Don's Weekly, 27 October 2025: Part 6 (Equipment, Andriivka Documentary & Flamingos)

(…continued from Part 5…)

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Equipment

Russia is now using a jet-assisted UMPK bomb that glides that traveled 130 km in two attacks on Poltava and Kharkiv. Odesa was attacked by glide bombs for the first time. UMPK bombs normally have a range of 40-90 km, depending on the altitude at the time of release. A range of 193 km was reached during testing. Ukraine says they functioned as a cruise missile and shot down two that were aimed at Odesa.

The Sw800Pro micro-turbojet engine from one of downed new UMPKs.

The Raven air defense system was developed in three months by the UK, using AIM-132 ASRAAM missiles, aircraft launch rails and a truck. They’ve shot down hundreds of drones with an effectiveness rate of 70%, but with upgrades they have had a 90% success rate since July.

The Raven air defense system was developed in three months by the UK, using AIMR-132 ASRAAM missiles, aircraft launch rails and a truck. They’ve shot down hundreds of drones with an effectiveness rate of 70%. With upgrades, they’ve had a 90% success rate since July.

Denmark started producing the AR-15 for their armed forces. This is the first time they have produced rifles in 60 years. It is an effort to reduce their reliance on foreign manufacturers, and in order to increase resilience, they will spread the work among several domestic companies.

Ukraine is making long-term plans with Sweden to eventually buy 100-150 Gripen E fighters. 100 Gripens would cost $8.5 billion and it might be paid for with frozen Russian assets.

Russia ordered 56 Kalibr missiles with nuclear warheads.

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Documentary

In 2022, Mstyslav Chernov and his AP reporting team documented the Russian invasion with reports that eventually became the movie “20 Days in Mariupol”. The video of the movie is available here. He has a new documentary that shows the 3rd Assault Brigade’s 2023 counterattack. It’s called, “2000 meters to Andriivka”. Its world premiere was at the 2025 Sundance Film Festival and there is a schedule of limited screenings until it airs on the PBS show “Frontline” in December. In the trailer, a soldier asks, “What if the war lasts for the rest of our lives?” For so many, it did.

At the beginning of May 2023, Ukraine still held a sliver of Bakhmut that was 500-1000 meters in depth. The 3rd began their attack south of Bakhmut in mid-May and advanced 2-3 kilometers by mid-July. They rotated their troops so that some were attacking, some were holding the front lines and some were resting and refitting. They lost less than a dozen men while defeating four Russian brigades and inflicting thousands of casualties.

The last two kilometers to Andriivka and the elevated railroad tracks were different. Between the brigade and the village of maybe 30 houses were kill zones of open fields and a single treeline leading directly into the village. Russian positions defended the treeline and shelling soon reduced it to stumps and branches devoid of leaves. The Russians feed into the meatgrinder kept dying but more of the brigade’s troops were killed and wounded, as well.

Drones had not achieved the level of lethality they have now but they were still a big factor. Two years ago, Ukrainians were still using Stinger missiles to shoot down drones. These days, it is likely that a truck would be destroyed well behind the front lines but this one was destroyed close enough to Ukrainian positions that the survivors were captured.

By 14 September, the brigade reached the edge of the village and a drone broadcast an offer of surrender to the Russians inside the village. Some accepted the offer. By this time, Russia had an established pattern of killing their own troops that tried to surrender and an artillery shell killed one of their own, but two other Russians and their Ukrainian captors survived.

In the end, the brigade killed the last of the Russians with hand grenades and bullets. If they were in the open fields, a mortar shell landing this close would probably have killed or wounded them, but the remnants of a house saved them. In the final assault, retreat was impossible for the Russians. They could only surrender or die.

A month later, the 93rd Mechanized Brigade had relieved the 3rd and posted a video of Andriivka.

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The Flamingo Missile Program

The stated potential of the FP-5 Flamingo missile in terms of range, payload and numbers would enable Ukraine to degrade Russian infrastructure and production capabilities at a much greater rate than is currently possible. These statements have yet to be proven.

What little data we have that is attributed to the Flamingo missile indicates possible accuracy issues, either due to internal shortcomings or enemy actions. We also haven’t seen any attacks beyond 300 km or confirmed that it cruises at 900 kph, but it does have a large 1150 kg warhead, with about 450-550 kg of explosives.

Ukraine is reportedly producing 2-3 missiles a day at $500,000 per missile. If they reach their stated goal of producing seven missiles a day it would create an annual production of 2,555 missiles a year, which is about the total number of missiles that Russia produces in a year. This would be a separate tally from the production of the other Ukrainian missiles, such as the Long Neptune, Hrim-2, Ruta, Palianytsia, Pekklo and Trembita. Ukraine has said that a shortage of funding and workers is limiting the rate of expansion.

