Don's Weekly, 5 November 2023: Part 2

(…continued from Part 1…)

Drones

Artillery is still the largest producer of casualties, by far, but for point targets, drones are increasing their share of successful prosecution of point targets. Russian counter-battery by artillery is largely non-existent but drones now fill that void and are an increasing threat to Ukrainian artillery and vehicles.

The Ukrainian Drone Army claims that half the Russian artillery and a third of their armored vehicles have been destroyed by drones. 12-15k drones are sent to the front each month. This may increase to 30k/month by March…

https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1719378386773066048

The head of a Ukrainian drone company said they produced 20 drones in August, 2022, 2,743 drones in August 2023, and they plan to make 4,000 drones in December, 2023. They now build 15% of the FPV drones. Components are the biggest issues and they are highly reliant on the Chinese for components and partial assembly. This is a huge risk as China does not officially allow the sale of fully assembled drones to Russia or Ukraine. Components are partially assembled drones are still allowed but when Chinese labels on boxes appear on Ukrainian social media posts, it increases the pressure and policy can be changed in an instant. In the meantime, Ukrainians are buying Chinese motors used in Russian drones to create supply issues for Russia.

Early drones had a range of around 6 km and cost around $400. Tanks and other vehicles in reserve now stay at least 10 km from the front, so drones with a range of 20 km and cost a little over $700 are needed. Due to ongoing issues with corruption, many Ukrainians feel that any drone that costs more than $400 is yet more corruption without understanding the details involved.

It is a small company but in order to deal with the laws, regulation and oversight they have almost as many lawyers and accountants as engineers.

The company also acts as a trusted middleman between private donors and a military unit. A lot of Ukrainian units rely on publicity and donations to supplement what they receive from the government. This company seeks out relationships with good, effective units that do not receive a lot of private donations. They ask that the unit send 30 seconds of video from the flights and they rate the pilots and the company creates reports for the sponsors who can then tell the donors how their money is being spent in order to solicit more money. If a unit chooses not to send the video then the company ends its relationship with the unit. In addition to this service, the company works for free with soldiers that passed the military’s drone school to further hone their skills.

The military switched frequencies but didn’t tell this company. Users on the front line thought it was a military issue, but because this company required reports, it realized that the company was the issue and quickly made the changes. The more companies flying with different frequencies, the harder it will be for Russian EW systems to be effective…https://mbiz.censor.net/resonance/3452489/vyrobnyk_fpvdroniv_eskadron_poky_my_ne_pogodylys_na_umovy_i_ne_vjyly_zahodiv_finansovogo_harakteru_nas

Operating 4 km behind friendly lines, a Ukrainian drone pilot was able to immobilize a Russian tank 18 km behind enemy lines. The Russian commander in one sector forbids any tanks waiting in reserves to come within 10 km of the front lines. There is a claim of a 58% success rate but since I cannot read the source article there isn’t enough context to understand what this means. Six months ago it took an average of five drones to kill a vehicle due to jamming or partial/no damage from just one hit. That may have changed in the rapidly evolving battlefield, but does the 58% represent destruction or immobilization, and was it the result of one drone or many? I don’t know…

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1719076221969977511

The capabilities and cost of drones vary by models but the cheaper kamikaze drones cost about $400. Sometimes a vehicle is immobilized, and maybe even destroyed, with one drone. At other times it may take several hits. Immobilized vehicles are abandoned since they are a sitting target, and abandoned Russian vehicles often have their hatches left open. Bombardier drones that drop even cheaper ordnance are often sent to eliminate immobilized enemy vehicles that cannot be captured and towed for repairs. It is difficult to drop ordnance on a target moving faster than a walking man…

https://twitter.com/front_ukrainian/status/1719014907415322909

On the other hand, a First Person View (FPV) drone can easily hit a moving target, vehicle or otherwise. From the first paragraph of the Economist article before the paywall kicks in: The drone might not spot you, but if it does, there is only one thing to do: hide well, and hide quickly. “Major”, a 25-year-old drone pilot operating near the hottest front lines of the south, in Zaporizhia province, says your chances are not good if an enemy pilot has you in his sights. The drone can come from behind your own positions, and masquerade as your own. The cameras are not great. But running at speeds of 150-160 kph, it will always outpace you. “If your cover is poor, then you are likely a dead man,” he says. Major has survived a pursuit four times, the last time in mid-October. Two of his closest comrades have been less fortunate. “God, not physics, decides if you survive,” he says…https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/10/29/trenches-and-tech-on-ukraines-southern-front

