Part of the reason for the reshuffle is to simply boost Zelensky's political standing.
He's obviously preparing for elections.
1) appointing Budanov as chief of staff gets him under Zelensky's control. Not only that but potentially any scandals can be pushed on Budanov. Budanov has a higher chance of winning elections in the 2nd round than Zelensky btw.
2) Head of SBU - I'm guessing the same reason, he was seen to positively by the general public(although not quite sure why). So potentially he had some type of political chance. There might be some other reasons.
Overall this is basically the same as Zelensky firing Zaluzhniy. Person becomes more positively viewed than Zelensky - so Zelensky simply sacks them or "promotes to mediocrity". At that point either they have no political standing or they are under Zelensky's control.
Don't even get me started on Zele coming out every month and whining that "I'm tired, I'll step down after war is over". He already stated this around 15 times from 2023 to now.
It's so sad that political reasons are ahead of military ones, especially considering that the war isn't going to be finished soon and therefore there is little reason to prepare for elections.
To attribute the current situation to individuals is a misdirection. Putin’s war, Trump’s kidnapping etc. For Trump to be able to do what he did, it took many years of effort by various administrations that weakened Venezuela through sanctions and other means. They have been doing the same with Cuba for decades now, with Syria as well, and with many other countries. Did Trump know or care about Venezuela or Greenland before he became the president? Of course not. Did Trump come up with Monroe’s doctrine ? No. What happened in Venezuela is the US doing what it did many times before.
Tom, as for Fedorov - while he's on the younger side and yes, digitalization of public services was his idea - the issue is that implementation sucked. I.e. Fedorov became notoriously "famous" for his "role of cybersecurity is slightly exaggerated" quote during one of the interviews in late 2019 - https://lb.ua/tech/2019/11/29/443542_rol_kiberbezopasnosti_nemnogo.html.
It is an open secret that ruzzian state hackers exploited Diia (govermental digital service), number of state portals as well as state drivers' license register / motorist insurance bureau and leaked in early 2022 a huge trove of personal data (to disguise it as a commercial / cyberactivist ops). It was corroborated by US court later in 2024 when some of the indictments were unsealed - https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/five-russian-gru-officers-and-one-civilian-charged-conspiring-hack-ukrainian-government.
Moreover, these leaks enriched by social media and other data sources were used for headhunting and "filtration" during first phase of the russian invasion, i.e. occupiers already had lists with addresses of pro-Ukrainian activists or their car numberplates, etc.etc.
Fedorov and his guys denied everything instead of acting and handling of this failure is no different that Syrsky's tactics on the battlefield - "no bad news". So him at the MoD is calling for another disaster.
P.S. Also it shows how different and complex things on the inside are if you scratch the surface a little bit, especially if you're unaware of the context and past events. I'd stress once again that you're also totally wrong endorsing Kasyanov as a "good patriotic commander" and "sole source of truth in the UAV sector", while he's a 100% crook, bad manager and actually have been unable to deliver any tangible results but just using politics to prop himself and whine all the time.
Thank you for continuing the work despite the facts. And indeed I do wish you both that 2026 will bring you both some joy and us that luck will not entirely fail us. To be lucky is important. Sometimes everything fails and then comes luck. "All good fortune is a gift of the gods, and you don't win the favor of the ancient gods by being good, but by being bold." Best wishes for 2026
I think the 'minigun shoots down drone' video was posted here before (not sure where else I would have seen it), it seems it's at least a month old (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBR8b1CI7GU).
Here is an information friction as the below called out two factors are currently interacting and causing a false comfort based on a complete blindspot:
1. The Syrskyi Micromanagement Trap
General Syrskyi’s command style, often criticized as "Soviet" or "top-down," has created a specific reporting pathology - which you all are aware of: when the High Command demands control over squad-level positions (as reported by military sources in late 2025/early 2026), brigade commanders are incentivized to report "success" or "status quo" to avoid immediate interference or dismissal.
