Don's Weekly, 27 January 2025: Part 4, (no end of) Ukrainian Leadership Issues

by Donald Hill & Tom Cooper

The focus on the failures of Ukraine’s leadership has to be kept in context of the entirety of the war. Russia’s economy is failing. Although the trend in this regards is undeniable, exactly when and how is that going to have direct impacts upon developments on the battlefield - is difficult, if not impossible to predict.

Ukraine’s strategic aerial bombardment is increasing in intensity and effectiveness and is causing significant damage. Russia’s strategic bombing is still doing damage but the intensity is diminishing. The Russians continue to gain territory but the scope and intensity of their ground attacks are reduced and they suffer extremely heavy losses in both men and equipment.

Russian leadership issues are so massive that they can only conduct “pulse” attacks, mini-waves of 3-20 men, or up to 40 for North Korean attacks. Sometimes these pulse waves are supported by vehicles, artillery, drones and bombs. But even when a Ukrainian defensive line has completely fallen apart, Russia is slow to exploit it and can only push through the gap at the speed of foot.

The worst of the Ukrainian leadership issues is still much better than the Russian leadership capabilities. Still, Russia has more people, so Ukraine needs to multiply its combat capabilities to not only equal, but exceed Russian capabilities.

Within this context, Ukraine does some things well and other things poorly. Cases where they do well should be replicated throughout the army - but, they are usually not. The failures should be acknowledged and corrected, either by changing practices or personnel - but, this is not done.

Nominally, that would be called accountability: accountability is a force multiplier that can save Ukrainian lives and increase the power of the Ukrainian military with the personnel and equipment they currently have.

Ukraine has taken some steps towards accountability - but still has a very, very long way to go in this regards.

***

On 10 May 2024, the Russian forces crossed the border at Kharkiv. There were reports that some defenses were unprepared or unoccupied. One battalion was able to hold out in their original positions for two days without any support or communications. The 125th Territorial Defense Brigade was reported to have abandoned its positions. With the help of reinforcements, the Russian advances were halted within two weeks and they have not made progress since then. On 15 May 2024, Brigadier General Yuriy Halushkin was relieved of his command of OTU Kharkiv (Operational Tactical Group Kharkiv), the next level of command above all the brigades and battalions in the area. General Drapatiy replaced him and he has since been promoted to commander of Ukraine’s ground forces.

Last week, Brigadier-General Halushkin was detained on suspicion of service negligence related to the failure of defense and the subsequent loss of territory in Kharkiv Oblast on 10 May 2024. He will be in custody for two months unless he posts a UAH 5 million (($118,000) bail.

Ukraine’s closest version of a corps is to assign a territorial sector to a headquarters and that headquarters will supposedly be in charge of all the units within that territory. This MilitaryLand map shows the light gray area that is the responsibility of Operational Tactical Group Kharkiv.

Above the battalion- and brigade-level, the next higher instance is the Operational Strategic Group - in this case the famous/notorious Khortytsia. In turn, the Khortytsia OSG is responsible for not just OTG Kharkiv, but for six other OTGs, too.

Operational Strategic Group Tavria extens from Odesa up to, but not including, Velyka Novosilka.

Lieutenant-General Arthur Horbenko, former commander of the 125th Territorial Defense Brigade, was also detained on suspicion of service negligence related to the failure of defense and the subsequent loss of territory in Kharkiv Oblast on 10 May, 2024. In an interview last July he explained that he had advance warning of the invasion but only had 6-8 people per kilometer and little heavy artillery or equipment. He says there were no breaches but there were retreats. The commander and ten staff members of OSUV “Khortytsia” (Operational Strategic Group “Khortytsia”, the level of command directly above OTG Kharkiv) were at his headquarters at the beginning of the Russian invasion. By 15 May, Horbenko was functionally relieved of his command. The front line units of the 125th Brigade were transferred to the 92nd Brigade and the investigation into his actions began. Ukraine says he failed to organize the defenses, did not effectively use his reserves, failed to coordinate with adjacent units and didn’t understand the battlefield situation.

At the time of the Russian onslaught on northern Kharkiv, the 415th Battalion of the 23rd Brigade was assigned to the 125th Brigade. Colonel Ilya Lapin was its commander: now he was detained for failing to organize the defense of settlements within the battalion’s area of responsibility during the Russian offensive in Kharkiv Oblast in 2024, neglecting to report developments to higher command, disobeying orders to reclaim lost positions, and voluntarily abandoning the battlefield. Ukraine added that he did not organize defenses, didn’t report the situation, didn’t stop the desertion of 12 soldiers, and ignored an order to retake lost positions. He faces ten years in prison if convicted.

