Don's Weekly, 5 December 2023: Part 3

(….continued from Part 2…)

As the Russian drone flies into the range of the Ukrainian jammer, the video feed fades in and out. The ability of the operator to communicate with the drone is also degraded until all control is lost and the drone falls to the ground…https://t.me/BARSRF11/6358

Spoofing

Here’s another image of Sevastopol. It shows the same square-shaped interference pattern that’s jamming the SAR satellite, but it also indicates GPS signals are being spoofed. That happens when a GPS receiver no longer receives the legitimate signals and starts receiving counterfeit signals from a spoofing device. In the case below, the Russian ships no longer appear to be in the main harbor but seem to be on land instead.

Here’s an article that describes how GPS works, how GPS spoofing works and how to counter spoofing…https://spectrum.ieee.org/gps-spoofing

In addition to the SAR jamming, the GPS of Russian ships are spoofed to indicate they are in a different location, in this case, over land.

Radars also detect airborne targets by bouncing radio waves off them and receiving the signals to determine direction, range and altitude. If an opposing radar has been previously detected, its characteristics can be recorded and placed in an electronic library. This library accompanies some electronic countermeasure systems. When they detect an incoming signal from an enemy radar, they can immediately identify it (if it is in the library) and determine the best way to attack it. It can do so by sending multiple signals falsely indicating different locations that are difficult to distinguish from the actual return signal bouncing off the target aircraft. It might also alter or delay a return signal to throw off range calculations.

Somewhere in the radar screen is one or more actual targets. The rest are spoofed signals indicating a lot of targets.

Electronic warfare attacks can also take the form of a physical attack. The Russian Kh-31 and the US AGM-88 HARM are two examples of anti-radiation missiles (ARM). They lock in on a radio signal and travel to the source to eliminate it with their warheads. They normally target radars but can also attack jammers and communication radios. Against earlier ARMs, air defense operators learned to turn off their radars when targeted. Without the radar signal to home in on and correct its course, the ARM would usually miss. Later missiles, such as the two examples above, have inertial guidance systems in addition to the active homing tracker so if the ARM loses the radio signal it will continue to travel to the last known location of the signal and, with the internal guidance, have a much better chance to destroy the target.

Electronic Support

This is a form of electronic reconnaissance that can detect and identify characteristics of an enemy system. Electronic attacks don’t happen without electronic support. Some electron support systems just detect and identify systems while many others also have the ability to jam or spoof, as well. An electronic support system is required to build the library necessary to spoof an enemy radar. It can identify the best method of jamming, or it can geolocate the source of an emission, either a radar or cell phone, and pass off the location to an artillery or drone unit. In the early months of the 2014 invasion, Russian electronic support systems would detect Ukrainians using cell phones and then bombard the location of the signal with artillery. At that time, the CIA had observers in the front line and once they told the Ukrainians what was happening the Ukrainians became much more disciplined with their cell phone use.

Electronic Protection

Electronic protection is tactics or technology to shield radio transmissions from being detected or jammed. Some of the solutions are simple. When the Starlink terminals were being jammed, Ukrainians found that just by placing them in a hole sometimes blocked the jamming signal. That didn’t work if Russian Orlan drones were the source of the jamming. Ukrainians also learned to use the terminals quickly and then change location so the Russians wouldn’t locate them (with electronic support) and bombard them with artillery.

The Russians jammed Starlink terminals not by interfering with the data transmissions, but rather the GPS signals that synchronize operations between the terminals and satellite. Another method to counter that was to place a cheap GPS receiver outside the jamming range and then enter its location into the Starlink terminal offset by the distance to the GPS receiver. This allowed the satellite and terminal to keep their GPS link through a relay while the satellite’s phased array antennas* directed the data stream directly to the terminal…https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/03/using-starlink-paints-target-ukrainian-troops/384361/

*(Some antennas are aimed mechanically with gears and motors. This takes time. One of the advantages of a phased array antenna is that it can be aimed electronically, extremely quickly. It does so by shifting the delay in the signal through its multiple electronic elements, best demonstrated by the animations in this article…https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phased_array )

