Don's Weekly, 3 February 2025: Part 3 (Syrsky's Command Style & Russia)

by Donald Hill, with Tom Cooper

(…continued from Part 2…)

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Velyka Novosilka

Probably because Syrsky was too busy somewher else but to care (for example with organising that big cauldron in the Andriivka area), the Ukrainian withdrawal from Velyka Novosilka was - ‘more or less’ - ‘good’. Read: relatively well-organised and resulting in (relatively) low losses.

In turn, this is enabling a crystal clear conclusion about Syrsky’s style of command:

1.) As first, he ignores a problem until it’s too late;

2.) then he’s surprised there is a problem;

3.) then he does react, but belatedly;

4.) then he deploys yet another battalion to patch up the frontline, and

5.) orders troops into pointless counterattacks to correct his mistakes; before,

6.) giving up and not paying attention at the results (i.e. letting what’s left of the units he’s squandered to sort out themselves on their own). Finally,

7.) he refuses to analyse the experience and draw logical lessons from it: instead, he does as if nothing of that kind happened before, and

8.) repeats the ‘steps’ 1-7 again, and again…

…which is then - what a surprise - also the way the majority of the ZSU (i.e. Syrsky’s subordinates) ‘works’, too…

…which, in turn, is making especially Syrsky ‘extremely unpredictable’ for the Keystone Cops in Moscow…

Unsurprisingly, and contrary to the Toretsk sector, since the fall of Velyka Novosilka, the Russian advance is going on. Novopil was hit by 13 bombs, an indication that Russia plans to assault it soon. 6 km from the front line, a Ukrainian tank was detected and destroyed.

3 km west of Neskuchne, Russian troops move into captured Ukrainian defensive positions but there seems to be enough artillery ammo to eliminate this assault, as well.

Ukraine's stated strategy is to slowly give up territory while bleeding Russian dry in casualties and equipment losses and minimizing own losses. A particular piece of ground needs to be viewed as to whether it provides a tactical advantage or is too costly to hold. This evaluation can change as the situation changes.

While we’re at that, let us continue discussing Syrsky’s ‘insistence on tactically successful cauldrons’. Thanks to him - at least as much also: thanks to Zelensky (i.e. what Zelensky thinks was the ‘successful experience of Severodonetsk’, back in March-July 2022, which in turn prompted him into issuing his ‘no step back’ orders, especially since Bakhmut) - numerous ZSU units are, repeatedly finding themselves in near-encirclements. It began with Mariupol and Volnovakha of February-May 2022 (do we have to say more?), and was continued with the 24th Mechanised Brigade that was nearly-encircled in Popasna, back in April-May 2022. Then, in June-July 2022, the ZSU was doing great in Severodonetsk and then Lysychansk, until nearly-encircled there: then it suffered heaviest losses of these two battles in a matter of days - while withdrawing out of cauldrons. Then Kurdyumivka, then Soledar, then Bakhmut, then Avdiivka, Vuhledar, Shakhtarske, Kurakhove … and six weeks ago, Makarivka was in some state of encirclement. Last week, Velyka Novosilka was mostly encircled…

(…the number of ‘lesser’ cases of near-encriclements is going into hundreds…)

Fact is: while the two top Ukrainian ‘commanders’ (Zele & Syrsky) seem to be obsessed with creating such battles, these are tactically inferior situations that create higher casualties. For example, the 110th Brigade spokesman said they were able to withdraw and avoid encirclement and were aided by weather conditions. There are no reports of anyone being left behind, but there aren’t any reports on how many additional Ukrainian casualties resulted from the near encirclement.

Conclusion is on hand: creating such battles is diametrically opposite to the ‘officially declared’ strategy by Zele & Syrsky.

No doubt: sometimes situations develop despite reasonable steps being taken. However, in Ukraine - in the ZSU - there are so many cases of units being nearly-encircled by the Russians that there are only three options possible:

• A) either the top commanders are incompetent and this is intentional; or

• B) this is not intentional, but top commanders are too incompetent but to care about unit coordination, and thus flank protection.

• C) Alternatively, though worst of all: it’s both A and B.

Yet another set of resulting facts is: repeated encirclements or near-encirclements suggest there is poor communication up and down the chain of command, there is poor communication and coordination between adjacent units, and that the weeks- and days-long developments occur at a faster rate than Ukraine’s operational staff’s ability to react to changes. Moreover, repeated experiences of this kind are extremely demoralising for the troops, and ruining their trust in higher-level commanders, too.

(…which, of course, is having additional, extremely negative repercussions for mobilisation attempts, already squandered by the corruption and incompetence of the Zelensky adminstration. After all, the majority of ‘younger’ Ukrainians we’ve asked about this, have expressed their refusal to get mobilised precisely with, ‘don’t want to get killed/maimed/or else because or by some idiot commander’.)