Colonel Dmytro Ryumshin is the former commander of the 155th Mechanized Brigade. Ukraine accuses him of failing to fulfill assigned duties and neglecting to address misconduct within his unit. They said he didn’t send any reports about the thousands of deserters which meant that law enforcement could not initiate searches for them. They accuse him of not eliminating the causes and conditions that led to the desertions and that he has sent men to France for training who were not motivated to serve and eventually deserted in France. He is held responsible for negatively impacting the brigade’s performance leading to operational failures and tarnishing the reputation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He faces ten years in prison and there is a petition to detain him.

Inside the newly formed 156th Brigade, a communications chief of one of its infantry battalions was tried for the unsatisfactory condition of his official documentation, in particular, unfiled journals, as well as corrections and errors when filling them out. Senior Lieutenant Igor P. had the job from July-October of last year and said there were problems when he took the job and he tried but was unable to correct all of them. The court found him guilty and gave him a verbal warning.

***

Accountability is the core factor for functionality of any effective organization (and that regardless if military or civilian).

Success should be noted and replicated.

Failure should be analysed, understood and corrected by changing practices and/or personnel.

Accountability should also be fair.

This is also the essence of the message from Colonel Andrei Biletsky, CO 3rd Assault Brigade, which we’ve posted the last week (pay attention at the segment where Biletsky is explaining that he’s sometimes firing - even degrading in rank - officers that prove to be unaccountable):

A particularly nice thingy about accountability is that it’s simple: a soldier is responsible to his platoon commander, platoon commander to company commander, company commander to battalion commander, battalion commander to brigade commander, brigade commander to his superiors…

Everything is crystal clear.

…except it’s about the Ukrainian armed forces: when it comes to the ZSU, all of these crystal clear rules seem to be not the least valid.

For example:

• Halushkin was appointed commander of OTU Kharkiv in April 2024 (just one month before the Russian offensive toward Kharkiv began). Halushkin didn’t post himself to that position on his own: he was selected by his superiors - probably on recommendation from the GenStab-U, if not as a matter of personal preference of the Glavcom, General Syrsky. He was selected for this position because somebody above his level, one or more of his superiors, have considered him both fit and competent to do this job. If Halushkin was unfit and incompetent, then, how comes he was not, how comes this was not known, and what can be concluded about the qualifications of that (or those) superior officer/s who selected him for that position? Actually, combined with the well-known set of strict limitations regarding the ability of OTU-commanders to exercise effective command and control from their command positions - the very same limitations imposed by Syrsky upon all the other ZSU generals in similar positions - this is imposing a giant question mark over this entire affair. And over the qualifications of his superiors. First and foremost. If Halushkin’s superiors were as incompetent as to select an incompetent officer (Halushkin) for his new position, he had next to no chance of improving the effectiveness of units under his command.

• In a Facebook post since removed, the 125th Brigade defended Lieutenant-General Horbenko, their former commander, saying, ‘We were defending a huge swath of the border, we fought to the death in the first hours of the attack. We were short of people, ammunition and support but we fought, we fought under the leadership of our commander!’ Horbenko didn’t appoint himself to a higher position on his own: he was appointed there - by the GenStab-U and the Glavcom. If not only the troops he used to command, but also his superiors, have considered Horbenko for fit and qualified to occupy a higher position of command, then how comes he ‘suddenly turned incompetent’ - as soon as appointed to that higher position of command? How ‘competent’ must have been Horbenko’s superiors when they brought such a ‘wrong’ decision like appointing him to his new, higher position?

• Ryumshin was previously the commander of the 231st Battalion of the 128th Territorial Defense Brigade. While serving in that function, he was widely praised as ‘demanding, disciplined and experienced’, for ‘acting quickly and with good decisions that saved many lives of people he was leading’. ‘But’, and exactly like Halushkin and Horbenko, ‘as soon as appointed to a higher position’ - he turned incompetent…?

Indeed, when appointed to higher positions, all of these officers have promptly failed; they began neglecting their duties, and turned incompetent?

