This is Putin’s curse: that Ukraine appears to be so weak and on the verge of exhaustion. He probably thinks, “I’ll sacrifice another 10,000 men and 10 billion USD, and victory is mine.” But Ukraine somehow always manages to hold on, and he finds himself once again faced with the decision of whether to raise the stakes or end the game.
The economic collapse of Russia it would not be some kind of boom, but slower or faster decline which would have impact on their military actions, too. E.g. North Korea is in a deep sh*t for years but the regime has not changed.
And Pudding has not invested everything at his disposal yet. He still have gas fields, oil fields, mines etc. His very friend Xi Jinping is skillfully driving Pudding to the point when he will have to decide whether to stop the war or sell these resources to him. What will happen then, when half of Russia would be owned by China?
Yes but North Korea doesn't have to wage a war and the population there doesn't know anything else except misery. The RF has lot more pressure to bear.
That depends on the conflict intensity. If Russian decline of abilities would correspond to Ukrainian decline, then the conflict may go for years. Or if it would be slower, then Russia advance may speed up.
Just want to say, do not expect something like hooray, Russia economy will collapse and Ukraine will win after then fast. This won't happen. (Unless the poor economy triggers some power shift inside Russia). In the best scenario, Russian advance would slow down, then stop, then Ukrainian slow advance would start, ... So it would be some, not fast, gradual process.
That wasn't my intention. Living in a shithole, even when one knows nothing else is one thing, but living in a shithole, when one knows something better and even waging war is a complete different dimension.
So the RF will face consequences, but the main question is, if Ukraine will be still standing to use the opportunity.
“Russia will be helping [with Ukraine’s reconstruction]. They want Ukraine to succeed, including providing power at very low prices.”
Thus spake the President of the United States after the recent press conference.
A number of people who know about these things have evidence that Trump has been a Kremlin asset since the 90s; as the man is totally amoral and utterly shameless, I imagine their 'hold' is actually quite pragmatic: 'Russia is very rich, and we must work together so that you are very rich too', an approach which would have appealed to him.
Putin reiterates every chance he has that Russia will only be content with the total destruction of Ukraine as a sovereign state. Of course he wants to help Ukraine's reconstruction if it's a vassal state providing cheap power to Russia, and the deal he and Trump will make will be based on how much each of them can make out of it. The wishes of the Ukrainian people and European allies have always been irrelevant. Including the current leadership of the Ukraine in the enrichment process makes absolute sense - but the 'peace' thus claimed could well trigger another Maidan, this time led by a hardened and practised army finally rejecting its incompetent leadership.
Who knows? But it's hard to remain optimistic when so many factors undermine the will of the Ukrainian people: the need for fundamental organizational reform of government and armed forces; the hugely successful Kremlin campaigns of disinformation throughout allied countries; a 'leader of the Western world' more akin to rotting lettuce than a visionary statesman; and a fundamental failure in European courage to face down the clear and open threat posed by Putin and his secret police/gangster pals.
Thank you, Tom and Don, for your unceasing and insightful analysis.
There was an interesting comment from the Hungaian PM (Orbán) he mentioned in a long interview that the aggregate Ua plus Ru losses (both KiA and WiA) on a weekly basis is approx 9K) - which is interesting from the point that we can draw some conlusions - if I apply a 1:1.5 ratio in favour of Russia then:
Total Monthly Attrition: 36,000 troops.
Russia: ~21,600 casualties/month.
Analysis: This is highly sustainable for Russia, as their current recruitment rate is estimated at 25,000–30,000 contract soldiers per month. In a positional scenario, Russia actually grows its total force size because recruitment exceeds losses.
Ukraine: ~14,400 casualties/month.
Analysis: This is a "danger zone" for Ukraine. Without a massive and consistent mobilization wave, replacing 14,000–15,000 experienced soldiers every month is difficult. This explains why, in positional warfare, Russia often seeks to prolong the conflict—they win the "math of exhaustion" even with higher losses.
4. Factors that Sustain the 1.5 : 1 Ratio
In a positional battle (like the current sectors around Seversk or parts of the Zaporizhzhia front), the ratio stays close because:
Drone Parity: Both sides use FPV drones to strike trenches and supply vehicles, leading to constant, incremental losses.
Artillery Dominance: Even if Russia fires more shells, Ukrainian precision (Excalibur, GMLRS) compensates, keeping the lethality high for both.