Equipment

After the ATACMS attack on Berdyansk airport, Russian helicopters were moved to Taganrog airbase 160 km to the east and inside Russia. Since Ukraine cannot use ATACMS in Russia they seem safe from that threat. The longer range will hamper the effectiveness of the helicopters since they will not be able to loiter as long when stalking targets…

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1719625296167723118

It’s already been reported that Russia has withdrawn equipment from the Kurile islands and the Kola peninsula and sent to Ukraine. There is now a report that equipment from Kalinhttps://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-near-norway-are-20-fewer-than-before-ukraine-war-norways-armed-2023-09-16/

Air defense systems are always a high value target. Russia lost four S-400 systems last week (which NATO calls SA-21)…

https://twitter.com/RcMuzzleflash/status/1720111976674738235/photo/1

There’s a report that Ukraine lost three aircraft at an airfield 50 km from the front lines. Although it is a Russian report, it appears to be valid…https://anna-news.info/tri-mig-29-unichtozhennyh-na-aerodrome-kulbakino/

Russia might be able to produce up to 600 tanks by the end of the year, which is three times what the west sent to Ukraine. They also sent about 500 new APCs and about 900 refurbished (old) APCs. Refurbished tanks were not included in these totals…

https://twitter.com/pati_marins64/status/1719943241385001365?s=20

Ukraine displays the Swedish Archer artillery system. Eight have been delivered and four more are coming…

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1720402709944185242

A fixed-wing Ukrainine drone with a 2-3 kg warhead and a 40 km range is now operational…https://mil.in.ua/en/news/serial-production-of-vidsich-uav-was-launched-in-ukraine/

A string of videos and images of the Russian BMPT…

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1525749683334922247

Ukraine’s Pokrova is designed to jam a GPS signal or spoof it, telling the missile or drone that it’s someplace where it’s not. Russian systems have the ability to resist jamming and spoofing but Ukraine says Pokrova can overcome that. If the Shaheed drones lose the GPS signal, then for every 100 km it flies without it, it will be off course by 5 km. If it regains the GPS signal for an instant it can course correct. Russian missiles have a better internal navigation system than the Iranian drones do but their accuracy would also be impacted by the lack of a GPS signal and the longer they fly without the signal, the more inaccurate they will become. The number of Pokrova’s, their range of effectiveness and the impact on the friendly use of GPS signals was not discussed…https://en.defence-ua.com/events/pokrova_ew_system_is_a_real_game_changer_in_ukrainian_fight_against_shahed_136_drones_and_cruise_missiles_that_renders_gps_receivers_useless-8462.html

Misc.

The head of Ukraine’s special operations was fired and most of the public is not sure why…https://www.kyivpost.com/post/23645

Ukrainian troops sleeping in the trenches…

https://twitter.com/ukrainiansquad/status/1719418466447311231

A description of how three people made 300 shipments of electronics to Russia for $7 million…https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/brooklyn-resident-and-two-russian-canadian-nationals-charged-massive-sanctions-evasion

There was a Japanese study on the Putin doppelgangers…

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1719615645745123835

A insight into the mentality of the wives of prisoners sent to Ukraine. It speaks to their potential of a new life, realized by some. On the other hand, there are widespread reports that (some? most?) prisoners aren’t getting paid salary or death benefits. Still, a girl can dream…

https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1718173928806285582

A 19-month old article that was brought to my attention. I had to translate the correction at the end of the article to understand the humor…https://time.com/6160347/ukrainians-blame-russians-for-war/?fbclid=IwAR1BPDTvebqmLCig3J2FzMpaDoYl65n4JLhUFSdA7pgvmhdvXQkJNk081rE

