(…continued from Part 1…)
Kharkiv
There were no territorial changes. A Russian column moving towards Lyptsi was hit by artillery, destroying four and damaging one turtle tank. A second column was hit, destroying six vehicles and damaging four.
The Knights Hospitaller were formed in Jerusalem in 1113 with the mission of serving the sick and poor and protecting pilgrims traveling to Jerusalem. In 2014, an 18-year-old university student formed the Hopitallers Medical Battalion named after the Crusading organization. She was paralyzed in a car accident a year later but remains the commander of the unit and is a member of parliament. They have over 500 volunteers, a hundred of which are lacking equipment and are seeking five more ambulances and 50 more trucks and vans. They now try to acquire armored ambulances and trucks, as shown in the picture above, as they are regularly (and intentionally) targeted by Russian drones.
Last week, “Mike” was operating at a stabilization point, where Ukrainian medics drop off the wounded and the first level of medical care beyond first aid is administered. She had already evacuated several non-critical cases and was scheduled to go on leave the next day, but she stayed to wait for her colleagues in a second vehicle. A drone struck her evacuation vehicle and she never made it home.
***
Western Luhansk
There were nine assaults in a single day near Synkivka but they were all repelled. There were also attacks in the Pischane area, and Russia captured another field, but nothing else changed.
***
Siversk
The small advances on the southern flank over the last couple of months were discontinued the last week. There were nine airstrikes but no heavy artillery or rocket attacks reported, which is also unlike recent trends. This could be a lack of reports as opposed to a change in patterns.
***
Bakhmut
Russia continues to try and cross the canal at the northern end of Chasiv Yar but at some point the assaults and any Russian that made it across were all eliminated.
Ukrainians fighting in Chasiv Yar don’t feel any relief after two weeks of fighting in Kursk. The Russians were attacking just as hard and dropping up to ten bombs a day, but were unable to advance. If the Kursk fighting eventually creates a shortage of personnel for Russia, it may take a while before the shortage takes effect.
***
Toretsk
North of Toretsk, the Russians tried crossing the canal and failed, but Russia expanded its control of Niu York.
***
Pokrovsk-Avdiivka
Russia has found a winning formula in this sector and they intend to keep exploiting it. Before Ocheretyne the advance was characterized by waves grinding down the Ukrainian defenses and forcing them to pull back to better defenses. The Russian attacks were contained, if relentless, and the Ukrainian withdrawals were organized.

With the breakthrough at Ocheretyne the level of containment in the north is much lower. Russian attacks find gaps that weren’t covered, or were weakly covered, without any reserves to react to breakthroughs. Once a gap is discovered, however small, Russian troops move through it and outflank neighboring positions. This forces more withdrawals to new defensive lines that also have some gap or weakness that the Russians eventually find and the cycle is continued.
It is notable that these Russian advances are happening in just one portion of the battlefield. Despite pressures from its front and left flank, the 59th Brigade is holding firm at Pervomaiske and Nevelske. Despite massive frontal attacks pushing them back from Umanske, the 25th Brigade is still holding on to the edge of Yasnobrodivka, and that for 2 1/2 months now. The 47th holds on to their front in an organized manner but are constantly threatened by penetration to their north which forces them back on their left flank. Their position in the line has been taken over by the 68th Jaeger Brigade because the 47th has been shifted to the center of the Russian advance to try and slow it down, even if it cannot be stopped.
Where the penetration repeatedly shows up is in front of the 31st Brigade. We know from their own soldiers that there are issues with their leadership and it appears as if they cannot establish a legitimate defensive line with mutually supporting positions that can observe and fire on any avenue of approach that leads to their position. And when things start to go bad, they have no reserve force and seemingly no plan to react to enemy actions. Subordinate units had to plan their own breakthrough and withdrawal when gaps were penetrated and forward units were surrounded, and they needed the help of the 47th Brigade to save the men.
There are two other brigades in the area. The 151st (which we’re supporting with our latest collection) is in the vicinity of Vesele, near the leading edge of the Russian advance. Little has been heard about the details of their fighting. And there’s the 110th that was accused of being responsible for the breakthrough of Ocheretyne, a charge which it denies. They have maintained a controlled withdrawal under pressure on the northern flank of this advance. But for the last two months, the Russian advance has followed the 31st Brigade like a heat seeking missile.
This is not an effort to place the entire blame on the 31st. Even units that have controlled withdrawals aren’t maximizing the potential of their defensive positions. There are far too many examples of units that do not establish effective defensive positions, or require that their soldiers continually improve their fighting positions. There are units that are at 50% strength and yet new brigades are being created. There are ammunition shortages of anti-tank weapons and mortar ammo. And in the 31st brigade, the reaction of the battalion and company level officers and their men to save their trapped soldiers in the face of inaction of their brigade level officers is nothing less than heroic. But the 31st brigade’s shortcomings can all be traced back to two concepts: leadership and accountability.
You can tell which brigades have it and which do not based on their performances over the years. The brigades that are performing well have developed systems, procedures and a culture that is successful in this environment. The fact that not all brigades not established the same systems and procedures is a fault of the Ukrainian army’s senior leadership. For all the things that they do well, this is a failure and should be a higher priority. Simply doing the basics of combat better can increase the combat power of the army significantly.
***
Among the many issues, it doesn’t help that there is still, and for a year now, a shortage of mortar ammunition. One brigade commander located somewhere at a hotspot in the Donbass said he had only four mortar tubes for his entire brigade and can only fire ten rounds per tube per day. There should be six mortars per battalion, or 18 for a brigade, and they should each be able to fire a hundred rounds per day. Although they have a much shorter range than artillery, mortars are the unit’s personal artillery dedicated to their mission and should be able to respond to any threat in under a minute.
This video is from three weeks ago with Ukraine being pushed out of Vesele. 4 Ukrainians in a bunker are approached by a Russian, casually walking in the open, doing something with a piece of trash even though defensive positions are just ten meters away. From his point of view they are just mounds of dirt. He is surprised by a drone flying by but it ignores him and flies into the woods. At the same time, an out-of-view Bradley to the right engages him but he survives.
There’s a break in the video and when it resumes one end of the bunker is on fire. The four Ukrainians are still in the bunker with all the smoke because a DPICM round is expended to engage the Russians in the woods. Much of the submunitions land in the open and around the bunker but the Ukrainians inside are safe as another drone flies into the woods. By now, the bunker is burning well and thick smoke emerges from an opening. The Ukrainian soldiers huddle at the other entrance trying to stay low and breathe fresh air. Then a Bradley approaching from the left opens fire into the woods. It stops just past the bunker and the soldiers run out before the ramp is dropped, pulling on it so they can climb inside to safety. The Bradley continues to fire into the trees as it withdraws.
(….to be continued…)
With what is happening in Kursk it seems the Gen Stab U is playing rope a dope in the east. Not replacing losses I don't get. The Union army in the ACW operated the same: raising new regts instead of filling depleted, but experienced ones, and that didn't work too well either.
Thank you, Don.