Delayed Truth: Critical failures—like the loss of a tree line or a specific trench—are often reported to the General Staff only when they become impossible to hide. By then, the opportunity for a localized counter-move is gone.
The Result: The Ukrainian High Command (and by extension, the West) often operates on a "lagged" map, while the Russians, using decentralized drone-corrective groups, often have a faster OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) - but this is just part of the problem- in my view, there is an often overlooked consequence
2. The Western "Face Value" Blind Spot
The second part of the problem is how Western intelligence agencies (CIA, MI6) and think tanks (ISW, RUSI) process Russian casualty data.
The Reliance on Aggregated Data: Many Western models still heavily weight the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily casualty reports. While these numbers are often adjusted downward for "Western consumption," the base data is still born from the reporting system mentioned above—one that is under immense pressure to show high "enemy trade-off" value for every meter lost.
The 12–18 Month Myth: This has been the recurring "expiry date" for the Russian war effort since 2023. By taking high casualty numbers at face value, Western analysts conclude that Russia’s "manpower pool" and "armor stocks" must be hitting a breaking point.
The Reality Gap: As we see in early 2026, Russia has managed to:
Sustain 1,000+ casualties a day through high-salary volunteer recruitment, avoiding another mass mobilization. (again Russians will not have every day of the year 1000+ casualties - as the Ukrainians are not switching off Russian refineries every day of the year either - statistics do tell the Story - which is again slow Russian adaptation...I know it is boring but sadly true)
Pivot to a "refurbishment economy" that, while not producing "new" tanks, keeps enough T-80s and T-62s on the field to maintain pressure.
3. The Combined Effect: Strategic Miscalculation
When you combine distorted reporting from the front with optimistic attrition modeling, you get a Western policy that is perpetually "one more HIMARS batch" or "one more 12-month cycle" away from victory.
The Danger: This creates a false sense of security. If the West believes Russia is 12 months away from collapse based on inflated or distorted kill-counts, they feel less pressure to drastically scale up their own industrial production or force a diplomatic pivot.
Example the Omsk Connection, the Omsk factory's ability to pump out modernized T-80bvm and TOS-3s contradicts the "Russia is running out of tanks by 2026" narrative that was dominant in Western media throughout 2024 and 2025, as Russians using tanks much more sparingly - but retaining larger reserves, we do not see tank battalions running beserk any longer...
Summary
The blind spot is real danger Micromanagement hides the local reality of the front, while the resulting (often inflated) statistics provide a "comforting" data set for Western leaders to justify a slow-walked support strategy...
Here is an information friction as the below called out two factors are currently interacting and causing a false comfort based on a complete blindspot:
1. The Syrskyi Micromanagement Trap
General Syrskyi’s command style, often criticized as "Soviet" or "top-down," has created a specific reporting pathology - which you all are aware of: when the High Command demands control over squad-level positions (as reported by military sources in late 2025/early 2026), brigade commanders are incentivized to report "success" or "status quo" to avoid immediate interference or dismissal.
Delayed Truth: Critical failures—like the loss of a tree line or a specific trench—are often reported to the General Staff only when they become impossible to hide. By then, the opportunity for a localized counter-move is gone.
The Result: The Ukrainian High Command (and by extension, the West) often operates on a "lagged" map, while the Russians, using decentralized drone-corrective groups, often have a faster OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) - but this is just part of the problem- in my view, there is an often overlooked consequence
2. The Western "Face Value" Blind Spot
The second part of the problem is how Western intelligence agencies (CIA, MI6) and think tanks (ISW, RUSI) process Russian casualty data.
The Reliance on Aggregated Data: Many Western models still heavily weight the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily casualty reports. While these numbers are often adjusted downward for "Western consumption," the base data is still born from the reporting system mentioned above—one that is under immense pressure to show high "enemy trade-off" value for every meter lost.
