Don's Weekly, 20 January 2025: Ukrainian Leadership Issues

by Donald Hill

Ukrainian (mid- and low-ranking) military leaders and soldiers continue to demand for changes that will make them more effective and more likely to survive the war. These are basic-, common sense requests, and they will continue to make the requests until the changes are made. On this blog, we are determined to support this effort with all of our powers, and are going to continue to document the issues and the responses by senior leadership.

While we are documenting the issues, some of readers were unclear of the solutions that we were also listing. Therefore, in this report the solutions are all highlighted.

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Individual soldiers need to be trained to proficiency with basic combat skills and their specialty skills.

Every soldier needs to know how to fire a rifle and a machine gun and how to throw a grenade. They need to know how to move at the front line and behind the front line. They need to know how to create a two-man position with overhead cover and how to coordinate their fields of fire with the positions to their left and right so there are no gaps on the line and they help defend each other. They must understand how to function around drones and how to counter them. They must know how to conduct surveillance and how to report their observations and their status. They need to be able to provide basic medical care for themselves and others.

These are basic skills that every soldier needs to do, regardless of their speciality.

The reason is that no soldier can feel confident in his/her own capabilities without such skills.

While it is true that the crew of a tank will be primarily performing other tasks, there is a good chance that their vehicle will become disabled or destroyed at some point. At that moment, they are infantry, and they need to know how to move as infantry until they can make it to safety. Logistical troops may never drive all the way to the front line, but if their vehicle is disabled or destroyed by a drone then they need to know how to counter drones that may arrive to eliminate any survivors.

If they are assigned non-infantry roles then they need to become proficient in whatever task they are assigned, whether it is as a driver/mechanic, a sapper or an artilleryman. But the infantry is the core of any army. Having a basic understanding of how the infantry fights will help all other branches support them. It will also provide them with basic survival skills should they be pressed into service as infantry. In an effective army, this is occasionally needed in emergency situations. Unfortunately, a large part of the Ukrainian army does not operate systematically, but rather in a constant state of emergency.

Ukraine has been transferring air force personnel to the infantry since the spring of 2024. On January 11, Syrskyi ordered 5,000 air force personnel transferred to Ground Forces units. Zelensky ordered the air force to retain enough personnel to continue operations but many in the air force are concerned that staffing levels are now only at 50%. Not only are these transfers impacting air operations, they’re eliminating years of experience in specialties. Worst of all the transferred personnel are not receiving adequate training before being sent to the front as infantry. The same lack of training is also true for artillerymen, logistical personnel and others that were reclassified as infantrymen.

Pay attention: even the Russians are meanwhile complaining that their troops are being sent into the battle with only two-to-four weeks of training (if as much). But, the Ukrainian top political- and military leadership is ‘certain’, the ZSU troops can do with less?

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Ukraine needs a national training standard and a national replacement system.

Because any location in Ukraine can be attacked, the ZSU has to decentralize its training and make the locations difficult to detect. While this does compromise certain efficiencies, individual training standards can be met. These standards must be consistent at every location, whether within Ukraine or in an allied country, and a national training command must be involved in the oversight of each location to ensure the training is planned and executed according to the national standard even at allied locations.

The commander of the 108th Separate Battalion “Da Vinci Wolves” went one step further, saying, “The realities of modern warfare and bitter experience show that foreign training without adaptation to Ukrainian conditions and work within the unit is a waste of time and has terrible consequences. Our mechanics, drivers, tankers, artillerymen, grenade launchers and machine gunners should teach NATO how to use weapons, and all we need from partners is maintenance instructions.”

Once basic combat training skills have been taught, the soldiers should be sent to training in their specialties. The need for different specialties would be based on the reported losses from existing units. Indeed, rather than wait for the losses to be reported, the trends of losses should be analyzed so there is a small surplus of personnel in each specialty that can be immediately dispatched fully trained to a unit that suffered a loss.

Also strictly analysed should be what units are losing how many troops and equipment, to- and/or for what reasons: simply sending replacements without knowing the reasons is entirely pointless.

…however, currently, that is the ‘norm’ in the ZSU: because the practice of post-operational analysis is unknown within their ranks, generals at the top have no trace of clue why is what brigade losing people and equipment. At most, they can guess - all provided they care to do so. Most of the time, they do not even that: they are sending reinforcements, because there were losses.

