hand on heart: if Syrsky is micromanaging squad positions, it follows that he is micromanaging the Commander, Ground Forces (Drapaty), too…

What a surprise Drapaty resigned…

After offering his resignation, he met with Zelensky. Zelensky gave him a ‘new task’, to lead front line units. Drapaty talked about what he wants to change, saying, “The culture of the commanders' attitude towards their fighters, towards the performance of their duties, towards the value of every life of a Ukrainian soldier who took up arms to defend Ukraine. I received a task from the president. I remain in the ranks. On the front line. Where I have to be. Where I can do the most. Glory to Ukraine!”

What was the result?

In Ukraine, in Kyiv, the ultimate command authority is Zelensky. He has the power to hire and fire commanders (all provided Yermak lets him do so, which Yermak is usually doing on the basis of ‘data from the social media’). Actual fact is: regardless of the political dynamics, it is Zelensky’s responsibility - and his core interest - to find the most competent military leader that Ukraine has to offer.

However, in the aftermath of Drapaty’s resignation, Zele… erm… Yermak found a… hm… ‘comfortable’ solution: Syrsky was retained, regardless what kind of losses is he causing to the ZSU, to all of Ukraine, while Drapaty was ordered to ‘focus on the battlefield’, while being robbed of his ability to organise the same. Correspondingly, ‘that issue’ of standardised training was ‘forgotten’, while the formation of corps commands will be, presumably, managed by Syrsky. Or one of his bud… erm.. representatives…

We’re thus left to wonder how many ZSU soldiers that might have survived the war and preserved Ukraine’s combat power will die because of this decision.