The 12–18 Month Myth: This has been the recurring "expiry date" for the Russian war effort since 2023. By taking high casualty numbers at face value, Western analysts conclude that Russia’s "manpower pool" and "armor stocks" must be hitting a breaking point.
The Reality Gap: As we see in early 2026, Russia has managed to:
Sustain 1,000+ casualties a day through high-salary volunteer recruitment, avoiding another mass mobilization. (again Russians will not have every day of the year 1000+ casualties - as the Ukrainians are not switching off Russian refineries every day of the year either - statistics do tell the Story - which is again slow Russian adaptation...I know it is boring but sadly true)
Pivot to a "refurbishment economy" that, while not producing "new" tanks, keeps enough T-80s and T-62s on the field to maintain pressure.
3. The Combined Effect: Strategic Miscalculation
When you combine distorted reporting from the front with optimistic attrition modeling, you get a Western policy that is perpetually "one more HIMARS batch" or "one more 12-month cycle" away from victory.
The Danger: This creates a false sense of security. If the West believes Russia is 12 months away from collapse based on inflated or distorted kill-counts, they feel less pressure to drastically scale up their own industrial production or force a diplomatic pivot.
Example the Omsk Connection, the Omsk factory's ability to pump out modernized T-80bvm and TOS-3s contradicts the "Russia is running out of tanks by 2026" narrative that was dominant in Western media throughout 2024 and 2025, as Russians using tanks much more sparingly - but retaining larger reserves, we do not see tank battalions running beserk any longer...
Summary
The blind spot is real danger Micromanagement hides the local reality of the front, while the resulting (often inflated) statistics provide a "comforting" data set for Western leaders to justify a slow-walked support strategy...
Part of the reason for the reshuffle is to simply boost Zelensky's political standing.
He's obviously preparing for elections.
1) appointing Budanov as chief of staff gets him under Zelensky's control. Not only that but potentially any scandals can be pushed on Budanov. Budanov has a higher chance of winning elections in the 2nd round than Zelensky btw.
2) Head of SBU - I'm guessing the same reason, he was seen to positively by the general public(although not quite sure why). So potentially he had some type of political chance. There might be some other reasons.
Overall this is basically the same as Zelensky firing Zaluzhniy. Person becomes more positively viewed than Zelensky - so Zelensky simply sacks them or "promotes to mediocrity". At that point either they have no political standing or they are under Zelensky's control.
Don't even get me started on Zele coming out every month and whining that "I'm tired, I'll step down after war is over". He already stated this around 15 times from 2023 to now.
It's so sad that political reasons are ahead of military ones, especially considering that the war isn't going to be finished soon and therefore there is little reason to prepare for elections.
To attribute the current situation to individuals is a misdirection. Putin’s war, Trump’s kidnapping etc. For Trump to be able to do what he did, it took many years of effort by various administrations that weakened Venezuela through sanctions and other means. They have been doing the same with Cuba for decades now, with Syria as well, and with many other countries. Did Trump know or care about Venezuela or Greenland before he became the president? Of course not. Did Trump come up with Monroe’s doctrine ? No. What happened in Venezuela is the US doing what it did many times before.
For all the many transgressions by the US in the past, it should be noted that Trump's actions are extending those boundaries.
Tom, as for Fedorov - while he's on the younger side and yes, digitalization of public services was his idea - the issue is that implementation sucked. I.e. Fedorov became notoriously "famous" for his "role of cybersecurity is slightly exaggerated" quote during one of the interviews in late 2019 - https://lb.ua/tech/2019/11/29/443542_rol_kiberbezopasnosti_nemnogo.html.
It is an open secret that ruzzian state hackers exploited Diia (govermental digital service), number of state portals as well as state drivers' license register / motorist insurance bureau and leaked in early 2022 a huge trove of personal data (to disguise it as a commercial / cyberactivist ops). It was corroborated by US court later in 2024 when some of the indictments were unsealed - https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/five-russian-gru-officers-and-one-civilian-charged-conspiring-hack-ukrainian-government.
