Don's Weekly, 16 September 2024: Part 4

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 3…)

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Military Leadership

Leadership is a combat multiplier.

There are Russian reports from two different units in the Pokrovsk area. One claims to have digital communications, drones, EW assets and training, coordination between different units and a logistical support system. The other Russian unit equips their assault teams with maps, the only supplies that get are the three days worth that they carry on their backs and there are no vehicles to supply or provide fire support. They not only are without their own drone support, they are constantly attacked by Ukrainian drones. If these reports are accurate, Russia has a wide variety in the quality of their leadership, just like the Ukrainians do. It’s not that the better Russian units don’t suffer heavy casualties: it’s that they have the support units that multiply their combat power that might reduce their rate of loss and certainly cause more Ukrainian casualties as they fight.

It turns out that some Russian commanders deliberately dismantle their support units if someone in those units angers them. The leader of a Russian drone unit in the Pokrosk area posted a video about how his unit fell into disfavor with his commander and was disbanded, and that this was likely his last video since they were being sent into an assault as infantry. After his death, multiple reports were posted about other drone units that were disbanded after their unit commanders became angry with them. Some units had drone operators, production and repair shops, intel analysts, communications centers and EW assets. They were reassigned as mechanics and radio operators, but most often as infantry. As a result of these units being disbanded, there is less information about Ukrainian activity and fewer drones to spot for artillery.

This behavior is not completely unknown in the Ukrainian army. The 59th Motorized Brigade has been a relatively quiet, effective unit. It was well-trained, disciplined and effective. One symptom of its effectiveness is that its soldiers had shovels and were expected to use them to continually improve their defensive positions. When soldiers from the 59th were temporarily replaced by soldiers from another unit and then returned to their position, they found that the other unit did nothing to improve the position and just sat around and smoked. Accountability, or lack of it, is a direct result of leadership. The 59th had an excellent brigade commander who only tolerated effective subordinate leaders. These subordinate leaders, in turn, expected their own subordinate leaders to be effective. And so the entire chain of accountability was extended to the lowest ranking soldier.

The brigade commander was recognized for his capabilities and he was promoted in April to fill a need at a higher level. His replacement did not have the same success.

The new brigade commander was young but still had capable subordinates, so he could have leaned on them. That was not the choice he made.

The commander of Chosen Company, a foreign volunteer unit that was assigned to the 59th Brigade for over a year and a half, said that the new commander consistently issued orders that resulted in the needless deaths of men under his command. Units are constantly short of replacements. One specific practice mentioned is that the new brigade commander would order officers, NCOs and soldiers trained in intelligence, logistics and tanks to be used as replacements for infantry units, even though they had no training as infantry. Without that training, they didn’t know what to do and when ordered to assault, a lot of them died.

Months ago, a new commander of the 47th Brigade ordered his artillerymen to be used as infantry since they were short on artillery ammo. If I recall, 17 of them were killed. He was soon replaced for that and other reasons before he destroyed the brigade.

When a new commander arrives and starts to destroy an effective unit, the subordinate leaders and soldiers notice right away. Under the best of circumstances, their lives are at risk every day, so they are highly attuned to risk and notice an increase right away. Increased risks because of enemy action has to be tolerated and mitigated as much as possible. Increased risk due to incompetence does not have to be accepted. So the subordinate leaders and staff will speak up, trying to fight for the effectiveness of the unit and the lives of their soldiers. If the new commander values his ego over the lives of his troops, there will be conflicts.

One intelligence officer had such a conflict and requested a transfer to another unit. Instead, he was sent to an infantry unit even though he was trained to use HIMARS and had never been in the infantry. When that unit was ordered to conduct an assault, he was killed. A second soldier untrained in infantry was sent to an infantry unit as retribution and also died. Now the entire brigade is afraid to speak up for fear they will be ordered to conduct a suicide mission, an ill-advised attack without proper planning or support.

It didn’t stop there.

The 59th had held its ground for two years while never being pushed back by more than 5 km in that timespan. That averages to 200 meters a month and a lot of Russian casualties, which is an excellent performance. In mid-April, shortly after the new commander took over, the Russians began to make progress in Krasnohorivka, which was defended by the 59th Brigade. By early August, Russia had control over most of the town. In addition, Ukrainian forces to the north were being pushed back, and the 59th was threatened with being cut off and encircled. So the brigade made the reasonable decision to pull back a little and reduce the chances of encirclement.

