Armenia vs. Azerbaijan, 12–14 September 2022
Hello everybody!
Hello everybody!
Before I return to my reporting about the War in Ukraine, let me have a look at another, ‘indirectly related’ affair: a ‘little bit overshadowed’ by developments in Ukraine of the last few days, the 30-years- (and more) -old war between Armenia and Azerbaijan re-ignited on Monday, 12 September 2022.
The story of ‘how comes’ is quite complex, thus let me summarise only the latest developments very briefly.
During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan defeated Armenia, compelling it to withdraw its forces from four districts it used to occupy since the 1990s. The Armenian defeat imposed the question of demarcation of the border between the two countries — which is not only including areas from which Armenian forces withdrew or were yet to withdraw, but also Qazakh District of Azerbaijan, the village of Karki in Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, and an Armenian exclave (the village of Arsvashen), too.
Since May 2021, both sides complained about multiple violations of the border by other party’s armed forces: several of these resulted in clashes with dozens of deaths. As tensions rose, in August this year Azerbaijani Armed Forces run the Operation Revenge, during which they took control of several strategic heights in Karabakh. On 26 August, they also took full control of the Lachin Corridor — and area between the (still) Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh, in which local Armenians declared an independent ‘Republic Artsakh’. This was along the cease-fire agreement that ended the war of 2020, though.
Therefore, on 31 August, Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, and President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, met in Brussels to negotiate the future of relations between their countries. Crucial issues were such like Armenian refusal to withdraw its armed forces from the Nagorny Karabakh area: Armenia promised to do so in the cease-fire agreement that ended the war of September-October 2020. Officially at least, Armenia says it has no forces there: however, the local Armenians, who are maintaining quasi-armed forces supported by Armenia insist on their ‘independent Republic of Artsakh’, insist on maintaining their own armed forces, and that all the agreements including ‘Artsakh’ as a part of Azerbaijan are null and void. Indeed, although the UN has clearly recognised the area as a part of Azerbaijan, they insist that the sole solution for the issue of Nagorny Karabakh/Artsakh is an international recognition and independence of their ‘republic’.
Other issues discussed between Pashinyan and Aliyev were a demarcation of borders between the two countries, mutual recognition of each other’s territorial integrity, renouncement of all the related claims; opening of the border and communications, and an end of military provocations.
Mediated by the President of European Council, Charles Michel, the meeting ended with an ‘agreement on the further course of work’ and ‘preparations for negotiations’: essentially, it ended without results. Under the usual (and fierce) pressure from chauvinists in his own country, Pashinyan turned down all of Aliyev’s proposals, in turn accusing the latter of demanding the impossible…
According to Azerbaijan, on 12 September, troops of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan then caught troops of the Armed Forces of Armenia as these were planting mines along paths used by the former in the so-called Lachin Corridor.
Early on 13 September, Azerbaijan Armed Forces then launched a series of air- and artillery strikes on selected units of the Armenian Armed Forces, this time inside Armenia. Known to have been hit were (from north to south), Artanish, Sotk, Martouni, Jermouk, Lac Sev, Goris, and Kapan.
The operation began by another onslaught on Armenian air defences: these were hit by a mix of UCAVs and loitering ammunition, with, apparently, devastating results. Here few examples:
another hit on an Armenian S-300 SAM-system (this time by an IAI Harop loitering weapon);
one more hit on S-300 SAM-system (possibly, this is the same attack like the one above); and
at least one hit on an Armenian R-300zh Resident electronic warfare system.
Once Armenian air defences were suppressed, Azeris went over to ‘plinking’ artillery pieces, bunkers, and single military vehicles — by UCAVs, and by their own artillery and multiple rocket launchers. This prompted Armenians into complaining about lots of civilian casualties. So far, I was only able to find evidence for injured civilians. Armenians retaliated by shelling Kalbajar, Lachin, and Dashkesen.
Finally, Azerbaijani ground forces advanced into Armenian proper near Vardenis, Goris, Sotk, and Jermuk. While some claimed they were about to create a land corridor to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, apparently, they limited their actions to securing selected Armenian positions along the (non-demarcated) border.
The last evening, a new cease-fire was negotiated, and the fighting — apparently — stopped.
In a rough summary, it can be said that according to Azerbaijani releases, Armenia suffered over 200 casualties and at least 30 Armenian troops were taken prisoner; according to Armenians, Azerbaijan should have lost 50 killed (of which some 7–8 special forces operators were confirmed so far).
Why all of this?
Some say it’s Putin who is attempting to distract from his defeat in eastern Kharkiv, in Ukraine. Considering his preference for subversion, wouldn’t be surprise.
However, most likely is that Aliyev decided to ‘teach Armenians a lesson’. Armenian armed forces were devastated during the last war, and thus his armed forces are enjoying vast military superiority. Furthermore, because Armenians not only failed to fulfill their promise about a complete withdrawal of their armed forces from Azerbaijan (of course, Armenians in Azerbaijan claim these would be ‘armed forces of the Republic of Artsakh’), because Armenia is thus still making claims on the territory of Azerbaijan, because Armenia is refusing to make peace, demarcate and open borders, and a mutual recognition of sovereignty, and an end of military provocations… he’s making them (painfully) aware of the consequences.
Now the question is going to be whether the government in Yerevan can, finally, bring the local chauvinists to their senses — or not.
(Ah yes…few notes for the end…
) While Azerbaijan is not only a close ally of Israel for years already, and is a big customer for Israeli arms, it has improved its relations to the EU over the last two years, too. At the same time, it is a close ally of Turkey, too.
In turn, Armenia not only moved yet closer to Putin, but is receiving serious offers for an alliance from the IRGC in Iran, which — whenever Armenia is in trouble — is publishing threats against Azerbaijan.
3.) Over the last two months, Aliyev has signed a number of contracts for gas exports to the EU. Whenever these might be realised (which is depending on an expansion of existing pipelines connecting Baku with Supsa in Georgia and Ceyhan in Turkey), Azerbaijan is likely to become a major gas-supplier for the European Union. The EU — the leaders of which were completely indifferent towards this conflict for ages, if not openly supporting Armenia (see: France) — now has a crucial interest in preventing a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia — and that while having to decide whether it prefers to cooperate with a dictatorship that is, legally, ‘right’ (and then for same reasons why the EU feels ‘right’ to support Ukraine), or a chauvinism-driven Armenian quasi-democracy that is, legally, ‘not the least right’, and a close ally of Putin, but also under a threat of a coup from own armed forces and extremist nationalists….)