New Phase of War

My recommendation is to temper expectations when there is a little bit of good news for Ukraine and not to despair when challenges are stated and addressed. I could just as well have put this under the “Diplomacy” category. General Zaluzhnyi issued a statement in which he acknowledges that the war transitioned from maneuver to static trench warfare, that a longer war favors Russia, and he talks about what is needed to win the war. The recurring theme is that Ukraine is very grateful for the aid that has been given but it’s not enough. While that is a huge part of the equation, there is still areas where Ukraine can increase their effectiveness by improving organization and communications:

Russia has air superiority on its side of the front line but Ukrainian air defenses prevent it from operating on Ukrainian controlled territory. Russian drones are filling the void and attacking artillery and other equipment behind Ukrainian lines. Ukraine’s own limited air force cannot venture too close to the front lines.

Russian minefields are 15-20 km deep. Ukraine doesn’t have enough equipment to clear the minefields for an assault. The minefields are observed and Ukrainians clearing them are attacked. Then, after they are cleared, Russian artillery and mine-laying vehicles quickly fill the gaps created with mines again. Ukraine also uses mines to stop Russian assaults.

Depending on the local battlefield conditions, artillery conducts 60-80% of the operations in a sector. The success of artillery operations is key to the success of any operation by either side, whether it is offensive or defensive. While Russian artillery has been seriously degraded, it is still able to create massed fires with older weapons and survives longer by moving and firing at maximum range. Even though it is outnumbered, Ukrainian artillery is able to achieve parity through precise targeting. Russian drones have taken on the role of counter-battery fire, and a large percentage of M31 GMLRS rockets have been expended on Ukrainian counter-battery fire.

Russia has three times the manpower that Ukraine does but does not fully utilize that capability due to logistical limitations and concerns about political turmoil within Russia. There is widespread reluctance to join the Russian army due to losses. In Ukraine, there are legal ways to avoid conscription and many take advantage of it. It is also difficult to train inside Ukraine since the training sites are vulnerable to missile attacks. With the current number of Ukrainian troops there are about 60% of Ukrainian units that have been on the front lines since the beginning of the war and this also hinders recruiting efforts. With the low number of reserves, Ukraine cannot achieve local superiority over Russian troops.

Zaluzhnyi spends a lot of time talking about Electronic Warfare (EW). He says that even before the 2014 invasion, Russia invested heavily in EW by replacing old equipment and producing around 60 different types of equipment in large quantities. Even with all the losses suffered, Russia still has a large advantage in EW. In the Kupiansk and Bakhmut areas they have a strong echeloned deployment consisting of powerful systems deep behind the front lines to the smaller units used by the infantry in the trenches, and the systems constantly change locations.

In 2022, 65% of Ukrainian EW systems dated from the Soviet era. Due to its limited national capabilities, Ukraine relies on donated western systems. Russia has a strong advantage in EW systems which are important for disrupting GPS signals of certain artillery shells and missiles, and necessary for detecting and disabling or controlling drones which have become a major asset for both sides. Drones are a force multiplier and EW systems can reduce their capabilities.

The reasons listed above have resulted in static warfare. The discussion below describes how those obstacles can be overcome.

Achieving Air Superiority

Massive amounts of decoy and assault drones will overwhelm enemy air defenses and expose them to attack. Drones can hunt other drones. Using lasers and IR strobe lights to blind thermal imaging cameras on drones. Using massive amounts of EW systems to protect against missiles and drones. (Note that he is not talking about using aircraft to achieve air superiority, he is talking about using drones and EW systems. This is similar to the Ukrainian navy forcing the Russian navy to retreat without having any conventional naval ships).

Counter-battery Fire

Improved navigational systems for precision guided munitions and better integration with allied intelligence capabilities to detect enemy artillery. (Overcome GPS signals being jammed to missiles/rounds and/or develop navigational systems that do not rely on GPS. Ukraine and allies are working on drones that are harder to jam, have pre-programmed routes that don’t require an operator, and have AI systems that can identify targets).

