Don's Weekly, 20 July 2026: Part 5 (Diplomacy & Equipment)

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 4…)

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A radio control link in Belarus aided a Russian drone strike. Either Belarus reactivated one or the Russians secretly activated one on their own.

Poland transferred 5 PAC-3 missiles to Ukraine with the understanding that if Poland is threatened they would receive 50 missiles within 24 hours. Poland’s Defense Minister addressed criticism by saying, “I prefer that our Patriots shoot down Russian missiles over Kyiv, not over Warsaw.”

Poland and Ukraine also resumed talks about the transfer of retired Polish MiG-29s but aviation maintenance and repair documentation, as well. Poland would receive drones in exchange.

Ukraine will receive Meteor air-to-air missiles with the Gripen jets. When asked if Ukraine would be able to use the missiles over Russian territory he replied, “Of course.” It’s stated range is 120 km and its estimated range is 200 km.

In light of Russia’s military reversals, the diplomatic momentum is increasing. The PURL program that provides money to Ukraine for purchasing US weapons and Turkey stayed out of the program in order to preserve its role as moderator. It will now contribute to the program and continue to supply military aid to Ukraine. France, Italy, Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia are the five NATO members that have yet to contribute to the program. Hungary and Czechia are closer to joining. Slovakia and Italy are not interested, and France, as usual, prefers supporting European programs over US weapons purchases. Germany, Norway and the Netherlands are the biggest contributors.

Turkey was removed from the F-35 program when it bought four S-400 systems in 2019. The US concern was that with an F-35 operating around an S-400, Russia would gain information about the plane over the years and be able to develop systems to defeat it. Trump recently gave verbal approval for Turkey to buy the F-35 and Turkey is in negotiations to sell the S-400s to the UAE. They would need Russia’s approval to transfer the equipment and a Russian source said they may get it but Putin has to make the decision. There is speculation that Russia may want Turkey to renew its gas deal with Russia as part of its approval but Ukraine attacked the gas compressor station that supported the pipeline to Turkey two weeks ago.

France will send 16 Rafale aircraft to Ukraine in 2028-2029, and allow Ukraine to build the Aster-30 missiles for SAMP/T air defense systems , AASM Hammer guided bombs and SCALP cruise missiles.

Bulgaria can no longer provide additional weapons to Ukraine but will help repair the equipment it sent.

Ukraine is asking Italy to produce the CAMM-ER surface-to-air missile in Ukraine. It has a 45 km range, a speed of Mach 3, and can operate against aircraft, helicopters and cruise missiles in all weather without continuous illumination from a ground radar.

After WW2, Japan created a self-defense force with limited offensive power, made it illegal to send military equipment to warring nations or allow the transfer of equipment it produced to be transferred to nations at war, and it purposely had a weak, decentralized intelligence capability. Given the changes in the geopolitical environment over the decades, it is now consulting with the US, Australia, Germany and other partners for advice on establishing a centralized intelligence agency. The increase of Russian spies in Japan and the amount of equipment and components shipped to Russia to support its military gave the government a sense of urgency. China’s increasing power was a primary motivation. Opposing politicians do not support the changes.

Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine committed to support the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB), which will be based in Canada. The purpose is to bolster the defense of allied nations by raising up to $134 billion in cheap financing for an alliance of middle power to combat the fracturing of the US-led world order with plans to be operational in 2027. Germany is uninterested. The UK was also not interested and was working on its own multilateral defense funding program with Poland, the Netherlands and Finland, but it says it is now working closely with Canada. The money would be a cheap source of loans for defense projects. The DSRB was first proposed in 2024 and the banks involved include JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, ING, RBC, BMO, CIBC, National Bank of Canada, Scotiabank and TD Bank.

After being repeatedly threatened by Trump, Canada is pushing for an alternative Middle Power alliance and disengaging with the US military industrial base. Elbridge Colby is a Department of Defense undersecretary that temporarily stopped a couple of aid shipments to Ukraine and believes that Europe should stand on its own and that the US should focus on China. He tries to make the argument that US bleeding edge technology cannot be surpassed and that there is no basis for a Middle Power alliance. Colby’s argument ignores Trump’s many verbal attacks on NATO countries and the US disengagement in Europe, and it ignores the value of mass inexpensive weapons that have been demonstrated in Ukraine and Iran. He does not recognize that Trump has permanently altered the relationship of the US with the world.