Only that wasn’t the brigade commander’s decision. His decision was for the unit to stand in place, even if it meant their destruction. His battalion commanders disagreed and withdrew on their own, saving hundreds from death or captivity. So they were fired.

The 31st Brigade was recently in that same situation with troops surrounded and no orders or coordination from the brigade, so the battalion commanders coordinated a rescue with the 47th Brigade and pulled their troops out. That seems to have been a case of incompetence. This commander of the 59th combines incompetence with his ego and the results are deadly.

Troops of the 31st Brigade.

The commander’s name is Bohdan Shevchuk. The contempt for him among his subordinates is widespread. On July 2, military correspondent Yury Butusov wrote that Shevchuk was young, energetic and would make a capable company or perhaps battalion commander, but doesn’t have the experience to command a brigade and that nepotism was a factor in his promotion. Kateryna Polishchuk was a medic that was captured at Azovstal and exchanged in May 2022, and she joined the 59th Brigade soon after her release. She left the unit in June, just three months after Shevchuk’s arrival. She addressed Zelensky on facebook asking for the investigation and removal of Shevchuck. A lieutenant with the call sign “Alex” agreed with Polishchuk, saying the brigade commander transferred almost all the brigade’s intelligence personnel and others to the front line. As a result of these transfers to the infantry, the head of intelligence, the commander of a battalion artillery unit and the top NCO of the intelligence unit were killed. The next day, Syrsky ordered the inspection of the 59th Brigade due to the unit’s recent losses.

Investigations have happened before. On June 23, a senior officer in the Azov brigade filed an official complaint calling for an investigation of the Commander of the Joint Forces, Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol, based on his conduct since 2022. The next day, Sodol was fired.

The senior leadership already knew Sodol’s problems because of complaints published on social media a month earlier during the Kharkiv offensive. These complaints generated thousands of supporting posts of outrage. Even when complaints are valid, conducting your business in the public is a danger to public and unit morale. It also doesn’t lend itself to calm, rational judgment. Sodol was associated with some successes, such as the defense of Vuhledar and also some failures, such as Krynky. Calm assessments are more useful than emotional discussions.

An officer serving with the 59th for two years, Sergei Tsekhotsky, disagreed with “Alex” and Polishchuk, saying Polishchuk was not a member of the brigade but served as a volunteer and could not evaluate the commander. He says that Shevchuk doesn’t just sit at the headquarters but he travels to the units and that it’s bad for morale to talk about the problems in public. He talked about the extensive Russian casualties. The investigation, though, will focus on Ukraine’s casualties.

Igor Lutsenko is a former member of parliament and current member of the Ukrainian army. He says that the issue of commander competence is widespread and needs to be talked about openly. The only system of accountability that exists now is when a higher level commander assesses a lower level commander. There are no protection mechanisms in place for anonymous reporting independent entities that can interview personnel. The Military Law Enforcement Service (VSP) was transferred into a military police unit with reduced powers. 90% of complaints are ignored, investigators are denied access to units and there isn’t enough personnel to conduct thorough pre-trial investigations. With no other effective system in place, social media is then best option for most service personnel.

Following orders is vital for military discipline. Accountability for both soldiers and commanders is important. There has to be a balance between those two factors. But ultimately, as always, it comes down to leadership. Commanders should be aware of these problems before they are reported on social media. Their communication shouldn’t be limited to their immediate subordinates, they should be knowledgeable about the command environment two levels below them.

That said, the Ukrainian army is still suffering from the legacy of the Soviet army. One of the greatest resources in western armies is the NCO corps. Distributed leadership is a combat multiplier and it’s more than just having leadership at the squad level. The platoon sergeant looks after the welfare of the soldiers in the platoon with logistics and other matters and takes command of the platoon if the platoon leader is incapacitated, and the inexperienced lieutenant would do well to listen to platoon sergeant’s advice. The first sergeant works on logistical efforts with the company executive officer and should be aware of each of the soldiers in the company. The sergeant major is the battalion commander’s eyes and ears throughout his unit and is in constant communication with the NCO’s and soldiers. If there are issues at a company, he lets the battalion commander know. The same is true for the sergeant major of the brigade and every level of command. They are a parallel system of communication and an essential extension of a commander’s awareness.

It is difficult to establish a new culture and new procedures in the middle of a war but ultimately the political and top military leadership is accountable for the performance of their subordinates. They have to find something that works: that process always starts by being aware of a problem before it grows.