Sorry but, this is only imposing ever more questions. We’ve mentioned some above, but lets repeat them for emphasis: if these officers were incompetent, then how competent were those advancing them in rank and assigning them to their new positions? How competent were those keeping them in such important positions? And how competent were their superiors that were, obviously, ignoring Halushkin’s, Horbenko’s, and Ryumshin’s, supposed, incompetence - until it was too late?

Foremost: how do their superiors want to know that Halushkin, Horbenko, and Ryumshin were incompetent - considering the fact that the practice of accountability is not exercised by Syrsky & Buddies, first and foremost, and thus not in the mass of ZSU units?

***

Have no doubt: we do not know all too many details about these three officers. We only have access to a few reports. If the reports are accurate then Ukraine had advance indications of an imminent Russian attack. The 125th Brigade commander said he only had 6-8 people per kilometre. If true, did he report that? Did anyone send replacements to bring the units up to full strength? Did anyone inspect the front lines, which were quiet before the Russians crossed the border? Were additional drone and artillery units in place to support the front lines? Were the units that were brought in later as reinforcements in reserve status, rested and ready to react to any incursion in the sector? Or were they rushed from the front line in one location to the front line in another location? What was the battalion or brigade commander’s plan to fight the defensive engagement? In case of a need to withdraw, were the routes and timing planned, coordinated with adjacent units and rehearsed by the unit leadership?

There are a lot of questions that remain unanswered.

And that’s not the only such case. Do we have to remind everybody that in April 2024, the ponderously slow Russian advance from Avdiivka suddenly moved through Ocheretyne. A company commander from the 47th Brigade said that the 115th Brigade left its positions without permission. The 115th said that they passed the position on to another brigade (the 100th)… Thus, it’s a ‘statement vs statement’, but all have one thing in common: none is mentioning the actual instance responsible for coordination of this kind. The superior command node responsible for coordination between these three brigades.

What about Oleksandr Sak? He was an extremely successful battalion commander in the 93rd Brigade when given the command of the new 47th Brigade. He was fired in September 2023, but in November 2024 he was appointed commander of the 53rd Brigade. So, is he now a good commander, or a poor commander?

…or, could it be the Glavcom and the GenStab-U can’t even make up their own minds about how and why do they act?

Oleksandr Pavili was commander of the 112th Territorial Brigade, which successfully defended Hostomel and Irpin. He replaced Sak as commander of the 47th Brigade. A month later he was fired - because he was short of infantry and used artillery and other personnel as infantry replacements even though they had not been trained as infantry…?

While we’re at the 47th: Colonel Ryumshin was fondly remembered by his troops as a battalion commander and replaced Pavili as commander of the 47th Brigade. Syrsky praised the performance of the brigade on 2 March, but then fired Ryumshin on 10 March, with the explanation something like, ‘some brigade commanders were not in control of the situation and posed a threat to the lives of their soldiers’.

And yet, only two months later, in May, Ryumshin was appointed the commander of the 155th Brigade…?

Or, shall we go back further? How about the Antonovsky road and railroad bridges, how about the bridge over the Kakhovka dam that were all left completely intact for the Russians to capture and thus quickly cross the Dnipro River, back on 24-25 February 2022?

Were Halushkin, Horbenko, and Ryumishin in command at the time and place, too?

Or, what about the shortcomings of Ukraine’s constructed defensive positions - all well documented: what about the fact that there are no ‘investigations’, and even less so ‘reports’ - no accountability, not even any kind of acknowledgement of the problems?

Indeed, as recently as a month ago, Colonel Volodymyr Husar, a deputy chief engineer of the Ukrainian army, assured the public that there are no problems with defensive positions anywhere along the frontline. ‘Strangely enough’, he was neither arrested, nor is under investigation… Instead, though as meanwhile usual, we’ve all been left to wait until after some ‘commissions’ complete their ‘internal investigations’ - into a small number of some other, hand-picked cases. And, though as usual, we’re still waiting for the results of even such cases.

(While we’re at useless defence positions, how about yet another example? Brigadier General Oleksander Lutsenko was the commander of Operational Tactical Group Donetsk when Avdiivka and Vuhledar were lost. He didn’t create any defensive positions behind the cities. Lutsenko was also in command when the Russians punched through Ocheretyne and encircled a battalion at Prohres. He was in command of the poorly handled retreat from Vuledar. ‘Instead’ of being ‘arrested & investigated’, he was relieved of his command in December and was reassigned to a staff position: replaced by Brigadier-General Oleksander Tarnavsky, who led Operational Strategic Group Tavria until he was fired in July 2024…)

***

Lets face it: ‘periodic accountability’ is not enough. Ukraine - and the ZSU - need/s a system of permanent accountability. Otherwise, the country, its people, and its armed forces are getting exactly nothing. Not even when their troops are trained abroad. See the 152nd and the 155th Brigades. Sure, we only know what has been reported. However, what has been reported says that the personnel in the two newly-established brigades was constantly added and removed, that nearly everybody - especially officers - were inexperienced, and that parts of the brigades were committed piecemeal into combat while the two units were still in the process of being established.