Last week, Trump posted an image on social media of a map that covers Venezuela, Canada and Greenland in a US flag. He also threatened to take back the Panamanian canal. A Canadian-born writer for the Atlantic said, “On this map, [Canadian prime minister and leader of the Liberal Party] Mark Carney would be the front-runner for the 2028 Democratic nomination and very likely next president of the United States.”

Two Russians were arrested by Serbian police on the Serbian-Hungarian border after being warned by friendly intelligence agencies and Germany. They planned to attack a factory in Bavaria.

Secretary of State Rubio said the US plans to systematically disable the International Criminal Court, which is something an administration with authoritarian tendencies would want to do if they repeatedly broke domestic and international laws, such as killing people on boats* without evidence in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean, starting an endless war and then trying to tax ships using international waters, preventing the delivery of oil to Cuba or abducting a world leader and then working with the rest of his government.
*For decades the US Coast Guard boarded suspected drug boats without killing anyone. 20% of the boats the boarded contained no drugs.

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Equipment

Piloted drones use one frequency to fly the machine and another frequency to send the camera view so the pilot knows where to fly the drone. These radio frequencies can be intercepted. A Ukrainian-Estonian company created software that uses the intercepted video signal and matches the images to a map to determine the location and route of the enemy drone as it flies.

The Flamingo missile had been using end-of-life aircraft engines but had produced the first ten purpose-built engines for testing in Ukraine.

Testing for the FP-9 is almost done and Fire Point expects to use the ballistic missile in Russia during the fall. It has an 855 km range and an 800 kg warhead. Before he was fired, Fedorov said that Ukraine tested a domestically developed ballistic missile, reduced the cost of the program by 30% and maximized its accuracy. He did not name the missile but said the program was within the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, which may indicate it was not a Fire Point missile. He could have been referring to the Sapsan missile that supposedly began serial production in 2025. Zelensky said they started using the Sapsan last December. It is supposed to have a 500 km range with a 500 kg warhead.

A cruiser, a corvette, a large anti-submarine ship, and a frigate were seen with radars designed to detect drones and EW systems to jam their radio connections.

After 4 years and $500 million, a plant in Texas that was built in 2024 still has not produced a single 155 mm shell when it was expected to build 30,000 a month. In total, all US facilities increased their production from 14k to 36k rounds a month but the plan was to produce 100k rounds per month by October 2025. The Texas facility bought equipment designed to build an older 155 mm round and believed it could adapt it to build the newer round with a longer range. Of the four US facilities, only one met the October 2025 goals. A report notes that the factory has joined a long list of US defense programs that have failed to meet the lofty goals set for them.

Another Review of Patriot and LIMA Defenses

If you’re interested in drones, missiles, and other weapons, Olena Kryzhanivska does an excellent job finding and summarizing the information. I’ve discussed some of these issues already but below are some times that were not covered. Here is the complete article.

In June and the two weeks of July, Russia fired as many ballistic missiles as it did in the previous three months. Most were aimed at Kyiv. On 11 July the ballistic missiles were equipped with shrapnel warheads, designed to kill people, not destroy buildings.

Ukraine’s interception rate of ballistic missiles has been declining: 37% in March, 14% in April, and 11% in May. In the first 12 days of July, 67 ballistic and anti-ship missiles were fired and the interception rate was 6%.

The number of ballistic missiles launched were 43 in March, 50 in April, 103 in May and 114 in June. Russia says the accuracy of the Iskander has a CEP of 5-30 meters but Ukraine says it is over 30 meters.

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence says Russia produces 60-65 Iskander missiles a month and about 100 ballistic and hypersonic missiles overall. Zelensky said Russia produces 120 ballistic missiles each month. Ukraine says Russia reached its production ceiling for all precision-guided missiles.

Russia has 36 Iskander launchers that carry two missiles each. They are not reloaded in the field and the stockpile of missiles is located hundreds of kilometers away. This limits each salvo to a maximum of 72 missiles, which slightly exceeds how many are produced each month.

To guarantee a hit, it takes 2-3 PAC-3 missiles to intercept one ballistic missile. To match Russia’s production with an interception rate of 2 PAC-3’s for every Iskander, Ukraine would require about 120 PAC-3 missiles a month or 1400 a year. The US is producing 600 a year with the goal to increase that to 2000 missiles a year by 2030.

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Here is a video that describes how LIMA deflects KABs and Iskanders.

