Don's Weekly, 20 May 2024: Part 4

(…continued from Part 3…)

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Equipment

In the videos, there’s certainly been more Ukrainian artillery in the last two months than there was four months ago. Some Ukrainian units say they haven’t seen an increase but Zelensky says Ukraine has enough shells for the first time in two years. In reality, Ukraine should be receiving 2-3 times more ammo…https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/987406.html

Russia’s stored artillery is being depleted as time goes by…https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1791766173425488269

Australia is sending boats…

https://twitter.com/UkrReview/status/1790454633384529936

I don’t know why they don’t just blow the mine in place but I’m not an explosive ordinance demolition guy…https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/1791956172582552005

A three month old report based on data gained by hackers says that Russia paid $290,000 per single Shahed drone when they were bought in quantities of 2,000, and $193,000 per drone in quantities of 6,000. When Russia began domestic production of the drones the price dropped to $48,800 each. Russia produces them in molds and assembles them by hand. Russia paid about $1 billion in gold for the drones so far when an exchange of technology if often the norm. Lancet and Shahed drones have poor aerodynamics…https://www.twz.com/news-features/what-does-a-shahed-136-really-cost

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The Wild Hornets founder, Dmytro, talks about how the organization was started. One way to avoid jamming is to use AI to provide terminal guidance so command and video frequencies are no longer needed. This is being tested in combat conditions now and the final stage is to encrypt the programming so Russia cannot use it if a drone is recovered intact. He says this will be ready sometime during the summer. His next project will focus on operating a swarm of drones that would attack a single target.

China currently dominates the world drone industry and he is talking with several European companies that are interested in producing parts quickly, which will reduce a dependency on China. Chinese production is characterized by speed and low quality, while European production has a higher quality and much lower production rates. Price is also a factor.

A previous interview explained how the Wild Hornets work closely with military units who share their videos and provide feedback. They are currently working with 30 units. They produce 5,000 drones a month but units require more drones that can be produced so each unit is given an portion of the drones available. The units that show the highest proficiency are given the most drones, but they work with each unit to increase their capabilities. On more than one occasion, a unit didn’t have enough drones and this contributed to them losing a position and some personnel.

Production is simply a function of money. The more money they have, the more drones they can produce. Scaling up the size of the operation is not a problem. In the meantime, the Wild Hornets have teams that are continuing to refine the AI program and improve the performance of the drone. The video of the interview is here.

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Ukrainian Tactical Communications

A Ukrainian EW specialist said that Ukraine had a shortage of radios in the first year but that is no longer the case now, and the radios are encrypted. The army has to change the encryption key regularly and make sure that Russia doesn’t capture the keys. If a radio is captured, or if they are unsure about the status of a radio, all the radios on that network have to immediately change their encryption key. The radios do not frequency hop, which makes it easier to locate, intercept and jam transmissions.

Starlink is the primary data transmission network but they have other systems as back up, such as the Tooway satellite system. When buying radios, they avoided Chinese equipment for security reasons. Russia buys Chinese systems and the inferior components result in poor reception at times.

Theoretically, mobile phones are banned from the front line to prevent the Russians locating positions and intercepting communications. In reality, everyone puts their phones in the silent mode on the front lines and the further back they are, the more likely they are to use it. Everyone uses their phones by the time they are 5-7 km from the front. In fact, the platoon, company and battalion message groups that are formed are useful for soldiers to share their experiences and knowledge. The risk is if a soldier is killed or captured and his phone falls into the hands of the enemy, allowing them to read the messages, as well. The way to mitigate the risk is for the admin to remove a compromised member and to change the password daily. There have been attempts of unknown military personnel trying to join a group with the proper documentation, but when they didn’t know the right password required to join, they disappeared.

Different jammers work at the different frequencies used by navigation satellites, drones, radios and phones. These jammers are mounted on vehicles that have to operate far from the front lines because it is easy to spot them even 6 km from the front lines. Of these kinds of systems, Ukraine only has 30% of what they need.

A Russian Pole-21 jamming complex interfering with a GPS frequency in the Zaporizhzha region

Portable jammers are used in trenches and vehicles to defend against drones that come close. The government doesn’t create these types of devices and the number of civilian-made devices only meet a very small fraction of Ukraine’s needs. One reason there are so few civilian-made systems is because companies are worried about being accused of overcharging the government, or not making enough profit. Another reason is that most of the components needed are Chinese and it’s illegal to import them. Any use of jammers needs to be coordinated with Ukrainian drone operators because they will knock Ukrainian drones down, as well. That’s one of the problems that Russia has.

Another problem is the Russian reconnaissance drones that fly 50-80 km behind the front lines. If they are detected, then units in the area should freeze so they won’t be detected. If a vehicle is moving, it should keep moving, faster, and away from the front lines where a Lancet could come from. If the Russian recon drone is not detected, then a refueling truck will eventually lead to a fuel depot, or a military vehicle will lead to a military unit and a Russian missile will arrive soon after. (He confirms that a Patriot component was destroyed after stopping too long). The EW specialist proposes that drone detection devices be built for $100. Once it is known that a drone is in the area, actions can be taken to minimize the risk.

One small company does make a drone detection device called “Sugar”. Initially it was made with Chinese components but a new version uses components from other countries. It costs about $75 and there is a 3-4 month waiting list because only a thousand are made each month, although the production rate should increase in the future.

The Ukrainian government needs to establish policies regarding acquisition, production, sales and utilization of portable jammers. Russian electronic warfare is improving. They are producing more drones than Ukraine and drones are starting to fly day and night. At some point it is likely that Russia will be able to saturate the front with drones, meaning all the frequencies in a given territory will be used by drones, and Ukraine will need to have a way to counter them or suffer their attacks. The EW specialist has a solution for the issue that he doesn’t want to discuss…https://ain.ua/2024/05/15/flash-on-electronic-warfare/

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Periodic Attribution

Just a reminder that I draw on DeepState maps and use data from Andrew Perpetua. All other data sources are noted in the links.