Fact is: the officers in question did not appoint themselves in positions of command, but have been appointed by their superiors. In similar fashion, it was not the battalion- and brigade commanders of the 152nd and the 155th that were sending their semi- (if at all) trained sub-units piecemeal into combat at their own discretion: their superiors were doing that.

Therefore, the question is: how can one blame them for actions that were obviously ordered by their superiors?

…instead, the ZSU and the SBU are blaming - for example - Colonel Ryumshin, for ‘not eliminating the conditions that caused the widespread desertions’. He is being held responsible for, ‘negatively impacting the brigade’s performance leading to operational failures and tarnishing the reputation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’.

Aha.

And? Was he responsible for the nine months of chaos in which thousands of personnel were added and removed from his command by the general staff? This chaos was a contributor to over 1700 personnel deserting. How much responsibility does Ryumshin bear for that issue? Who is responsible for committing the partially trained troops to combat when Ryumshin was in France - or is somebody going to explain that he did so via Skype, Zoom, Webex or similar service?

Actually, we’re few weeks short of experiencing three years worth examples of battalions being detached from their brigades and how their performance suffers when they are not properly integrated with superior and adjacent units. ALL such decisions were taken by officers at significantly higher positions than that of Ryumshin. With other words: it is 1000% certain that officers above the level of the brigades in question have contributed to many of these issues.

However, the Glavcom and the GenStab-U want to make it ‘known’ and ‘sure’, it is Ryumshin and similar officers who are to blame. As if he’s introduced this practice, service-wide - in all of the ZSU, and that since (at least) February 2022 - and is maintaining it until this very day, even now he’s under arrest?

Man, in such case, Ryumshin (and others that were arrested) must be the head/s of some sort of ‘ZSU mafia’: an extra-legal-, super-secret-network of officers actually commanding (and actively sabotaging) the entire force…

OK. Fine. Though, if that’s the case, then the Glavcom and the GenStab-U must answer this question: how competent should we consider them, if they have permitted something as absurd to emerge within the ZSU?

***

Again: we don’t know all the details of the case and we may never know if he is actually reasonably responsible for the issues of the brigade. However, what we do know is making it certain: it was… ‘personnel’ (read: generals) outside of the brigade who contributed to many of these issues.

Eventually, it doesn’t matter who is responsible: far more important than punishment is to acknowledge and correct such issues.

Determining responsibility is one aspect of accountability. If someone was responsible for positive results, then recognition by the state and a promotion may be in order. Certainly, how he (or she) achieved his success should be shared within the army. But if someone is responsible for a detrimental result, then the lessons learned from that event should also be shared throughout the army. The individual consequences need to be considered in context of the severity of the failure and the likelihood of it happening again.

For example, in the above-mentioned case of a lieutenant who inherited a position where the records were already in disarray, was unable to re-organize them, and may or may not have contributed to further disorganization, it seems like a reassignment to a new position and a verbal warning would have been sufficient.

Fact is: in the ZSU, there is no practice of either critical analysis nor of permanent accountability. Indeed, the generals at the top are as stubbornly refusing any kind of critical analysis as they are refusing permanent accountability. As a result, they’re all the time GUESSING about what’s going on - on the battlefield, and in units subordinated to them.

Unsurprisingly, accountability is existent only haphazardly, and exercised at discretion of Syrsky & Buddies.

The result is a chaos that’s disabling stability and effectiveness, while hiding underlying issues.

….and all of these ‘arrests & investigations’ - are little else but a search for scapegoats.

***

Once again: an efficient army uses a system of systems. Accountability needs to be a part of that system.

Whatever the issue is, punishment for mistakes should not be the primary objective. Ukraine should focus on identifying successes and replicating them, identifying failures and correcting them, and removing leaders that have proven they are ineffective. Doing so will greatly enhance national survival.

The Chief of Staff of the Luhansk Military District, Serhiy Sobko, speaks on all these issues.

Butusov has his own opinions.