(…continued from Part 1…)
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Kharkiv
The quality of Ukrainian leadership varies and Syrsky holds commanders accountable, but there are quite a few that are below acceptable standards. Constantine shares that a lot of Territorial Defense and Border Defense units did not dig positions or rehearse what to do when attacked by Russians. Defensive positions utilizing concrete bunkers cannot be built while under the threat of attack but excavators are often used within 3 km of the front even as some of them are now being damaged or destroyed. Even in the absence of an excavator, the personnel could have dug a limited amount of positions. For many units, this did not happen and some units retreated ahead of the advancing Russian troops. At Hlyboke they did have extensive defensive positions but they were abandoned without a fight.
One unit that did not retreat was the 227th Battalion of the 127th Brigade stationed near Zelene. It had a new commander that trained and rehearsed what to do in case the Russians attacked and prepared defensive positions as best they could. When the Russians did attack, the disruption of Ukrainian communications through jamming and solar disturbances meant that the 227th Battalion lost communication with the rest of the Ukrainian army for 2 days. Since the higher command didn’t hear from them, they assumed their unit was lost and the position along with it. When the battalion was able to reestablish communications, they reported that they repelled all the Russian attacks and inquired about the general situation.
While the 227th Battalion did its job, someone in their chain of command should have sent someone to their location to determine the status of that unit and its defenses. It’s another indication of how uneven the command quality is throughout the Ukrainian army. It is not an issue of quality soldiers, it is an issue of quality leadership. A unit with good leadership will create an effective team.
The fact that Russia made so little progress when so many Ukrainian units were not prepared also indicates how poor the Russian leadership is.
The previous Ukrainian commander in this sector - Yuriy Halushki - was on the job for a month when the Russians crossed the border. The poor performance of his command compelled Syrsky to replace him 72 hours after the attacks began. The new commander is Brigadier General Myhailo Drapaty. Drapaty’s first assignment was to stem the Russian advance in the Kherson area with ad hoc defenses, back in March-April 2022. Later the same year, his command eventually forced the Russians out of Kherson and conducted assaults across the river. He was promoted to vice chief of army staff and will retain that position while commanding the Kharkiv sector.
Much of the Russian attacks have decreased in intensity and the casualty rate reflects that. Russia holds the northern half of Vovchansk while Ukraine holds the southern part of the town, on the other side of the river. Russia destroyed some of the bridges in the area to complicate Ukrainian logistical efforts.
A Russian war blogger says that Russian losses are heavy and Ukraine flooded the skies with drones and has superiority with artillery. This may not be entirely true but it’s close enough to create an impression. The blogger is concerned about a Ukrainian counterattack…https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1792835039119454341
From Grozny to Vovchansk, the Russian army leaves its mark…https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1793919350442713567
Ukraine has a smaller OODA loop than Russia but the loop increased in size when Russian jamming, interfering with Ukraine’s ability to communicate and coordinate activities. In addition to the jamming, some of the measures to prevent Russia from using Starlink also interfered with Ukraine’s ability to use Starlink close to the border. In addition, the biggest geomagnetic storm in two decades also disrupted Starlink’s communications. Ukrainian personnel had to use text messaging to communicate and even that was slow. The jamming and interference also impacted the use of drones. After a few days, communications were restored. Ukraine has access to other satellite communication systems which would help with jamming issues, but they are not as widely available as Starlink…https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/24/technology/ukraine-russia-starlink.html?smid=url-share
Some of the Russians that tried to infiltrate Ukrainian border defenses through the woods a couple of weeks ago…https://x.com/albafella1/status/1793923610777641135
The 82nd Airmobile Brigade engages Russian troops while they were still on the northern side of the river…https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/124
A minute of the Russian Volunteer Corps fighting in the streets of Vovchansk…https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1794435660675186912
Spetsnaz troops approaching a Ukrainian position are engaged in the open by a National Guard drone unit…https://x.com/Wezyr12/status/1794305804172251638
Russian positions in the court house are bombed by the Ukrainian air force…https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1794335929945247801
