Don's Weekly, 3 February 2025: Part 2

by Donald Hill, with Tom Cooper

(…continued from Part 1…)

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Kupyansk-Svatove

General note: as reported back in January (and in the interview with UkrLife, too), since December, Germany is delivering larger amounts of artillery ammunition calibre 155mm to Ukraine. With other words: after three years of war, even the procedures-obsessed German administration has figured out it’s got to ‘reform’: it has got to sort out its procedures, start placing orders for growing quantities of ammunition, pay (up to) 50% of these in advance - and then the industry is going to deliver.

‘Unsurprisingly’ considering the ZSU is now (slightly) better supplied with artillery ammunition, there is also a growing number of reports about Ukrainian artillery strikes and - surprise, surprise - counterattacks. One, small, example for results came from the Kupyansk-Svatove sector.

Ukrainians attack a building on the northern edge of Dvorichna. 3 km to the north of the village, a Russian at the edge of the small river was detected and attacked but is not brought down.

About a kilometer south of Zapadne, the 40th artillery brigade uses HE and cluster munitions to attack Russians on the southeastern edge of the river crossing. It’s good to see this much artillery ammo on hand.

9 km east of Petropavlivka, a Ukrainian BMP is immobilized and then destroyed.

The 77th claimed that 12 vehicles and a lot of Russians were casualties in Zahryzove.

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Terny

2500 m east of Yampolivka, about a dozen Russians are hit by HE and one cluster round. Seeing this much artillery ammo being used is a good sign.

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Siversk

A Nemesis drone hunts three different vehicles at night in the Kreminna forest.

Russians shell Hryhorivka, 5 km from the front line. They claim it’s a Ukrainian drone base.

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Chasiv Yar

Essentially, the town is lost for Ukraine: there’s only a small district still held by the ZSU.

And so, a long-abandoned M113 was captured near Ivanivska.

Russian drones attack Ukrainian positions on the edges of northern Chasiv Yar. South of the town and a kilometer from the front, Russians shell Ukrainian positions.

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Toretsk

Surprisingly enough, Syrsky & Buddies seem to have concluded that, if they provide enough artillery ammunition to ZSU units fighting in other sectors than in the Kursk province of the Russian Federation, these ‘can fight, too’. And, since Germany (and few other EU members) is (are) delivering more artillery ammunition, we can see more of the same in action. And a (slowly) growing number of Ukrainian defence successes.

One good example for such developments was the Toretsk sector - where improved availability of artillery ammunition and a series of ‘small’ Ukrainian counterattack have all but stopped the Russian advance. Arguably, this came too late: the town is meanwhile completely under the Russian control.

Of course, one could also say that the actual reason for their ‘stop’ is that after all of their losses during months-long grinding through Toretsk, the Russians ‘run out of steam’ in this sector. However, the point is that - contrary to usual developments in similar situations (and that ever since the fall of Severodonetsk, back in June-July 2022) - this time the Russians didn’t manage to continue exploiting their success: so far, VSRF has completely failed to exploit the opportunity and push further.

On the northern edge of Toretsk, the Safari Regiment of the National Police Lyut Brigade conducts what has become a standard tactic for Ukrainian units in this sector. They quickly approach a building in an armored vehicle and provide heavy suppressive fire from mounted machine guns and dismounted infantry. With the defenders seeking cover from such fire, they plant huge demolition charges on timers that (hopefully) detonate shortly after they leave. The Khyzhak Brigade, another National Police unit, does the same. The Kord Brigade, also National Police, assaults a building and kills one Russian and capturing four others in the north of the town. After observing Russian infantry enter a building in the mine complex on the northern side of town, a Ukrainian tank shells them at point blank range.

A Russian airstrike 2 km west of the front line in Toretsk.

Ukrainian attacks on Leonidivka continues. This is good news. A month ago Russian forces were 2 km further north. Counterattacks are an essential part of any defense. A Russian armored carrier runs over a mine on the western edge.

The traditional look at a Ukrainian town after Russians came into contact with it. This one is Toretsk.

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Pokrovsk

Except for additional artillery ammunition, the ZSU units in the Pokrovsk sector have also a new commander: since about a week, and instead of Syrsky, it is nobody less than General Drapaty - the commander of the Ground Forces, ZSU - who is in command. Sure, at the first look this is near-certain to appear like a continuation of Syrsky’s practice of micromanagement and overruling commanders at levels in between him (Glavcom, i.e. Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces), and brigade-commanders.