In addition to attacking Starlink terminals with local jammers, the Russians attacked the GPS signals of the Starlink satellites. They have at least seven electronic warfare ground stations called Tobol. They were designed as defensive systems to prevent jamming of Russian satellites by directing null waves (see below) towards the jammer, which would cancel the signal. They were repurposed to jam the GPS signals of Starlink satellites. Starlink said they were able to counter this effort by just writing a line of code. Since Tobol attacked the Starlink satellites over Ukraine from three static locations (near Moscow, another location 360 km east of the Kerch bridge, and in Kaliningrad) it may have been as simple as telling the receiver to ignore signals from these locations…https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/18/discord-leaks-starlink-ukraine/

Another example of electronic protection is the US navy’s use of a 45 km antenna to generate extremely low frequencies to communicate with submarines hundreds of feet below water and is virtually jam-proof from natural or manmade interference. It is reported that the submarine can receive but not send at these low frequencies due to the requirements of a large antenna, a large transmitter and a lot of power…https://www.usamm.com/blogs/news/submarine-communication

When a jammer is detected, radio signals with inverse waves can be directed at the jammer creating a null. This is similar to noise canceling headphones and can lower the power of the jammer by 30 dB. Another tactic is using lower power in communications to reduce the chances of being detected or intercepted. If both of these tactics are used at the same time, directing null waves to the jammer and using low power, then the stronger signals of the null wave emitter will help mask the lower power transmission, making it even less likely it will be detected or intercepted…https://modernbattlespace.com/2020/09/24/impact-lpi-lpd-waveforms-anti-jam-capabilities-military-communications/

(A one minute video on how noise-canceling headphones work)…

Yet another tactic is to use narrow beam transmissions so only receivers in one direction can detect the signal. Phased array antennas can create narrow beams in a similar way sonars use multiple sonar projectors but delay some of the pulses so they all arrive at the target as a single, powerful pulse and are returned to the sonar receiver as one signal. The small waves of the microwave make it easy to create a narrow beam for point to point communication, and the light waves of a laser are about a thousand times smaller than microwaves, making communication on a very narrow beam possible.

Frequency-hopping radios share an agreed upon key that will determine the channel sequence. The US SINCGAR radio widely used by its ground troops can change frequencies 100 times a second. This rapid change in frequencies reduces any jamming on a particular frequency because it’s only used for 1/100th of a second at a time and it has 2320 channels from which to choose. It also makes it more difficult to detect and intercept communications.

It’s been difficult to find documentation that describes advanced wave forms in simple terms, but this is my understanding of it: The Sine wave is the standard wave that is familiar to us all, but other wave shapes can be created as seen below.

But all of these waves have a regular pattern that can be detected and jammed or nullified. Advanced wave forms use randomly generated irregular waves that can only be read by another receiver using the same key. They have been described as impossible to jam, although impossible doesn’t always last as long as it used to. Still, they are extremely difficult to detect, intercept, jam or nullify.

As if that wasn’t enough, I came across this advertisement that stated their system uses a stochastic (having a random probability distribution or pattern that may be analyzed statistically but may not be predicted precisely) and keyless algorithm designed to remove waveform features without degrading the bandwidth. It uses algorithms that are built on probability mass functions (PMF) that are discrete random variables without repeatable elements. Their product can be used over any frequency, at any data transmission rate using any kind of equipment. But “keyless algorithm” is a bit of an oxymoron because the algorithm is the key. Anyone that has the algorithm can predict and receive that random advanced wave form…https://www.militaryaerospace.com/trusted-computing/article/14291328/secure-communications-waveform-jamresistant

It’s now being reported that a year ago, 90% of Ukraine’s drone losses were a result of jamming that either cut off communications between the operator and drone or fried the circuits with too much power. Ukraine is now using drones without AI that they say are immune to jamming. If so, then Russia is, too, or soon will be. Two questions that I don’t have answers to is how easy is it to produce drones that are immune to jamming and what is the cost of the components. If the cost is too high then it makes sense to reserve that capability for a few key drones and continue to use the cheaper drones even with their 90% loss rate. If the cost is not too high then it is another evolution in the development of drones and communications in general.

