Don's Weekly, 29 April 2024: Part 1

Good morning everybody!

The end of the month is near, but it’s also a Monday, and thus the time for Don’s review of the last week.

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Western Luhansk

Near Kupyansk, Russia lost a Buk air defense system, 3 tanks, a BMP, an SPG and a truck. No Ukrainian vehicles were recorded as hit but Russian airstrikes and artillery was heavy.

Russia moved a new regiment to Terny. Two tanks and two BMPs were confirmed as destroyed in a week that saw relatively few assaults in this sector.

A Russian tank is stopped well before Terny. The BMP trailing it is destroyed 250 meters later…

https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1783240186106626277

A HIMARS was caught by a drone…

https://twitter.com/3_bm15/status/1784539860436418752

A Desertcross is attacked by a drone…

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1784551118258786437

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Bakhmut

Last week a Russian recon team made it to the canal before being eliminated. Since then, the brigade that was defending this important sector was replaced and Russian bombardments and airstrikes suggest that Russian control ends at the western end of Bohdanivka. Russian airstrikes in the forest east of the canal district means that Russian troops aren’t there or they bombed their own troops. That said, the Russian bombing, shelling and MRL strikes on the canal district and the forests to the north and east were very intense.

Limited Russian attacks in Ivanivske went nowhere. Southeast of the village, Ukraine regained a treeline.

Russia’s vehicular assaults at Andriivka and Kurdiumivka resulted in 16 armored vehicles being knocked out before they reached the front line.

Ukraine’s 67th Brigade began as a right wing political militia before expanding and being integrated into Ukraine’s military. The politicians did not have the military experience needed to command a Brigade, plus they favored their right wing members while sending non-political, poorly-trained replacements to the front. This resulted in higher casualties and poor performance. Zaluzhny allowed this arrangement to continue but Sirsky insisted on accountability. In February, disagreements within the command staff resulted in a significant portion of DaVinci’s Wolves transferred out of the 67th Brigade and into the 59th Brigade. Now, in mid-April, Sirsky dispersed the fighting core of the 67th to different brigades as replacements, breaking up the Right Sector Ukrainian Volunteer Corps apart. The army is investigating the actions of the leaders, who believe they are being politically persecuted…https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/14/7451183/

Russian bombing in Chasiv Yar’s canal district and the forest to the east was intense…https://t.me/Ratnik2nd/5274

***

Avdiivka

On April 9th, Russia had just conducted that large vehicular assault west of Tonenke, which is 4 km south of Orlivka. They had also been crossing the small Durna river trying to take Semonivka and took the eastern half of Berdychi. On that same day, they traveled 700 meters up a treeline towards Novokalynove. In the next four days, the Ukrainians would withdraw 4 km from their isolated positions in the open fields south of Tonenke and the Russians would advance, but the Russians had already decided to shift their efforts to the north.

It started with attempts to move north of Berdychi and bypass the Durna river. The Russians weren’t able to get around the river but over the next four days, with the aid of heavy bombardments and airstrikes, they were able to punch through the front lines towards Ocheretyne. From April 12-15 they advanced 2800 meters along the rail line and moved 2000 meters westward along another treeline.

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The Ukrainian 115th Brigade was defending the area east of Ocheretyne towards Novokalynove. They had just replaced another Ukrainian brigade that was being rotated to the rear for replacements and rest. The 47th Brigade was in the south, defending Berdychi and the area to the north. There was also an independent battalion in Novobakhmutivka and one battalion of a territorial defense brigade in Ocheretyne. Neither of those battalions had tank support or organic artillery support.

Organic artillery means that a particular unit has an artillery unit permanently assigned to it, just like the infantry units are. Certainly, they receive artillery support from adjacent brigades or the independent artillery brigades that support the entire sector, but organic artillery is offering closer level of coordination and communication.

When a brigade establishes a defense, it will often put two battalions on the front line and keep one battalion in the rear. This allows it to rotate troops between the front and rear to provide rest and replacements, and it also gives it a reserve its command can commit in case of an emergency. There is no indication that either of these battalions had any units in the area that they could call upon as reserves. Certainly, there were other units in the area, such as the 100th Brigade, but, again, that is another level of coordination and communication.

Ukraine has understandably struggled to standardize equipment, training and leadership competence. Some units are outstanding in all three categories. Others are lacking in one or more. I don’t know the specifics of the territorial defense battalion, or even the 425th Assault Battalion, but many territorial defense units began with citizens being handed a rifle and evolved from there. Some have been more fortunate than others with regards to equipment, training and leadership. But even the best units can be overwhelmed by firepower and a mass of enemy units.

The 3rd Assault Brigade has a proven record of success at Bakhmut and Avdiivka and they are no longer holding Semenivka. You can rest assured that if they are not in Semenivka it is because the cost of holding it no longer made tactical sense given the terrain, their capabilities and the capabilities of their enemy.

There have been Russian and Ukrainian reports that the Ukrainian defenders ran from their positions at some point in some places. It is possible that the defenders left when their positions could still be defended at a reasonable cost. It could also be that it was clear, given the heavy bombardments and the number of Russian attackers, that the defenders would be unable to hold, so they left. I don’t have enough information to make that determination.

