A quick Review of the Russian Bomber-Fleet

Hello everybody!

Amid official Kyiv reporting 40+ Russian aircraft - primarily ‘bombers’ - destroyed during UAV-raids on (more than) four air bases in Russia, on 1 June, and contradicting reports and assessments about the actual number of aircraft destroyed or damaged, think it’s about to the time to check how many of such were actually still around. The following ‘counts’ are based on research for books War in Ukraine Volume 6 and War in Ukraine Volume 7: when preparing the two (in late 2023/early 2024), I sat down and ‘head-counted’ all the airframes photographed as ‘in operational condition’ since around 2015. I think, the ‘result’ is likely to lead to a useful conclusion about the actual effectiveness of the Ukrainian Operation Spider Web.

***

Russia’s bomber-fleet is operated by the Long-Range Aviation (DA). The centrepiece of the same was the 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Division. As of 2022, the same consisted of following major sub-units:

• 121st Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment; home-based at Engels-2 AB and operating 16 Tu-160s;

• 184th Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment; home-based at Engels-2 and operating Tu-95MS;

• 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment; home-based at Shaykovka AB, operating Tu-22M-3s; and

• 840th Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment; home-based at Soltsy AB, operationg Tu-22M-3s.

***

For research, development, series production, earlier operational service etc., please see numerous other publications: here I’ll focus on the Russia’s bomber fleet in operations since 2022. For the status of the Russia’s fleet of A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft, see the feature: A quick Review of the Russian A-50-Fleet.

***

Tu-160

A total of 15 aircraft (all manufactured before 1992) were overhauled and upgraded in 2002-2006, when they became capable of deploying Kh-555, Kh-101 and Kh-102 cruise missiles (up to 12 in their internal bomb bays). In 2014-2018, an additional example was ‘assembled from spare parts’, bringing the total of available airframes to 16. The fleet was scheduled for an upgrade to Tu-160M-2 standard, but, AFAIK, only four were actually subjected to such works. The majority continued suffering from chornic engine-related problems and lack of spares. Back in 2015-2017, Moscow was proudly boasting about their deployment against ‘terror’ targets in Syria.

A Tu-160 of the 121st Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, as seen while releasing a Kh-555 cruise missile against a target in Syria, on 20 November 2015 (while escorted by a Su-30SM fighter-bomber).

Front section of the Tu-160 ‘RF-94109/Aleksandr Novikov’, as seen during one of sorties against Syria, in 2016. Notable are four ‘Red Stars’ applied under the cockpit. On Russian tactical combat aircraft (Su-25/30/34/35, for example), each stood for ‘10 combat sorties’. In the case of bombers, though, it’s more likely that each stood for ‘1 combat sortie’.

Since 2022, some were sighted in operations within 50 kilometres from the border to Ukraine, but there is no ‘firm’ confirmation for their involvement in the ongoing conflict: apparently, at least two are constantly kept on alert, armed with ‘nuclear-tipped’ cruise missiles.

A still from a video (from the Russian social media), showing a Tu-160 about 50km from the border to Ukraine, on 26 June 2022, before banking right and disappearing in northern direction. The video was showing no release of weapons, thus leaving the question open if the type is deployed in combat operations against Ukraine.

***

Tu-95

During the work on the book War in Ukraine, Volume 6, I’ve counted 55 Tu-95MS’ as ‘available since 2015’ (plus one serving as instructional airframe). Should there be doubts about the care of that count, here a part of the table published in that book:

Before 2022, ‘tracking’ Tu-95MS’ was ‘relatively easy’ because all used to wear serial numbers on the fin, and about 50% of the fleet used to wear names and crests of major cities in Russia (and, in the case of ‘RF-94116/Sevastopol’, in Ukraine). Arguably, since 2016, some of names were removed in the course of overhauls. Here a related ‘screen grab’ from the book War in Ukraine, Volume 6.

Generally, the Tu-95-fleet was in mediocre condition. As of 2022, the majority of airframes was 30-35 years-old, all required extensive maintenance after every flight, and all first had to be brought to ‘fully mission capable’ (FMC) status before every next sortie. While generally described as ‘technically reliable’, only some 10-12 could be described as ‘regularly active’ (i.e. ‘flown more often than others’). My assessment is that the majority of available Tu-95MS’ was flown ‘1-3 times a month’.

Tu-95MS’ saw intensive deployment against Syria, in 2015-2017, and then even more so against Ukraine: indeed, since 2022, they are the primary platform for the release of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles. Since 2023, two or three were reported as damaged or destroyed during various Ukrainian UAV-strikes on their bases: the identity of the airfames in question remains unknown.

The Tu-95M ‘RF-94127/Vokuta’ releasing a Kh-101 on a target in Syria, (and that while underway over Iran), in 2017.