Lack of Armor: In positional fights, both sides use small infantry groups. Without large armored columns to be destroyed, we don't see the massive 4:1 or 5:1 spikes seen in failed offensives (like the early days of Vuhledar...)
Now I apply a 160k annualized Ukraine AWOL value with 30% of AWOL cases resulting at the end Ukrainian soldiers returning - maybe to a different - unit:
The Combat Only Ratio: 1.5 : 1 (Ru to UA)
Total Net Attrition Ratio: ~1.1 : 1
Even with the 30% return rate, the "buffer" Ukraine usually enjoys due to defensive warfare is almost entirely erased. Russia is losing men at a slightly higher rate, but the difference is no longer statistically significant enough to offset Russia's larger mobilization pool.
3. Sustainability vs. Growth
To understand if the army is shrinking or growing, we compare total attrition against estimated monthly recruitment/mobilization (approx. 30,000 for both sides):
Russia:
Monthly Losses: ~27,000
Monthly Recruitment: ~30,000
Result: +3,000 (Slow Growth/Sustainability)
Ukraine:
Monthly Losses (Combat + Net AWOL): ~24,580
Monthly Mobilization: ~30,000
Result: +5,420 (Marginal Growth)
4. Qualitative Impact: The "Returning Soldier" Factor
The 30% who return are not the same "asset" they were before:
Legal/Moral Status: Returning from AWOL often involves a loss of trust within the unit. These soldiers are frequently assigned to high-risk "digging" or logistics tasks rather than specialized roles.
The "Revolving Door": There is a risk of "secondary AWOL," where a soldier returns to avoid prison but leaves again during the next high-intensity bombardment.
Command Disruption: A 30% return rate means commanders are constantly managing a shifting roster, which degrades the cohesion needed for complex defensive operations in cities like Pokrovsk or Kurakhove.
Summary
With a 30% AWOL return rate, Ukraine narrowly avoids a total manpower collapse, but remains in a state of "treading water." The army can replace its losses, but it cannot generate the massive surplus (100k+ new troops) required to launch a major counter-offensive. Essentially, the 30% return rate is the "oxygen mask" keeping the front from breaking, but it doesn't solve the underlying exhaustion.
Again - this is a crude modell - but shows the current manpower status...
Keep in mind, that "returning from AWOL" usually means not "returning" but "switching to another unit with a better reputation". Lots of "returned AWOLs" leave their original unit because of bad leadership (which also prohibits them to move to another unit, making AWOL the only way to do so), and they seek a better unit to join before returning from AWOL to the new unit. Just a small fraction of AWOLs are caught by military police and returned to service forcibly.
At least, it used to be that way before recent changes announced by Syrsky - about "return from AWOL only into assault units".
Sorry but the economic analysis, which seems to be based on that twitter thread by pro genocide Zionist Oliver Alexander is completely nonsensical.
I rather not comment on using BlackRock as a source.
The Russian Central bank higher interest rates are the textbook policy meant to combat inflation. Reduction of the money supply is not a negative of such policy but the very policy itself.
Also there is no "free money" in economy. Sudden currency increase, be it by crude money printing (and currency devaluation) or mode developed state policy generate inflation as there is suddenly an increase in demand before the supply of good could be adjusted.
Perhaps the most surprising and worrying development of this war if you are Westerner) is that the West economy is actually doing significantly worse than Russia and is even far less sustainable on the medium term. Imo even on short terms which help explain the seemingly erratic policies of Trump and his attempts to extract ransom from "allies" nations like some ancient times empire in financial trouble.
All sources we have are biased. Common sense and all observations tells us that Russia is currently throwing everything including the kitchen sink into the war. That cannot be sustainable. Even when following text books for countering problems. The analytical problem is we don’t know how long this can be tried. The situation is of course equally bad for Ukraine. They can only function on foreign aid, but they are likely to get it. Has gotten it for two more years. So we know that the situation will lead to some crisis for one or both of them. Estimating how long this period is is difficult, also of course because both parties try to avoid the crisis. Regarding the outlook of the European economics I think you are far too pessimistic. Actually Europe can now do the standard economic bootstrap itself trick, build an armament industry, build a software industry (from a security point of view we cannot trust Microsoft, Google, Oracle…so we need to build our own). Trump is ironically forcing us that way. Europe can handle the economy. Whether it can handle supporting Ukraine I don’t know, but I hope it continues.