However, there are - or at least: there should be - few principal differences between Syrsky and Drapaty. The primary, I would say, is something like this: while Syrsky considers the catastrophe of Debaltseve (where in February 2015, hundreds of ZSU troops were killed while trying to withdraw from a cauldron created by Russian advances into their flanks) for ‘tactical success’, and is still bragging with that as one of his greatest combat achievements (apparently because at least something of his command has survived that battle) - in July 2014, Drapaty successfully broke out with his entire unit from a similar cauldron in the Zelenopillia area (losing one soldier killed in the process). Moreover, Drapaty has a history of (seriously) effective command of the 30th Mechanised- and the 58th Motorised Brigades and is considered something like ‘one of few new-model Ukrainian generals’: somebody whose (more or less) entire military career is based on combat experience since 2014.

With other words: Drapaty is one of ‘junior’ ZSU commanders whom Syrsky & Buddies have permitted to advance up the ladder in the chain of command.

…whether this was a sort of their ‘mistake’ or some kind of accident: that’s unclear as of now.

Point is: contrary to Syrsky, Drapaty is no micromanager, but has a team of younger, and competent officers working with him, and - what a surprise - is also (very) popular among ‘new’ officers throughout the force (ZSU).

Pity is only that Syrsky wouldn’t let him reform the entire force as necessary…

Anyway… early the last week, Drapaty reorganised some of ZSU formations in the Pokrovsk area, withdrew few battered battalions and companies, and replaced them by (relatively) fresh units. While these rotations did enable at least a few minor Russian advances, eventually, they stopped them. Arguably, the last few days, the Russians did resume their assaults but, in grand total, their grinding was - significantly - slowed down. So much so, at least for a while (‘hope dies the last’) the situation in this sector might be described as ‘possibly stabilising’ now. Lets hope it’s not too late…

With support from a Bradley, the 425th Battalion entered captured Russian defensive works southeast of Kotlyne just before an artillery shell landed on the road where they were a few moments before. They then clear the trenches. GRAPHIC: Ukrainian drones work over Russian positions north of the village. 2 km northeast of the village, and abandoned Ukrainian tracked vehicle is destroyed.

Russians shell positions north of Zelene.

A Russian is detected in Dachenske and a drone is sent for him.

Two abandoned Ukrainian vehicles are destroyed near Yelyzavetivka.

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Andriivka

One sector where no Drapaty’s-, but a lots of Syrsky’s influence was obvious the last week, was that of Andriivka. There, Syrsky has ‘successfully’ created a cauldron that’s something like two, if not more times bigger than that of Debaltseve. Because, you know, why should somebody who considers a catastrophic withdrawal from exaclty such a cauldron, back in 2015, for ‘tactical success’, think about affairs of that kind in any different fashion, 10 years later?

Correspondingly, why should Syrsky then order ZSU units there to withdraw if they can’t hold a frontline of 20km, and are outflanked? It’s much more opportune to force the same units to hold about 50km - and that on three sides around them, and with less troops (mind the casualties of the last two months) than before…

Should there be any doubts about this assessment, check the map:

Point is: Syrsky is the only one in the ZSU to ‘have brain’, and ability to think reasonably, and everybody else is incompetent and stupid… And so… well, sigh… Ukrainian infantry was bombarded and hit while moving in Dachne. Russian forces were seen in the southern part of the village. In the north, Ukrainians moving by pickup truck came under bombardment. Meanwhile, Dachne is lost, thus one can hope the surviving ZSU units have - finally - been withdrawn from this cauldron.

Notably, clashes between armored vehicles in this war remain rare. Not only in this sector, but especially in this sector. Armoured vehicles - like Leopard 2 main battle tanks of the 33rd Mechanised Brigade - are more often used to shell infantry positions. And the majority of the Russian tanks are modified into ‘turtle tanks’: to carry infantry while serving as assault guns. The effectiveness of drones is limiting the use of armoured vehicles to short operations before seeking cover again, and even these short exposures result in many vehicles being damaged or destroyed. But a tank from the 33rd Mechanized Brigade engaged a Russian column and showed how effective they can be by hitting at least five vehicles multiple times.

East of Zelenivke, Russian motorcyclists are caught on the road. Inside the village, Ukrainian positions are bombarded.

East of Kostiantynopil, two Russian bombs destroy a bridge.

A drone from the 46th Brigade hunts a Russian Zala reconnaissance drone. It’s possible that the Zala’s futile evasion efforts are automatically triggered when a nearby signal is detected, but the FPV drone is faster, more maneuverable and has a higher altitude.

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(…to be continued…)