That’s how it happens that ineptly-commanded brigades are becoming true ‘black holes’ in which people and equipment are constantly disappearing without a trace, while highly effective, combat proven units are not receiving any-, or only a bare minimum of replacements.

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New units should not be formed. Existing units should be fully manned with replacements.

As stated many times by many people, it makes no sense to continue establishing new units when existing units are not fully manned. This concept is so simple that it staggers the mind when trying to understand why it isn’t being followed. One reason given for forming brigades 151-160 is that allied nations would provide all the equipment and training. In fact, even before such units like the 152nd and the 155th Brigade were equipped, both were broken up and their troops and equipment sent to other existing brigades.

It very much sounds like the allied-trained brigades were an effort to leverage more equipment from the allies. There is no evidence that it was ever meant as a long-term path to sustainment.

In the public aftermath of the 155th Brigade, Zelensky suspended the formation of new brigades in order to send replacements to existing brigades. While replacements were reportedly sent to existing brigades, the formation of a new 156th Brigade continues, as does the formation of the 161st and 162nd Brigades - and that although ‘major issues’ in the establishment of the 156th Brigade have already been identified, too.

Conclusion is on hand: official statements about the suspension of the formation of new brigades is a lie, and the practice has not been discontinued.

While trained in Ukraine, the 152nd Brigade suffered some of the same issues as the 155th Brigade. Personnel was constantly assigned to the brigade and then removed to be used as replacements to other existing units. Its commander, deputy commander and chief-of-staff were all recruiting commissariats that lost their jobs when the positions were dissolved due to scandals. The chief-of-staff was verbally and physically abusive leading to the transfer or request for transfer of dozens of officers and other ranks. The deputy chief-of-staff says 30 personnel wanted to leave because of him, himself included. Appalling conduct such as this is not surprising since the new units are staffed with reserve officers, officers from non-combat units as well as officers who were ‘promoted’ because they did not perform well in their previous combat role - which is yet another, scandalous practice by both the Glavcom (Syrsky) and his Buddies (GenStab-U).

As for the chief-of-staff of the 152nd Brigade, a case was opened against him in September for "Abuse of power or authority by a military official."

Result?

In November he was promoted.

Meanwhile, one battalion was sent to the front first as an attachment to another brigade and then another was assigned to a sector as an independent battalion, without the support or leadership of a larger brigade. At that point, there were only four platoon leaders and no company commanders left in the battalion, so a 59-year-old Major from the staff was sent to lead the troops at the front. A few months from retirement, he was demoted from a higher staff position and was not capable of leading troops in the field. Upon arrival, they were immediately engaged by the enemy. Many died and the major did not return.

One soldier from the 152nd said that the mismanagement described is just a tip of the iceberg and he’s never heard anything complimentary about the 150-series brigades from other soldiers. His own 152nd is also viewed as “laughable” and “completely f****ed up”. As a member of the unit, such comments are a source of shame for him.

Characteristically, the soldier in question is not giving up: he also finds such comments as a source of hope because it means that the “nonsensical nightmare” that he’s lived through isn’t the norm but an extreme and one of the worst cases in the ZSU. He said other units are better, sometimes much better. He believes, “There's still a hope to withstand this war and preserve our country from absorption by an even worse state apparatus, wich would be not only corrupt, but also cannibalistic. I'm still eager to serve and do whatever I'm capable of, yet I'd be happy to find a way to be transferred to another unit.”

Conclusion is on hand: Ukrainian troops are eager to fight, they are eager to learn and to improve, eager to liberate their country. It’s the debilitating nature of the command system within the ZSU which is defeating them.

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New units should not be formed. Existing brigades with proven performance records should be expanded into divisions. The best units should be provided with the best equipment.

Even when battalions of new brigades are detached and attached to existing experienced brigades they perform poorly and suffer heavy casualties. They are a liability to themselves. When they retreat, they become a liability to adjacent experienced units and the experienced units suffer more casualties as a result.

Those personnel would be more useful if they were sent to an existing proficient unit and that proficient unit was expanded to a division. This has been done before. The Achilles and Magyar drone units were expanded from companies to battalions to regiments. The 33rd Separate Assault Battalion was just recently expanded to a regiment. And the 3rd Assault Brigade is already larger than a standard brigade.