The "free money" was kind of "surplus household income", at least on one of the plot. And it is falling, which means that ordinary people spend more on electricity, transportation, basic food and medicine and have less for luxuries.
Thank you for the analysis. Including the introduction. It is interesting that you start with Russian economy. Here you write: “Russia’s economy is alive but fragile. The buffers from 2022 are gone. Trust, liquidity, and confidence are now holding together a fragile system teetering on the brink. In this state, one major shock wouldn’t be absorbed, it would push it off the edge.” I would rather say that Russian economy is dying. It will kill the Russian state as it is. The federation cannot sustain this over time. The problem is how long this process takes, and it may take another twenty years. More likely five to ten. In the meantime Russia can «function» as now. I do think the sanctions are working (yes I know about the work arounds) and I think there should be more and harder, but they work. But it is like garroting instead of hanging. It takes time, and we always underestimate the resources available for plunder. To win the war Ukraine must win on the battlefield. And you have outlined how this could happen, but it seems that this is not happening. Unfortunately.
It is encouraging to see Tom describe the nature of the war in terms of which economy (including manpower) collapses first as that is more optimistic than usual.
However it is a very bold claim to say that Ukraine would have won by now if it weren’t for incompetence and corruption.
Tom is an expert in matters of war an analysis but I wonder if he has ever had a position in a large company or govt which would provide an insight into how hard it is to steer these kinds of organisations and how there is a base level of inefficiency and corruption linked simply to the the size of an organisation.
I think it is safe to say that almost no one in Ukraine wants to lose this war but arguably naive to argue that it could have easily been won if only large organisations didn’t act like large organisations and were filled with automatons that followed all of Toms suggestions (and yes they are of course good suggestions) instead of imperfect human beings with limited information
Speaking just for myself: There are very basic military concepts that Ukraine's general staff are violating or failing to do. These concepts have been well known for a while.
Mistakes will always be made in a war, but some mistakes are so obvious that they should be easily avoided.
This is not a case of outside 'experts' trying to impose their vision of warfighting on Ukraine without understanding the circumstances on the ground. There are multiple successful Ukrainian brigades. They are successful because they made mistakes, some dating prior to 2022, and they learned from them. They collaborated with subordinates. They trained, trusted and empowered their subordinates and encouraged them to find their own solutions. And a couple of them became corps commanders and are working to spread that culture throughout their command.
I don't think those people are naive. I do think if their method of fighting was the standard for the Ukrainian army then a lot more Russians would have been killed, a lot fewer Ukrainians would have been killed and a lot less territory would have been lost.
I appreciate your explanation, thank you. I would not even put experts in quotes - you flat out are experts.
I even agree with you for what it’s worth (I am not an expert). Where I had the question was whether the mistakes were serious enough to literally swing the whole outcome of the war in a shortish space of time. Perhaps you are right - it just seemed like a big claim.
It is my belief that the claim is justified. Without a doubt, things would be better. And there are many in the Ukrainian military that are advocating for these changes.
In reporting, it is very difficult to present the entirety of the war in detail and with context on a weekly basis. The very best and very worst captures our attention and should be noted. But there are a lot of things that aren't reported. Some of that are defenses aren't being pushed back because the units there are doing what should be done, plus, they have the resources to handle the size of the attacks that they are facing.
Russia looks for weaknesses. Russia looks for failures, including the failures to properly support good units. When then find a weakness or failure, they divert a certain amount of resources to exploit that advantage.
The fewer failures there are, either at the local or higher levels, the fewer advantages Russia has to prosecute.
The corruption is directly linked to Zelensky with two of his major patrons (Kolomoyskyi and Mindich) both of whom are literally responsible of putting him on the throne got caught with thier hands in the cookie jar in a two separate major corruption scandals prior and during the war and both fled to Israel.
So I am sorry but this is not case of the Ukrainian society being backward and irredeemably corrupt and poor innocent command can do so much with such an endemicly rotten state apparatus.
One can only wish that was the case since the status quo aould've been a much more easier pill to swallow.
Putin made a historic strategic mistake with an invasion plan that reenacted the second massacre of Rzhev , no blaming the Russian society or military for that disaster since the regime have the first and final say in that matter.
Same goes for Zelensky, wiping out the Ukrainian material and momentum advantages during the counter offinsive by splitting the offensive effort into multiple directions while committing the coup de main into the thickest point of the Russian defensive belt , sure it was fun watching that disaster unfold in real time.
