Don's Weekly, 26 August 2024: Part 2

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 1…)

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Kursk- Northern Sector

Because there was a limited number of Ukrainian units and logistical support, there was going to be a limit to Ukraine’s free-ranging exploitation phase after the breakthrough. The exploitation phase was also limited by an increasing number of Russian units that were able to establish some sort of a defense, and there were a number of Russian units that were surrounded at different locations. The surrounded Russian units need to be contained and eventually eliminated by Ukrainian units, which makes them unavailable to expand the perimeter. The isolated Russian units also interfere with Ukrainian supply routes that have to be routed around them.

Members of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigrade report they suffered “many” casualties 18 km south of the E38.

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Kursk- Eastern Sector

There are several surrounded Russian units in this area and a lot of Russian units pushing west to try and break them out. The battle lines aren’t solid, though, as Martynovka was encircled and 19 Russians were able to escape with some being wounded. Russian Spetsnaz units were also able to penetrate the front lines and ambush Ukrainian supply trucks. Ukraine assaulted Malaya Loknya with Marders and infantry and killed or captured all the defenders so they no longer block the supply route to the north.

Lancet strikes on Ukrainian vehicles and a bombing, and other destroyed Ukrainian vehicles.

Captured Russian tanks and trucks, including this T-90. Still images (no bodies) of Russian vehicles that were ambushed by the 82nd Brigade near Kruglen’koe and Kalinov.

Ukrainian units in the Donbass are rationing artillery ammo because so much of it is being diverted to Kursk.

Further north, the Russians are spending lots of efforts, equipment, and time to construct a new defence line. The new construction of defensive positions in Kursk consists mostly of trenches and anti-vehicular ditches, which are trenches that are too wide for a vehicle to cross.

A Russian report on the first week of the Kursk offensive in which a local official complains about the confusion, incompetence and lies in Russian leadership at both the federal and local level. For two years the local government fed the conscripts in the region, not the Ministry of Defense. Minefields consisted of warning signs but no mines. Conscripts were sent to the front with two magazines and told to hold out for a day. Ukrainian drones supposedly used drones two months ago for reconnaissance. Ukrainians advanced not on the main road, but on the back roads and trails that were unknown to most locals. Many conscripts were wandering around, abandoned by leaders, and the locals guided them to safety. He said the local leadership shouldn’t receive prison sentences but rather psychiatric treatment.

A confirming source on the false story of a Russian build up near Sumy in order to mask Ukraine’s own build up.

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Northern Kharkiv

In Vovchansk, the aggregate plant was bombed by Ukraine but no territory changed hands.

In Hlyboke, not only did the Russians almost push the Ukrainians out of the town, the Ukrainians lost 7 BTR-4’s trying to make it into the village.

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Western Luhansk

Russia assaulted from Pishchane and Andriivka but didn’t make any progress.

A portion of the 3rd Assault Brigade was moved to this sector because of the buildup of Russian troops and the intelligence that suggested they would make a push for Borova. Three weeks ago, the brigade conducted a spoiling attack to reduce the number of Russian troops to their front. It was revealed last week that they also conducted an attack 6 km to the south and pushed back the Russians to the Zherebets river, even though they were outnumbered 2.5:1. It should be noted that prior to the attack there was extensive planning and coordination with multiple elements, including tanks, artillery, mortars, aircraft, engineers and scouts. In other words, it was a combined arms operation, with each of those elements increasing the strength of the other elements. The attack relieved pressure on other sectors and reportedly cost the Russians 300 personnel and a fair amount of equipment. Their opposition wasn’t conscripts, either. They were the 237th Tank Regiment and the 24th Spetsnaz Brigade.

When we identify the shortcomings of some units it’s also important to acknowledge the competence of units like the 3rd Assault Brigade that developed the knowledge, discipline and procedures to be an effective fighting force. Because of their success and their publication of their success, their ranks are full of recruits and they have a healthy donor program, all of which contributes to further success. This attack had relatively modest goals of advancing two kilometers until the river was reached, but the thorough preparation and execution allowed them to thoroughly defeat a numerically superior enemy that was among the best the enemy had to offer. This type of operation should be the standard throughout the Ukrainian army.

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(….to be continued…)