Confirmation for Assad-Regime providing the IRGC with ‘carte blanche’ in Syria

That the Assad-Regime is suffering from massive manpower shortages is nothing new since years; that its ‘Syrian Arab Army’ is de-facto…

That the Assad-Regime is suffering from massive manpower shortages is nothing new since years; that its ‘Syrian Arab Army’ is de-facto non-existing and had to be replaced by a large-scale deployment of IRGC-operated groups of Iraqi, Lebanese, Afghan, and other Shi’a Jihadists — ditto.

At least in theory, it should also be no news that in his struggle for survival, Assad not only provided the IRGC, but Russians too, with a ‘carte blanche’ to do what they deem necessary for his survival. ‘In theory’, because so far there was very little firm, undisputable evidence in this regards.

This changed lately due to the publishing of copies of a document clearly confirming how far is the Assad-Regime ready to go in regards of letting the IRGC organize and run its Shi’a militias in Syria.

Released in form of the article Administrative Decisions on Local Defence Forces Personnel: Translation & Analysis by Aymen Jawad at-Taimimi, the paper in question is explicitly citing orders to, ‘organize the forces working with the Iranian side’, and ‘not to obstruct or detail personnel working with the Iranian side’ — as long as these are carrying ID-cards of so-called ‘Local Defence Forces’.

This is pointing at another important fact in this conflict: namely, that in the nomenclature of the Assad-Regime, the IRGC-established and commanded Syrian Shi’a militias are officially designated the ‘Local Defence Forces’.

Sadly, and as so often in the past, Taimimi fails to recognize the importance of the document he has received. He not only fails to put together a coherent story, connect the dots and explain the facts: he’s circling around the actual topic like a cat around a mug of hot milk. He also fails to understand the sheer brutality of the Assad-Regime and instead ventures into ‘loud thinking’:

…As a result, there has been widespread evasion of compulsory and reserve service, along with desertion from the army ranks. Fear of arrest for these offences would also prevent many people from venturing too far beyond their hometown or area, on account of the risk of encountering a security checkpoint that might have their names on a wanted list.

Instead, militias may be seen as offering a better alternative, as the salaries are often higher than those of army conscripts.

Actually, the principle is simple: by scattering whatever was left of its armed forces as of 2012 to man about 2,000 checkpoints around the country, the regime lost the control over large segments of the ex-SAA. There is simply nobody who can maintain control over the ensuing chaos. Correspondingly, fragments of units lost the touch with their superior commanders, and even if they did not, Damascus is so short on money, it pays next to nothing to a force considered ‘disloyal’ already since the start of the Syrian Civil War. Poorly armed and supplied, unable to support their families, and not keen to fight for Assad-Regime, many of SAA’s officers and other ranks are defecting. In this fashion, they are criminalized. ‘But then’, there come the ‘saviours’ from some militia, offer them amnesty, and the Assad-Regime then expects the defectors to consider themselves ‘lucky’: they were not only ‘saved’, but are now ‘in debt’ with ‘merciful government’ that gave their lives a new sense.

Sadly, Taimimi fails to understand this principle, as much as he does fails to draw a number of logical — and important — conclusions about the very purpose of famed ‘National Defence Forces’ (NDF) and the ‘Local Defence Forces’ (LDF), namely: the formalisation of all the possible of militias, armed gangs and private military companies established over the time.

It is for this reason that he is surprised to find out the LDF ‘exists beyond Aleppo’: for somebody in his position this should be nothing new since years, simply because it is a well-known practice of the Assad-Regime to call that way any of IRGC’s local surrogates, as and when necessary. Indeed, in some cases the situation is de-facto absurd: what Taimimi calls the ‘LDF of Mhrada’ for example, is calling itself ‘Mhrada NDF’.

Overall, Taimimi’s piece is informative in regards of existence of few of armed groups in question. But, his narrative and failures to understand the nature of the regime, connect the dots regarding its way of cooperating with the IRGC (and indeed: the IRGC’s methods of operations in Syria), and the purpose of the NDF/LDF legend, is severely smudging the picture.

Actually, the paper he obtained is even more important in the light of reports about Russians apparently running similar efforts like the IRGC. Accordingly, a Russian delegation allegedly arrived in Suweida (southern Syria) — an area predominantly populated by the Druze — and proposed the creation of a local militia. By side the fact that if the Russians did so, they are obviously poorly informed, then there are several local militias existing there: these are ‘just’ refusing to fight for the Assad-Regime.

More important is the fact that, if such reports are true, the Russians are trying to recruit some of these to fight on their side, i.e. for Assad — i.e. that Moscow is now trying to do the same the IRGC is doing in Syria already since 2012.

…but also that,

a) combined, the documents obtained by Taimimi, and reports about this Russian effort in Suwaida, are confirming other reports about the IRGC and the Russians doing whatever is possible to recruit additional combatants for the Assad-Regime, and

b) Assad-Regime is regularly issuing orders to its own officers to let the IRGC and the Russians do whatever they want to do in regime-controlled parts of Syria.

But foremost, this is a definite confirmation that the Assad-Regime is pursuing the policy — i.e. as desperate as to pursue the policy — of letting the IRGC do whatever it wants to do in parts of Syria that are nominally ‘regime controlled’. I.e. the regime actually has no say at its own home turf: even at the time it’s so short on troops like never before, it must let the IRGC recruit and establish militias as it likes.