) AFAIK, it’s different from place to place.
) + 7.) I was never for a ‘military intervention’ (of the West) in Syria. That is a foolish idea.
) AFAIK, it’s different from place to place. It appears that in most of places they’re maintaining good relations, though there are other places where their cooperation is not as good (though if so, usually that’s not of long duration). Particularly interesting is that while this cooperation is usually smooth in areas dominated by the FSyA (see Dera’a, but also south-western Idlib), even in areas dominated by Ahrar ash-Sham, there are areas where civilian authorities are at odds with military authorities of Islamists groups in particular (see Eastern Ghouta, Idlib City, etc.).
) + 7.) I was never for a ‘military intervention’ (of the West) in Syria. That is a foolish idea.
I am for provision of support to native insurgents, perhaps combined with an aerial blockade, even no-fly zones over specific parts of the country.
But, ‘intervention’ — no.
That said, my assessment about possible difficulties of an attempt to establish a no-fly zone over Syria is that these would depend on selection of geographic area in question. For example: there are large insurgent-held areas in Idlib, western and northern Aleppo, plus Dera’a. No problem to establish a NFZ there, because 90% of this would be outside the range of any kind of SAMs except for Russian S-300s (one site in as-Safira area) and S-350/400s (one site in Lattakia area, but geographically separated from Idlib by Anti-Lebanon Mountains). Dera’a is a similar case. But, Ra’astan-Talbiseh Pocket or Eastern Ghouta… that would require a major and then constant military operation involving top technology. I.e. that would be far more complex than anything that was undertaken over Libya.
Presently, I do not consider this even distantly possible.
3.) FSyA — No.
But, ‘some other groups’: sure. And that’s the actual problem, because Assad did his best to tie the fate of most of Alawites in Syria to that of his regime.
4.) There’s pro-insurgency press, and there is anti-insurgency press in the West. Major things they have in common is that what they publish is well-controlled by those owing the outlets in question, and that majority of journos working for them do not have a serious trace of clue about what’s going on in Syria. That’s the essence.
And whether some of them would love to report this or that — is actually irrelevant. Unless there is a major shift in Western politics towards Syrian insurgents, nothing like some ‘major offensive by favoured factions’ is going to happen.
5.) + 6.) AFAIK, the FSyA was never ‘outnumbered’ by Islamists. Reason is that majority of FSyA groups are of local nature — i.e. small units, of 20–70 combatants, protecting their village, for example — and there are nearly 2,000 of such groups. This is something no Islamist group has ever achieved — nor tried to achieve.
Now, I haven’t seen any reliable figures released since the start of the Russian military intervention, but my ‘educated guestimate’ if you like, is that the FSyA is still at about 75,000–80,000 in total. ‘Problem’ is that about two thirds of these are in southern Syria (see ‘Southern Front’), and in Ra’astan-Talbiseh Pocket (Fatah Homs). Islamists might have about 50,000 (including some 15,000 holed in Eastern Ghouta), and the JFS is always somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000.
Re. how could one develop them into a viable, and cohesive force… the answer is the same like it was back in 2012, for example: through provision of necessary support. Supplies (food, ammo, comms, clothing etc.) are the essence of any war: no fighting is possible without supplies. The experience with Qatari support for the JFS is clearly showing: the more one invests into one group, the more attractive this is getting even for people who actually can never agree with its ideology. But, hell, the JFS pays nearly 10 times better than the FSyA can afford — because it can afford that, thanks to Qatar. Just like the Ahrar can pay at least 5 times better than the FSyA can, thanks to Turkey.
On the contrary, limitations to ‘non-lethal support’, and then ‘only on condition of ideological declarations’, and ‘if the IRGC is not on advance’… and all other sorts of similar nonsense enforced by Obama — are simply BS. Either help them fight and win the war, and then talk about politics and ideology — which is actually perfectly in line with declared (but, obviously not ‘lived’) ideology of the USA — or shut up and don’t complain if they start siding with far better supported Islamists.
> I’m going to assume that bringing Saudi, Turkey, and Qatar behind the FSyA, and getting them to abandon the Islamists, is nigh-impossible (or do you think the US could really do it?)
The US could do it, especially in cooperation with its Western allies. Indeed: Saudis would certainly be happy if the USA would do it; Turks would say, ‘we told you so, years ago’ and ‘finally’ — and quickly agree, because a strong alliance with the USA is and remains in their interest; and Qataris would moan, perhaps kick the 5th Fleet and USAF out of their bases — but eventually accept, too.