Anyway you correct about one thing , I know some places where those responsible for that strategic plunder would be sent directly to the gallows or would face the firing squad, at minimum drafted into an assault detachment and sent to the frontline
Your summary is unfortunately right on target. If Ukraine collapses first then Putin wins. And vis versa. So let’s continue our support and put pressure on our politicians to do the same.
Again a very big thank you to Tom & Don for that excellent summary. Here are my usual 5 cents:
1) IMHO regarding "Withdrawals on bank deposits are increasing", there is an additional reason to a lack of trust, local black markets accept only cash.
2) The consequences of saved (i.e. not spent) needed maintenance start to kick in. This creates another problem for the RF.
3) Ukraine has to find a way for a much better kill ratio, as under the current situation it will break down in a short time (<6 months), thanks to that bloody idiot Syrsky and his mindless monkey Manko. It simply cannot afford the way manpower is wasted by them.
The loss of foreign volunteers exacerbates the problem.
4) How does one identify an enemy of Ukraine? Hint it isn't by the uniform, but by the performed actions.
This section is especially interesting. "Read: it remains extremely hard to explain Ukrainians presently not in Ukraine (and especially: those NOT serving in the ZSU), that Ukraine could stop Russia ‘with ease’ - if its leadership wouldn’t be both as incompetent and as idiotically corrupt as it is. That ‘quality management’ would result in a far more effective use of what Ukraine has got; in far better training of the ZSU; in magnitudes-better treatment of ZSU-troops - and thus no mass-defections (mind: the ZSU had next to no defections back in 2022 and has stopped the Russians, two times; once in March and once in July). Alas… that thanks to Syrsky and his idiots, the ZSU is currently melting away at some 25,000 troops a month (without combat losses)."
Thanks Tom and Don.
This is Putin’s curse: that Ukraine appears to be so weak and on the verge of exhaustion. He probably thinks, “I’ll sacrifice another 10,000 men and 10 billion USD, and victory is mine.” But Ukraine somehow always manages to hold on, and he finds himself once again faced with the decision of whether to raise the stakes or end the game.
The economic collapse of Russia it would not be some kind of boom, but slower or faster decline which would have impact on their military actions, too. E.g. North Korea is in a deep sh*t for years but the regime has not changed.
And Pudding has not invested everything at his disposal yet. He still have gas fields, oil fields, mines etc. His very friend Xi Jinping is skillfully driving Pudding to the point when he will have to decide whether to stop the war or sell these resources to him. What will happen then, when half of Russia would be owned by China?
E.g. the new logging law, all that timber is sold to China https://caliber.az/en/post/protesters-rally-in-russia-s-irkutsk-against-lake-baikal-logging-law
Yes but North Korea doesn't have to wage a war and the population there doesn't know anything else except misery. The RF has lot more pressure to bear.
That depends on the conflict intensity. If Russian decline of abilities would correspond to Ukrainian decline, then the conflict may go for years. Or if it would be slower, then Russia advance may speed up.
Just want to say, do not expect something like hooray, Russia economy will collapse and Ukraine will win after then fast. This won't happen. (Unless the poor economy triggers some power shift inside Russia). In the best scenario, Russian advance would slow down, then stop, then Ukrainian slow advance would start, ... So it would be some, not fast, gradual process.
That wasn't my intention. Living in a shithole, even when one knows nothing else is one thing, but living in a shithole, when one knows something better and even waging war is a complete different dimension.
So the RF will face consequences, but the main question is, if Ukraine will be still standing to use the opportunity.
“Russia will be helping [with Ukraine’s reconstruction]. They want Ukraine to succeed, including providing power at very low prices.”
Thus spake the President of the United States after the recent press conference.
A number of people who know about these things have evidence that Trump has been a Kremlin asset since the 90s; as the man is totally amoral and utterly shameless, I imagine their 'hold' is actually quite pragmatic: 'Russia is very rich, and we must work together so that you are very rich too', an approach which would have appealed to him.
Putin reiterates every chance he has that Russia will only be content with the total destruction of Ukraine as a sovereign state. Of course he wants to help Ukraine's reconstruction if it's a vassal state providing cheap power to Russia, and the deal he and Trump will make will be based on how much each of them can make out of it. The wishes of the Ukrainian people and European allies have always been irrelevant. Including the current leadership of the Ukraine in the enrichment process makes absolute sense - but the 'peace' thus claimed could well trigger another Maidan, this time led by a hardened and practised army finally rejecting its incompetent leadership.