Moreover, these leaks enriched by social media and other data sources were used for headhunting and "filtration" during first phase of the russian invasion, i.e. occupiers already had lists with addresses of pro-Ukrainian activists or their car numberplates, etc.etc.
Fedorov and his guys denied everything instead of acting and handling of this failure is no different that Syrsky's tactics on the battlefield - "no bad news". So him at the MoD is calling for another disaster.
P.S. Also it shows how different and complex things on the inside are if you scratch the surface a little bit, especially if you're unaware of the context and past events. I'd stress once again that you're also totally wrong endorsing Kasyanov as a "good patriotic commander" and "sole source of truth in the UAV sector", while he's a 100% crook, bad manager and actually have been unable to deliver any tangible results but just using politics to prop himself and whine all the time.
Yup, the more I'm 'scratching the surface' of Ukraine, the less I like what I find...
Thank you for continuing the work despite the facts. And indeed I do wish you both that 2026 will bring you both some joy and us that luck will not entirely fail us. To be lucky is important. Sometimes everything fails and then comes luck. "All good fortune is a gift of the gods, and you don't win the favor of the ancient gods by being good, but by being bold." Best wishes for 2026
Thanks for the update!
I think the 'minigun shoots down drone' video was posted here before (not sure where else I would have seen it), it seems it's at least a month old (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBR8b1CI7GU).
It's possible but if I had remembered I wouldn't have posted it again.
With all those rounds downrange, it is reminiscent of Hollywood's depiction of automatic fire and worthy of the sharpshooting Imperial stormtroopers.
Here is an information friction as the below called out two factors are currently interacting and causing a false comfort based on a complete blindspot:
1. The Syrskyi Micromanagement Trap
General Syrskyi’s command style, often criticized as "Soviet" or "top-down," has created a specific reporting pathology - which you all are aware of: when the High Command demands control over squad-level positions (as reported by military sources in late 2025/early 2026), brigade commanders are incentivized to report "success" or "status quo" to avoid immediate interference or dismissal.
Delayed Truth: Critical failures—like the loss of a tree line or a specific trench—are often reported to the General Staff only when they become impossible to hide. By then, the opportunity for a localized counter-move is gone.
The Result: The Ukrainian High Command (and by extension, the West) often operates on a "lagged" map, while the Russians, using decentralized drone-corrective groups, often have a faster OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) - but this is just part of the problem- in my view, there is an often overlooked consequence
2. The Western "Face Value" Blind Spot
The second part of the problem is how Western intelligence agencies (CIA, MI6) and think tanks (ISW, RUSI) process Russian casualty data.
The Reliance on Aggregated Data: Many Western models still heavily weight the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily casualty reports. While these numbers are often adjusted downward for "Western consumption," the base data is still born from the reporting system mentioned above—one that is under immense pressure to show high "enemy trade-off" value for every meter lost.
The 12–18 Month Myth: This has been the recurring "expiry date" for the Russian war effort since 2023. By taking high casualty numbers at face value, Western analysts conclude that Russia’s "manpower pool" and "armor stocks" must be hitting a breaking point.
The Reality Gap: As we see in early 2026, Russia has managed to:
Sustain 1,000+ casualties a day through high-salary volunteer recruitment, avoiding another mass mobilization. (again Russians will not have every day of the year 1000+ casualties - as the Ukrainians are not switching off Russian refineries every day of the year either - statistics do tell the Story - which is again slow Russian adaptation...I know it is boring but sadly true)
Pivot to a "refurbishment economy" that, while not producing "new" tanks, keeps enough T-80s and T-62s on the field to maintain pressure.
3. The Combined Effect: Strategic Miscalculation
When you combine distorted reporting from the front with optimistic attrition modeling, you get a Western policy that is perpetually "one more HIMARS batch" or "one more 12-month cycle" away from victory.