As you might have guessed by now, electronic warfare is a very technically detailed and vital part of the battle ground. These are just a few examples to provide some broad understanding of the scope of the discipline. If one side had clear and unchallenged superiority over the other then there would be little need to change tactics and capabilities, but while Russia started out with a strong advantage, Ukraine is now on par with capabilities even though they have fewer pieces of equipment. Because of that, both sides are working hard to gain an advantage over the other.

Russia has long valued electronic warfare as an asymmetrical method of combating superior western forces, and Gen. Zaluzhnyi stated that technology is a key focus of Ukraine as it is a force multiplier. Because of this, the advances in electronic warfare over the next two years is likely to be much greater than it was during the 20 years the US was in Afghanistan, and both the US and China are determining how this will impact the balance of power around the South China Sea.

Here’s a 30 minute video that explains radars, frequencies, phased array, SAR, jamming by frequency, and artifacts (signals created by anomalies), all in simple terms:

Radio & Nukes on Substack

Weather

Operations can still be conducted in the snow so the defense lines must be fully manned, no matter how cold it is. It is important that soldiers have protection against the cold, with clothes and shelter, but this isn’t always possible. Some front line positions take 45 minutes to reach and movement to and from the position might be done under fire. Even if you have warm clothes, patrols and other movement can generate a lot of heat, but if you sweat in your boots or other clothing that moisture may end up freezing and lowering your body core temperature or generate frostbite. So you have to have clothing that you can vent while moving and zip up when stationary, all under combat conditions.

There are other things, too, that you might not think about. I’m not trying to provoke a reaction, but imagine expelling bodily waste, male or female, in subzero temperatures. It can be a danger to your health. The wisest move may be to keep your pants on.

Last year, at some inaccessible locations in Bakhmut, soldiers were in their positions under fire for three weeks before being rotated out. They had packaged rations and drank from the snow. Some locations will be better off than other locations. Without a doubt, the Ukrainians, as a whole, will be better off than many Russians because we see the value Russia places on its soldiers. In one hospital last winter, hundreds of Russian soldiers had cases of frostbite and 40% of them ended up with amputations. If you’re interested, you can look up images of frostbite to see how extreme it could be.

So you want to join the infantry?…

https://twitter.com/Lyla_lilas/status/1729460048726782398

He hasn’t had that weapon on his shoulder very long…

https://twitter.com/Lyla_lilas/status/1729370876565414348

You don’t need a weatherman to tell which way the wind blows…

https://twitter.com/Lyla_lilas/status/1729374548913737849

It’s important to stay clean…

https://twitter.com/Lyla_lilas/status/17290815025528

Miscellaneous

Drones will attack anything on either side…

https://twitter.com/Lyla_lilas/status/1729083518431494435

Gepards and MANPADS have been very effective against drones. Machine guns have been moderately effective. Because of the cheap and moderate effectiveness, Ukraine has expanded its fleet of trucks with machine guns…

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1730499239678030265

Ukraine will add a military department in their universities as a choice for students that want basic military training…

https://twitter.com/Flash_news_ua/status/1728144700333244587?fbclid=IwAR3ax5CXEAfWz4XAxiHHpA3QCuYXscrPfZwiJYuIW1T_ZUa06KlGNM4O0rI

Kyiv is under constant threat from drones and missiles so schools have been built inside the Metro. As you can see, they’re a little more developed than last year…

https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1730312776482959574

Sometimes symbolism is worth the risk to your life…

https://twitter.com/Lyla_lilas/status/1729539810941968712

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On Don’s, and on my behalf, I would like to express my gratefulness to everybody for your attention, and for kindly supporting our efforts to keep you informed and updated here on the Sarcastrosaur. Be sure, as long as we physically and mentally can, we’re going to continue in exactly the same fashion: the worst that can happen is that one or another post is delayed, by a day or few.