Who knows? But it's hard to remain optimistic when so many factors undermine the will of the Ukrainian people: the need for fundamental organizational reform of government and armed forces; the hugely successful Kremlin campaigns of disinformation throughout allied countries; a 'leader of the Western world' more akin to rotting lettuce than a visionary statesman; and a fundamental failure in European courage to face down the clear and open threat posed by Putin and his secret police/gangster pals.
Thank you, Tom and Don, for your unceasing and insightful analysis.
We will see in a relativley short time (<6 months) in which direction the dice will finally fall.
There was an interesting comment from the Hungaian PM (Orbán) he mentioned in a long interview that the aggregate Ua plus Ru losses (both KiA and WiA) on a weekly basis is approx 9K) - which is interesting from the point that we can draw some conlusions - if I apply a 1:1.5 ratio in favour of Russia then:
Total Monthly Attrition: 36,000 troops.
Russia: ~21,600 casualties/month.
Analysis: This is highly sustainable for Russia, as their current recruitment rate is estimated at 25,000–30,000 contract soldiers per month. In a positional scenario, Russia actually grows its total force size because recruitment exceeds losses.
Ukraine: ~14,400 casualties/month.
Analysis: This is a "danger zone" for Ukraine. Without a massive and consistent mobilization wave, replacing 14,000–15,000 experienced soldiers every month is difficult. This explains why, in positional warfare, Russia often seeks to prolong the conflict—they win the "math of exhaustion" even with higher losses.
4. Factors that Sustain the 1.5 : 1 Ratio
In a positional battle (like the current sectors around Seversk or parts of the Zaporizhzhia front), the ratio stays close because:
Drone Parity: Both sides use FPV drones to strike trenches and supply vehicles, leading to constant, incremental losses.
Artillery Dominance: Even if Russia fires more shells, Ukrainian precision (Excalibur, GMLRS) compensates, keeping the lethality high for both.
Lack of Armor: In positional fights, both sides use small infantry groups. Without large armored columns to be destroyed, we don't see the massive 4:1 or 5:1 spikes seen in failed offensives (like the early days of Vuhledar...)
Now I apply a 160k annualized Ukraine AWOL value with 30% of AWOL cases resulting at the end Ukrainian soldiers returning - maybe to a different - unit:
The Combat Only Ratio: 1.5 : 1 (Ru to UA)
Total Net Attrition Ratio: ~1.1 : 1
Even with the 30% return rate, the "buffer" Ukraine usually enjoys due to defensive warfare is almost entirely erased. Russia is losing men at a slightly higher rate, but the difference is no longer statistically significant enough to offset Russia's larger mobilization pool.
3. Sustainability vs. Growth
To understand if the army is shrinking or growing, we compare total attrition against estimated monthly recruitment/mobilization (approx. 30,000 for both sides):
Russia:
Monthly Losses: ~27,000
Monthly Recruitment: ~30,000
Result: +3,000 (Slow Growth/Sustainability)
Ukraine:
Monthly Losses (Combat + Net AWOL): ~24,580
Monthly Mobilization: ~30,000
Result: +5,420 (Marginal Growth)
4. Qualitative Impact: The "Returning Soldier" Factor
The 30% who return are not the same "asset" they were before:
Legal/Moral Status: Returning from AWOL often involves a loss of trust within the unit. These soldiers are frequently assigned to high-risk "digging" or logistics tasks rather than specialized roles.
The "Revolving Door": There is a risk of "secondary AWOL," where a soldier returns to avoid prison but leaves again during the next high-intensity bombardment.
Command Disruption: A 30% return rate means commanders are constantly managing a shifting roster, which degrades the cohesion needed for complex defensive operations in cities like Pokrovsk or Kurakhove.
Summary
With a 30% AWOL return rate, Ukraine narrowly avoids a total manpower collapse, but remains in a state of "treading water." The army can replace its losses, but it cannot generate the massive surplus (100k+ new troops) required to launch a major counter-offensive. Essentially, the 30% return rate is the "oxygen mask" keeping the front from breaking, but it doesn't solve the underlying exhaustion.
Again - this is a crude modell - but shows the current manpower status...
Definitely a useful calculation.
You mind if I post this as one of 'main features' in the coming days?