It was designed in 2022 to interfere with the navigation of Russian missiles. Normal jamming prevents communication between the missile and a navigation satellite when within range of the jamming device but the missile can regain communications when it leaves the range of the jamming device. With LIMA, the weapon still might not be able to restore communications once it has been infected. LIMA impacts all missiles, guided bombs and drones. Special operating procedures were developed so LIMA doesn’t interfere with friendly drones.

Radio waves can be shaped, so LIMA can be directed to engage lower altitudes to defeat drones or aimed towards higher altitudes to defeat ballistic missiles. When a satellite signal is lost due to jamming, the error of internal mechanical navigation can be calculated. In order to protect a city, LIMA jams the drones far enough away so that the navigation error steers them clear of the city. The objective is not to destroy the incoming weapons but rather to cause them to miss their target and land in an unpopulated area.

Before a KAB is released, the aircraft’s navigation computer must confirm satellite reception, calculate the route, and verify the target. When the navigation receiver is suppressed by LIMA the pilot receives a failure warning and may not be able to release the bomb.

Jamming a navigation receiver takes less than a second. Spoofing can take 30-40 seconds because the actual signal has to be replaced with a fake signal slowly without alerting the system that the signal is fake. 61 Kinzhal missiles have been diverted. When the fake coordinates were accepted by the navigation system as real, some missiles maneuvered so quickly to follow the new heading that the gravitational force exceeded the structural limits of the missile and it broke apart.

Russia spent a lot of money with Chinese help to protect its weapons from LIMA with new antennas, primarily by increasing the number of elements in the CRPA antennas from 4 to 8, 12, 16 and even 32 now with two separate 16 element bandwidths. Ukraine says they already developed and tested a system that counters it.

LIMA Quant was developed to defeat those antennas three ways: It jams the navigation antenna, it bypasses the protection of advanced antennas, and it spoofs the navigation receiver with false signals to make the drone believe it’s somewhere else. That last method also loads a virus into the receiver that prevents it from operating even when it is no longer flying within range of LIMA.

LIMA can reliably protect an individual target. Protecting a city so a weapon’s internal navigation misses the entire city would require coverage of the surrounding regions with each signal from a system reinforcing the signals from other systems.

LIMA was first deployed in Kiliia and Izmail in Odesa. Attacks there were reduced after repeated failures to hit targets. It now covers 15-20% of Ukraine and coverage is expanding. A single system has a range of several dozen kilometers. Multiple coordinated systems extend the range to hundreds of kilometers. It is a highly automated system that requires little training. An individual system costs between $60-72,000, depending on the power of its amplifiers. It would cost $1 billion to protect all of Ukraine from drones and cruise missiles. It would cost an additional $800,000 to protect all of Ukraine from ballistic missiles because the systems would have to be directed towards high altitudes.

It was not clear if past LIMA systems became totally ineffective with Russian upgrades or if they could be upgraded as well. If they cannot be upgraded then if Ukraine spent $1.8 billion to cover their entire nation against all missiles and drones and Russia upgraded their antennas then Ukraine would need to spend another $1.8 billion to reestablish universal coverage.

An Opinion on Ukrainian Leadership

Tartarigami is a former Ukrainian officer who is now an analyst.

A few more expanded thoughts on the current situation. I’ll start from a distance and gradually move toward the center of the issue.

We live in an era where the battlefield evolves so rapidly that if you fall out of the information cycle for even 6–12 months, you’ll be shocked by how much has changed. New technologies emerge, geopolitical balances shift, financial situation changes, producing completely different battlefield dynamics. In such an environment, you need people who can not only adapt quickly, but also systematize those changes and, far more importantly, implement them.

Mykhailo Fedorov was one such minister. Within months, he helped introduce several adaptations that had a tangible impact on the battlefield. Unfortunately, this kind of talent is rare. Yet perhaps even more important than the practical results was the hope he brought to the troops. I hope that things can improve. I hope that change is possible. I hope that someone at the top understood that yesterday’s solutions would not solve tomorrow’s problems.

This hope was not baseless. It was actively helping shape the conditions for victory.

Now let’s zoom out from the Ministry of Defense and look at the broader picture.

Since 2023, I have consistently argued against promoting General Syrskyi to the position of Commander-in-Chief. Even back then, as commander of the Ground Forces and the Khortytsia operational grouping, he was displaying three major flaws that, in my view, outweighed his strengths.