Overcome Minefields

Improve minefield detection, deploy anti-drone weapons to deny the enemy’s ability to observe soldiers clearing mines, dig tunnels under minefields, use jet engines, water cannons and high explosives to blast through the minefields.

Reserves and Mobilization

Use a unified state registration and documentation system instead of using multiple organizational systems and close the legal loopholes to avoiding service. Increase the number of personnel in the reserves and improve their training prior to entering combat.

Electronic Combat Management

Increase domestic and foreign acquisition of EW systems. Increase integration of allied signals reconnaissance information. Detect, locate and eliminate enemy EW systems and prevent them from doing the same. Include drones in combined arms operations. (The widespread practice now is for drones operating independently of infantry assaults. A member of the 54th Brigade advocates using drones to support the assault as it is occurring and to have drones standing by to repel counter-attacks immediately after an assault).

Troop Leadership and Situation Assessment

Zaluzhnyi speaks of decreasing Ukraine’s OODA loop through better communications and information sharing which would result in increased combined arms operations. If infantry is assaulting while armored vehicles provide supporting fires, that is a minimal combined arms operation that increases the effectiveness of both components. If armored vehicles, mortar, artillery, aircraft with JDAMs bombs, attack and reconnaissance drones, plus adjacent infantry companies and battalions are all conducting the same integrated operation over a wider section of the battleground, with EW units jamming enemy drones, that increases the effectiveness of all those components and is a much more powerful combined arms operations.

There have been many documented instances of Ukrainian components operating in the same battlespace isolated from each other. In the Robotyne area, a select group of about 30 soldiers provided the only operational momentum for a month by assaulting a position by themselves, maybe after the objective was hit by artillery, and then holding on for 2-3 days before reinforcements arrived, allowing them to attack the next objective. In Staromaiorske, a mortar unit was hitting Russian targets detected by a drone. They had to stop firing during Ukrainian infantry advances because it was hard to tell the Ukrainian and Russian infantry apart with the drone cameras. That’s exactly when the mortars should be firing, but the Ukrainian infantry didn’t know how to call for indirect fire support and/or didn’t have the communication capabilities to do so. Also, given the wide variety of military and civilian radios, some units don’t have the technical capability to communicate with each other.

Logistic Support

Zaluzhnyi notes that logistics starts with production and after the Cold War ended basic logistical principles were ignored. The number of military factories was reduced, lowering production capabilities. The surge capacity of vacant factories being activated wasn’t preserved. Stockpiles large enough to sustain adequate rates of fire until production was increased weren’t established. And sufficient supply lines for the resources needed to create the weapons and ammo in the factories wasn’t secured.

Russian stockpiles were much greater than western stockpiles, or at least for the amount of ammo and equipment that the west was willing to give to Ukraine without endangering their own security needs. This accounted for the higher rates of fire for Russian artillery, but even they are running short now and their rates of fire have decreased even as they receive aid from Iran and North Korea.

It may take 1-2 years for western factories to provide enough ammo. The production of armored vehicles may only be enough to maintain what Ukraine already has, or not. Since Ukraine’s ability to disrupt Russian factory production is limited, the only options left are the partially effective sanctions (an exact percentage is hard to determine), and to disrupt and destroy the storage and flow of equipment into Ukraine. For that, Ukraine needs long range missiles, such as ATACMS, Taurus and GLSDB, but Zaluzhnyi notes Ukrainian-produced missiles are preferable since they are not allowed to use western missiles in Russia. At the same time, Ukraine needs to protect their own production capabilities from Russian long-ranged attacks.

He also notes that while waiting for sufficient conventional equipment to be produced they should continue to develop asymmetric weapons. Drones are taking on roles traditionally reserved for aircraft and artillery and naval drones threaten naval vessels.

He concludes by saying that a long war will allow Russia to rebuild its military capabilities and Ukraine needs to continue to out-innovate Russia…https://9z0c0.r.a.d.sendibm1.com/mk/mr/sh/6rqJ8GoudeITPxZ82qq8LQNnPj3/ekZVlTncsbPG?fbclid=IwAR2bavHp18ZrxclCwtqXp5fKFidNnQLOENufoxcmvoFGI0KMwUqwxpvRasw