Not at all - please, just call out that there are lot of assumptions and the tolerance level is high (+/- 20%)
Keep in mind, that "returning from AWOL" usually means not "returning" but "switching to another unit with a better reputation". Lots of "returned AWOLs" leave their original unit because of bad leadership (which also prohibits them to move to another unit, making AWOL the only way to do so), and they seek a better unit to join before returning from AWOL to the new unit. Just a small fraction of AWOLs are caught by military police and returned to service forcibly.
At least, it used to be that way before recent changes announced by Syrsky - about "return from AWOL only into assault units".
Sorry but the economic analysis, which seems to be based on that twitter thread by pro genocide Zionist Oliver Alexander is completely nonsensical.
I rather not comment on using BlackRock as a source.
The Russian Central bank higher interest rates are the textbook policy meant to combat inflation. Reduction of the money supply is not a negative of such policy but the very policy itself.
Also there is no "free money" in economy. Sudden currency increase, be it by crude money printing (and currency devaluation) or mode developed state policy generate inflation as there is suddenly an increase in demand before the supply of good could be adjusted.
Perhaps the most surprising and worrying development of this war if you are Westerner) is that the West economy is actually doing significantly worse than Russia and is even far less sustainable on the medium term. Imo even on short terms which help explain the seemingly erratic policies of Trump and his attempts to extract ransom from "allies" nations like some ancient times empire in financial trouble.
All sources we have are biased. Common sense and all observations tells us that Russia is currently throwing everything including the kitchen sink into the war. That cannot be sustainable. Even when following text books for countering problems. The analytical problem is we don’t know how long this can be tried. The situation is of course equally bad for Ukraine. They can only function on foreign aid, but they are likely to get it. Has gotten it for two more years. So we know that the situation will lead to some crisis for one or both of them. Estimating how long this period is is difficult, also of course because both parties try to avoid the crisis. Regarding the outlook of the European economics I think you are far too pessimistic. Actually Europe can now do the standard economic bootstrap itself trick, build an armament industry, build a software industry (from a security point of view we cannot trust Microsoft, Google, Oracle…so we need to build our own). Trump is ironically forcing us that way. Europe can handle the economy. Whether it can handle supporting Ukraine I don’t know, but I hope it continues.
Europe has a large economic problem due to Chinese competition. It got worse and it requires deep social reform to regain competiveness
We shall see I guess.
The "free money" was kind of "surplus household income", at least on one of the plot. And it is falling, which means that ordinary people spend more on electricity, transportation, basic food and medicine and have less for luxuries.
Thank you for the analysis. Including the introduction. It is interesting that you start with Russian economy. Here you write: “Russia’s economy is alive but fragile. The buffers from 2022 are gone. Trust, liquidity, and confidence are now holding together a fragile system teetering on the brink. In this state, one major shock wouldn’t be absorbed, it would push it off the edge.” I would rather say that Russian economy is dying. It will kill the Russian state as it is. The federation cannot sustain this over time. The problem is how long this process takes, and it may take another twenty years. More likely five to ten. In the meantime Russia can «function» as now. I do think the sanctions are working (yes I know about the work arounds) and I think there should be more and harder, but they work. But it is like garroting instead of hanging. It takes time, and we always underestimate the resources available for plunder. To win the war Ukraine must win on the battlefield. And you have outlined how this could happen, but it seems that this is not happening. Unfortunately.
It is encouraging to see Tom describe the nature of the war in terms of which economy (including manpower) collapses first as that is more optimistic than usual.
However it is a very bold claim to say that Ukraine would have won by now if it weren’t for incompetence and corruption.
Tom is an expert in matters of war an analysis but I wonder if he has ever had a position in a large company or govt which would provide an insight into how hard it is to steer these kinds of organisations and how there is a base level of inefficiency and corruption linked simply to the the size of an organisation.
I think it is safe to say that almost no one in Ukraine wants to lose this war but arguably naive to argue that it could have easily been won if only large organisations didn’t act like large organisations and were filled with automatons that followed all of Toms suggestions (and yes they are of course good suggestions) instead of imperfect human beings with limited information
Speaking just for myself: There are very basic military concepts that Ukraine's general staff are violating or failing to do. These concepts have been well known for a while.
Mistakes will always be made in a war, but some mistakes are so obvious that they should be easily avoided.