Ukrainian soldiers are not Russian soldiers. The mass of desertions in the Ukrainian army is a result of soldiers recognizing a substandard situation that is likely to result in their injury or death. Units that are successful are much less likely to have deserters.

Success must be reinforced. Every sane military organisation is reinforcing success.

Under Syrsky & Buddies, success is at least ignored if not damned or even resulting in punishment.

The successful units should also be given the best equipment. They know how to best utilize and preserve the weapon systems, and better systems are combat multipliers that will increase their combat power. It makes no sense to provide inexperienced units with advanced equipment when the experienced units do not have that equipment yet.

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Battalions should not be detached from brigades. Units should remain intact.

Units that train together and fight together develop a cohesion that multiplies their combat power. Battalions that are detached from their original brigade and assigned to another brigade lose that cohesion and sometimes aren’t properly supported. Some detached battalions are kept as a separate battalion unattached to any unit. This also reduces unit cohesion and coordination.

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Corps should be based on the units assigned to them. Corps should not be assigned to a territory and populated by units in that territory.

Instead of reducing unit cohesion, Ukraine should build unit cohesion. One way to do that is to assign brigades to a division. Not only would the battalions within the brigades be coordinated, the brigades within a division would have better coordination.

Ukraine already stated that they won’t be forming divisions, but they did say they would form corps. They actually have corps now, but each corps is responsible for a section of the front and any units that are located in that section. This means that some corps are responsible for 60 units. That is the same as being responsible for no units. No ‘commander’ can keep track of the details of so many units: that is mentally and physically impossible. Commanders of so many units also cannot understand the terrain or enemy behavior in front of each unit. Under this format, all the units within a corps are essentially on their own.

Corps need to be limited to no more than five units. At that level their staff can process all the information that is needed to properly support their subordinate units.

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Individuals should be held accountable for both their successes and failures. Unit successes and failures should be accurately reported and studied to replicate the successes and eliminate the failures.

Armies need information. The information needs to be accurate, even if it’s bad news. The enemy wants to deny their opponent information. Denying your own army information is acting in the interest of the enemy.

Conclusion is obvious: lying in reporting should never be tolerated.

A lot can be learned from both successes and failures. One thing that might be learned is that a leader might be ineffective. Ineffective leaders need to be removed. The ‘norm’ in the ZSU is exactly the opposite: all too often, ineffective leaders are placed in positions of authority. Some are promoted. Others are assigned as commanders or staff in new units. These decisions weaken combat power and kill Ukrainian soldiers.

It is making absolutely no sense to act in the interest of the enemy and kill your own soldiers.

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Ukraine needs to stop treating every leadership challenge as an emergency and start establishing and operating systems.

The only reason you send individuals to fight without proper training is because of an emergency. The only reason why you detach an unit and rush it to a crisis point is because of an emergency. The only reason why you create ad hoc situations is because of an emergency.

Arguably, Ukraine - and thus the ZSU - is in the state of emergency at least since 24 February 2022. However, an effective army operates as a system of systems. Ukraine needs to stop the years-long emergency operations and start establishing systems.

Individuals need to be fully trained. They do not got to the front unless they are trained for the job they are sent to do. Platoons, companies and battalions need to be fully trained. They should not be given a three week training window and then moved back to the front if they are not fully trained. If they are not trained, they should not be sent to the front. Battalion and brigade staff should be fully trained. Period.

Proven organizational structures need to be utilized. Information should be accurately reported up, down and across these structures. Systematically.

There is no excuse for failing to address these shortcomings over these last three years. None. There has been plenty of time to fix these situations. Failure to do so has made the Ukrainian army less effective. Failure to do so cost Ukraine both territory and lives.

If a unit has a good leader then eventually all of his subordinate units will be good. There are several brigade and regimental commanders that have proven this. Right now, Zelensky is the supreme commander, Syrsky- and the job of his Buddies is to convert Zelensky’s political orders into military realities. If Zelensky becomes a good leader then eventually all of the units subordinate to him will be good, too; and versa vice: if Zelensky and his top commanders continue refusing to learn lessons and continue to refuse reforming the ZSU, then the units subordinated to them cannot improve, either.

Conclusion is on hand: Ukraine needs a better-trained and -organised army, and Zelensky, Syrsky & Buddies need to become far better leaders. Or they have to quit and let people take over who can do the job.