Don's Weekly, 12 August 2024: Part 2

by Donald Hill

(…continued from Part 1…)

***

Northern Kharkiv

There were no changes in Hlyboke but a significant shift in Vovchansk. Earlier in the week Russia attacked on the eastern side of the city but: the mass of assailants was eliminated. On the western side, Ukraine was crossing into Russian territory last week but couldn’t hold the terrain. This week they were able to advance 250-800 meters. It is not known whether that is a result of a Russian withdrawal or collapse but they said they were shifting to defensive operations here. Ukraine said that there were about 40 Russians at the plant and their numbers continue to decrease. It is very difficult to fly enough water by drone to that many people, let alone food and ammo, so they are on the clock now.

***

Western Luhansk

The only place where territory changed hands was around Pischane, where Russia advanced 2-4 kilometers in some areas.

The 3rd Assault Brigade just keeps being the 3rd Assault Brigade with its usual, deadly drone attacks.

***

Siversk

Rather than compile a week’s worth of bombardment in this sector, I’ll just tell you it was heavy and post a screenshot of Andrew Perpetua’s map showing just one day’s worth of MRL shelling. Siversk was also hit by a lot of rockets on another day and 17 airstrikes were recorded during the week. Russia also advanced up to 1300 meters towards Kuzmynivka.

***

Bakhmut

The Russians spent this week shelling, bombing, and rocketing Chasiv Yar.

From Andrew Perpetua’s map, one day in Chasiv Yar as it undergoes a massive airstrike

36 bombs landed on Chasiv Yar in a very short time.

Ukrainian infantry under indirect fire pulling back from the edge of the canal as a Russian drone observes them. This also gives you a good view of the terrain that is manned by very few people. This is the location where Russia has been trying to cross the canal (see map). After the artillery fire, Russia sent a BMP across with 8 infantry dismounts. EW jamming prevented many of Ukraine’s drones from functioning but one eventually knocked out the BMP. Ukrainian infantry closed in to hunt the Russian infantry but they only killed five before another BMP arrived with more infantry and, again, Ukrainian drone activity was hampered by jamming. Several squads were dropped off and Ukrainian mortars pinned them down and caused some casualties while Ukrainian infantry kept them from expanding out of their pocket. Eventually, the flow of reinforcements stopped and the Russian infantry on the west side of the canal was wiped out.

The Economist says: A commander of the 24th brigade, recently transferred from Niu-York to Chasiv Yar, two of the hottest sections of the front, says battalions in his brigade are now fighting with just “20 people in position, less than a platoon size.” He “says his brigade, which mostly uses now rare Soviet-produced weapons, has been rationed to two to six shells over eight guns per day. The result is about 15 casualties for every fighting day in the brigade. ‘It’s madness. We are fighting with cooks, electricians and mechanics.’”

***

Toretsk

The last of the pre-2022 defenses, which were held for almost a decade, fell when Ukraine withdrew from the positions east of Niu York. Russia made games west of Niu York, as well, and advanced through Pivnichne despite local Ukrainian counter attacks.

Ukrainian troops cleared houses on the western side of Pivnichne. The 8th SSO Regiment is also reported to be in Pivnichne using scoped rifles and .50 caliber machine guns to support their assaults.

The 3rd SSO - the unit for which we’ve collected to buy a Shark UAV system, earlier this year - is also in the Toretsk sector. Their snipers killed 5 and wounded two Russians that approached their position in one engagement.

Russia plants a flag at a schoolhouse in Niu York, 500 m further than they were last week. The next day, it was replaced by a Ukrainian flag.

The 24th is the oldest brigade in the Ukrainian army. They had been guarding the last sector on the Donbass that still had trenches dating from before 2022. A senior sergeant with the brigade said, “The trenches were deep, the dugouts were well organized, the control posts were good and everything was working. We understood the enemy and understood their movements and how to react.”

In May, they were told they were moving to Chasiv Yar and replacing the 41st Brigade, which surrendered a lot of territory in a small amount of time. The 41st, in turn, would move into the positions that the 24th had been guarding without losing a single meter. Because the front line hadn’t moved, it was considered a quiet sector. But soldiers in the 24th had been monitoring Russian movements on the front line and behind it and warned their senior commanders that a Russian attack was coming. It was a bad time to rotate brigades.

Units rotate personnel all the time. After some days on the front, personnel are moved to the rear and new personnel take their place. On a static front, both sets of personnel had been in the same positions many times and were familiar with the terrain. Still, Russian activity and indicators have to be tracked and compared to past actions. The 24th had the history and experience to know what to look for, to understand what it meant, and to know what they had to do to counter it.

Despite the warnings, the two units began to change places over several weeks, finishing in mid-June. Two days later, the Russians attacked. “It was a big mistake that we were taken from there,” said the sergeant from the 24th.

Members of the 41st said they didn’t know the terrain. Both soldiers from the 41st and a National Guard battalion assigned to them said the commanders didn’t recognize the threat that was developing and issued unclear orders. “There were losses in the battalion due to the senseless orders of the senior commander.”

The deputy commander of that National Guard battalion blamed the commanders of both the 41st and the senior commanders of the Ukrainian army, saying they do not, cannot, accurately assess the capabilities of their units, either in terms of personnel or equipment, and then give them orders that cannot hope to achieve. He writes, “And the commanders who voice these things, instead of stupidly trumping - are ostracized, ridiculed as weaklings and snots. As a result of such short-sightedness/stupidity/criminal negligence, fantastic tasks are not completed, people die, fall out of control, and when appetites decrease and it comes to realistic tasks, no one can complete them. And domino farts further.”

The 41st is no longer in charge of operations in the Torestk sector. A deputy commander of a regiment in the Liut National Police Brigade is hoping that the Russians will soon expend themselves but Ukraine will have to hold on until then.

The 41st refused an interview but released a statement saying it was “outraged by this incomprehensible and strange campaign to discredit the command of our unit and our fighters.” Many of the criticisms came from the soldiers of the 41st.

Ukraine’s General Staff said it, “always takes into account a reasonable initiative and suggestions of field commanders,” but commanders who, “do not manage units and, as a result, lose subordinate personnel, equipment and territories must bear responsibility for it after establishing the degree of their guilt.”

That is an accurate statement, and the General Staff is responsible for the management of the 41st Brigade.

(…to be continued…)