While the quality of a leader and his staff can vary widely, proven organizational structures, such as the traditional brigade/division/corps pyramid, can greatly aid the gathering, processing and sharing of information. This information and coordination can minimize unfavorable situations such as encirclements.

25 minutes of an unimpressive Russian assault in eastern Velyka Novosilka from a couple weeks ago.

Still (and, please, pay attention): these assaults have ultimately pushed the Ukrainians out.

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Zaporizhzhia

A Russian discusses his unit’s difficulties with Ukrainian drones.

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Kherson

An unoccupied Russian boat is eliminated. Russia dropped a pair of bombs on the northern side of the destroyed bridge.

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Unknown Location

A reconfigured Russia loaf survived a drone attack.

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Russia

Compared to 2023, Russian oil shipments in 2024 fell by 9.1%. Refineries up to 1500 km away were hit and 84 attacks were conducted on the oil infrastructure. This happened even with Biden telling Ukraine last March to stop attacking Russia’s energy infrastructure out of concerns for driving up world oil and gas prices.

The Ryazan Oil Refinery, which is almost 5% of Russia’s refinery capabilities, suspended operations because of the damage caused by the January 24th strike. Oil storage facilities caught fire and the railway loading equipment was damaged, preventing oil shipments. The hydro heater unit, which removes impurities, was also damaged. There were no reports on when the refinery might reopen.

The refinery at Kstovo near the Volga river was in flames. It also produces 5% of Russia’s refining output at 13 million barrels a year.

The Volgograd refinery was attacked in February and May 2024. It was repaired a week after the attack in May. On January 15 2025, a fire broke out at the refinery that local officials claimed was an internal issue. It was attacked again last week. In addition to gas and fuel oil production, it provides 7% of Russia’s diesel production.

The Andreapol oil pumping station was hit, forcing the Russians to shut down the main pipeline to the Ust-Luga terminal in Leningrad, which handled 20% of Russia’s oil exports. Every day it doesn’t operate is lost revenue.

There are two pipelines from Russia that pass through Belarus and into the rest of Europe. The pumping station for both of them was attacked and set on fire, but the extent of the damage is not yet known.

Smaller refineries have a difficult time staying profitable when hit by sanctions and drone attacks. It was reported last November that the Tuapse refinery experienced multiple shutdowns in 2024 due to low profitability. The Ilyich and Novoshakhtinsk refineries operated at half capacity. The three refineries are likely to close completely early this year. Also in 2024, the major refineries of Volgograd, Ilsky and Yaysky partially halted operations due to a shortage of equipment needed to perform maintenance. Domestic equipment supplies only provide 30-45% of the pumps, compressors and reactors and sanctions cut off access to outside sources. Chinese oil technology is not compatible with Russian oil technology.

There are several attacks from last week that aren’t accounted for on this chart.

Because of the drone attacks, the Russian are improving their air defenses at some bases in the form of hangers, shelters and S-300/S-400 air defense systems. Russia has a diminishing number of air defense systems so the newly repositioned air defense systems had to be removed from someplace else.

Last September there were tremendous explosions as tons of ammo blew up at the 107th arsenal in Toropets. The bunkers are difficult for drones to penetrate so they waited until a train arrived to transport the ammo and then attacked it as well as piles of ammo that weren’t in bunkers but were stacked in the open. Last week, they waited the train to arrive again and attacked it and three additional buildings. 20 explosions were reported.

Russia’s officially documented dead exceeded 90,000. There are an unknown number of undocumented dead. More than 50,000 inquiries have been filed by Russians on Ukraine’s “I Want to Find” project seeking information about missing soldiers. A Russian Deputy Defense Minister says they’ve received 48,000 DNA samples hoping to identify their family members. Contract soldiers now make up 60% of the officially acknowledged dead. Families of dead contract soldiers are supposed to receive 4 million rubles, about $40,000 right now. One woman was paid when her first husband died in 2022. She asked online if she would get paid if her second husband died, too.

Russia has 41 icebreakers, most of which are small and used to keep harbors open. It has 7 nuclear-powered ships that are used to open sea lanes and 50 Years of Victory is one of them. While trying to free a cargo ship from the ice, it collided and tore a hole in its side above the waterline. The ship was built in 2007 and is one of two remaining ships of that class which was first launched in 1993. Prior to 2022, Russian ships were reliant on western parts and shipyards but they no longer have access to them due to sanctions. At a NATO summit earlier this month, the US, Canada and Finland agreed to build 70-90 icebreakers by 2030. Normally, it takes 5-7 years to build an icebreaker so that target is unlikely to be met on time. China declared itself a “near Arctic” country and is building icebreakers. With global warming and the growth of icebreakers, the Arctic Ocean is an increasingly growing world trade route.

A crewman observes the damage to the “50 Years of Victory” from below the deck. Russia is building a new ice breaker in Vladivostok but it has been delayed by years. That delay was increased when the “Ursa Major” sank carrying difficult to replace hatches.

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(…to be continued…)