Can They or Can’t They (or: They Could, but They Aren’t Going To)

You’re welcome, and yes, ‘it’s actually me’. Also, no problem to reply — if there is sense in doing so (and as long as I find time).

You’re welcome, and yes, ‘it’s actually me’. Also, no problem to reply — if there is sense in doing so (and as long as I find time).

As usually in such cases, what the Iranian Minister of Defence is claiming, is what he has to and needs to claim (which is that the Iranian defence sector is making giant leaps forward, that the Army is going to get the Karrar tank instead of Russian T-90s, and - generally — that the life in the IRI just couldn’t get any better). The reality is an entirely different pair of shoes — and this is so not only in the IRI or the USA, but everywhere else on this spaceship (named ‘Earth’).

From my POV, yes, there is little doubt that the Iranian defence sector (at least their Defence Industries Organization) could — yes, ‘under ideal circumstances’ — make ‘a tank like the Karrar’: they have the know-how and means to research and develop all the necessary pieces (from thermal-imaging systems to the last bolt and screw), and they have the facilities to build them. The IRGC and the DIO have not only one but three factories with proven ability to overhaul, upgrade and even manufacture new tanks. The Iranian Electronic Industries has several factories capable of producing necessary electronics, while companies run by the Resources Development Organization (say, such like the Esfahan Negin Steel Plant, Fajr in Tehran and others) can deliver — at least according to Dehghan — between 70% and 80% of necessary metals and other materials (including all sorts of composites).

Arguably, they might not have all the necessary testing facilities; arguably, they would also experience significant problems in terms of organization of such an enterprise, then each of factories is run by a different clique and this would pocket plenty of bribes etc., and there is a chronical lack of industrial-management-skills in the country, etc. But, the necessary know-how and manufacturing capabilities are there, and there’s no doubt about this. Therefore (and again: under ideal circumstances), these companies are in perfect position to design and manufacture everything to make a Karrar a tank of the kind presented by Maj-Gen Dehghan: advanced composite armour, all the necessary electronics, a suitable gun, etc., etc., etc.

From that standpoint, sorry, but it’s actually irrelevant what of this might appear ‘dubious’ to us or not: 30, 20, 15 years ago, sometimes even today, there was (i.e. still is) an entire host of experts ready to bet (at least) their annual income that Iranians can’t maintain and operate their F-14 Tomcats (if nothing else then that the Iranians couldn’t afford doing this). And still; the F-14 not only proved its mettle in the war with Iraq, but remains the backbone of the IRIAF’s interceptor fleet.

If nothing else, in a sort of ‘worst case scenario’ (say: in cases of specific pieces of equipment that would cost too much to manufacture at home), the Iranians would place corresponding orders abroad (like they did all the time — and without the least kind of problems — even at the times of most stringent embargos and economic sanctions). And they would get what they need to launch series production of the Karrar at home.

But, and regardless how realistic, that’s all theory; and, this is so because of that ‘kaput’ chain of command.

In practice it is so that the Army has nearly 20 years of experience with similar promises in regards of the Zulfiqar MBT. They know the company in question (Masjed Soleiman; BTW, the facility there was established with US-support back in the early 1970s) was playing around with different assemblies, sub-assemblies, parts and whatever else it got from different companies in Iran and around the world, and eventually managed to assemble less than 30 vehicles, less than a dozen of which ever worked.

The Army knows such projects are leading nowhere for an entire host of reasons — starting with the fact that (contrary to his order for the IRIAF to overhaul its F-4s and F-14s, from 31 August 2008, just for example), the Supreme Leader never ordered Zulfiqar into series production. Army knows the Karrar is almost certain to experience a similar fate, and thus it wants (i.e. wanted) to order 300 T-90s from Russia.

In practice, this order was then cancelled because the Supreme Leader agreed with the government and imposed a ban on any orders for Russian arms unless Moscow would deliver S-300s. ‘But then’, just a few weeks later, the IRGC was granted permission to ‘import’ 24 T-90s (to Syria, not to Iran), because there was ‘a tactical necessity’ (read: because somebody from the IRGC deemed acquisition and distribution of 24 T-90s to four different gangs in Syria more important than equipping the IRIA with 300 T-90s).

What this means should be obvious (or at least I guessed it would be, while writing that article): the MOD can fame the Karrar into (this is a hyperbole) a sort of ‘Battlestar Galactica of MBTs’, and explain the Army is going to get Karrar as much as he likes, and the industry can be in best position to manufacture and deliver.

But, the experience has shown that no such project is realized without a corresponding order from the Supreme Leader. Indeed, that even such orders from the Supreme Leader — no matter how much they used to be ‘final word’ on so many issues in the past, and how many times they forced everybody else ‘into the line with final decision’ — mean next to nothing nowadays. On the contrary.

Bottom line: lengthy discussions about what is Karrar, how is it going to get equipped, and whether Iranians can or can’t manufacture (or any comparisons with Turkish experiences etc.) are de-facto irrelevant. The only thing that would be theoretically relevant would be an explicit order from Supreme Leader for Karrar to enter series production. However, even if there would be any such order, there are more than enough ‘cliques’ in Iran that would find it rather easy to overrule such an order.

That, in turn, is what is also the major obstacle for any possible Iranian acquisition of Su-30s. With Iran spending over US$ 100 billion in the last five years to finance the IRGC’s supposed ‘war for survival against al-Qaida in Syria’; with a MOD that is an IRGC-officer; Head of the JCS that is an IRGC-officer; with two out of four ‘military advisors to the Supreme Leader’ that are IRGC-officers; with the head of the DIO that is IRGC-officer… with Russians repeatedly bowing to US pressure and blocking deliveries of armament ordered by Tehran even when Iranians placed up-front payments worth billions…

…hand on heart: what are chances of the regular Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force being granted permission of the Supreme Leader to actually order, and then get funded too, some batch of Su-30s (or anything similar) from Russia…?