The first was an unwavering top-down approach to command. In this system, even sergeants are not treated as independent tactical decision-makers but as instruments for enforcing the will of higher command. It is a model commonly associated with the worst traditions of the Russian military. Such systems tend to produce higher losses, lower morale, and an environment that can only be sustained through coercion and, in some cases, physical abuse. A brigade commander who refuses to impose such practices is seen as weak and is eventually replaced by someone more willing to enforce “iron discipline,” regardless of the human cost.

The second was the systematic construction of a network of loyal officers throughout the Armed Forces. Like many senior figures in politics or military institutions, Syrskyi built a power base. However, in this case, it reached unusually high levels. Officers whose loyalty was unquestioned advanced through the system, while individuals perceived as potential rivals or threats were marginalized. The story surrounding General Drapatyi is one example. Cases involving units such as Skelya, the 155th Brigade, and the Assault Troops under Man’ko further illustrate the consequences of such a system. When loyalty becomes the primary criterion, even poor decisions can be executed without meaningful opposition. And when problems emerge at lower levels, the mechanisms described in the first point ensure they rarely travel upward.

The third was a strong resistance to systemic change. This is largely an extension of the previous two points. Individuals who proposed new approaches, new structures, or new ways to break the operational deadlock were often viewed not as assets but as threats. A loyal network of officers can then create an environment where reformers are either pushed out, sidelined, or forced to leave on their own.

Unfortunately, it appears that Fedorov managed to irritate many entrenched interests. This likely included individuals within the Ministry of Defense involved in procurement, traditionally one of the most corruption-prone areas of government, as well as figures within the military command structure itself. After all, from their perspective, who is this civilian in his thirties to interfere in matters they consider exclusively military?

This brings us to the core issue.

General Syrskyi does not possess the formal authority to appoint or dismiss ministers. However, because of his loyalty to the Presidential Office, his extensive network of loyal officers, and his willingness to execute virtually any task assigned to him, his opinion carries significant weight. Apparently, together with other influential figures who are deeply uncomfortable with change, that weight proved greater than the benefits Fedorov had brought.

Ultimately, however, the decision belongs to the President. Whether to remove Fedorov, whether to retain Syrskyi, whether to continue along the current path, those are presidential decisions. Responsibility therefore rests with him.

And that brings us to a more uncomfortable point.

Despite the concentration of power created by wartime conditions, President Zelensky has often shown an ability to hear public opinion. He reacted to public pressure over NABU. He has, on multiple occasions, adjusted course when political pressure became too great to ignore.

Yet power has a tendency to influence even the most disciplined individuals. No one is entirely immune to it. Years of authority, especially authority exercised under extraordinary circumstances, can slowly distort one’s judgment and narrow the range of voices one is willing to hear.

I continue to support the President and believe he should remain in office in accordance with the Constitution. But I am increasingly concerned by the direction in which some decisions are pointing. It is a road that begins with good confidence in one’s own judgment, but can gradually evolve into something else entirely.

Two Opinions on the State of the War

Russian opposition analyst and economist Vyacheslav Shiryaev says that everything could be decided in July or August. If Ukraine methodically finishes off every refinery that Russia tries to restore then the system will simply cease to function.

There are a lot of small refineries, but if you combine all their capacity it would not equal even one large refinery, and Russia cannot import as much fuel as they need.

Russia’s only option is to rapidly increase the production of air defense systems and mobile fire groups, but Russian doesn’t have the capability to do that. The only thing that can stop Ukraine from achieving its goal is if they don’t have enough long-range drones.

No one should expect a popular uprising and they shouldn’t count on Putin agreeing to end the war. Ukraine should just focus on the destruction of Russia’s fuel production.

A shortage of diesel would be worse than a shortage of gasoline. Mining dump trucks, locomotives on non-electrified rail sections, ships, trucks and construction equipment all run on diesel. Components, goods and products will not be delivered. Industry will stop working. The state will be paralyzed.

The goal of these attacks isn’t to cost Russia money or raise the gas prices. The goal is paralysis of the economy, logistics, management and production systems. Without these things, Russia cannot fight. Ukraine has a strong negotiating position and Russia can either agree to peace or just lose the war.

Firepoint co-founder Shtilierman says that 80% of Russian oil exports pass through the Baltic and Black Seas, and Ukraine could shut down the exports in a single day by imposing a blockade on the ports with drones, but they won’t do that. He also says that it will take another year or 18 months to finish the war.