The Danger: This creates a false sense of security. If the West believes Russia is 12 months away from collapse based on inflated or distorted kill-counts, they feel less pressure to drastically scale up their own industrial production or force a diplomatic pivot.
Example the Omsk Connection, the Omsk factory's ability to pump out modernized T-80bvm and TOS-3s contradicts the "Russia is running out of tanks by 2026" narrative that was dominant in Western media throughout 2024 and 2025, as Russians using tanks much more sparingly - but retaining larger reserves, we do not see tank battalions running beserk any longer...
Summary
The blind spot is real danger Micromanagement hides the local reality of the front, while the resulting (often inflated) statistics provide a "comforting" data set for Western leaders to justify a slow-walked support strategy...
Here is an information friction as the below called out two factors are currently interacting and causing a false comfort based on a complete blindspot:
1. The Syrskyi Micromanagement Trap
General Syrskyi’s command style, often criticized as "Soviet" or "top-down," has created a specific reporting pathology - which you all are aware of: when the High Command demands control over squad-level positions (as reported by military sources in late 2025/early 2026), brigade commanders are incentivized to report "success" or "status quo" to avoid immediate interference or dismissal.
Delayed Truth: Critical failures—like the loss of a tree line or a specific trench—are often reported to the General Staff only when they become impossible to hide. By then, the opportunity for a localized counter-move is gone.
The Result: The Ukrainian High Command (and by extension, the West) often operates on a "lagged" map, while the Russians, using decentralized drone-corrective groups, often have a faster OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) - but this is just part of the problem- in my view, there is an often overlooked consequence
2. The Western "Face Value" Blind Spot
The second part of the problem is how Western intelligence agencies (CIA, MI6) and think tanks (ISW, RUSI) process Russian casualty data.
The Reliance on Aggregated Data: Many Western models still heavily weight the Ukrainian General Staff’s daily casualty reports. While these numbers are often adjusted downward for "Western consumption," the base data is still born from the reporting system mentioned above—one that is under immense pressure to show high "enemy trade-off" value for every meter lost.
The 12–18 Month Myth: This has been the recurring "expiry date" for the Russian war effort since 2023. By taking high casualty numbers at face value, Western analysts conclude that Russia’s "manpower pool" and "armor stocks" must be hitting a breaking point.
The Reality Gap: As we see in early 2026, Russia has managed to:
Sustain 1,000+ casualties a day through high-salary volunteer recruitment, avoiding another mass mobilization. (again Russians will not have every day of the year 1000+ casualties - as the Ukrainians are not switching off Russian refineries every day of the year either - statistics do tell the Story - which is again slow Russian adaptation...I know it is boring but sadly true)
Pivot to a "refurbishment economy" that, while not producing "new" tanks, keeps enough T-80s and T-62s on the field to maintain pressure.
3. The Combined Effect: Strategic Miscalculation
When you combine distorted reporting from the front with optimistic attrition modeling, you get a Western policy that is perpetually "one more HIMARS batch" or "one more 12-month cycle" away from victory.
The Danger: This creates a false sense of security. If the West believes Russia is 12 months away from collapse based on inflated or distorted kill-counts, they feel less pressure to drastically scale up their own industrial production or force a diplomatic pivot.
Example the Omsk Connection, the Omsk factory's ability to pump out modernized T-80bvm and TOS-3s contradicts the "Russia is running out of tanks by 2026" narrative that was dominant in Western media throughout 2024 and 2025, as Russians using tanks much more sparingly - but retaining larger reserves, we do not see tank battalions running beserk any longer...
Summary
The blind spot is real danger Micromanagement hides the local reality of the front, while the resulting (often inflated) statistics provide a "comforting" data set for Western leaders to justify a slow-walked support strategy...
Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate you taking your time out of your busy schedules to do this public service.
Malyuk's name is Vasyl, not Oleksandr