This is not a case of outside 'experts' trying to impose their vision of warfighting on Ukraine without understanding the circumstances on the ground. There are multiple successful Ukrainian brigades. They are successful because they made mistakes, some dating prior to 2022, and they learned from them. They collaborated with subordinates. They trained, trusted and empowered their subordinates and encouraged them to find their own solutions. And a couple of them became corps commanders and are working to spread that culture throughout their command.
I don't think those people are naive. I do think if their method of fighting was the standard for the Ukrainian army then a lot more Russians would have been killed, a lot fewer Ukrainians would have been killed and a lot less territory would have been lost.
I appreciate your explanation, thank you. I would not even put experts in quotes - you flat out are experts.
I even agree with you for what it’s worth (I am not an expert). Where I had the question was whether the mistakes were serious enough to literally swing the whole outcome of the war in a shortish space of time. Perhaps you are right - it just seemed like a big claim.
It is my belief that the claim is justified. Without a doubt, things would be better. And there are many in the Ukrainian military that are advocating for these changes.
In reporting, it is very difficult to present the entirety of the war in detail and with context on a weekly basis. The very best and very worst captures our attention and should be noted. But there are a lot of things that aren't reported. Some of that are defenses aren't being pushed back because the units there are doing what should be done, plus, they have the resources to handle the size of the attacks that they are facing.
Russia looks for weaknesses. Russia looks for failures, including the failures to properly support good units. When then find a weakness or failure, they divert a certain amount of resources to exploit that advantage.
The fewer failures there are, either at the local or higher levels, the fewer advantages Russia has to prosecute.
The corruption is directly linked to Zelensky with two of his major patrons (Kolomoyskyi and Mindich) both of whom are literally responsible of putting him on the throne got caught with thier hands in the cookie jar in a two separate major corruption scandals prior and during the war and both fled to Israel.
So I am sorry but this is not case of the Ukrainian society being backward and irredeemably corrupt and poor innocent command can do so much with such an endemicly rotten state apparatus.
One can only wish that was the case since the status quo aould've been a much more easier pill to swallow.
Putin made a historic strategic mistake with an invasion plan that reenacted the second massacre of Rzhev , no blaming the Russian society or military for that disaster since the regime have the first and final say in that matter.
Same goes for Zelensky, wiping out the Ukrainian material and momentum advantages during the counter offinsive by splitting the offensive effort into multiple directions while committing the coup de main into the thickest point of the Russian defensive belt , sure it was fun watching that disaster unfold in real time.
Anyway you correct about one thing , I know some places where those responsible for that strategic plunder would be sent directly to the gallows or would face the firing squad, at minimum drafted into an assault detachment and sent to the frontline
Your summary is unfortunately right on target. If Ukraine collapses first then Putin wins. And vis versa. So let’s continue our support and put pressure on our politicians to do the same.
Again a very big thank you to Tom & Don for that excellent summary. Here are my usual 5 cents:
1) IMHO regarding "Withdrawals on bank deposits are increasing", there is an additional reason to a lack of trust, local black markets accept only cash.
2) The consequences of saved (i.e. not spent) needed maintenance start to kick in. This creates another problem for the RF.
3) Ukraine has to find a way for a much better kill ratio, as under the current situation it will break down in a short time (<6 months), thanks to that bloody idiot Syrsky and his mindless monkey Manko. It simply cannot afford the way manpower is wasted by them.
The loss of foreign volunteers exacerbates the problem.
4) How does one identify an enemy of Ukraine? Hint it isn't by the uniform, but by the performed actions.
Thanks Tom,
But are you sure that there were no defections in 2022? The front in Kherson just melted up to the city and the ZNPP.
There were, but they were minimal. Something like 100-200 troops - a month. And that at 'worst times' (May-July 2022).
Kherson didn't fall because of defections, but because Zelensky, Zaluzhny, Syrsky, especially Sodol, and Budannov have all screwed up.
Thank you very much.
This section is especially interesting. "Read: it remains extremely hard to explain Ukrainians presently not in Ukraine (and especially: those NOT serving in the ZSU), that Ukraine could stop Russia ‘with ease’ - if its leadership wouldn’t be both as incompetent and as idiotically corrupt as it is. That ‘quality management’ would result in a far more effective use of what Ukraine has got; in far better training of the ZSU; in magnitudes-better treatment of ZSU-troops - and thus no mass-defections (mind: the ZSU had next to no defections back in 2022 and has stopped the Russians, two times; once in March and once in July). Alas… that thanks to Syrsky and his idiots, the ZSU is currently melting away at some 25,000 troops a month (without combat losses)."