A Tu-95MS returning from a training sortie during Exercise Amur, in September 2022.

***

Tu-22

Russia inherited a large fleet of these medium bombers (no ‘strategic’ bombers: Tu-22M-3s have no in-flight refuelling capability and their crews were not trained for this). The majority of these were 35+ years-old already as of 2022. Except during their operations against Syria, in 2015-2017, tracking those in operational condition proved harder than in the case of Tu-160s and Tu-95s. As of 2021-2022, about 70 were kept in service. However, less than 50% were ‘overhauled in the last 5-10 years’, and ‘regularly active’ (3-5 flights a month).

In 2015-2018, Russian Tu-22M-3s saw quite intensive operations against Syria: several airframes were sighted carrying 20 or more ‘mission markings’.

Thanks to the RT never covering Borts (two-digit identification numbers) applied on the cover of the front undercarriage bay of Tu-22s, back in 2015-2017, it was ‘relatively easy’ to track the activity of the Russian bombers of this type against Syria.

With their ‘targets’ in Syria having no air defences, Russian Tu-22M-3-crews primarily deployed free-fall bombs, ‘carpet bomb-style’ - foremost ODAB-250 (visible here), FAB-250M-62, FAB-500M-62, but also a few of 3,000-kilogram-heavy FAB-3000M-54s. Although reportedly ‘upgraded’, the navigational systems of Tu-22M-3 were still inprecise enough for bombers to - following a flight of some 1,500 kilometres - regularly miss by 500-2000 metres.

The first trace of Russia deploying Tu-22M-3 against Ukraine appeared as early as of late March/early April 2022, when a video surfaced in the social media, showing one in - leisury-slow - flight over Mariupol:

Subsequently, videos surfaced showing their strikes (still with free-fall bombs) on the giant Azovstal works in Mariupol:

Through the second half of 2022, and especially in 2023, Russian Tu-22M-3s were regularly deployed to strike targets in Ukraine using Kh-32 supersonic air-to-ground missiles (essentially, an overhauled and slightly upgraded variant of the well-known Kh-22). Tragically, these old weapons - the seeker heads of which are requiring targets with a radar cross section of more than 1000 square metres - have frequently caused massive civilian casualties.

A still from a video-sequence shown the release of a Kh-32 from a Russian Tu-22M-3 bomber against a target in Ukraine, in summer 2022.

A still from security camera, showing a Kh-32 milliseconds before hitting the rear side of the Amstor Shopping Mall in Kremenchuk, massacring 21 civilians and injuring 59, on 27 June 2022.

As of 2023, the Ukrainian intelligence assessed that the Russia’s Tu-22M-3-fleet was down to only 27 ‘fully mission capable’ airframes. One was confirmed as shot down (probably by Ukrainian S-200/SA-5 Gammon SAMs), on 19 April 2024:

***

Conclusions

It is certain that bomber aircraft are regularly kept in service long past their planned life-span (see the US Air Force still flying 60+ years-old Boeing B-52s). It is also certain that about 50% of the Russian bomber fleet underwent overhauls in period 2015-2022. However, at least as much of the Long-Range Aviation’s Tupolevs can only be described with ‘museum pieces’ (which is why SBU’s claims about ‘destruction of bombers worth US$7 billion’ is, sorry, ridiculous).

Nevertheless, and even if there is still no evidence available to confirm the Ukrainian claim for destruction and damage of ‘40+’ Russian aircraft - the Ukrainian Operation Spider Web was still ‘important’: at least in the case of Tu-95MS’, it primarily hit aircraft that are ‘regularly operated’, if not exactly the aircraft that are ‘more often operated than the other available airframes’.

Thus, while in grand total this operation might have destroyed and/or damaged ‘just’ some 30% of the total Russian bomber fleet, and even if it might have ‘only’ destroyed some 5-7 confirmed Tu-95MS’ and 3 Tu-22M-3s, one must keep in mind that it destroyed ‘5-7 out of 10-12 regularly operated Tu-95MS’’. With other words: ‘more than 50% of airframes that can be considered as regularly-FMC’.

This is a loss the Russians cannot easily replace: because Tu-95s are out of production for so long, it’s going to take them ‘cannibalising’ lots of airframes, and plenty of time to re-build the fleet to its previous status. So much so, this is unlikely to happen before late this year.

Sure, it seems that the Russia’s Tu-160-fleet came away without any losses: thus, they remain a threat (for Ukraine and for ‘others’). In turn, the Tu-22M-3-fleet was decreased by strikes of 1 June, but this was of lesser importance: due to the shortage of Kh-32 missiles (the stock was almost completely exhausted in 2022-2024), and since the loss of one bomber in April 2024, it saw very little action.