Zelensky claims that there are 8 Russian casualties in the Kharkiv area to every Ukrainian casualty. I have no means to verify that but it’s plausible. According to Ukrainian reports, Russian casualties jumped from 900-1000 per day to 1300-1500 per day. If the entire reported increase is attributed to Kharkiv, that means Russia is suffering 300-600 casualties a day in that sector. If Zelensky’s ratio is correct, then Ukraine is suffering 37-75 casualties a day there. Keep in mind that Ukraine’s estimates of Russian casualties have been about 15% higher than past US and UK estimates of Russian casualties. By Ukraine’s count, Russian casualties have been trending down to 1100 the last couple of days…https://index.minfin.com.ua/en/russian-invading/casualties/
This is one of the fortifications being built. This is a month’s work for 4 people, or 2-3 days with three people and an excavator…https://x.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1792960337718743216
This is just one day’s casualties collected by Andrew Perpetua. These casualties are from all over Ukraine. There are a lot more Ukrainian casualties than normal. A lot of trucks were damaged or destroyed on both sides. Trucks are always worth a drone. There’s some Russian and Ukrainian boats damaged on the Dnieper river. There are two Ukrainian excavators, one located in the Avdiivka area. They were only damaged so the mechanics can retrieve and repair them. Then, if you look at the last entry, a Russian drone nailed a Ukrainian tree near Vesele, likely believing it was a Bohdana since many had been firing from that area. Fortunately, the tree was only damaged so the arborists can hopefully repair the tree and it can keep on fighting…https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1793395026543669412
Not graphic, but a horrible story of how the Russians shot an elderly couple, killing the grandmother in a wheelchair…https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1793891217802948836
Near Lyptsi, the 113th National Guard Brigade first confronted the Russians without any fortifications. The 92nd Brigade now has the primary defensive duties and works with captured Russian direct fire guns that fire Polish-made ammo and even French mortar rounds. They also have detection devices that warn them when a drone is in the air. With that warning, they seek cover and concealment and try to determine if it’s friend or foe. The video is here.
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Western Luhansk
Russian troops from the Kupiansk area are being moved to the Kharkiv sector. There were limited attacks along the front but Russia only gained territory by advancing into Berestove.
In Berestove, a Russian squad takes shelter in a house that is also used to store munitions…https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1794096046315889075
The Russian drop a bomb on Lyman, 15 km from the frontlines…https://x.com/MilitarySummary/status/1792211247544357138
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Siversk/Bilohorivka
The Russians once again claimed to have taken Bilohorivka. In fact, they lost 14 vehicles failing to do so. In addition to those 14 vehicles, the map shows previously unmarked vehicles that appeared on new high resolution satellite images. Andrew Perpetua says that five kilometers from the city are even more Russian vehicles that they will include once they acquire the imagery. (Tasking a satellite to take an image is very expensive. It’s cheaper to wait until someone else orders an image of an area and then just pay for a copy of that tasking).
A compilation of Russian vehicles destroyed in front of Bilohorivka…https://x.com/giK1893/status/1793600418242805918
2.5 km east of Bilohorivka, an immobilized turtle tank is finished off…https://x.com/giK1893/status/1793591069432746322
Russia bombs an apartment building in Siversk, 10 km behind the front lines…https://x.com/giK1893/status/1793224155258626182/video/1
They also hit Siversk with MLRS…https://x.com/clement_molin/status/1793993182826349039
A Russian uses a bow to shoot a grenade about as far he could throw it…https://t.me/iamsniper/5120
***
(…to be continued…)
"Zelensky claims that there are 8 Russian casualties in the Kharkiv area to every Ukrainian casualty" how realistic could that be?
Leadership, that is the big one. One of the weaknesses I really noticed was the UA NCO system and also some of the junior leader level training back in 2017. I can't speak for it now, hopefully they have continued to work on it because the desire to improve that area was certainly there. Removing guys who don't measure up is critical to military success. Maybe they can do great work somewhere else (staff, logistics, there is a huge list and lots of guys who can't lead in combat can lead in those jobs), but you have to have the guys who can make it happen in the battlefield in charge, ruffled feathers or not, political connections or not. History is full of guys who were not up to the task being left in command until too late. And units that missed the old saying "The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war". Training to dig a trench sucks, training reaction drills sucks, but it saves lives. Good leaders do it and tell the men to shut up and dig.