What is clear is that from April 15-23, the Russians were able to push another 2500 meters along the rail to enter Ocheretyne and 1500 meters to the west to take the village of Novobakhmutivka. Three days later, they fully secured Ocheretyne and moved another 1500 meters west to take the village of Soloviove.

While advancing along the narrow treelines on both sides of the railroad, Russia was very vulnerable to artillery fire. With sufficient artillery fire, Ukraine could have easily stopped any attack along this route. Even with a breakthrough, the reinforcements and supplies traveling along the railroad could be interdicted with artillery. But Ukraine has never had enough artillery ammo.

Both sides have difficulties with exploiting breakthroughs with speed. Most of the Russian attacks in the north were conducted by just infantry: the Russians had no battalions of mechanized troops ready to burst through any openings in Ukrainian defense, so the breakthrough was exploited at the speed of foot. As such, Ukraine had more time to react to it and has since sent two brigades to contain the breakthrough.

One thing is sure, and that is that the Ukrainian regional command did not have the forces needed to protect such an important location, nor did it have enough forces to react in case of an emergency. The forces that were sent arrived only after the breakthrough. The 115th and 47th Brigades tried counter attacking from both sides but they were unsuccessful. Given the 47th’s proven record at Robotyne and Avdiivka, that is an indication of the firepower and manpower that Russia committed to the effort. In fact, Russia just added four regiments and two battalions to Avdiivka to replace losses and continue the push.

Whenever Russia sees any kind of success, they keep shoving men and equipment into the effort. This has provided them with some victories but at a high cost.

The 115th Brigade didn’t just have to contend with the Russian penetration on its right flank at Ocheretyne, it was also dealing with the Russian push on its left flank, past Novokalynove in direciton of Karamik. Russia took the first village and is pushing into the second. Those two villages and Ocheretyne are the border between the 115th Brigade and the friendly units to its right and left. It’s always advantageous to attack along these operational borders because the adjacent units have to have good coordination to protect areas of overlapping responsibilities. Without a successful counterattack at either Ocheretyne or Novokalynove/Karamik, the 115th eventually had to withdraw. In about a four days it suffered 30 killed, 100 wounded and another 30 are missing. By Ukrainian standards, these are heavy losses.

The following map shows how important Ocheretyne is. There are a series of small rivers, which can be crossed by foot at most places, but they do restrict logistical paths. Along these rivers are reservoirs that are impassable. These small rivers and any defenses built behind them have the potential to be strong positions. But splitting these defenses is the high ground that runs from Avdiivka to Ocheretyne and continues west. The railroad also runs along this high ground because the water runs down either side and minimizes the bridges that needed to be built.

Fortifications had been built in front of Ocheretyne but they were not adequately manned so one of the trenches provided the Russians a covered approach leading into the city. The town was to be a key component of the Ukrainian defenses. The number and quality of Ukrainian fortifications behind Ocheretyne is unknown, but Ukraine will need to contain Russian expansion from the town.

For its part, Russia cannot venture too much further north and west without exposing its logistical route for supplies and replacements. To safeguard against that, it will need to take the ground between Ocheretyne and Keremik, as well as continue pushing south from Ocheretyne and west from Semenivka. This will not be an easy task to accomplish. In their favor is a large number of reinforcements to replace their losses and heavy artillery, MLRS, TOS thermobaric bombardments and the growing number of airstrikes. Working against them is time, which brings more artillery ammo, more air defense systems as well as MANPADS and ATGMs.

To put these developments into context, it took Russia over two months to move ten kilometers, and then it did so because Ukraine was low on ammo, many of their units were operating at 50% strength, and they made mistakes. Even with Ukrainian units at half strength, an increased amount of ammo will make the Russian’s objective much harder to achieve. We forget how static the war has been to the point where a gain or loss of 500-1000 meters is cause for celebration or concern. So when there’s a narrow advance of 5000 meters in two weeks, there’s certainly reason to be concerned, not just for the loss of territory, but for the challenges caused by the loss of specific pieces of terrain, such as Ocheretyne. Yet Ukraine will survive this setback. The terrain isn’t as important as the manpower and equipment on both sides. And the scale of the terrain is reflected in that white rectangle on this map, which covers the area shown on the topographic map. Compare that to the territory covered in the green to the north, recovered by Ukraine in the Kharkiv offensive in 2022.

Tartarigami and his team does excellent work and they say that while the situation is concerning, Russia’s “goal of capturing the entire Donbas region may be unattainable in the foreseeable future.” In my judgment, Russia has a near-zero chance of taking the Donbas. And as time goes by, that chance moves closer to zero.

A Russian command post is hit 15 km from the front line…

https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1783181744524472354

A tank from the 3rd Assault Brigade fires on Orlivka from 2 km away. The tank is aided by being at a higher elevation (196 meters) than the target area (171 meters) …https://twitter.com/giK1893

Russians use infantry to advance west of Tonenke…

https://twitter.com/giK1893/status/1783791000411889941

The Russians recover an M-1…

https://twitter.com/FreudGreyskull/status/1784535670834561224

The 47th Brigade is happy with their M-1s…

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1784165211454194096

(….to be continued…)