55-60% of the drones used on attacks in Russia are FP-1 drones that have a range of 1600 km. Iryna Terekh, Fire Point’s chief technology officer, says that 55-60% of the FP-1 drones have hit their targets. With a production rate of 100 a day, that would imply that an average of 55-60 FP-1 drones are hitting Russian targets each day. While it is difficult to determine precise results, a daily average of successful drone strikes in the single digits seems more likely, and that’s including the other drones that make up 40% of the attacks.

The Flamingo is faster than the drones but it’s a large missile, about 13 meters long and six meters wide. The body is made of fiberglass, which doesn’t provide a strong radar return, but the large metal engine on top does. It’s possible to use terrain to mask the missile from known ground radar sites, but airborne radars can see over a lot of terrain.

For those missiles that make it past the air defenses, there is a question about accuracy. It has a reported accuracy of 14 meters or less from the planned impact point. With the size of the warhead, it should destroy any soft target within 38 meters and any above ground reinforced concrete position should be destroyed at 21 meters or less. Low altitude flights could aid in avoiding ground radars but diving from higher altitudes would increase penetration of hard targets.

Internal navigation systems of gyroscopes and accelerometers are accurate enough to place a missile near the target but are not accurate enough to guarantee it will be close enough for the warhead to impact the target. Even the wind can push the missile off route. The longer the missile flies, and 3000 km is a long distance, the more likely that the missile will land further away from the target. Updates from global positioning satellites allow the missile to reorient itself with accurate data, but the signals from the satellites can be jammed.

CRPA antennas can resist jamming by only responding to signals from trusted locations, such as an overhead satellite rather than a jamming signal from the ground, but they do not guarantee success, particularly if airborne jamming systems are used. Optical cameras that scan the terrain and compare it to an internal map can be a very accurate navigation tool, but there are no reports that such a system is used on the Flamingo.

There have been few reports of strikes with the Flamingo and fewer details mentioned in these reports, but the attack in Armyansk, Crimea has imagery that shows craters that are 13-15 meters in width. One impact landed on the corner of an FSB building. Another landed 70 meters from a collection of hovercraft. Even from 70 meters away it was able to destroy one hovercraft in the open and damage two more, but that impact is five times the distance of the published expected accuracy. It is not known whether it was an internal failure or if it was intercepted or effected by electronic warfare.

At Armyansk, the impact of the missile was about 70 meters from the hovercraft base and was a direct hit on the corner of a building in an FSB compound.

If the Flamingo has navigation issues then it not only makes it a less effective weapon, it also increases the chances of collateral damage of civilian targets, particularly when combined with a larger warhead. Out of concern for collateral damage, some targets might not be chosen for the Flamingo. On the other hand, Ukraine’s Bohdan artillery system has been upgraded many times mid-production based on feedback from the field. Ukraine says that the Flamingo is still being refined and it will improve with time.

Speed combined with large numbers of missiles per attack, accompanied by drones, could stress Russian air defenses and allow missiles and drones to reach their targets but it’s unknown how many Flamingos can be launched in a single attack. The Flamingo has reusable truck-mounted launchers, but in order to be produced quickly and inexpensively, it does not have folding wings that would allow it to be launched directly from its transport container. This means it takes 20-40 minutes to launch each missile while Russian drones are trying to spot them in order to send a ballistic missile to the launch site. The number of launch teams might also be a limiting factor.

The Flamingo has a reported straight-line range of 3000 km, which would threaten 90% of Russia’s defense industries. If Ukraine meets its objective of building 2,555 Flamingos a year and if 10-20% of them accurately hit their targets then 250-500 targets will be damaged for months or longer.

FP-1 drones are responsible for about 60% of the drone attacks and have a range of 1,600 km. Flamingo missiles have a range of 3,000 km. Even with indirect routes to evade Russian air defenses, it could still hit targets within 2,500 meters.

The impact it would have on the Russian war effort would depend on the nature of the targets. Oil, gas and refinery targets would reduce Russian income and further strain their economy. Power infrastructure targets would reduce production in all sectors of their economy. Attacking factories that produce drones and offensive missiles and airbases would protect Ukraine. And attacking factories that produce air defense system components would increase the success rate of future attacks on Russia. 47.2% of all Russian cargo moves on rail lines and any disruption and delays will reduce productivity.

Ukraine has invested enough money and propaganda into the FP-5 program that it is probable that the program will eventually succeed even after initial difficulties. Various missiles and drones will be used together to penetrate Russian airspace but the FP-5 will likely be used to attack targets that other Ukrainian weapons cannot reach, penetrate, or damage to the same degree with smaller warheads. Being a local product, there are no restrictions on how it can be used. In fact, 99% of the recent strikes in Russia were conducted with weapons built in Ukraine.

There’s little Russia can do except take into account that more targets are now endangered and adjust their air defenses. They will also try to identify launch sites. Russia’s war is on a clock and a successful Flamingo program speeds up the clock.